IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.R. (Minor Child); A.R. (Mother) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A.R. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to J.R. (“Child”). Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the termination of her parental rights, but we disagree. Accordingly, we affirm.

Issue

[2] Mother raises five issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights is clearly erroneous.

Facts

[3] Child was born in November 2011 to Mother and E.R. (“Father”).¹ In March 2020, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report regarding Mother and Child, who were living in a shelter. Mother had a history of mental illness, psychiatric hospitalizations, and was behaving erratically and irrationally. DCS removed Child from Mother's care, and Mother admitted herself into a psychiatric hospital.

[4] On March 24, 2020, DCS filed a petition alleging that Child was a child in need of services (“CHINS”) pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-34-1-1. DCS alleged that Mother had untreated mental health issues, was making irrational statements, was now hospitalized in a psychiatric unit, was homeless, and was unable to provide Child with a safe, stable, and appropriate living environment. In November 2020, Mother admitted to the allegations in the CHINS petition, and the trial court found Child to be a CHINS.

[5] Child was placed with Mother as part of an in-home trial visitation in September 2020, but on November 6, 2020, Mother requested that Child be removed from her care. At the time, Mother and Child were living in a shelter. Mother stated that Child was “hitting, kicking, not listening and she wouldn't go to bed all the time” and Child's behavior interfered with Mother's “studies.” Tr. Vol. II p. 70. Mother said that Child was “her abuser” and that Mother “would rather be dead.” Id. at 70-71. DCS again removed Child from Mother's care. The trial court entered a dispositional order, which required Mother to engage in individual therapy, family therapy, and follow all recommendations from service providers.

[6] Although DCS provided Mother with extensive individual and family therapy over the next several years, Mother made little progress in addressing her mental health issues. Mother had a habit of requesting new providers and therapists throughout the proceedings. Mother also placed “overwhelming” calls, complaints, and texts to DCS employees. Tr. Vol. III p. 91. Ultimately, in July 2021, the trial court ordered Mother to complete a psychological evaluation, which was performed by Dr. Daniel Westmoreland.

[7] Dr. Westmoreland diagnosed Mother with: (1) schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type;² (2) borderline personality disorder;³ and (3) unspecified trauma- and stressor-related disorder. Dr. Westmoreland opined:

[Mother] struggles with irritability and is prone to experiencing psychotic episodes if severely distressed. Although her mood instability is a significant factor contributing to her psychopathology, [Mother's] personality disorder indicates that she is likely to be challenging to treat. She may also struggle to develop parenting skills due to egocentric thinking and relatively limited modeling of effective parenting during her childhood. For [Mother], long-term therapy and supportive services are likely to be needed to help her to parent her child in a safe and healthy home environment.

In conclusion, [Mother's] pathological features are likely to require indefinite treatment and she will require sustained therapy and supportive services.

Ex. Vol. I p. 146. Dr. Westmoreland recommended, in part, that Mother participate in an intensive outpatient program; participate in individual and group dialectical behavior therapy; meet with a psychiatrist to determine an appropriate course of pharmacological intervention; and participate in ongoing individual therapy and medication management.

[8] Robin Cox-Yates provided family therapy to Mother and Child beginning in December 2020. At that time, Mother was living in a shelter, and Child was in foster care. Mother was “[v]ery combative” and was not open to suggestions to improve her parenting. Tr. Vol. II p. 41. Mother told Cox-Yates that Mother and Child were “physically and mentally abusive to each other.” Id. Cox-Yates, however, never saw Child be physically violent or out of control. In April 2021, during a therapy session, Mother “got very verbally aggressive and angry, got up, walked to her door, and told [Cox-Yates] to take [Child] and get out.” Id. at 44. Cox-Yates was concerned for Child's safety, and Mother refused further services from Cox-Yates after the incident.

[9] Sara Renneisen began providing family therapy to Mother and Child in May 2021 after Mother refused to work with Cox-Yates. Renneisen noted that Mother's and Child's communication skills with each other were not appropriate. Mother did not believe that she had mental health issues. Mother blamed Child for DCS's involvement and accused Child of lying. Mother again claimed that Child was abusing her. Mother stated that Child “tries to play mind games with [Mother] and use[s] [Mother's] past trauma against her.” Id. at 107. Renneisen, however, did not observe this behavior from Child. In December 2021, Mother requested a new family therapist because she felt Renneisen was “taking [Child's] side.” Id. at 108. Mother's request for a new therapist was denied.

[10] During March 2022, Mother told DCS that she had stopped taking her mental health medications five months earlier at her psychiatrist's recommendation. Mother, however, refused to provide a release for DCS to speak with the psychiatrist.

[11] Peter Pauley provided supervised visits between Mother and Child beginning in March 2022. In June 2022, unsupervised parenting time with “pop-ins” was allowed. Tr. Vol. III p. 55. On the first such visit, Mother called Renneisen and said that Child was failing to follow instructions and destroyed Mother's property (an air freshener). Mother called the police, wanted to press charges against Child, and wanted Child placed in juvenile detention. Renneisen described Mother's behavior as manic. When Pauley arrived at Mother's residence, Mother had blocked the door with a piece of furniture. Mother and Child were in a verbal argument, and Mother wanted Pauley to take Child back to her foster placement. Mother threatened to press trespassing charges against both Pauley and Child. Mother was screaming and agitated.

[12] At the next visit, which was supervised, Pauley witnessed Mother and Child physically struggling over a toy, and Mother suggested that Child had “antisocial personality disorder.” Id. at 61. Mother also suggested in front of Child that Child “would be jailed and executed ․ as a result of the personality disorder.” Id. at 63. Mother referred to Child as her abuser multiple times during the visit. While Child was drawing animals, Mother suggested that Child was “drawing something demonic.” Id. at 64. During a later visit, Mother compared Child to a serial killer and said that Child was “emotionally apathetic.” Id. at 65.

[13] Child told Renneisen that she did not “like to be alone with [Mother] because ․ [Mother] acted weird when other people were not around.” Tr. Vol. II p. 117. During the fall of 2022, Renneisen noted that Mother was “overly critical” of Child. Id. at 119. Mother continued to describe Child as her abuser, and Renneisen was unable to recommend unsupervised parenting time. In 2023, Mother was unable to calmly have a conversation and regulate her emotions. Mother was not “making rational decisions.” Id. at 124. In March 2023, Mother again requested a new therapist, and Renneisen agreed because “there was no progress being made.” Id. at 125. Renneisen, however, continued as Child's therapist.

[14] Mariam Bandawal began providing family therapy for Mother and Child beginning in April 2023. Bandawal observed Mother have mood swings, outbursts, and dysregulated behavior. Child told Bandawal that she did not feel safe alone with Mother. Mother repeatedly raised issues that were unrelated to the goals of the family therapy, which impeded their ability to make progress in the family therapy. Mother denied having any mental health issues. Mother described Child as her abuser, which also hindered their ability to make progress. By the summer of 2023, Mother was hostile toward family therapy and Bandawal. Mother then refused to work with Bandawal.

[15] In July 2023, DCS requested that the CHINS permanency plan be changed to adoption because it had “exhausted all of [its] efforts and for the best interest of [Child].” Tr. Vol. II p. 200. In August 2023, the trial court approved the permanency plan change from reunification to adoption. On August 17, 2023, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights.

[16] DCS, however, continued providing services to Mother. Katherine Newton began providing individual therapy to Mother in approximately August 2023. Mother was confused as to why Child had been removed from her care. Mother told Newton that Child was “her abuser.” Id. at 80. Mother struggled to identify Child's strengths. Mother became upset that DCS had access to Newton's treatment notes, although Mother had signed a release, and Mother requested a new therapist in March 2024. Mother made no progress during her therapy with Newton.

[17] Matthew Siekkinen provided family therapy in March 2024. Child was uncomfortable with the therapy because she felt like “her mom wouldn't change.” Tr. Vol. III p. 9. Mother still felt that Child's behaviors caused DCS's involvement, and Siekkinen felt that Mother's mental health was impacting her interactions with Child. During one session, Mother said that, if Child was adopted, Mother would “leave the country.” Id. at 12. Mother told Child that she would change her name, and Child would “never be able to find her again.” Id. at 13. By April 2024, Siekkinen recommended that family therapy stop because there seemed to be more harm to Child than progress.

[18] Paul Keck began providing therapeutically supervised visits for Mother and Child in April 2024. At one point, Mother was upset because she thought Child had taken a joke from Mother “and tried to pass it as her own.” Tr. Vol. II p. 162. Mother wanted to confront Child and said “there could be legal ramifications.” Id. at 163. Mother was generally adamant that Child was abusive to her and blamed Child for DCS's involvement. The visits were typically in the community, although one visit was in Mother's home. After cockroaches crawled on Keck and his computer, the visits were moved back into the community.

[19] An evidentiary hearing was held in January 2025. At the time of the hearing, Child was thirteen years old. Although Child loved Mother and wanted to maintain contact, Child did not want to live with Mother. Child wanted to be adopted.

[20] Mother testified that, at the beginning of the case, Child was “physically aggressive” toward Mother; Mother was “absolutely innocent” of abusing or neglecting Child; and Mother had been diagnosed with depression, which she has “under control.” Id. at 20. Mother testified that she could not “take responsibility for [Child's] actions,” and Mother was “not sure exactly what [she] did to get to this point.” Id. at 21. Mother denied being “neglectful” and claimed that her mental health issues “have been resolved.” Id. Mother disagreed with Dr. Westmoreland's opinion of her mental health. Mother considered Child to be “an abuser.” Id. at 23. Mother admitted that she was currently living in an apartment that had a cockroach infestation, and she was not current on her rent. Mother testified that she was not taking medications for her mental health because “[i]t was causing physical and mental problems.” Tr. Vol. III p. 154.

[21] Child's foster parent since March 2022 testified that she had decided not to adopt Child because of the “very stressful” interactions with Mother. Id. at 72. Mother sent “constant” and “aggressive” texts and emails to foster mother. Id. at 74. Mother filed complaints about foster mother with foster mother's employer and called the DCS hotline repeatedly regarding the foster parents. Mother's behavior was “so overwhelming” that the foster parents determined they could not adopt Child or become Child's guardian. Id. Child had been visiting with her paternal uncle, who was willing to adopt Child.

[22] On June 2, 2025, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions thereon and terminated Mother's parental rights. Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[23] Mother challenges the trial court's termination of her parental rights to Child. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., Dearborn Cnty. Off., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent's interest in the upbringing of [his or her] child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].’ ” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000)). We recognize that parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's best interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id.; see also In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019) (“Parents have a fundamental right to raise their children—but this right is not absolute.”). “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45-46.

[24] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(c), the trial court “shall enter findings of fact that support the entry of the conclusions required by subsections (a) and (b)” when granting a petition to terminate parental rights.⁴ Here, the trial court did enter findings of fact and conclusions thereon in granting DCS's petition to terminate Mother's parental rights. We affirm a trial court's termination of parental rights decision unless it is clearly erroneous. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 45. A termination of parental rights decision is clearly erroneous when the trial court's findings of fact do not support its legal conclusions, or when the legal conclusions do not support the ultimate decision. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility, and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Id.

[25] The requirements for the termination of parental rights are codified by statute. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(a) provides that “if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in [Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4] are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” At the time the petition to terminate Mother's parental rights was filed, Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) provided that a petition to terminate a parent-child relationship involving a child in need of services must allege, in part:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child.

DCS must establish these allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016).

I. Mother's challenge to the trial court's findings fails.

[26] First, Mother challenges five of the trial court's findings. In Finding No. 23, the trial court found that, during family therapy with Renneisen, Mother referred to Child as her abuser in Child's presence. Mother contends this is “stale information” because Mother had stopped calling Child her abuser “to her face about a year prior to the hearing.” Appellant's Br. p. 24. The evidence presented at the hearing, however, supports the trial court's finding, and the finding is not clearly erroneous.

[27] In Finding No. 89, the trial court detailed the testimony of a family therapist that began working with Mother and Child in December 2024, shortly before the hearing. Mother contends that the trial court left out positive information from the therapist's testimony. Again, the evidence presented at the hearing supports the trial court's finding, and the finding is not clearly erroneous.

[28] In Finding No. 98, the trial court detailed the testimony of the family case manager supervisor and noted: “There is also no person identified who is willing to pursue guardianship or third party custody of the Child because of Mother's behavior and mental instability.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 227. Mother, however, contends that she testified that her friend was willing to become Child's guardian. The DCS supervisor, however, testified that no one had “identified themselves with the wish to be a guardian over [Child].” Tr. Vol. III p. 91. Mother merely requests that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. The evidence presented at the hearing supports the trial court's finding, and the finding is not clearly erroneous.

[29] In Finding No. 100, the trial court found: “Mother claims she has a mental health provider but has failed to provide that person's information or a release of information to DCS.” Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 228. Mother argues that she provided her therapist's name but had privacy concerns about signing a release of information. Even if this finding is partially erroneous, we cannot say Mother's substantial rights were impacted by the error. It was clear from the evidence that Mother had engaged in mental health therapy throughout the proceedings.

[30] In Finding No. 103, the trial court found: “Mother does not take accountability for DCS's initial involvement or ongoing intervention with the family.” Id. Mother contends that she took accountability, but Mother is merely requesting that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. The evidence presented at the hearing supports the trial court's finding, and the finding is not clearly erroneous.

II. The trial court's finding of a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Child's removal will not be remedied is not clearly erroneous.

[31] Next, Mother challenges the trial court's conclusion that there is “a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.”⁵ I.C. § 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B)(i). “In determining whether ‘the conditions that resulted in the [Child's] removal ․ will not be remedied,’ we ‘engage in a two-step analysis.’ ” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014) (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we ‘determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.’ ” Id. at 643 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). In analyzing this second step, the trial court judges the parent's fitness “ ‘as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.’ ” Id. (quoting Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 152). “We entrust that delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent's prior history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination.” Id. “Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not preclude them from finding that parents’ past behavior is the best predictor of their future behavior.” Id.

[32] Mother argues that the CHINS petition was based upon Mother's untreated mental health issues and unstable housing. Mother contends that these conditions “were remedied or actively being managed.” Appellant's Br. p. 19. According to Mother, she has lived in the same apartment since March 2023, and she was participating in individual therapy and family therapy.

[33] At the time of Child's initial removal in March 2020, Mother and Child were living in a shelter, and Mother had untreated mental health issues. Regarding housing, DCS presented evidence that, at the time of the hearing, Mother was behind on rent for her apartment, and the apartment had a cockroach infestation, making it an inappropriate location for even the supervised visits with Child.

[34] Regarding Mother's mental health, over the next five years, DCS provided extensive mental health resources for Mother with little progress. Dr. Westmoreland diagnosed Mother in 2021 with schizoaffective disorder and borderline personality disorder, which he noted would be difficult to treat and would require indefinite therapy and management with medications. Although Mother has participated in individual and family therapy, she has refused to take medications due to the side effects. Mother has repeatedly made concerning statements during therapy, and her behaviors during unsupervised and supervised visits have been disturbing at times.

[35] DCS argues that Mother's “sustained pattern of mental health instability shows that Mother's conditions are deep-seated and unlikely to be remedied.” Appellee's Br. p. 27. We agree. Mother's reliance on her own self-serving testimony of improved mental health is merely a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. Given the evidence presented, the trial court's conclusion that Mother is not likely to remedy the reasons for Child's ongoing removal from Mother's care is not clearly erroneous.

III. The trial court's finding that termination of parental rights is in the Child's best interests is not clearly erroneous.

[36] Next, Mother challenges the trial court's finding that the termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests. In determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. In doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child involved. Id. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. A trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is a “central consideration” in determining the best interests of a child. Id.

[37] Mother argues that she has a strong bond with Child and that Child loves Mother. The evidence demonstrated that, despite the bond between Mother and Child, Mother's behaviors as a result of her mental health needs are harmful to Child. Despite extensive services, Mother has made little progress in addressing her mental health needs. Mother repeatedly over almost five years described Child as her abuser, and Child did not wish to have unsupervised visits with Mother. In fact, Child has been clear that she wishes to be adopted and does not want to live with Mother. The family case manager, Child's therapist, and the guardian ad litem all recommended that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interest. Under these circumstances, the trial court's finding that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interest is not clearly erroneous.

IV. The trial court's finding of a satisfactory plan for Child is not clearly erroneous.

[38] Finally, Mother challenges the trial court's finding that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child. Indiana courts have held that for a plan to be “ ‘satisfactory’ ” for the purposes of the termination statute, it “ ‘need not be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the parent-child relationship is terminated.’ ” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied), trans. denied.

[39] Mother argues that DCS's plan is speculative and Mother's plan of guardianship by a friend would provide stability to Child. DCS's plan for Child is adoption by a paternal uncle, and this plan is satisfactory. The evidence demonstrated that Child has been visiting with the uncle and his family for many months, and the uncle expressed his intention to adopt Child. Child, however, would remain with her foster family until she finished the school year. Mother's plan of guardianship by an unidentified friend that she met at a shelter does not establish that DCS's adoption plan is clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[40] The trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights to Child is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.

[41] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father consented to Child's adoption and does not participate in this appeal.

2.   According to Dr. Westmoreland, a person diagnosed with “schizoaffective disorder with bipolar type, may have delusions, paranoia, they may even have hallucinations, auditory or visual, they may have disorganized speech, disorganized thought patterns, in addition to mood component. In this case, which would be bipolar where they would have episodes of depression and episodes of mania.” Tr. Vol. III p. 28.

3.   According to Dr. Westmoreland, “Borderline personality disorder is typically a disorder, the [etiology] of which is from trauma. Symptomology would be fear of abandonment, uncontrollable anger outbursts, paranoia, dissociation, low self-esteem.” Tr. Vol. III p. 28.

4.   Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8, governing termination of a parent-child relationship involving a delinquent child or CHINS, provides as follows:(a) Except as provided in section 4.5(d) of this chapter, if the court finds that the allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.(b) If the court does not find that the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall dismiss the petition.

5.   Mother also argues that there was no reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of Child. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) was written in the disjunctive. Consequently, DCS was required to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence a reasonable probability that either: (1) the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied, or (2) the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of Child. See, e.g., Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 148 n.5 (Ind. 2005). The trial court here found a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Child's removal or reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied, and there is sufficient evidence to support that conclusion. Accordingly, we do not address whether the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of Child.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Weissmann, J., and Foley, J., concur.