REED v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Chrishone Reed appeals his conviction for battery resulting in bodily injury. He argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to continue the trial to allow him to conduct additional discovery. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] A few days after Christmas 2023, Reed arrived at a supervised visitation facility for a scheduled visit with his three-year-old daughter. Shaylah Miller, a friend of the child's mother who was bringing the child to the facility that day, had not yet arrived, so Reed waited in the parking lot. When Miller arrived, the child threw a fit and did not want to go with Reed. Both Reed and Miller tried to calm the child down, but she refused to go inside and clung to Miller. Miller told Reed, “Hold on, let me take her,” and “asked him if [she] could take her over to the ․ lady who was facilitating the supervised visit.” Transcript at 9.

[3] As Miller would later recount, Reed “immediate[ly] snap[ped].” Id. at 10. He began to shove Miller and tried to pull his daughter away from her, which caused the child to scream and cry. Miller tried to give the child to Reed, but the child kept clutching her while Reed continued to push and hit Miller. Eventually, Reed managed to take his daughter from Miller and then walked with her in his arms into the facility. Miller followed him and told “him that he need[ed] to calm down[.]” Id. at 11. As Miller walked through the doorway, Reed—who was still holding his daughter in one arm—used his other hand to punch Miller in her collar bone, knocking her sideways into the door frame. His daughter then reached for Miller, and when Miller instinctively reached back to her, Reed violently pushed Miller's arms away.

[4] The State charged Reed with one count of battery resulting in bodily injury, a Class A misdemeanor.¹ The parties appeared for a bench trial in October 2024, but it was continued to February 2025 at the State's request and over Reed's objection.² On the day of the scheduled February trial, Reed moved for a second continuance, which the trial court granted.³

[5] Then, at the start of the trial in June, Reed's attorney again moved for “a short continuance.” Id. at 4. He argued that there was “some additional evidence that [Reed] believe[d] exist[ed][.]” Id. He specified that while the State had produced surveillance camera footage taken from inside the facility on the day of the incident, Reed believed there was additional footage of the parking lot that the defense had not received. The State denied that it had failed to produce any such footage, and its attorney argued, “There is none outside. We don't have anything from outside. ․ [T]hey've had time, if there is this mystery video to get[.] ․ I don't know if [ ] there's a camera out there.” Id. at 5-6.

[6] The trial court denied Reed's motion, held a bench trial, and ultimately found Reed guilty as charged. The court sentenced Reed to one year in jail, suspended to probation. Reed now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] On appeal, Reed contends “[t]he trial court erred when it denied [his] request to continue the trial” because “exterior camera footage from [the supervised visitation facility] ․ would have potentially provided evidence that [he] was acting in self-defense.” Appellant's Brief at 9.⁴ Reed cites no statutory authority under which the trial court was required to grant a continuance. “When, as here, a defendant moves for a continuance not required by statute, we review the court's decision to deny the request for an abuse of discretion.” Ramirez v. State, 186 N.E.3d 89, 96 (Ind. 2022). We apply a two-step inquiry to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion. Id. First, we “determine whether the trial court ‘properly evaluated and compared’ the parties’ ‘diverse interests’ that would be impacted ‘by altering the schedule.’ ” Id. (quoting Vaughn v. State, 590 N.E.2d 134, 135-36 (Ind. 1992)). If the court did not do so, “we assess whether the court's denial resulted in prejudice.” Id.

[8] Even if we were to assume, for the sake of argument, that the trial court erred at step one, Reed has not shown any resulting prejudice.⁵ Establishing prejudice in this context requires a “specific showing[ ] as to why additional time was necessary and how it would have benefitted the defense.” Id. (emphasis added). Reed showed nothing specific and instead asserted without evidence that he believed his interaction with Miller was captured by security cameras outside the facility. But as the State correctly notes, “Reed [ ] did not call any witnesses from [the facility] to testify about whether the building had any outdoor cameras and, if so, how long such video recordings were stored, if at all.” Appellee's Br. at 9. Indeed, even on appeal, Reed merely speculates that “[t]he exterior video would show video of prior interaction between the parties, if such video exists.” Appellant's Br. at 12 (emphasis added). Reed had an additional eight months or so from the date the trial was originally set to resolve this discovery matter. We fail to see how he would have benefitted from more time to explore whether that security camera footage even existed. This is particularly so in light of his failure to rebut the State's claim that there was no additional footage that hadn't already been given to the defense. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Reed had failed to make a specific showing as to why a continuance was necessary.

[9] Reed nonetheless contends that because he requested video from the State and “reasonably believed” the State had video showing the exterior of the facility, he was entitled to a continuance under Jacobs v. State, 436 N.E.2d 1176 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982). Appellant's Br. at 13. But Jacobs is not on point. At issue there was the denial of a defendant's motion for a continuance based on newly discovered evidence. Jacobs, 436 N.E.2d at 1177. The defendant filed that motion after the State—on the day of trial—produced a letter written by the alleged victim detailing the crime. Id. Under those circumstances, this Court recognized the general rule that “[a]n appropriate remedy for the State's late compliance with a discovery order is a continuance to compensate for surprise and to permit the aggrieved party time to prepare a proper defense.” Id. Even so, the Jacobs panel found that the defendant was not harmed by the trial court's denial of a continuance. Id. at 1178.

[10] There is no evidence here that the State failed to comply with its discovery obligations. Reed orally requested at a hearing in June 2024 that the State provide “any video or body camera evidence.” Appellant's Br. at 5. The State produced the surveillance footage it had from inside the visitation facility, and Reed offered nothing to refute the State's claim that it did not “have anything from outside.” Tr. at 5. Regardless, if Reed believed the State failed to fully respond to his June 2024 request, he had a full year before trial in June 2025 to raise that issue with the court. In fact, after Reed's new counsel requested a continuance in February 2025, he had several months before trial to move to compel additional footage from the State or request footage from the visitation facility. Given the amount of time Reed and his counsel had to prepare his defense, there could not have been any “surprise” on the day of trial that the defense had not been given footage from outside the facility.

[11] Finally, based on our review of the surveillance footage admitted at trial, Reed's claim that footage from outside would have supported his self-defense claim is anything but persuasive. According to Reed,

[t]he interior video shows Reed pushing Miller,6 but [it] does not provide any indication of why that may be ․ If the video [from outside] did show that Miller tried to physically take the child from Reed, then a reasonable conclusion would have been that Reed was acting in self-defense.

Appellant's Br. at 12. Not so. The video from inside facility shows Reed walking through the door with Miller following several steps behind, only for him to turn around, take a half-step toward Miller, and punch her. Regardless of what happened outside, Miller did not present an active threat to Reed when he attacked her. See Miller v. State, 720 N.E.2d 696, 700 (Ind. 1999) (“Self-defense [ ] is unavailable to a defendant who is the initial aggressor except in circumstances not present here.”). Accordingly, any error in the trial court's decision not to allow Reed more time to request footage from outside the facility was harmless, if it existed at all. See Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A) (“No error or defect in any ruling or order ․ is ground for granting relief or reversal on appeal where its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.”).

Conclusion

[12] For these reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1(c)(1), (d)(1).

2.   Neither the basis for the State's request nor Reed's objection thereto is clear from the record before us on appeal.

3.   The basis for Reed's motion to continue the February 2025 trial is also not clear from the record before us. On appeal, the State claims that new counsel “appeared with [Reed] at the bench trial scheduled for February 7, 2025, and requested a continuance[.]” Appellee's Brief at 10. While we do not have the transcript from that hearing to corroborate the State's account, we do note that Reed did not contest the State's version of events in his reply brief.

4.   In his opening brief, Reed also argued that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the surveillance video footage from inside the facility on the grounds that “[t]he State did not lay [a] proper foundation because the witness did not watch the video.” Appellant's Br. at 10. However, the State correctly noted in its brief that before overruling Reed's objection, the court had taken a short recess to allow the witness to watch the video in its entirety. Reed withdrew this argument in his reply brief and “apologize[d] for the oversight.” Appellant's Reply Br. at 4. Thus, we do not address that argument.

5.   In its brief, the State argues that because Reed did not file an affidavit as required by Indiana Code section 35-36-7-1, he did not make the statutorily-required showing that would have required the trial court “to postpone a trial because of the absence of evidence[.]” I.C. § 35-36-7-1(a); see also Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 231, 236 (Ind. 2015) (under section 35-36-7-1, “a defendant is statutorily entitled to a continuance where there is an ‘absence of material evidence ․ and the specially enumerated statutory criteria are satisfied” (quoting Elmore v. State, 657 N.E.2d 1216, 1218 (Ind. 1995))), cert. denied. Reed, in turn, contends the State waived any argument that he did not satisfy the statutory requirements. Appellant's Reply Br. at 5. However, Reed did not invoke the statute below or in his opening brief on appeal, so he has waived the argument that he was entitled to a continuance under the statute. See State v. Allen, 187 N.E.3d 221, 228 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“Arguments raised for the first time on appeal ․ are waived for appeal.”), trans. denied; Dunn v. State, 202 N.E.3d 1158, 1165 n.3 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“[A]n argument raised for the first time in a reply brief is waived.” (quoting Kirchgessner v. Kirchgessner, 103 N.E.3d 676, 682 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied), trans. denied.In any event, our Supreme Court explained in Gibson that if a defendant does not satisfy the criteria under section 35-36-7-1(a), a trial court may nonetheless abuse its discretion in denying a continuance “where a defendant was prejudiced as a result of not getting a continuance.” 43 N.E.3d at 236. It is undisputed that Reed did not satisfy the statutory criteria because he did not file an affidavit supporting his motion to continue. So regardless of who waived what with respect to the statute, our analysis is properly focused on the issue of prejudice.

6.   While Reed refers to his actions as a “push,” to our eyes it looks more like a punch.

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.