IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of B.U. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] T.U. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court's involuntary termination of her parental rights to B.U. (“Child”).¹ Mother raises one issue for our review which we restate as: Is the trial court's conclusion that termination is in Child's best interests clearly erroneous? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Since Child was born in April 2017, he has been adjudicated a child in need of services (“CHINS”) three times. The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed Child from Mother's care and alleged Child was a CHINS in late 2017 because of Mother's methamphetamine use. Child was adjudicated a CHINS for the first time in January 2018 and the trial court ordered Mother to participate in substance use treatment. Mother participated in services and the case was closed in early 2019 when Child was returned to Mother's care.

[3] One week after reunification, DCS removed Child from Mother's care for a second time because Mother had relapsed and tested positive for methamphetamine. Mother admitted she was “overwhelmed with everything” and “didn't use coping skills.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 45. Child was adjudicated a CHINS in April 2019. Mother participated in individual and family therapy and parenting and substance use programs, including seven months in a rehab program. This second CHINS was closed in December 2021, and Child was again returned to Mother's care.

[4] In 2024, Mother had legal custody of Child and she and Father lived separately—Mother in Marshall County and Father in LaPorte County. Mother began experiencing health issues and was in and out of the hospital. Because she had no friends or family nearby, she sent Child to live with Father and visited Child there. In February 2024, police were called to Father's home about an alleged domestic violence incident between Mother and Father. Both parents reported they had a verbal altercation during which Mother unintentionally struck Father in the head with a cellphone. No arrests were made and no charges were filed. But DCS investigated the incident and administered drug screens to both parents. Both screens returned positive for methamphetamine. Mother admitted she had relapsed in December 2023. See id. at 46. In March, Father—still the physical custodian of Child—agreed to a program of informal adjustment (“IA”), which “envisions the provision of services in the home[.]” Id. at 77. Both parents were drug screened during the IA and tested positive for methamphetamine. DCS filed a petition in May alleging Child was a CHINS but did not remove Child from Father's home.

[5] Child was adjudicated a CHINS for the third time in May 2024. Mother was ordered to submit to random drug screens; participate in home-based casework services including transportation and housing, individual therapy, and substance use treatment; and attend supervised visitation with Child. About a month after the CHINS adjudication, Child was removed from Father's care and placed in foster care because Father continued to test positive for methamphetamine. Child was not placed with Mother because Mother had not yet had a period of consistent negative drug screens or participation in services.

[6] Over the next six months, “progress really was not made towards reunification.” Id. at 94. Mother was non-compliant with services other than visits, which were supervised at her apartment and “tend[ed] to go well.” Id. at 121. Mother had three home-based casework referrals between May and December that were all closed because of Mother's non-compliance. Mother told the family case manager (“FCM”)² that she was receiving substance use and counseling services on her own through the Bowen Center—a “community-based mental health and substance abuse treatment resource” offering outpatient services—but when the FCM reviewed Bowen Center records, “that was just untrue.” Id. at 102.³ Mother did not regularly call in for drug screens and two of the four screens she did submit after Child's removal were positive.⁴ In December, the CHINS court approved a concurrent permanency plan of reunification and adoption.

[7] Several notable events occurred in February 2025. First, the FCM told Mother she needed to cooperate with drug screens and other services for visitation with Child to continue at her apartment. Mother called in for screens consistently for about one week after that conversation but then stopped. Second, Mother completed a medication management appointment at the Bowen Center but did not return for services. Third, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights, alleging there was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child; termination was in Child's best interest; and there was a reasonable probability the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or reasons for placement outside the home will not be remedied and/or Child has been adjudicated a CHINS on two separate occasions. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 8–9. And lastly, Mother was evicted from her apartment at the end of February and moved out the first week of March.

[8] After Mother was evicted, she resided at a hotel when she was able to afford it or stayed with a friend, “just kind of bouncing around here and there and everywhere[.]” Tr. Vol. 2 at 53. At times, Mother was unhoused, “just wandering around” and sleeping in a friend's car for a few weeks. Id. at 54. The FCM found a shelter for Mother in LaPorte County and made referrals for services at a nearby facility. While Mother was at the shelter, she called in for drug screens “a few times.” Id. at 117. But Mother never contacted the new service provider for an intake appointment. And she was asked to leave the shelter because she appeared to be under the influence. Mother said her behavior was because of a medical issue, but she provided no documentation to the FCM to support that assertion.

[9] The trial court held a termination hearing in June 2025. Mother admitted she had struggled with methamphetamine use since 2017 but testified she had been clean since September 2024. She said she had found a place to live within the last two weeks, renting a room from friends. Mother testified she had been inconsistent with services, but insisted: “When I'm stable, I'm on medication and staying clean and have a place, I'm a good mother.” Id. at 141.

[10] The current FCM testified Mother had not made significant progress toward being able to meet Child's specific needs. Child, seven years old at the time of the hearing, had “some challenges in his placement.” Id. at 124. He was diagnosed with Disruptive Mood Disorder and “has a lot of struggles[.]” Id. at 125. He participates in individual therapy and medication management and DCS was trying to find a behavioral health specialist that could accommodate him. At one point during the current CHINS case, Child had an “acute stay” at a mental health facility and was “in an emergency shelter care situation because [DCS] could not find a home for him, due to his behaviors.” Id. at 126. The FCM testified Child is “sensitive to having structure and consistency and stability,” id., and “does not adjust to change very well,” id. at 129. She believed some of Child's behaviors were because he was moved numerous times at an early age and “he's unsure and uncertain of things.” Id. at 126. But she believed Child could thrive in a nurturing home environment “that would give him that structure, that stability, ․ free of substance use, where he can ․ start feeling safe[.]” Id. DCS’ plan for Child was to place him “in the adoption recruitment program through Firefly” where “[h]e will be able to achieve that forever home,” but DCS could only place him in the program after termination was ordered. Id. at 127. Child's home will “need to be able to accommodate him with services, with going to doctors to ensure that he is taking appropriate medications, to ensure that ․ his educational needs are met by advocating, ensuring that he has accommodations to be successful in school.” Id. at 129.

[11] The director of the LaPorte County court-appointed-special-advocate program testified that termination of parental rights was appropriate “based on [Child's] history with DCS” and said it would be in his best interests to “move on with an adoptive home.” Id. at 135.

[12] In July, the trial court issued an order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence established a reasonable probability that the conditions which led to and continue to require Child's removal will not be remedied; Child has been adjudicated a CHINS on two separate occasions; termination of parental rights is in Child's best interests; and DCS had an adequate plan for Child's care and treatment following termination.

Standard of Review

[13] Parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). That said, “this right is not absolute.” In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied. “When parents are unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities, their parental rights may be terminated.” Id. at 45–46.

[14] To terminate a parent's rights to a child, DCS must prove there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child and termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)–(3) (2024). DCS must also allege and prove the existence of one or more statutory circumstances warranting termination. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c)(1), (d)(1)–(12).⁵

[15] If the trial court finds the allegations of a termination petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court “shall” terminate the parent-child relationship and “shall enter findings of fact” supporting that conclusion. I.C. § 31-35-2-8(a), (c) (1998); see also I.C. § 31-37-14-2 (1997) (burden of proof). As our Supreme Court has observed, “[d]ecisions to terminate parental rights are among the most difficult our trial courts are called upon to make. They are also among the most fact-sensitive—so we review them with great deference to the trial courts[.]” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 640 (Ind. 2014). We do not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of the witnesses for ourselves but consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment. Id. at 642. We apply a two-tiered standard of review to a termination decision: first, we determine whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings and second, whether those findings support the judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We will set aside the trial court's findings of fact and judgment only if they are clearly erroneous. J.W., 259 N.E.3d at 1044.

The trial court's best interests determination is not clearly erroneous.

[16] Mother argues the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning Child's best interests are clearly erroneous.⁶ She specifically points to the following passages from the findings and conclusions:

[B]29 ․ There is little reason to believe that additional efforts to provide Mother ․ with services will materially change [her] circumstances such that [Child] could be returned to [her] care ․ Mother ․ [is] substantially further from reunification than when the CHINS case[ ] [was] first opened.

* * *

[B]31 ․ Mother testified that she is ready and willing to provide [Child] with therapeutic and psychiatric services. The evidence does not suggest that Mother is able to do so.

[B]32. The Court finds that there exists a reasonable probability that the conditions which necessitated [Child's] removal will not be remedied ․ [Mother is] further from reunification than when the CHINS case[ ] began.

* * *

[B]34. The Court finds that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of [Child]. [Child] deserve[s] permanency and a safe, drug-free environment capable of meeting [his] needs. Mother ․ [has] not exhibited the ability to provide that to [Child]. This pattern has now played out over three CHINS cases and the majority of [Child's life].

* * *

[C]1 ․ Termination of parental rights will enable DCS to expand its efforts to pursue pre-adoptive placements and facilitate the adoption when an appropriate placement is located.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 94–96.⁷

[17] A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it. In re W.H., 254 N.E.3d 549, 554 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). But Mother does not specifically dispute the evidence supporting any of these findings and conclusions, and the record contains facts and inferences supporting each. Moreover, Mother does not challenge the remainder of these findings or any of the other thirty findings and conclusions, and we accept those unchallenged findings as true. Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[18] Instead, Mother argues the trial court should have come to a different conclusion because there is other evidence or an absence of evidence that should have been considered. For instance, Mother argues “there is no evidence that [Child] exhibited chronic behavioral issues at home or school prior to DCS's removal of [him] from the home” and asserts there “is simply no evidence that Mother's use of methamphetamine affected her care” of Child. Appellant's Br. at 11, 13. But Mother testified Child had a “violent outburst” while in her care and her history of drug use has harmed Child because he has been removed from her care three times because of it. Tr. Vol. 2 at 141. Mother also argues “she has been free of methamphetamines since September of 2024 [and] obtained stable housing.” Appellant's Br. at 15. This assertion is based on Mother's self-serving testimony, not evidence of consistent negative drug tests or DCS review of Mother's recent housing situation. In short, Mother's argument with respect to the findings and conclusions is largely a request for us to reweigh the evidence, a request we must decline. See E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642.

[19] As for the trial court's ultimate determination, the question of whether terminating parental rights is in a child's best interests is “[p]erhaps the most difficult determination in a TPR” because it “necessarily places the [child's] interest in preserving the family into conflict with their need for permanency.” Id. at 647. When deciding whether termination is in a child's best interests, courts look to the totality of the evidence and “must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children.” In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 811 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. A child's need for permanency is a central consideration, and they “cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification[.]” E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648. Although permanency is among the factors a court may consider, it “is not reason enough to terminate parental rights where the parent has an established relationship with his/her child” and has “taken positive steps” in accordance with the plan for reunification. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1152 (Ind. 2016).

[20] Mother argues she and Child are strongly bonded and “the environment in which [Child] has been the healthiest” is in her care, claiming she “is the only viable path to permanency” for Child. Appellant's Br. at 13–14. In V.A., our Supreme Court reversed a termination order upon finding the father had maintained an appropriate relationship with his daughter throughout the CHINS proceedings, provided for her throughout the foster care placement, maintained consistent employment, acquired suitable housing, and complied with the requirements of the parent participation plan. 51 N.E.3d at 1153. In that case, the Court found “the goal of permanency may best be served by allowing [the child] to remain with her current foster family while DCS pursues the goal of reunification with [f]ather as he receives the appropriate services[.]” Id; see also In re H.G., 959 N.E.2d 272, 293 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (holding where no adoptive family had been identified and parents had a bond with children and had made significant efforts at self-improvement but “still ha[d] work to do” before reunification would be possible, there was “little harm in allowing the parents to continue working toward reunification”), trans. denied. Here, Mother exercised visitation regularly and apparently does have a bond with Child. But she has not “taken positive steps” toward reunification otherwise. V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1152. She has not complied with the parent participation plan, has not consistently maintained suitable housing, and has not demonstrated she is drug-free. Moreover, given Mother's history of non-compliance, there was no reason to believe Mother would cooperate and benefit from continuing with the CHINS if termination were not granted.

[21] Mother casts blame on DCS for Child's “severe[ ] deteriorat[ion]” since his most recent removal because it has moved him “numerous times” despite acknowledging he does not adjust well to change. Appellant's Br. at 11–12; see Appellant's Reply at 8 (“The evidence clearly shows that DCS's care has caused more harm to [Child] than remaining in Mother's care.”). Yet she fails to acknowledge her own responsibility for Child's situation.

[22] DCS first removed Child from Mother's care when he was eight months old; he was eight years old at the time of the termination hearing. Except for a two-year period after the second CHINS closed, Child has been outside of Mother's care nearly all his life. Mother's choices and actions over the years have created an extended period of instability for Child. He has been adjudicated a CHINS three separate times, and consequently, removed from Mother's care multiple times. Mother admitted she has struggled with methamphetamine use since 2017—the year Child was born. She claimed she has been clean since September 2024, but she did nothing to show DCS that was true. See In re A.B., 924 N.E.2d 666, 671 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“A parent whose drug use led to a child's removal cannot be permitted to refuse to submit to drug testing, then later claim the DCS has failed to prove that the drug use has continued.”). During this most recent CHINS, Mother experienced a period of housing instability—including being unhoused for several weeks—and had only found what she called “[s]table housing” two weeks before the termination hearing. Tr. Vol. 2 at 40. But she had no lease for the space she claimed to be renting and had not paid any rent. And she was non-compliant throughout the CHINS proceedings with services that would have provided her with substance use treatment and assisted her with housing instability.

[23] The FCM testified Child has a particular need for structure, consistency, and stability. But Mother has not improved her own situation or shown she can provide Child the care and certainty he needs to feel safe. The trial court's decision that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests is not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion

[24] The findings clearly and convincingly support the trial court's judgment terminating Mother's parental rights.

[25] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court also terminated Mother's rights to her younger child M.U. in this proceeding, but Mother does not appeal that termination. See Appellant's Br. at 8. In addition, M.S. (“Father”) is the biological father of both children. His parental rights were also terminated, but he does not participate in this appeal. To the extent possible, we have limited our recitation of the facts to those pertaining only to Mother and Child.

2.   There were at least four FCMs involved in this case.

3.   The CHINS case was filed in LaPorte County, but the Bowen Center provided services in Marshall County where Mother lived.

4.   Mother was required to call in to a drug screening service every day between 1:00 a.m. and 8:59 a.m. to find out if she had been selected to screen that day. If so, she had to coordinate with a member of the service to take the test. Mother did not regularly make that daily call, and she said on the occasions when she did, she was not required to screen. The end result was that Mother was not often drug screened during the CHINS proceedings.

5.   DCS alleged the circumstances warranting termination in this case were:(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.* * *(5) That the child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services.Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 9 (termination petition citing I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d)(3), (d)(5)). DCS needed to prove only one of these two circumstances to support termination of Mother's rights. See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (“DCS was only required to prove one of the circumstances listed in subsection (d) in support of its petition to terminate [a parent's] parental rights[.]”), trans. denied. Mother admitted at the termination hearing Child had been adjudicated a CHINS on two prior occasions. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 46.

6.   Mother challenges only the best interests determination and we discern no evidentiary issue with respect to the remaining requirements.

7.   Each of these findings and conclusions has additional content. We have quoted only those parts that Mother quoted in her brief. See Appellant's Br. at 9–10.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.