IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of C.H. (Mother) and B.H. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] C.H. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to one of her children. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother and T.E. (“Father”) are the parents of B.H. (“Child”), who was born in July 2015. Father has never had custody or parenting time with Child and does not participate in this appeal. The Department of Child Services (DCS) became involved with the family immediately after Child's birth because he was born a drug-exposed infant. Mother and Father participated in an informal adjustment with DCS until May 2016. As part of the informal adjustment, Mother attended substance-abuse classes.

[3] A few months later, in September 2016, DCS received a report of a domestic disturbance between Mother, who'd recently relapsed, and her then-boyfriend in front of Child. Mother was charged with and later pled guilty to Class A misdemeanor domestic battery. DCS placed Child in foster care and filed a petition alleging that he was a child in need of services (CHINS). The trial court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS in December 2016. Mother attended therapy to address positive relationships and substance abuse, and she produced negative drug screens from November 2016 to March 2017. Child was returned to Mother's care in April 2017, and the CHINS case was closed that September.

[4] In August 2018, Mother became “involved with an assessment out of Daviess County” for neglect of Child. Ex. Vol. 2 p. 164. On August 26, Mother submitted to a drug screen, which was positive for amphetamine, methamphetamine, and THC. Three days later, Mother was arrested and charged with Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon and Level 5 felony intimidation with a deadly weapon for an incident at a motel in Daviess County. DCS couldn't locate Father, so it placed Child, then three, in foster care and filed another CHINS petition. The trial court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS a second time in October 2018. In February 2020, Mother pled guilty to Level 5 felony intimidation with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to one year on community corrections followed by two years of probation.

[5] Child remained in foster care until 2022 because Mother picked up several more criminal cases and was in and out of jail and the Department of Correction (DOC). After Mother was released from the DOC in September 2020, she produced clean drug screens and participated in substance-abuse counseling. In October 2021, Mother had another child, B.B. DCS returned Child to Mother's care in June 2022, and the CHINS case was closed that August.

[6] In March 2023, Mother, Child, and B.B. were staying with a neighbor because Mother had been evicted from her apartment. On March 17, DCS received a report that Mother and the neighbor had a physical fight about Mother bringing drugs into the home, and the neighbor kicked Mother and the children out. When DCS interviewed Mother, she admitted that she'd recently relapsed and that she was under the influence of methamphetamine, marijuana, and Tramadol. DCS removed the children from Mother and filed petitions alleging that they are CHINS. DCS placed Child, then seven, in foster care, where he has since remained. Mother entered a sober-living program and lived there until June. That same month, after Mother admitted to the allegations in the petition, the trial court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS for the third time. (B.B. was also adjudicated a CHINS under a separate cause number.) In July, the court issued a dispositional order requiring Mother to, among other things, contact the family case manager (FCM) weekly, maintain safe and stable housing, complete a substance-abuse assessment and any resulting recommendations, submit to random drug screens, and attend visitation.

[7] Mother complied with the dispositional order for a couple of months but then went “MIA for about three, four months” in late 2023. Tr. p. 30. By September, she'd stopped attending visitation. In October, she began residential substance-abuse treatment, but she checked herself out against medical advice after one week. She eventually stopped participating in services and contacting DCS. At that time, Mother was on probation in the intimidation case, and there was an outstanding petition to revoke. Mother's probation was revoked in December, and she was ordered to serve 360 days on Daviess County Community Corrections. In January 2024, after less than a month on community corrections, Mother had a positive drug screen. The State petitioned to revoke her placement, and Mother was arrested and held in the Daviess County Jail. In May, Mother admitted to the allegations in the petition and was ordered to serve the remainder of her sentence (118 days) in jail. While incarcerated, Mother participated in substance-abuse treatment and virtual visits with Child. Mother was released from jail at the end of July and moved into residential treatment at Light House Recovery Center.

[8] Still, in August 2024, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's and Father's parental rights to Child.¹ Mother stayed at Light House until November, when she left without completing the program because she “knew [she] was ready.” Id. at 69. In December, Mother began submitting to random drug screens through DCS. She also participated in supervised visitation and home-based casework with focuses on budgeting and finding housing. Mother's visitation never progressed beyond supervised, and visits took place at the supervising agency because Mother didn't have appropriate housing.

[9] The fact-finding hearing was held on January 9, 2025. At that time, Mother was living at a Red Roof Inn and had enrolled in intensive outpatient treatment but hadn't started yet. FCM Stephen Beatty testified that DCS was “concern[ed]” about Mother's “inability to maintain her sobriety” because she has “a pattern of periods of sobriety and periods of illegal substance use.” Id. at 33-34. FCM Beatty opined that termination of Mother's parental rights and adoption of Child by his current placement are in Child's best interests because Child needs permanency. He explained that Child, then nine, had been out of Mother's care for a total of almost six years—over half his life—which has caused him issues with his mental health and forming attachments. Denise Swink, Child's court-appointed special advocate (CASA), testified that the Red Roof Inn is “not an appropriate home life” for Child. Id. at 56. She also expressed concern about Mother's inability to maintain her sobriety, particularly her pattern of three to six months of sobriety followed by a relapse and period of drug use. CASA Swink opined that termination and adoption are in Child's best interests because he's “been in the system” for so long, he needs permanency, and he's thriving in his current placement. Id. at 57. Mother testified that she'd been sober since being arrested in January 2024 but acknowledged that she was incarcerated for half of that time.

[10] In April 2025, the trial court terminated Mother's and Father's parental rights to Child.

[11] Mother now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Mother contends there is insufficient evidence to support the termination of her parental rights. When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013). Rather, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most favorable to the trial court's judgment. Id. When a trial court has entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, we will not set aside the court's findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous. Id. To determine whether a judgment terminating parental rights is clearly erroneous, we review whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings and whether the findings support the judgment. In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016). DCS must prove the allegations in a termination petition by clear and convincing evidence. See Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2.

[13] Here, DCS filed its termination petition under Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4. A petition under that section must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c) (2024).² As to the first requirement, DCS alleged, and the trial court found, the existence of the following circumstances in subsection (d):

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

(5) That the child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been adjudicated a child in need of services.

See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 19-20, 61, 63.

[14] Mother acknowledges that, in addition to the underlying CHINS case, Child was adjudicated a CHINS on two other occasions. See Appellant's Br. pp. 5, 9. Because Section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) requires the existence of only one of the circumstances in subsection (d), we need not address whether there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in Child's removal or placement outside the home will not be remedied or that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to Child's well-being, safety, physical health, or life. See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). We thus turn to Mother's argument that termination isn't in Child's best interests.

[15] In determining whether termination is in a child's best interests, the trial court must look at the totality of the evidence and subordinate the parent's interests to those of the child. In re Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 49 (Ind. 2019), reh'g denied. Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is a “central consideration” in determining the best interests of a child. Id. “Indeed, children cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or reunification.” Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49 (quotation omitted).

[16] A parent's historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability, and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same supports a finding that termination is in the child's best interests. Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. As the trial court found, Mother “has not demonstrated an ability to maintain sobriety while also maintaining an appropriate home.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 62. When the underlying CHINS case began, Mother had recently been evicted from her apartment, and she and the children had been kicked out of the home where they'd been staying because Mother brought drugs there. Throughout the case, Mother was in and out of jail, community corrections, and sober-living facilities. Her supervised visitation with Child was held at the supervising agency because she didn't have appropriate housing. As of the fact-finding hearing, Mother was living at a Red Roof Inn, which CASA Swink said is “not an appropriate home life” for Child.

[17] Although Mother had been sober for a year by the time of the fact-finding, she was incarcerated for the first six months of that year and in residential treatment at Light House for the next four. FCM Beatty and CASA Swink both expressed concerns about whether Mother can maintain her sobriety long-term. As they explained, she has a history of staying sober for several months and then relapsing. She participated in substance-abuse services during the informal adjustment and the two prior CHINS cases but relapsed each time. Though Mother enrolled in intensive outpatient treatment before the fact-finding, she hadn't started yet, and she has a history of leaving treatment programs early—in October 2023, she checked herself out of residential treatment against medical advice after one week, and she left Light House in November 2024 without completing the program because she “knew [she] was ready.” While we commend Mother's progress toward sobriety, the trial court was in the best position to determine whether she is likely to maintain her sobriety long-term.

[18] While this evidence alone is sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion, permanency is a central consideration in determining Child's best interests. Both FCM Beatty and CASA Swink opined that termination of Mother's parental rights and adoption of Child by his current placement are in Child's best interests because he needs permanency. Throughout the three CHINS cases, Child, now ten, was out of Mother's care for a total of six years, including a period of nearly four years in the second CHINS case. These periods of removal have caused Child mental-health issues, and he's struggled with forming attachments. But CASA Swink testified that Child “has come so far since he has been at his current placement,” Tr. p. 60, to whom he is bonded and who wish to adopt him. The totality of the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that termination is in Child's best interests.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   At the time, B.B. was “on the track for reunification with his father,” so DCS didn't pursue termination of Mother's parental rights to B.B. Tr. p. 47. But in October 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's (and B.B.’s father's) parental rights to B.B., and that case is still pending.

2.   Section 31-35-2-4 was amended effective July 1, 2025, several months after the termination order was issued in this case. See Pub. L. No. 179-2025, § 25. Neither party argues that this amendment has any bearing on the proceedings.

Vaidik, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Scheele, J., concur.