Aaron Hope, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Aaron Hope appeals his conviction for Level 5 felony domestic battery resulting in bodily injury to a pregnant family or household member.¹ He presents the sole issue of: Did the admission of a 9-1-1 recording and police body camera footage violate his face to face confrontation rights under Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Hope and his girlfriend, J.B., had an on-again-off-again relationship and shared a child together. In January 2024, J.B. was seven months pregnant with their second child and staying at Hope's place in the Castle Point Apartments in South Bend. In the early morning hours of January 14, Hope and J.B. got into a verbal argument that turned physical. Hope struck J.B., tried to strangle her, and kicked her in the stomach. J.B. fled outside into the cold and snow and called 9-1-1. Hope left the apartment and got into his car to look for her. Dispatch sent police and other emergency services to the scene.

[3] Corporal Bryce Peterson of the St. Joseph County Police Department was one of the responding officers. While driving through the apartment complex roads, he encountered J.B. “crying, emotionally frantic, and pulling on [his] rear passenger squad car door trying to get in.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 86. She was bleeding around the mouth, had marks on her neck, and was concerned about her pregnancy.

[4] Other responding officers found Hope's car stopped near the apartment complex entrance within J.B.’s eyesight. Hope was in the car and—unbeknownst to officers at the time—his thirteen-year-old son was in the backseat. Hope drove off out of the complex, police officers followed, and the ensuing chase ended when Hope's car bumped into a patrol car and got stuck in a snowbank. Hope was arrested, and both he and J.B. were transported to the hospital for treatment. There, Corporal Peterson photographed J.B.’s injuries, which included abrasions on her face, cuts inside her mouth, and marks on her neck and stomach.

[5] By amended information, the State charged Hope with seven offenses but proceeded to trial only on the following five charges: Level 5 felony domestic battery resulting in bodily injury to a pregnant family or household member; Level 6 felony domestic battery in the presence of a child less than sixteen years of age; Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent; Class A misdemeanor interference with the reporting of a crime; and Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement.

[6] The trial court held a jury trial on March 11 and 12, 2025. J.B. did not appear to testify. In her absence, the State offered two pieces of evidence containing statements J.B. made that night: first, an audio recording of J.B.’s five-minute 9-1-1 call—during which a distraught J.B. reports Hope beat her and requests medical help; and second, about two minutes of video footage from Corporal Peterson's bodycam taken when he first encountered J.B.—in which J.B., bleeding and crying, reports Hope pulled her hair, choked her, hit her head against a wall, and kicked her stomach. Hope objected to both pieces of evidence, arguing they contained inadmissible hearsay and violated his confrontation rights guaranteed under the federal and state constitutions. The trial court overruled the objections, finding the statements were excited utterances and their admission would not violate Hope's confrontation rights. The trial court also admitted photographs of J.B.’s injuries, to which Hope did not object.

[7] After the State rested its case, Hope testified in his defense, explaining he and J.B. were in a relationship, he knew she was pregnant, they got into an “altercation” that evening, he “got upset,” and it became physical. Id. at 111. He claimed the fighting was mutual and it “wasn't [his] intention” to injure her, but acknowledged, “I hit her. I wouldn't deny it. We did go back and forth a lot.” Id. at 111–12.

[8] A jury found Hope guilty of both domestic battery charges, neglect of a dependent, and resisting law enforcement; it found him not guilty of interference with the reporting of a crime. To avoid double jeopardy issues, the trial court did not enter judgment of conviction for Level 6 felony domestic battery. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Hope to four years for Level 5 felony domestic battery, to be served consecutively to his concurrent eighteen-month sentences on the other two offenses.

Standard of Review

[9] Hope argues his domestic battery conviction should be vacated because his face to face confrontation right under our state constitution was violated when the trial court admitted the 9-1-1 call recording and Corporal Peterson's bodycam footage over Hope's objections.

[10] A trial court generally has broad discretion in ruling on admissibility of evidence. Cardosi v. State, 128 N.E.3d 1277, 1286 (Ind. 2019). But when a defendant challenges the admission of evidence as a violation of his constitutional rights, we review the issue de novo. Id.

The trial court did not err in admitting the bodycam footage.

[11] Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right ․ to meet the witnesses face to face[.]” This text differs slightly from the Sixth Amendment, which states: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ․ to be confronted with the witnesses against him[.]” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Indiana's confrontation right is more detailed and “contains both the right to cross-examination and the right to meet the witnesses face to face.” Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981, 988 (Ind. 1991).² Still, “Indiana's right to a face-to-face meeting is, to a considerable degree, co-extensive with the federal confrontation right.” Ward v. State, 50 N.E.3d 752, 756 (Ind. 2016) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted).

[12] “Although the Indiana Confrontation Clause ‘places a premium upon live testimony of the State's witnesses in the courtroom during trial,’ the right is not absolute.” Pierce v. State, 677 N.E.2d 39, 49 (Ind. 1997) (quoting Brady, 575 N.E.2d at 987–88). As our Indiana Supreme Court has explained, “face to face” has not always been interpreted literally, because otherwise the testimony of all absent witnesses would never be admissible at trial. Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 756. In the typical hearsay scenario where a live witness on the stand reports what the declarant said, “the constitutional reference to meeting the ‘witness’ is literally fulfilled because the witness reporting the hearsay is on the stand.” Pierce, 677 N.E.2d at 49. In that situation, the declarant is not the witness. Id. For this reason, our Supreme Court has held a defendant's confrontation rights under the Indiana Constitution were not violated when, for example, a paramedic and forensic nurse appeared at trial and testified under oath about a victim's prior statements to them identifying the defendant as her attacker. See Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 756–57.

[13] Here, because of J.B.’s unavailability, the State sought to introduce Corporal Peterson's bodycam footage taken when he first encountered J.B. on January 14. Before introducing the video, the officer testified about J.B.’s identity, his observations of her “scared” and “emotionally frantic” demeanor, and her visible injuries. Tr. Vol. 2 at 86. He also stated that when he spoke with J.B., they were within eyesight of Hope's car and Hope was still in the area. The State then asked, “Did she make any statements to you on that initial interaction relating to why she was scared and injured?” Id. at 87. Over Hope's hearsay objection, Corporal Peterson testified J.B. “said she had been attacked, struck, possibly strangled, and kicked in the stomach and that she was concerned for her pregnancy.” Id. at 88.³ The State then moved to admit his bodycam footage, which confirmed his testimony about her statements. Because the witness (Corporal Peterson) was present to testify about the declarant's (J.B.’s) statements and Hope was able to confront the witness face-to-face, we discern no violation of Hope's confrontation right under the Indiana Constitution by the trial court's admission of the witness’ bodycam footage. See Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 756–57.

Any error in admitting the 9-1-1 call recording was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

[14] As to the 9-1-1 call, neither J.B. nor the dispatcher appeared to testify. The State offered the recording as an authenticated business record of the St. Joseph County Police Department during the testimony of a different police officer who had been dispatched to the scene and later listened to the recording. The 9-1-1 call therefore does not fit into the framework set forth in Ward.

[15] However, we need not reach the issue of whether the trial court's admission of the 9-1-1 call violated Hope's state constitutional confrontation right. Assuming (without deciding) the admission was erroneous because the dispatcher was not present, our Court may apply a harmless error analysis to a violation of a defendant's confrontation rights. See Koenig v. State, 933 N.E.2d 1271, 1273–74 (Ind. 2010) (applying harmless error analysis to a violation of the federal constitutional right to confrontation); Johnson v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1198, 1209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“Violations of the Indiana Constitution's Confrontation Clause are also reviewed under a harmless error standard.”), trans. denied. “A trial court's error is harmless when ‘its probable impact, in light of all the evidence in the case, is sufficiently minor so as not to affect the substantial rights of the parties.’ ” Id. at 1206 (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 66(A)). When conducting a harmless error analysis of violations of Indiana constitutional rights, we look to see whether the error was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Torres v. State, 673 N.E.2d 472, 474 n.1 (Ind. 1996).

[16] Here, J.B. made statements on the 9-1-1 call incriminating Hope when she stated her boyfriend beat her up and she identified Hope as her boyfriend. But these facts were also established by other evidence, including Hope's own testimony. Corporal Peterson's testimony, bodycam footage, and photographs established J.B.’s identity, injuries, and pregnancy. And Hope testified he and J.B. were in a relationship, she was living with him, and on the night of January 14, 2024, they got in a fight, he was upset, and he hit J.B. knowing she was pregnant. This was sufficient to establish the elements of domestic battery as charged. See I.C. § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1) & (c)(3) (providing that a person who knowingly or intentionally touches a family or household member in a rude, insolent, or angry manner commits Class A misdemeanor domestic battery, but the offense is a Level 5 felony if it results in bodily injury to a pregnant family or household member if the person knew of the pregnancy); Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 63 (amended charging information). In light of this evidence, we conclude any error in the admission of the 9-1-1 call recording—assuming a violation of Hope's confrontation right under the Indiana Constitution—was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Conclusion

[17] The trial court's admission of video footage from a police officer's body camera did not violate Hope's face to face confrontation right under the Indiana Constitution. Any error in the admission of a recording of the victim's 9-1-1 call was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

[18] Affirmed.

[19] I agree with the result reached by the majority, but because I do so on different grounds, I concur in result.

[20] To be sure, Hope's brief expressly disavows any claim under the Sixth Amendment's “testimonial” analysis set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Specifically, he claims that “[t]he ‘testimonial’ vs. ‘nontestimonial’ analysis that is used to determine if the Federal [Sixth] Amendment confrontation right has been violated is not relevant to an analysis under the Indiana Constitution.” Appellant's Br. p. 9. As I explain below, this is incorrect.

A. The Sixth Amendment

[21] “The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, provides in relevant part: ‘In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ․ to be confronted with the witnesses against him.’ ” Ward v. State, 50 N.E.3d 752, 756 (Ind. 2016) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI).

[22] In Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59, the United States Supreme Court determined that admission of a statement made by a person who does not testify at trial violates the Confrontation Clause if, among other things, the statement is “testimonial” in nature. See Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1054 (Ind. 2011) (summarizing Crawford). “To determine whether a statement is testimonial, [a court] must decide whether [the statement] has ‘a primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.’ ” Id. (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 (2011)). In contrast, “ ‘[s]tatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.’ ” Isom v. State, 31 N.E.3d 469, 483 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)).

B. Article 1, Section 13

[23] Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution provides in relevant part: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right ․ to meet the witnesses face to face․” “[W]hile the language of Indiana's [Confrontation Clause] ‘has much the same meaning and history as that employed in the Sixth Amendment, it has a special concreteness and is more detailed.’ ” Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 756 (quoting Brady v. State, 575 N.E.2d 981, 987 (Ind. 1991)).

[24] Our Supreme Court has long recognized that the right to confront witnesses is “an ancient one with roots in the common law and that its design has more than a single part.” Brady, 575 N.E.2d at 986. The Indiana Confrontation Clause “contains both the right to cross-examination and the right to meet the witnesses face to face.” Id. at 988. The Brady Court recognized that the right to cross-examine is the “primary interest” protected by the Indiana Confrontation Clause. Id. See also Johnson v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1198, 1208 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (recognizing that Article 1, Section 13 provides a right to cross-examine as well as the right to meet the witness face to face) (citing Wilder v. State, 716 N.E.2d 403, 406 (Ind. 1999)), clarified on reh'g, 206 N.E.3d 1195; McCain v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1202, 1206 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (noting that both the Sixth Amendment and Article 1, Section 13 guarantee the right to cross-examine witnesses).

[25] Still, the Brady Court held that the right to meet witnesses face-to-face “has not been subsumed by the right to cross-examination.” 575 N.E.2d at 986. “That is to say, merely ensuring that a defendant's right to cross-examine the witness is scrupulously honored does not guarantee that the requirements of Indiana's Confrontation Clause are met.” Id. The inverse is also true—ensuring that a defendant has the right to see the witness face to face does not mean that the right to cross-examine a declarant has been satisfied, if the statement is testimonial. Accordingly, our Supreme Court has held that the Confrontation Clause of Article 1, Section 13 provides “slightly more protection” to a criminal defendant than the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Church v. State, 189 N.E.3d 580, 592 n.4 (Ind. 2022).

C. The Crawford test applies under the Indiana Constitution.

[26] Although I have been unable to find any Indiana case that explicitly applies Crawford's “testimonial vs. nontestimonial” analysis under Article 1, Section 13, it is clear that this test is equally applicable under both constitutions. First, our courts have recognized that Indiana's Confrontation Clause applies to “testimonial” evidence. See Tiller v. State, 896 N.E.2d 537, 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (“[W]here testimony is secured prior to trial and the defendant cross-examined the witness or was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witness and the witness is unavailable for purposes of trial, the testimonial evidence may be admissible”) (emphasis added).

[27] In addition, some cases have addressed whether evidence was testimonial in nature and, therefore, subject to the limitations of the confrontation clauses contained in both the federal and Indiana constitutions. See, e.g., Thornton v. State, 25 N.E.3d 800, 803 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (citing both federal and Indiana confrontation clauses in holding that an out-of-court statement was testimonial in nature and therefore inadmissible); King v. State, 985 N.E.2d 755, 758 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (same).

[28] More importantly, our Supreme Court has indicated that the Crawford test is applicable under the Confrontation Clause of Article 1, Section 13. In Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039 (Ind. 2011), the defendant claimed that certain out-of-court statements were inadmissible because they were testimonial. On appeal, our Supreme Court concluded that the statements were nontestimonial and, therefore, did not violate Turner's right to confrontation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 1055.

[29] In a footnote, the Court then addressed Turner's argument under the Indiana Confrontation Clause, writing:

Although [t]o a considerable degree, the federal right of confrontation and the state right to a face-to-face meeting are coextensive, the rights guaranteed by our state constitution are not necessarily identical to those provided by the federal constitution. However, Turner has not explained and offers no argument as to why an analysis of the Indiana [C]onstitution concerning the testimonial character of a statement is or should be any different than the federal analysis. Our conclusion concerning Turner's federal constitutional claim applies equally to his state constitutional claim.

Id. at 1055 n.8 (emphasis added) (case citations and quotations omitted). This certainly indicates that our Supreme Court would apply the Crawford test under Indiana's Confrontation Clause.

D. The admission of the recording of the 911 call and the body camera footage did not violate the Indiana Constitution's Confrontation Clause.

1. The 911 call.

[30] Hope objected to the admission of the recording of the 911 call placed by J.B. on grounds that her out-of-court statements were hearsay and violated his right to confront the witness against him. See Tr. Vol. II pp. 15-18, 29-30. On appeal, Hope narrows his argument and claims that his confrontation rights were violated because he did not have a face-to-face confrontation with J.B.

[31] As noted by the majority, our Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Ward. See, supra, slip op. at 7 (citing Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 765-67). But this does not mean, of course, that all aspects of the right to confrontation are satisfied by a face-to-face confrontation with a witness instead of the declarant. The defendant still has the right to cross-examine the declarant if the declarant's statements are testimonial in nature. See Turner, 953 N.E.2d 1055 n.8; Tiller, 896 N.E.2d at 545. Otherwise, Article 1, Section 13 would provide lesser, not greater, protection than the Sixth Amendment.

[32] Here, J.B.’s statements in the 911 call were nontestimonial. Our Supreme Court has explained:

In order to determine whether a statement is testimonial versus nontestimonial, we must consider: (1) whether the declarant is describing present or past events; (2) whether there is an ongoing emergency at the time that the statements are made; (3) whether the nature of the questions asked and the responses given were made in an effort to resolve a present emergency; and (4) the degree of formality during the course of the police questioning. Simply put, statements generally elicited from individuals seeking help during an ongoing emergency are not classified as testimonial.

Isom, 31 N.E.3d at 483 (citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 827-28).

[33] Here, J.B. was describing events that had just occurred; there was still an ongoing emergency, as she required the assistance of first responders; the questions and responses were made to resolve the emergency; and the statements were not formal police questioning. In other words, J.B.’s statements and the questions from the 911 operator were not made as a substitute for in-trial testimony but were instead made in response to an emergency situation and were, therefore, nontestimonial. Thus, the admission of the recorded 911 call did not violate Hope's confrontation rights. See Cruz v. State, 218 N.E.3d 632, 637 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (911 operator's questions and caller's responses were nontestimonial because they were not made to establish facts for trial but instead to obtain emergency assistance to deal with an upset, gun-wielding person at caller's home and to ascertain the nature of the peril to enable the police to end the situation); Gayden v. State, 863 N.E.2d 1193, 1197-98 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (victim's answers to 911 operator's questions regarding identity of perpetrator and location of the incident were nontestimonial because the operator's purpose was to deal with an emergency, not create a substitute for trial testimony); Collins v. State, 873 N.E.2d 149, 155 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (purpose of questions 911 operator asked eyewitness had the primary purpose of enabling police to meet an ongoing emergency, and thus eyewitness’ statements to operator were nontestimonial).

[34] Because the statements in the 911 call were nontestimonial, and Hope was able to see the sponsoring witness face to face, the admission of the recording of the 911 call did not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Indiana Constitution.

2. The body camera video.

[35] Hope also challenges the admission of Exhibit 6, which consists of two minutes of video from Corporal Peterson's body camera when J.B. first approached his patrol car. In this short video, J.B. informed the officer that Hope pulled her hair, choked her, slammed her head against the wall, and kicked her in the stomach. Hope claims that the admission of Exhibit 6 violated his confrontation rights because he was not allowed to confront J.B. face to face. When this exhibit was offered into evidence at trial, however, Hope claimed only that the statement was hearsay; he did not argue that its admission violated his confrontation rights. See Tr. Vol. II pp. 87-90. Thus, this claim is waived. See Small v. State, 736 N.E.2d 742, 747 (Ind. 2000) (defendant's hearsay objection did not preserve a confrontation clause claim for appeal).

[36] Waiver notwithstanding, as noted by the majority, the face-to-face requirement is satisfied when the defendant confronts the witness face to face, not the declarant. See, supra, slip op. at 7 (citing Ward, 50 N.E.3d at 765-67). The fact that Hope could confront Corporal Peterson satisfied this component of Hope's confrontation rights. Id.

[37] And even though Hope does not argue that J.B.’s statements on the body camera video were testimonial, I note that they were not. J.B. approached Corporal Peterson's patrol car crying and “frantic” and pulled on his rear passenger door in an attempt to get in. Tr. Vol. II p. 86. She then explained what Hope had done to her. It is clear that the primary purpose of these statements was not to create an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony. Instead, they were made under circumstances “ ‘objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation [was] to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.’ ” Isom, 31 N.E.3d at 483 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822).

Conclusion

[38] Because J.B.’s statements made in the 911 call and in Corporal Peterson's body camera footage were nontestimonial, their admission did not violate Hope's confrontation rights as set forth in Article 1, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution. And because Hope was able to confront face to face the witnesses who testified regarding these statements, the face-to-face requirement of Article 1, Section 13 was satisfied. Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the majority.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1.3(a)(1) & (c)(3) (2021). Although Hope was convicted of other offenses, he appeals only this conviction.

2.   Hope contends only that his state constitutional right to confrontation was violated because he did not meet the witness against him face to face. See Appellant's Br. at 7 (“Hope was never given the opportunity to confront, in a ‘face to face’ fashion, the complaining witness who formed the basis of the State's case against him. As such, his rights under the Indiana Constitution were violated[.]”). He expressly disclaims any argument or analysis of his right to cross-examination using the framework set forth in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). See id. at 9 (“The ‘testimonial’ vs. ‘nontestimonial’ analysis has no place in determining if the face-to-face requirement under the Indiana Constitution is met.”). For this reason, we confine our review only to the face to face right.

3.   The trial court admitted J.B.’s statements to the officer under the excited utterance exception to hearsay, and Hope does not challenge this ruling on appeal.

Kenworthy, Judge.

Bailey, J., concurs. Tavitas, C.J., concurs in result with separate opinion.