Sherman Weston, Appellant-Defendant v. CityPlace Realty & Property Management, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a hearing, the trial court entered judgment in favor of CityPlace Property Management (“CityPlace”) and against Sherman Weston (“Weston”) in the amount of $14,687. Weston appeals and argues that: (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting photographs without proper authentication; (2) the trial court erred by failing to consider Weston's evidence of pre-existing damages; (3) the trial court improperly excluded Weston's email communications on hearsay grounds; and (4) the damages award was speculative and unsupported by the evidence. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings and that sufficient evidence supports the damages award. Accordingly, we affirm.

Issues

[2] Weston presents four issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as:

I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in its evidentiary rulings.

II. Whether sufficient evidence supports the damages award.

Facts

[3] On December 8, 2023, Weston signed a residential lease agreement with CityPlace for a residential property (“the Property”) located in Indianapolis. Weston moved in on December 15, 2023, and the lease was to terminate on December 31, 2024. The monthly rent was $1,650, and Weston paid a security deposit of $825.

[4] At the time of move-in, Weston completed a move-in checklist dated December 11, 2023, which states in all capital letters, “ALL PROPERTIES ARE RENTED AS-IS.”¹ Defendant's Ex. B p. 91. Weston noted several preexisting conditions of the Property, including that “some faucets are not dispensing water,” “[three] window[s] upstairs are missing screens,” the “upstairs hallway and [two] bedroom ceiling are damage[d],” there was “some type of roach shell,” the “carpets in the [first] floor bedroom [are] filthy,” the “carpet starting from the stairs up is dirty,” and “three sets of blinds [are] broken.” Id. at 92.

[5] Weston vacated the Property on April 30, 2024. Following Weston's departure, CityPlace prepared a schedule of damages seeking $13,927 in damages after the deduction of his security deposit, plus $760 in attorney's fees, for a total of $14,687. The damages claimed included the cost of replacing carpet, repainting the house, replacing toilets and blinds, repairing drywall, cleaning the house, and other miscellaneous items.

[6] On July 23, 2024, CityPlace filed a complaint for damages. A hearing was held on October 29, 2024, and Erica Bravo, CityPlace's property manager, testified. CityPlace introduced several exhibits, including the lease agreement, a schedule of damages, a resident ledger, photographs taken after Weston moved out, and “marketing photos” taken when the Property was posted for rent prior to Weston's tenancy. Plaintiff's Ex. 5B, 5C; Tr. Vol. II pp. 5-7. Bravo testified that she did not know the exact date the “marketing photos” were taken. Tr. Vol. II p. 7.

[7] Weston objected to admission of Exhibit 5C, the “marketing photos,” on authenticity grounds, arguing that “these are not photos of the house before I moved in, before I took possession. There was another tenant there, prior to me moving in.” Tr. Vol. II p. 9. Bravo testified that, although she did not know the exact date the photos were taken, they represented the Property when it was “ready to go on the market,” as CityPlace does for all of its properties. Id. at 10. Over Weston's objection, the trial court admitted the marketing photos as “general” and “exemplar photos as to what the [P]roperty looks like.” Id. at 10-11. The trial court also explained that Weston would “have the opportunity to cross” examine Bravo about the move-in condition of the property. Id. at 11.

[8] Weston sought to introduce email communications between his partner and CityPlace regarding the condition of the Property at move-in. CityPlace objected on hearsay grounds, arguing that the emails were from “a third party ․ that's not even on the lease.” Id. at 18. The trial court sustained the objection and stated: “[I]f the ․ exhibit was not from you, and between you and the property (sic), then I can't admit it into evidence.” Id. at 19. Weston testified and referred to his move-in checklist. Weston attempted unsuccessfully to admit photographs showing the pre-existing conditions of the Property.² Weston also testified, “[a]nyone with common sense can tell that no damage is going to be done like this to that type of place in 4 months.” Id. at 22.

[9] On April 4, 2025, the trial court entered an order granting CityPlace's complaint for damages in the amount of $14,687, plus costs of $187 and statutory interest of eight percent per annum. Weston now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Standard of Review

[10] Weston proceeds pro se, and we, therefore, reiterate that “a pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). “This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Picket Fence Prop. Co. v. Davis, 109 N.E.3d 1021, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). “ ‘We will not become an advocate for a party or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.’ ” Picket Fence, 109 N.E.3d at 1029 (quoting Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984).

[11] We also note that CityPlace did not file an appellee's brief. “[W]hen the appellees do not submit a brief on appeal, the appellate court need not develop an argument for the appellees but instead will ‘reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error.’ ” Salyer v. Washington Regular Baptist Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind. 2014)). “Prima facie error in this context means ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’ ” Id. This less stringent standard of review “relieves [us] of the burden of controverting arguments advanced in favor of reversal where that burden properly rests with the appellee.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Wright v. Wright, 782 N.E.2d 363, 366 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). We are obligated, however, to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record in order to determine whether reversal is required. Id. (citing Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006)).

II. Trial court properly admitted and excluded evidence.

[12] Weston challenges the admission of CityPlace's evidence and the exclusion of his evidence showing the pre-existing damage to the Property. We afford a trial court broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Sims v. Pappas, 73 N.E.3d 700, 705 (Ind. 2017). We will disturb the trial court's ruling only where the trial court has abused its discretion. Id. “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it.” Id. (quoting Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1041 (Ind. 2011)). In addition, it is well established that “ ‘errors in the admission of evidence are to be disregarded as harmless error unless they affect the substantial rights of a party.’ ” Sibbing v. Cave, 922 N.E.2d 594, 598 (Ind. 2010) (quoting McClain v. State, 675 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ind. 1996)). “Likewise, reversible error cannot be predicated upon the erroneous admission of evidence that is merely cumulative of other evidence that has already been properly admitted.” Id. (citing Davis v. Garrett, 887 N.E.2d 942, 947 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied). “To determine whether the admission of evidence affected a party's substantial rights, we assess the probable impact of the evidence upon the [trier of fact].” Id. (citing McClain, 675 N.E.2d at 331).

A. The trial court did not abuse discretion in admitting CityPlace's marketing photos.

[13] Weston contends that the trial court improperly admitted CityPlace's Exhibit 5C, the marketing photos of the Property, without adequate authentication, foundation, and relevancy.³ Appellant's Br. p. 7. We disagree.

[14] Weston relies on Indiana Evidence Rules 901, 401, and 403. Indiana Evidence Rule 901 provides, “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Indiana Evidence Rule 901(b) then provides a non-exhaustive list of examples of how that requirement may be satisfied, including “[t]estimony that an item is what it is claimed to be, by a witness with knowledge.” Indiana Evidence Rule 401 provides, “[e]vidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Indiana Evidence Rule 403 provides, “[t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”

[15] Our Supreme Court has held that “[g]enerally a photograph is relevant and admissible if it depicts an object or scene which a witness would be permitted to describe through testimony. Admission of photographs is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed unless it is apparent the trial court abused its discretion.” Jones v. State, 536 N.E.2d 490, 492 (Ind. 1989). The foundation for a photograph need not be laid by the photographer. Id. at 493. Nor must the authenticating witness be able to identify when or where the photograph was taken. Raub v. State, 517 N.E.2d 80, 83 (Ind. 1987). To establish foundation for photographs admitted as demonstrative evidence, the witness is not required to testify that the photograph is an accurate representation of the scene on a specific date, so long as the witness testifies that “the scene appears in the photographs,” sufficient to persuade the trial court of their competency and authenticity to a relative certainty. Smith v. State, 491 N.E.2d 193, 195 (Ind. 1986); Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1282 (Ind. 2014).

[16] Here, Bravo, as the property manager, testified that the marketing photos are real photos of the Property and that she did not have “an exact date” on which the photos were taken. Tr. Vol. II pp. 9-10. The trial court questioned Bravo about the circumstances under which the photos were taken. Bravo only testified that the photos were taken when the Property was “ready to go on the market.” Id. at 10. Under the circumstances, the trial court admitted the photos as “general” and “exemplar” photos to show “what the [P]roperty looks like.” Id. The trial court also advised Weston that, if he wished to make clear that the photos did not reflect the condition of the house when he moved in, he could cross-examine the witness and obtain that clarification. Id. at 11. During his cross-examination, Weston failed to ask questions to clarify that the marketing photos did not show the conditions when he moved in. See id. at 23-26.

[17] Thus, through the testimony of Bravo, the marketing photos in CityPlace's Exhibit 5C were relevant and properly authenticated. That authentication provided a sufficient foundation for the photos to be admitted as “exemplar” to show the general layout of the house. Tr. Vol. II p. 11. Further, the trial court expressly clarified that the photos were admitted to show “what the [P]roperty looks like,” not the conditions when Weston moved in. Id. at 10. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photos.

B. Trial court properly considered the pre-existing damage.

[18] Weston next argues that the trial court erred by disregarding his move-in checklist and his photographs, which he contends would directly “rebut[ ]” CityPlace's claims. Appellant's Br. p. 7. We disagree.

[19] Weston's move-in checklist was admitted into evidence and labeled as Defendant's Exhibit B. His assertion that the trial court disregarded his move-in documentation is, thus, unsupported by the record. To the extent Weston relies on photographs he claims to have taken after he moved in, those photographs were not properly introduced or admitted at the hearing for the trial court to consider. Weston testified that he took photographs on March 27, 2024, showing the condition of the Property at that time, and that the photos on his phone had time stamps. Weston did not present the photos at trial; thus, the trial court had no opportunity to review them. Instead, Weston described the purpose of his photographs only in general terms, explaining that “the whole gist of it ․ they are trying [to] get [him] to pay for the ‘as is’ ․ in the move-in check list.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 31-32.

[20] We afford trial courts broad discretion in admitting and excluding evidence, and we will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. Sims, 73 N.E.3d at 705. The trial court admitted Weston's move-in checklist, but Weston failed to introduce his photographs into evidence for the trial court to review.  ⁴ The trial court determines the weight to be given to the admitted evidence. We find no abuse of discretion. Weston's argument invites us to reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do.

C. Trial court properly excluded the email evidence.

[21] Weston next challenges the trial court's ruling excluding the email evidence he offered. The evidence at issue is an email sent from Weston's partner to the management company on December 7, 2023, which discussed fixing electric outlets and carpet cleaning before Weston signed the lease. Weston laid no foundation for the email. CityPlace objected on hearsay grounds because the email was from a non-testifying third party. See Tr. Vol. II p. 18.

[22] Indiana Evidence Rule 801(c) defines “hearsay” as a statement that “(1) is not made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing; and (2) is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Hearsay is generally inadmissible. Ind. R. Evid. 802. That general rule, however, is subject to exceptions and exemptions that may render an otherwise hearsay statement admissible.

[23] Weston offered his partner's email to prove the truth of the matter asserted—that the Property had pre-existing damages. Weston's partner was not a party to this case and did not testify regarding the email's contents at the hearing. Weston does not explain how the email is not hearsay or identify any exception or exemption to the hearsay rule that would render it admissible. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the email from admission.

III. The trial court properly calculated damages.

[24] When, as here, a trial court conducts a hearing without entering specific findings of fact and conclusions of law, the appellate standard of review is highly deferential. Under this general judgment standard, an appellate court “may affirm on any legal theory supported by the evidence adduced at trial” Tr. No. 6011, Lake Cnty. Tr. Co. v. Heil's Haven Condominiums Homeowners Ass'n, 967 N.E.2d 6, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor assess witness credibility. In re Tr. Created Under Last Will & Testament of Mitchell, 788 N.E.2d 433, 435 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). Specifically regarding damages, “no reversal will occur if the award is within the scope of evidence before the trial court.” McLean v. Trisler, 161 N.E.3d 1259, 1270 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). Courts have emphasized that, “if the award of damages is supported by the record, the determination of damages is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Id.

[25] Weston argues that CityPlace “did not submit receipts, contractor testimony, or itemized documentation to support the $14,687 in claimed damages.” Appellant's Br. p. 8. We disagree. CityPlace presented Exhibits 3, 4, and 5A, which included summarized and itemized cost estimates supporting the damages it requested. Weston did not challenge or object to admission of any of this evidence at the hearing. See Tr. Vol. II pp. 8-11. The trial court's damages award matches the amount shown on Exhibit 3 and is, therefore, within the scope of the evidence before the trial court. Weston has not demonstrated “prima facie error” showing that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding CityPlace damages.

Conclusion

[26] The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting and excluding evidence, and sufficient evidence supports the amount of damages awarded by the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm.

[27] Affirm.

FOOTNOTES

1.   CityPlace did not object to the move-in checklist when Weston moved to introduce that into evidence.

2.   The photographs Weston took with his cellphone were not admitted or presented at the hearing nor were they preserved for the record. Although Weston submitted the photographs in the appendix, we cannot consider them on appeal. See Ostrowski v. Everest Healthcare Indiana, Inc., 956 N.E.2d 1144, 1147 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (explaining that where deposition excerpts appeared in the appendix but “the record before us does not show that they were admitted into evidence,” the court would not consider them and that “[t]he inclusion of extra-record deposition testimony in the appendix is improper”).

3.   Weston challenges the admission of Exhibit 5C on lack-of-foundation and relevancy grounds, although his arguments merely mention those evidentiary rules without any cogent development. See Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Generally, challenges to the foundation and relevancy of evidence are waived when raised for the first time on appeal. Leatherman v. State, 101 N.E.3d 879, 885 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), as corrected (Aug. 24, 2018) (“It is well-established that we generally will not address an argument that was not raised in the trial court and is raised for the first time on appeal.”) Regardless, we address the issue on its merits.

4.   For some of the conditions Weston noted at move-in, the corresponding repair costs were not included in CityPlace's itemized repair list in Exhibit 5A. For example, Weston noted missing screens on the move-in checklist, but missing screens were not listed as an item needing repair on Exhibit 5A's itemized cost sheet. Weston expressly did not object to the admission of Exhibit 5A. When the trial court asked whether he objected to the exhibit, Weston responded, “[n]ot 5A.” Tr. Vol. II p. 9.

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.