CLARK v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Todd Clark appeals his convictions and sentences for Level 3 felony rape, Level 6 felony intimidation, Level 6 felony unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle, Level 6 felony domestic battery, and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. Clark raises five issues for our review, which we reorder and restate as follows:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support Clark's convictions for Level 3 felony rape and Level 6 felony unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle.

2. Whether Clark's convictions are contrary to Indiana double jeopardy protections.

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in the admission of certain evidence.

4. Whether Clark's aggregate sentence of sixteen years is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and his character.

5. Whether remand is appropriate for the court to clarify Clark's sentencing orders and the abstract of judgment.

[2] We affirm and remand with instructions.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] C.R. has known Clark for sixteen years, and over that time they have had an on-and-off romantic relationship. They occasionally lived together. C.R. owned a red HHR, and she permitted Clark to use it on occasion, and, thus, he had a key to the vehicle. C.R. stopped living with Clark in 2022, but, for some time thereafter, she permitted him to live out of her HHR. C.R. then helped Clark purchase his own vehicle, and he ceased living out of hers.

[4] C.R. worked at a tobacco shop in Mooresville. On February 14, 2023, she worked until 8:00 p.m. After her shift, she entered her vehicle and began to drive home. However, Clark was hiding in the back seat, and before she had driven far he “jumped up,” “backhanded” her, and “told [her] to keep driving” or he would “kill [her].” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 217. C.R. had not given Clark permission to be in her vehicle on that day.

[5] Clark instructed C.R. to pull into a neighborhood, and he informed her that they were going to have sex there. He stated that, if C.R. did not want to have sex with him, “he was going to make [her] have sex, he was going to choke [her] out[ ] and bring [her] back[ ] and have sex, and if [she] didn't come back, he was going to have sex with [her] warm body.” Id. at 220. He also told her that he was carrying a knife, and C.R. believed him because she knew that he often carried a knife.

[6] Upon parking in the neighborhood, C.R. “jumped out of the car and ran up to a house ․ banging on the doors and screaming.” Id. Clark grabbed C.R. by the face and head and dragged her back to the car, struck her, and drove the vehicle out of the neighborhood. He then ordered C.R. to perform oral sex on him, telling her that, if she resisted, he would kill her. C.R. complied. Clark then had C.R. drive him back to his vehicle in Mooresville.

[7] The next morning, C.R.’s daughter observed the marks on C.R.’s face and went to the police station with C.R. There, C.R. explained to investigating officers what had happened the night before, and Clark was arrested. While in jail, Clark repeatedly told C.R. in recorded phone calls that she did not have to go through with his prosecution. He likewise wrote letters to her in which he tried to convince her not to testify against him.

[8] The State charged Clark with the following nine counts:

1. Level 1 felony rape;

2. Level 3 felony rape;

3. Level 3 felony kidnapping;

4. Level 3 felony criminal confinement;

5. Level 6 felony intimidation;

6. Level 6 felony unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle;

7. Class A misdemeanor domestic battery;

8. Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct; and

9. Level 6 felony domestic battery.

[9] C.R. testified at Clark's ensuing jury trial and recounted the details of the evening hours of February 14, 2023, and early morning hours of February 15. On cross-examination, Clark asked C.R. whether, although they had broken up prior to February 14, they were still seeing each other every day and occasionally having sex. C.R. confirmed that they were. Clark also asked about C.R.’s daughter, soliciting C.R.’s testimony that C.R.’s daughter did not “like” Clark, did not “approve of [C.R.’s] relationship with him,” and had excluded Clark from C.R.’s home with C.R.’s daughter. Id. at 240. And Clark asked C.R. if Clark and C.R. had previously argued over a cash inheritance C.R. had received upon her father's death. In particular, Clark asked C.R. if they had argued over using that “money for drugs.” Id. at 243. C.R. confirmed that they had.

[10] On redirect, the State sought to clarify for the jury why C.R.’s daughter disliked Clark, namely, because he had abused C.R. In particular, the State argued that Clark's cross-examination of C.R. left the jury with the misimpression that Clark and C.R. were engaged in a secret relationship to avoid C.R.’s daughter, and that, upon finding out about the relationship the morning of February 15, C.R. had gone to the police station to protect her relationship with her daughter. Over Clark's objection, the trial court permitted the State to ask C.R. questions “in broad strokes” and without “specific instances” to clarify the relationship between Clark and C.R.’s daughter. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 16. Thus, the State asked C.R., “why your daughter didn't like [Clark] or approve of your relationship with him,” and C.R. responded, “[b]ecause he was abusive, he was mean, [and he was] always in a bad mood.” Id. at 18.

[11] The jury found Clark guilty of Level 3 felony rape, Level 6 felony intimidation, Level 6 felony unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle, Level 6 felony domestic battery, and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. The jury found Clark not guilty of the other charges. Following a sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Clark to an aggregate term of sixteen years in the Department of Correction.

[12] This appeal ensued.

1. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Clark's convictions for rape and unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle.

[13] On appeal, Clark first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his convictions for Level 3 felony rape and Level 6 felony unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle. For challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider only the probative evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the judgment of the trier of fact. Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021). We will neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility. Id. We will affirm a conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[14] To show that Clark committed Level 3 felony rape as charged, the State was required to prove that he knowingly caused C.R. to perform other sexual conduct on him when she was compelled by the imminent threat of force. See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1) (2022). And to show that he committed Level 6 felony unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle, the State was required to prove that he entered into a motor vehicle knowing he did not have the owner's permission to do so, he had no contractual interest in the vehicle, the vehicle was used in furtherance of a crime while he occupied it, and that he knew that it would be so used. I.C. § 35-43-4-2.7(d), (e)(2).

[15] Clark first argues that, because he was acquitted of the confinement charge, the State must have presented insufficient evidence that he compelled C.R. to perform other sexual conduct by the threat of force. But our Supreme Court has long recognized that we will not review jury verdicts in criminal cases for purported inconsistency. Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 649 (Ind. 2010). Accordingly, Clark's argument here fails.

[16] Clark next argues that his relationship with C.R. suggests that what happened in the HHR on February 14 and 15 was consensual. He also attacks C.R.’s credibility. But those arguments ask our Court to reweigh the evidence and reassess the credibility of the witnesses, which we will not do. A reasonable fact-finder could readily conclude from C.R's testimony that Clark raped her.

[17] Clark also argues that his conviction for Level 6 felony unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle should be vacated because he had a key to the vehicle and he and C.R. were still in a sexually intimate relationship. But Clark's argument is again a request for our Court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. A reasonable fact-finder could conclude from C.R.’s testimony that she had not given him permission to enter the HHR when he did so, and Clark knew as much by hiding in the back seat. The State presented sufficient evidence to support Clark's convictions.

2. Clark's convictions are not contrary to Indiana double jeopardy protections.

[18] Clark next asserts that his convictions for rape and intimidation, and, separately, domestic battery and disorderly conduct, violate his right to be free from double jeopardy under Indiana law. We review such issues de novo. A.W. v. State, 229 N.E.3d 1060, 1064 (Ind. 2024).

[19] As we have explained:

Indiana's protection against substantive double jeopardy prohibits “multiple convictions for the same offense in a single proceeding.” Id. at 1066. To determine if a substantive double jeopardy violation has occurred, we apply a “three-part test based on statutory sources ․” Id. The first step is to look to the statutory language of the offenses at issue; if that language “clearly permits multiple punishments,” then “there is no violation of substantive double jeopardy.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Here, [the parties] agree that the first step is not dispositive ․

We thus turn to the second step. At this step, as clarified by our Supreme Court in A.W., we look to the face of the charging information to discern if the factual bases identified for the charges implicate our statutory definitions of an “included offense.” Id. In particular, the Indiana Code defines an included offense as an offense that:

(1) is established by proof of the same material elements or less than all the material elements required to establish the commission of the offense charged;

(2) consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or

(3) differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious harm or risk of harm to the same person, property, or public interest, or a lesser kind of culpability, is required to establish its commission.

Ind. Code § 35-31.5-2-168 (2021). As our Supreme Court has further clarified, an offense is also an included offense where the charging information states that the “means used” to commit the alleged greater offense “include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense.” A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1067 (quotation marks omitted).

This step of our substantive double jeopardy analysis creates a risk of “an asymmetrical benefit to the State” because a prosecutor may “unilaterally decide how much” information “to include (or not include) in the charging instrument, which could decisively determine the outcome of a double jeopardy claim.” Id. at 1069 (emphasis omitted). Thus, to eliminate that asymmetry, our Supreme Court requires that, “where ambiguities exist in a charging instrument about whether one offense is factually included in another, courts must construe those ambiguities in the defendant's favor[ ] and thus find a presumptive double jeopardy violation at Step 2.” Id.

Bolcerek v. State, 255 N.E.3d 1206, 1217-18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[20] The State's last-amended charging information for Clark's convictions for Level 3 felony rape and Level 6 felony intimidation stated, respectively and in relevant part, as follows:

[O]n or about February 14th, 2023, ․ Clark did knowingly cause [C.R.] ․ to perform other sexual conduct[ ] when such person was compelled by the imminent threat of force, to wit: the threat to kill her.

* * *

[O]n or about February 14th, 2023, ․ Clark did communicate to [C.R.] ․ a threat to unlawfully injure [her], to wit: cut her heart out, with the intent that [C.R.] be placed in fear that the threat will be carried out ․

Appellant's App. Vol. 2, pp. 117-18.

[21] In effect, Clark argues that, under those two charges, the means used to rape C.R. was Clark's intimidation of her.¹ We agree that the face of the charging information between those two counts does not plainly distinguish them, and the same facts alleged in support of the Level 6 felony intimidation charge could have been used to support the Level 3 felony rape charge. Accordingly, Clark has demonstrated a presumptive double jeopardy violation between those two charges.

[22] Similarly, the State's last-amended charging information for Clark's convictions for Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct and Level 6 felony domestic battery stated, respectively and in relevant part, as follows:

[O]n or about February 14th, 2023, ․ Clark did recklessly engage in fighting or tumultuous conduct.

* * *

[O]n or about February 14th, 2023, ․ Clark did knowingly touch [C.R.], a household member[,] in a rude, insolent[,] or angry manner by hitting her in the face ․

Id. at 118-19. Again, we must agree with Clark that those two charges are not plainly distinct in the facts that would be used to support them. Accordingly, Clark has also demonstrated a presumptive double jeopardy violation between those two charges as well.

[23] We thus turn to step three of our double jeopardy analysis:

The third and final step of our substantive double jeopardy analysis gives the State the opportunity to rebut the presumptive double jeopardy violation. To do so, “the State must demonstrate that it made clear to the fact-finder at trial that the apparently included charge was supported by independent evidence such that the State made a ‘distinction between what would otherwise be two of the same offenses.’ ” Ratliff v. State, 242 N.E.3d 1070, 1078-79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1071), trans. denied. However, if the State's evidence at trial “shows only a single continuous crime, and one statutory offense is included in the other,” the State may not obtain cumulative convictions. Id. at 1079 (quotation marks and brackets omitted).

Bolcerek, 255 N.E.3d at 1219.

[24] At this step, we agree with the State that it rebutted both of the presumptive double jeopardy violations. Regarding the rape and intimidation charges, C.R. testified that Clark told her he would “cut [her] heart out” at the beginning of their encounter, and only later did he compel her to perform oral sex on him by telling her that he “was going to kill her.” Tr. Vol. 2, pp. 220, 222. The prosecutor likewise delineated those specific facts between those two charges during her closing argument. Tr. Vol. 3, pp. 104-06. Accordingly, the State demonstrated independent evidence to the jury in support of the charges of rape and intimidation.

[25] So too with the Level 6 felony domestic battery and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct charges. The prosecutor made clear at her closing argument that Clark committed domestic battery when he “backhanded” C.R. across her face, leaving bruises. Id. at 107. According to C.R.’s testimony, Clark backhanded her at the beginning of the night when she had first started driving her car. As for disorderly conduct, the prosecutor stated that Clark's “tumultuous” conduct was based on Clark's “behavior throughout most of this,” i.e., the totality of his actions throughout the night, which, notably, included Clark seizing C.R.’s person as she tried to escape in a neighborhood and dragging her back into the car. Id. We therefore conclude that the State supported the Level 6 felony domestic battery and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct charges with sufficiently distinct evidence.

3. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in the admission of evidence.

[26] Clark also argues that the trial court abused its discretion in the admission of evidence. The trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017). Rulings on the admissibility of evidence are reviewed for an abuse of discretion and ordinarily reversed only when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id.

[27] On this issue, Clark first contends that the trial court erred when it permitted the State to ask C.R., on redirect, why C.R.’s daughter disliked him, which permitted the jury to hear that C.R.’s daughter disliked him “[b]ecause he was abusive, he was mean, [and he was] always in a bad mood.” Tr. Vol. 3, p. 18. But otherwise inadmissible evidence may become admissible where the defendant “opens the door” to questioning on that evidence. Turner v. State, 953 N.E.2d 1039, 1055 (Ind. 2011). The evidence relied on to “open the door” must leave the trier of fact with a false or misleading impression of the facts related. Id. at 1056.

[28] We agree with the State and the trial court that Clark opened the door to the redirect question and C.R.’s response. On cross-examination, Clark solicited C.R.’s testimony that C.R.’s daughter did not like him, did not approve of C.R.’s relationship with him, and did not want Clark at the residence she shared with C.R. Clark also noted that C.R. first went to the police on the morning of February 15 with her daughter. Thus, Clark's line of questioning may have left the jury with the impression that C.R. reported the incident only to maintain her ongoing but hidden relationship with Clark while also maintaining her relationship with her daughter. The State's question on redirect disambiguated that misimpression.

[29] Clark also complains on appeal that other questions asked by the State on redirect permitted C.R. to testify that Clark had previously used her money to purchase drugs. But that evidence first came in during Clark's cross-examination of C.R., and, thus, there is no error in the State's cumulative questions on redirect.

4. Clark's sixteen-year sentence is not inappropriate.

[30] We next address Clark's argument that his aggregate sentence of sixteen years is inappropriate. Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may modify a sentence that we find is “inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Making this determination “turns on our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

[31] However, sentence modification under Rule 7(B) is reserved for “a rare and exceptional case.” Livingston v. State, 113 N.E.3d 611, 612 (Ind. 2018) (per curiam). Thus, when conducting this review, we will defer to the sentence imposed by the trial court unless the defendant demonstrates compelling evidence that portrays the nature of the offense and his character in a positive light, such as showing a lack of brutality in the offenses or showing substantial virtuous character traits. Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).

[32] The sentencing range for a Level 3 felony is three to sixteen years, with an advisory sentence of nine years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5(b). The sentencing range for a Level 6 felony is six months to two-and-one-half years, with an advisory sentence of one year. I.C. § 35-50-2-7(b). And a person convicted of a Class B misdemeanor may be sentenced up to 180 days. I.C. § 35-50-3-3.

[33] The State concedes that, aside from Clark's Level 3 felony rape conviction, his remaining convictions were a single episode of criminal conduct under Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(d)(4). Thus, Clark faced a maximum possible term of imprisonment of twenty years. Following the sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Clark to the maximum possible sentence for each of his convictions; however, the court ordered all of Clark's sentences to run concurrently with his sixteen-year sentence for his Level 3 felony rape conviction. In imposing that sentence, the court found the following aggravating circumstances: that Clark has a history of violations with community corrections and similar placements; that he has a criminal history; and that he violated a protective order or no-contact order. The court did not find any mitigating circumstances.

[34] We cannot say that Clark's aggregate sixteen-year sentence is inappropriate. Regarding the nature of the offense, he violently attacked a longtime partner and repeatedly threatened her life. Regarding the nature of his character, Clark has twelve prior felony and misdemeanor convictions going back into the early 1990s. He has had multiple charges brought against him with respect to C.R. in particular, although several of those charges were dismissed. He also has had “numerous prior violations of post-trial supervision including probation supervision, community corrections day reporting, and work release.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 229.

[35] Clark's arguments do not identify any substantial, virtuous character traits or positive aspects of the instant offenses. Instead, his arguments on appeal simply seek to have our Court impose a different sentence than the sentence imposed by the trial court, which is contrary to our usual deference to trial courts on sentencing issues. We reject Clark's arguments and affirm his sentence.

5. Remand is appropriate for the court to clarify Clark's sentencing orders and the abstract of judgment.

[36] The parties agree on appeal that Clark's sentencing orders and abstract of judgment contain clerical errors that require correction on remand. We also agree, and we remand with the following instructions: the court shall correct the sentencing orders to identify the sentence the court imposed on each of Clark's five convictions; and the court shall correct the abstract of judgment to identify each of Clark's five convictions and the sentences imposed on each conviction.

Conclusion

[37] For all of these reasons, we affirm Clark's conviction and sentence, and we remand with instructions for the court to correct the sentencing orders and abstract of judgment.

[38] Affirmed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We do not consider Clark's argument that Level 6 felony intimidation is always included in the elements of Level 3 felony rape. See I.C. § 35-31.5-2-168; Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). What matters for Clark is whether the factual basis for his Level 6 felony intimidation charge was with the facts alleged for the Level 3 felony rape charge. A.W., 229 N.E.3d at 1066-67.

Mathias, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Pyle, J., concur.