FLOWERS v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Randy Flowers asks us to exercise our authority under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) to revise his two-year executed sentence for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The facts supporting Flowers’ conviction are straightforward and undisputed. He drank alcohol past the point of intoxication, got behind the wheel of a car, and was arrested after officers saw him driving on a major roadway. The State charged him with Count I: Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated (OWI), as a Level 6 felony;¹ Count II: OWI endangering a person, a Class A misdemeanor;² and Count III: OWI, as a Class C misdemeanor.³ While on pre-trial release for those charges, Flowers was again arrested and charged with several more OWI offenses.

[3] Flowers agreed to plead guilty to Count I, and the State agreed to dismiss Counts II and III, as well as the OWI offenses Flowers had been charged with while on pre-trial release. The parties also agreed that Flowers’ sentence would be at the trial court's discretion. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and entered a judgment of conviction on Count I.

[4] At the sentencing hearing, Flowers’ mother testified that at the time he was arrested, he was driving to see one of his children. She explained that he had been drinking because he was upset with his child's mother. Before sentencing, Flowers told his mother that he was “going to go and get [ ] some help” for his drinking problem and that he had “a job ․ that's waiting on him” once he completes his sentence. Transcript at 21, 22. However, during cross-examination, she admitted that in the past year Flowers had already sought treatment for his alcohol addiction, and that treatment had been unsuccessful.

[5] Flowers then read a letter to the court in which he expressed remorse for his actions and said that he had two children who would be negatively affected if he was incarcerated: a five-year-old daughter who lived with her mother and a teenage son who lived with Flowers. He also explained that his mother was disabled and relied on him for assistance, and that his uncle would be able to help him get a job if he was released from custody. He concluded by telling the court that he was “too weak for jail because [he] prioritize[d] [his] family and freedom.” Id. at 26.

[6] The State asked the trial court to sentence Flowers to two years in jail. It argued that Flowers had an extensive criminal history, including several OWI convictions. Indeed, Flowers’ presentence investigation report shows that he was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol in Illinois in 2012 and was similarly charged with driving under the influence in 2019 (though the disposition of that case is unclear from the record before us). He was then convicted of OWI in Indiana in 2022 and was sentenced to probation and to participate in substance abuse services, though his probation was later revoked after a violation. In February 2023, less than a year after the 2022 conviction, he was arrested again for OWI and was later convicted and sentenced to one year of probation. While the February 2023 charge was pending, he committed his present OWI offense in August of that year and then was arrested again for OWI in April 2025. All in all, Flowers’ criminal history included six misdemeanor and two felony convictions, including the OWI offenses listed above, a felony conviction for armed robbery, and a misdemeanor conviction for disorderly conduct.

[7] After acknowledging his extensive criminal history, Flowers asked the trial court to sentence him to “time served[.]” Id. at 28. His counsel described his apology as “genuine” and argued that his willingness to maintain steady employment and need to care for his high-school-aged son made additional jail time inappropriate. Id. at 29. The court acknowledged the apparent sincerity of Flowers’ statement, but told him, “[Y]ou have had time after time after time after time to ․ deal with this. And you've not. You've not been successful on probation ever and, ․ it's leaving me with no options.” Id. at 30.

[8] Ultimately, the trial court recognized Flowers’ criminal history and prior violations of probation and the terms of pre-trial release as aggravating factors. As the sole mitigating factor, the court noted that Flowers had pled guilty. It sentenced him to two years executed in the Department of Correction. Flowers now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Flowers argues his sentence is inappropriate and asks us to “reduce” it under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Appellant's Brief at 9. Rule 7(B) permits us to revise a sentence if it “is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B)). We give the trial court “considerable deference” when reviewing a sentence under Rule 7(B). Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008)). We will not revise a sentencing decision absent “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard[,] and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1093 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)). The burden is on the defendant to persuade us that his sentence is inappropriate. Id. at 1092.

1. Character of the Offender

[10] In this case, we begin our review with Flowers’ character. In doing so, “we engage in a broad consideration of [his] qualities[.]” Burkhart v. State, 259 N.E.3d 347, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)), trans. denied. This includes “whether [he] has ‘substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character[.]’ ” Id. (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122).

[11] Flowers contends that his good character is supported by the fact that he is “the father of two children[,]” whom he cares for along with his disabled mother; that he has been “employed ․ as a kitchen worker making $21.25 per hour” and “plans to return to that job when released from incarceration[;]” that he “admitted his offense and pled guilty[;]” and that he “apologized and took full responsibility for his actions.” Appellant's Br. at 8. But Flowers’ arguments belie his extensive criminal history—which include two felony and six misdemeanor convictions, many of which were for OWI. It is well-settled by our Rule 7(B) jurisprudence that “[e]ven a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.” Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). In fact, it reflects extremely poorly on Flowers that he repeatedly drove drunk despite being on probation and pre-trial release for various OWI-related convictions and charges between 2022 and 2025.

[12] Additionally, while Flowers’ willingness to care for his teenage son and disabled mother is perhaps commendable, the burden imposed on a defendant's dependents by their imprisonment does not itself justify a sentencing revision. See Jones v. State, 218 N.E.3d 3, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“[H]ardship to a defendant's dependents can be given little consideration when the defendant fails to show why incarceration for a particular term will cause more hardship than incarceration for a shorter term[.]” (citing Weaver v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1066, 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied)), trans. denied; see also Nicholson v. State, 768 N.E.2d 443, 448 n.13 (Ind. 2002) (noting defendant failed to prove his imprisonment was an undue hardship on his dependents when he “presented no evidence to demonstrate that the hardship to his family would be any worse than that normally suffered by a family whose relative is imprisoned”). Thus, while still relevant to a defendant's character, courts generally tend to give a defendant's caretaker status little weight when considering the appropriateness of a sentence. The same can be said of Flowers’ employment. Holmes v. State, 86 N.E.3d 394, 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), (“[M]any people are gainfully employed; therefore, a defendant's employment is not necessarily a mitigating factor.”), trans. denied.

[13] Finally, while Flowers argues he accepted responsibility for his actions by pleading guilty, we note that the trial court took Flowers’ guilty plea into account in tailoring his sentence, and Flowers has otherwise failed to meet his burden to produce compelling evidence of his good character demonstrating that his resulting two-year sentence is inappropriate.

2. Nature of the Offense

[14] Flowers next contends that his sentence is inappropriate considering the nature of his offense. When evaluating the nature of an offense, we “look at the extent, brutality, and heinousness of the offense.” Borroel v. State, 241 N.E.3d 8, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. We begin with the advisory sentence as “the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), as clarified on reh'g by 875 N.E.2d 218 (2007).

[15] Flowers was convicted of Level 6 felony OWI. Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7(b) provides a sentencing range for a Level 6 felony between six months and two and a half years, with an advisory sentence of one year. In determining whether Flowers’ two-year sentence is appropriate, we consider “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” T.A.D.W. 51 N.E.3d at 1211 (quoting Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806-07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)).

[16] To convict Flowers on Count I, all the State was required to prove was that he operated a vehicle while intoxicated and had previously received one OWI conviction within seven years of the offense. I.C. § 9-30-5-3(a)(1). Because a single prior OWI conviction would have satisfied the statute, Flowers’ repeated acts of drunk driving and his several prior OWI-related convictions made his present offense more egregious than the typical Level 6 felony offense accounted for by the legislature.

[17] Even so, according to Flowers, his two-year sentence is inappropriate because, although he admittedly drove drunk, he “did not cause an accident and injured no one.” Appellant's Br. at 9. But had Flowers caused death, catastrophic injury, or serious bodily injury, the State could have charged him with a Level 4 felony under Indiana Code section 9-30-5-5(a) (OWI causing death or catastrophic injury) or a Level 5 felony under section 9-30-5-4(a) (OWI causing serious bodily injury), which would have carried advisory sentences of six and three years, respectively. I.C. §§ 35-50-2-5.5 (Level 4); 35-50-2-6(b) (Level 5). Because OWI causing injury or death would have likely resulted in a harsher sentence, Flowers’ two-year sentence for Level 6 felony OWI already reflects the fact that he “did not cause an accident and injured no one.” Appellant's Br. at 9. Flowers has thus failed to show that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense.

Conclusion

[18] Because Flowers failed to show that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense or his character, we affirm.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 9-30-5-3(a)(1).

2.   I.C. § 9-30-5-2(b).

3.   I.C. § 9-30-5-2(a).

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.