SANTIAGO BAUTISTA v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Paulino Santiago-Bautista appeals his conviction and sentence for Level 3 felony rape, raising the following issues for our review: (1) whether the evidence is sufficient to support his conviction and (2) whether the trial court considered two improper aggravating factors during sentencing. Finding no error, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On June 10, 2023, fourteen-year-old L.A. was home alone at her family's farm in Carroll County. Around noon, Santiago-Bautista knocked on the door and L.A. answered. Santiago-Bautista had been an employee at the farm for eleven years and had socialized with the family for birthday parties and similar events. Santiago-Bautista told L.A. he had come to return a tool. She thanked him and closed the door, going back inside. Santiago-Bautista then opened the front door uninvited and walked into the house, asking L.A. if she wanted a hug, to which she replied, “no[.]” Tr. Vol. II p. 12.

[3] Santiago-Bautista continued into the house and sat next to L.A. on the couch. He began “rubbing [her] thigh up and down” on top of the blanket, eventually moving his hand under the blanket to touch her bare thigh. Id. He then “put his hand underneath [her] pants ․ [and] rubbed [her] vagina over [her] underwear” and “underneath [her] underwear.” Id. at 13. L.A. did not react to the touching but was “[s]cared.” Id. Santiago-Bautista then took off her shorts and carried her to her bedroom, where he “laid [her] on the bed” and “put his head between [her] thighs” and “lick[ed]” her. Id. at 15. At this point, she “started screaming” and he “put his hand over [her] mouth.” Id. He then got on top of her, held her down, and “put his penis inside [her].” Id. After “two or three minutes,” he pulled out, brought L.A. her clothes, and left. Id. at 16.

[4] L.A. called her parents and informed them what had happened. Her parents called the police, who began an investigation and instructed L.A.’s parents to take her to the hospital. She was taken to Riley Children's Hospital in Indianapolis, where a sexual-assault nurse conducted an examination and collected samples for a sexual-assault kit. The police interviewed Santiago-Bautista, who gave conflicting accounts of his interactions with L.A. that day. He eventually stated he had gone to the house, hugged L.A., but that she then “yelled at him” and ran to her bedroom, so he left. Id. at 71. He consented to a buccal swab. Later testing on swabs from L.A.’s external genitalia revealed a DNA profile that was “150 billion times more likely if it originated from [L.A.] and Paulino Santiago-Bautista than if it originated from [L.A.] and an unknown, unrelated individual.” Ex. Vol. III p. 25.

[5] The State charged Santiago-Bautista with Level 3 felony rape, Level 4 felony burglary, Level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor, and Level 5 felony sexual misconduct with a minor. A bench trial was held in March 2025. At trial, L.A. testified as to the details of the sexual assault, and acknowledged that she did not physically resist. She testified that she was “[v]ery scared” and did not “feel like [she] could get away[.]” Tr. Vol. II pp. 15, 25.

[6] The court found Santiago-Bautista guilty of Level 3 felony rape, Level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor, and Level 5 felony sexual misconduct with a minor, but acquitted him of the burglary charge. Due to double-jeopardy concerns, the court entered judgment of conviction only as to the Level 3 felony rape. At sentencing, L.A. and her parents submitted victim-impact statements, detailing L.A.’s mental-health struggles since the rape, including that she suffers from depression, anxiety, and has thoughts of suicide. Her parents also highlighted the betrayal they felt given their long relationship with Santiago-Bautista and that the crime happened in their home. The court then stated,

․ I can only think of the horrific nature of this crime and what trauma it has placed on her and her family. I think you were in a position of trust, and you'd been around the family since she was very, very young. And betrayal of that trust was extraordinary, and the trauma that was suffered by her was extreme, and it caused -- the trauma that was caused to her family has been extreme. It was unnecessary, senseless, deviant, disgusting, and evil. Your actions were predatory in nature, given her age, your position of trust, and your knowledge of the situation.

Id. at 155. The court noted the following aggravators: (1) that the “harm, injury, loss, or damage suffered by the victim of an offense was significant; and greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense” and (2) that Santiago-Bautista was “in a position of trust with the family given his lengthy work history on the family farm and had been around the victim since she was approximately four (4) years old.” App. Vol. II p. 108. The court sentenced Santiago-Bautista to fourteen years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction. Santiago-Bautista now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of Evidence

[7] Santiago-Bautista first argues the evidence is insufficient to support his Level 3 felony rape conviction. Our standard for reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence is well-settled:

For sufficiency of the evidence challenges, we consider only probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the judgment of the trier of fact. On sufficiency challenges, we will neither reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Hall v. State, 177 N.E.3d 1183, 1191 (Ind. 2021) (citations omitted).

[8] In order to convict Santiago-Bautista of Level 3 felony rape, the State must prove he knowingly or intentionally had sexual intercourse with L.A. or knowingly or intentionally caused L.A. to perform or submit to other sexual conduct, and that L.A. was compelled by force or imminent threat of force. See Ind. Code § 35-42-4-1(a)(1) (2022).¹ Santiago-Bautista challenges only whether the State sufficiently showed L.A. was compelled by force or imminent threat of force.

[9] Our Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he force necessary to sustain a rape conviction need not be physical; it may be constructive or implied from the circumstances.” Jones v. State, 589 N.E.2d 241, 242 (Ind. 1992). However, “[e]vidence that a victim did not voluntarily consent to a touching does not, in itself, support the conclusion that the defendant compelled the victim to submit to the touching by force or threat of force.” Bailey v. State, 764 N.E.2d 728, 730 (Ind. 2002). When determining whether the presence or absence of forceful compulsion existed, we use a subjective test that looks to the victim's perception of the circumstances. Id. at 732. Thus, the question is whether the evidence supports that L.A. perceived that she was compelled to submit to Santiago-Bautista's touch by force or imminent threat of force. See id.

[10] Santiago-Bautista likens his case to Jones, 589 N.E.2d at 243, in which our Supreme Court overturned a rape conviction due to insufficient evidence of force or imminent threat of force. There, Jones and twenty-six-year-old C.L. lived in the same house, and one night Jones approached her and asked her to have sex with him. She initially refused, but he kept asking, and the third time she “just let him have it” because she was “afraid.” Id. at 242. Our Supreme Court determined this was insufficient citing a lack of “evidence of force or threats, either actual or implied from the surrounding circumstances.” Id. at 243.

[11] Unlike in Jones, here there is sufficient evidence of force or threats implied from the surrounding circumstances. Fourteen-year-old L.A. was home alone when Santiago-Bautista, an adult man, walked into her home uninvited. He asked her for a hug, and when she refused, he began touching her thigh and eventually her vagina. He then carried her to her bedroom and performed oral sex on her. She testified that she was “[v]ery scared” and at one point “started screaming” but Santiago-Bautista put his hand over her mouth. Tr. Vol. II p. 15. He then held her down, got on top of her, and “put his penis inside [her.]” Id. While Santiago-Bautista may not have verbalized any threats, these circumstances from L.A.’s perspective are sufficient to imply force or threat of force. See Tobias v. State, 666 N.E.2d 68, 72 (Ind. 1996) (evidence sufficient to show force or threat of force where defendant, an adult man, physically forced himself on the sixteen-year-old victim, held her down, ignored her verbal resistance, and subjected her to sexual acts). As such, the evidence most favorable to the judgment was sufficient to prove Level 3 felony rape.

II. Sentencing

[12] Santiago-Bautista also argues the trial court erred in sentencing him and, specifically, that it considered two improper aggravators. “[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. A court abuses its discretion in sentencing a defendant if it: (1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all[,]” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons,” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration,” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.” Id. at 490-91. The sentencing range for Level 3 felony rape is three to sixteen years, with an advisory sentence of nine years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-5(b) (2014). Santiago-Bautista received an above-advisory sentence of fourteen years.

[13] Santiago-Bautista argues the trial court abused its discretion by identifying the harm, loss, or damage suffered by L.A. as an aggravating factor. “The trial court may assign aggravating weight to the harm, injury, loss or damage suffered by the victim if such harm was significant and greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense.” Sharkey v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1074, 1078 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012); Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(a)(1) (2019).²

[14] Here, the court cited “extreme” trauma to L.A., who was fourteen years old at the time of the offense. Tr. Vol. II p. 155. This trauma is reflected in letters from L.A. and her family, which were entered into evidence at the sentencing hearing. L.A. and her parents detailed her mental-health struggles after the attack, including anxiety, depression, and suicidal thoughts, and emphasizing the harm was compounded by the fact that it occurred in her home and by a family friend. Given this evidence, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in finding this aggravating factor. See Sharkey, 967 N.E.2d at 1078-79 (trial court did not err in identifying harm to victims as aggravating sentencing factor where court relied on victim letter, which described harm beyond what was necessary to prove offense).

[15] Santiago-Bautista also argues the trial court abused its discretion by identifying as a non-statutory aggravating factor that he was in a position of trust with L.A. and her family. “A position of trust exists where a defendant has ‘more than a casual relationship with the victim and has abused the trust resulting from that relationship.’ ” Amalfitano v. State, 956 N.E.2d 208, 211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 868 N.E.2d 551, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)), trans. denied. Here, the evidence showed Santiago-Bautista had worked for L.A.’s family on their farm for eleven years and had known her since she was approximately four years old. He had socialized with the family, including being invited to parties at their home. And he used this trust to initiate his encounter with L.A.—claiming that he was at the home to return a tool he had borrowed. We have previously found the “position of trust” aggravator to apply to similar circumstances. See Benner v. State, 131 N.E.3d 634, 639 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (defendant was in a position of trust in part because he was a “family friend” of the victim); see also Reyes v. State, 828 N.E.2d 420, 424 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (affirming trial court's use of position of trust aggravator where defendant was victim's friend and used that relationship to gain access to the victim's home), summarily aff'd in relevant part, 848 N.E.2d 1081, 1083 (Ind. 2006). As such, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in identifying this aggravator.

[16] Affirmed.³

FOOTNOTES

1.   Indiana Code section 35-42-4-1 was amended effective July 1, 2025.

2.   Indiana Code section 35-38-1-7.1 was amended effective June 30, 2023, and two subsequent times in 2024 and 2025 respectively.

3.   Santiago-Bautista also argues the trial court erred in admitting DNA evidence obtained from L.A.’s sexual-assault kit, contending the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody. However, the sexual-assault kit was not admitted at trial. Instead, the State introduced State's Exhibits 20 and 22—certificates of analysis from the Indiana State Police Laboratory containing the results of DNA testing on the contents of the sexual-assault kit. Santiago-Bautista did not object to the admission of either exhibit. While he did object to the forensic scientist's testimony regarding DNA evidence, he did so only after State's Exhibit 20 had been admitted, and only on the basis of lack of foundation. See Tr. Vol. II p. 97. As such, he has waived this issue for our review. See Raess v. Doescher, 883 N.E.2d 790, 797 (Ind. 2008) (“To preserve a claimed error in the admission of evidence, a party must make a contemporaneous objection that is sufficiently specific to alert the trial judge fully of the legal issue.” (quotation omitted)). Furthermore, he does not now argue fundamental error and thus has arguably doubly waived the issue. See Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1179 (Ind. 2016) (holding that where appellant “failed to raise the issue of fundamental error in his initial appellate brief[,]” such a claim was “entirely waived”). As such, we will not address this issue.

Scheele, Judge.

Brown, J., and Felix, J., concur.