M.L., Appellant-Respondent v. BY NEXT FRIEND (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] M.L. appeals the trial court's entry of an order of protection on behalf of L.L. M.L. raises three issues for our review, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court's order is clearly erroneous. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] M.L. is L.L.’s stepmother. L.L. is a two-year-old child who is the subject of a custody order between her mother, K.W. (“Mother”), and her father, B.L. (“Father”).

[3] On January 19, 2025, L.L. was in the care of Father and M.L. That afternoon, Father contacted Mother and reported that L.L. had fallen out of her crib, but she was fine. That evening, Mother picked up L.L. from Father, and Mother observed “bruising,” “welts,” and a handprint across L.L.’s lower back. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 15. Mother took L.L. to a nearby emergency room, and local law enforcement and the Indiana Department of Child Services became involved.

[4] Mother filed a petition for an order of protection on L.L.’s behalf and against M.L. The trial court entered a temporary ex parte order and then set the matter for a hearing on whether to make the temporary order permanent. At that hearing, Mother testified to her own observations of L.L. on the evening of January 19. Mother also submitted into evidence seven photographs she had taken of L.L.’s injuries from January 19 through January 21. Those photographs showed significant redness and swelling across L.L.’s entire lower back.

[5] Following the hearing, the trial court entered a two-year order of protection against M.L. and on L.L.’s behalf. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Initially, we note that Mother has not filed an appellee's brief on L.L.’s behalf. When the appellee fails to file a brief on appeal, we may reverse the trial court's decision if the appellant makes a prima facie showing of reversible error. McGill v. McGill, 801 N.E.2d 1249, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). In this context, prima facie error is defined as “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Orlich v. Orlich, 859 N.E.2d 671, 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). This rule was established to make clear that it is not the burden of the court on appeal to rebut apparently valid arguments advanced for reversing the trial court's judgment. See McGill, 801 N.E.2d at 1251.

[7] M.L. contends that Mother did not present evidence sufficient to support the order of protection for L.L. Our standard of review is well settled. When considering the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a decision to issue an order of protection, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. A.G. v. P.G., 974 N.E.2d 598, 598 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). We look only to the evidence of probative value and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Id.

[8] M.L. first argues that Mother presented insufficient evidence to show that M.L. was the cause of L.L.’s injuries. But, contrary to M.L.’s argument on appeal, the evidence at trial was undisputed that Father and M.L. were L.L.’s caregivers at the time she incurred the injuries. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 24. Indeed, Father testified that he was outside and M.L. was inside with L.L. when L.L. was injured. Id. Thus, there is res ipsa loquitor evidence that M.L. was a cause of L.L.’s injuries, and the court's entry of the order of protection against M.L. is not clearly erroneous.

[9] M.L. next asserts that she is not a present threat to L.L. because she has not had contact with L.L. since the January incident. But M.L.’s lack of contact with L.L. is at least in part because of the investigations and ex parte order of protection that followed the incident. In addition, Father testified that he and M.L. are married and share a residence, and Father has a custody order for parenting time with L.L. Since Father's custodial time with L.L. would otherwise occur in the presence of M.L., M.L.’s argument here is not persuasive.

[10] Last, M.L. argues that the order of protection is not necessary to protect L.L. because the family law court can adjust custody between Father and Mother. While we agree that the family law court has concurrent jurisdiction over L.L., until it exercises that jurisdiction, the trial court's protection order remains in full force and effect as Father's legal right to parenting time is not the issue here.

[11] For all of these reasons, M.L.’s arguments against the order of protection fail, and we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[12] Affirmed.

Mathias, Judge.

May, J., and Felix, J., concur.