CHINWEZE v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Uzochukwu Chinweze appeals his conviction for rape as a level 3 felony. He contends that he involuntarily waived his right to a jury trial. He also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request for a continuance and in admitting certain evidence. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In July 2023, Chinweze was a correctional officer at the Indiana Women's Prison and was assigned to the Special Needs Unit (“the SNU”). T.N. was an inmate in the SNU, which houses inmates who are “seriously mentally ill.” Transcript Volume II at 43. Generally, prior to 10:00 p.m., the SNU inmates had access to a “TV area, a kitchen, a laundry room, [and] a mop closet.” Id. at 90. On “[m]ore than one” occasion, “after lights out,” Chinweze would knock on T.N.’s door and she would meet him in the unit's kitchenette. Id. at 93-94. T.N. would stand in “a blind spot for the cameras,” and Chinweze would “[s]tick his fingers in [T.N.’s] vagina” and touch her breasts. Id. at 94.

[3] On July 5, 2023, Chinweze told T.N. to meet him in the mop closet. The mop closet was generally locked, but Chinweze unlocked it that night. T.N. agreed to meet Chinweze and believed that they “were going to mess around” and that Chinweze would “touch” her “[s]imilar to what happened in the kitchenette.” Id. at 95. T.N. walked to the closet, and after she was in the closet for “maybe 20 seconds,” Chinweze entered. Id. at 96. Chinweze grabbed T.N. by the hips, turned her around, and pulled her pants down. T.N. told “him to stop,” but he did not and she knew that she “didn't have any control over the situation.” Id. Chinweze inserted his penis inside T.N.’s vagina and ejaculated inside of her. He then inserted his penis inside her a second time but ejaculated on the floor drain “behind him.” Id. Chinweze “wiped himself off with a little napkin and tossed it at [T.N.]” saying, “Here, clean yourself.” Id. Chinweze “looked spooked,” left the mop closet “in a hurry,” and T.N. went to the bathroom and cleaned herself up before returning to her cell. Id. at 100-101. Shortly after the incident, T.N. stopped seeing Chinweze in the SNU and assumed he was no longer working at the prison or assigned to the unit.

[4] T.N. started having nightmares about Chinweze “raping” her, and she decided to write a letter to the warden about what happened in the mop closet and kitchenette. Id. at 103. In November 2023, an investigator was assigned to investigate the incident. During the investigation, surveillance video footage from July 5, 2023, was located “that aligned with what T.N. said.” Id. at 47.

[5] On January 30, 2024, the State charged Chinweze with sexual misconduct as a level 5 felony and sexual misconduct as a level 6 felony. On March 5, 2025, the State amended the information to add the charge of rape as a level 3 felony. Chinweze moved to continue his trial six times, the last one being on the first day of the scheduled trial, June 24, 2025. The court granted the first five motions to continue but denied the motion made on the day of trial. Specifically, on the day of trial, Chinweze requested a continuance to depose T.N. about whether she had sought and received a settlement in a civil case against another prison guard, Chinweze's former co-defendant in this case. Counsel requested a continuance to investigate, arguing that it went to T.N.’s credibility and motive. The State objected to the additional continuance arguing that the information would not be relevant because it concerned a different defendant, that T.N.’s allegation of sexual abuse against Chinweze came before her disclosure against the former co-defendant, that a continuance would be prejudicial to the State, and that its out-of-town witnesses had arranged to be present for trial. In explaining its reasons for the denial, the court noted that the possibility of a civil suit was “easily anticipatable” given the circumstances of the case, that defense counsel had already deposed T.N. once, and that the case had been pending for more than a year and one-half and it was starting to “get into undue delay.” Transcript Volume II at 6-8. Defense counsel argued that he needed just a “very brief” continuance. Id. at 7. The court denied the continuance but stated that it was taking a recess and told defense counsel, “[i]f you have information after talking to her, I'm more than happy to hear it.” Id. at 8.

[6] When the court came back on the record, it noted that it had received a verified waiver of Chinweze's right to a jury trial and that the “parties have agreed that we will bifurcate the proceedings and hear Miss T.N. on another day.” Id. at 9. The court then advised Chinweze regarding the difference between a bench trial and a jury trial, told Chinweze that he had an absolute right to a trial by jury, and that once he waived that right, he could not “take it back.” Id. at 10. Chinweze confirmed that he understood his rights, that he had not received any promises or inducements for his waiver, and that his attorney had advised him of his right to a jury trial. Id. Both Chinweze and his counsel signed a written waiver form that indicated that Chinweze had four years of college education, that his right to a jury trial was absolute, that he received no promises or inducements in exchange for the waiver, and that his waiver was entered into freely, knowingly, and voluntarily.

[7] The bench trial began that same day, and during the testimony of Prison Investigator Michelle Dewitt, the State introduced surveillance video footage from the prison. Defense counsel objected to the footage, stating that Dewitt could not “testify to whether or not what she saw actually happened on that day or not.” Id. at 55. The prosecutor responded, “I can ask further questions to identify people in the footage, but she's testified to how the system works” and “how it's stored and what kind of time stamps are associated with that, if the Court would like.” Id. The prosecutor further explained that Dewitt “was able to confirm when this happened because she found the footage,” but that the prosecutor would also “be calling the victim” to confirm that the incident indeed happened. Id. The court ruled, “I am going to admit it. Again, this is a bench trial. Expecting the State to close the loop with - - with the next witness.” Id.

[8] The bench trial resumed on August 18, 2025. T.N. testified that the surveillance video footage accurately portrayed the incidents that occurred on July 5, 2023. T.N. stated that the date stamp on the video was accurate and that the video showed Chinweze unlocking the mop closet, her entering the mop closet, and then Chinweze entering the mop closet. She testified that when they were in the mop closet, Chinweze forced sexual intercourse even after she told him to stop. The court found Chinweze guilty as charged.

[9] The court held a sentencing hearing on September 15, 2025. During the hearing, defense counsel stated that he “would like to orally move to correct error.” Id. at 182. He argued that, although Chinweze “understands that he did sign the jury waiver and request a bench trial ․ he does feel as if his right to jury trial was taken from him in the dilemma that he had to decide whether or not to continue this.” Id. He argued that Chinweze “felt like he was pressured into that and he was denied his right to a jury trial. And therefore, we would ask that the bench verdict be set aside and this matter be set - - reset for trial.” Id. When asked by the court if he had “some case law to support that position,” defense counsel stated that he did not. Id. The prosecutor then explained that the information Chinweze sought in requesting his sixth continuance was “all speculative” and that, after conferring with T.N., the prosecutor advised defense counsel that “there was no settlement” from the Department of Correction on behalf of Chinweze or the former co-defendant and that was “all figured out ahead of trial.” Id. at 184. Defense counsel argued that Chinweze “had to decide whether or not to waive his fundamental right to a jury trial or get the continuance to explore potentially exculpatory information.” Id. at 186. The court denied the motion to correct error, noting that the evidence sought with the continuance was not even “potentially exculpatory,” and that Chinweze's current claims were akin to Chinweze simply deciding, “I have regrets” because “I got convicted.” Id.

[10] At the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, the court vacated the sexual misconduct verdicts due to double jeopardy concerns and entered judgment of conviction on rape as a level 3 felony. The court imposed an eleven-year executed sentence.

Discussion

I.

[11] Chinweze first challenges his waiver to his right to a jury trial. The Indiana Supreme Court has explained:

The jury trial right is a bedrock of our criminal justice system, guaranteed by both Article I, Section 13 of the Indiana Constitution and the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In broad view, federal and Indiana constitutional jury trial rights guarantee the same general protection—a criminal defendant must receive a jury trial, unless he waives it. Waiver of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right must be “express and intelligent,” Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312, 50 S.Ct. 253, 74 L.Ed. 854 (1930), and waiver of the Indiana constitutional jury trial right must be “knowing, voluntary[,] and intelligent,” Perkins v. State, 541 N.E.2d 927, 928 (Ind. 1989).

Horton v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1154, 1158 (Ind. 2016). On appeal, the defendant bears the burden of establishing that his waiver was invalid. Nunez v. State, 43 N.E.3d 680, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

[12] On the record presented, we have little difficulty concluding that Chinweze's waiver of his right to a jury trial was valid. First, Chinweze's waiver was knowing. We observe that Chinweze was advised of his rights both on the record and in writing. “For waiver to be knowing, a defendant must be advised of their rights either on the record or in writing.” Carmouche v. State, 188 N.E.3d 482, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (citing Duncan v. State, 975 N.E.2d 838, 844 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)). Second, Chinweze's waiver was voluntary. At the start of the bench trial, the trial court stated on the record that the parties had agreed and were ready to proceed in a bifurcated bench trial, Chinweze did not object to the case being tried by the court, and Chinweze orally confirmed that he had received no promises or inducements in exchange for the waiver of his right to a jury trial. “[S]ubmission to a bench trial [is] one piece of evidence, among others, supporting a [voluntary] waiver.” Johnson v. State, 6 N.E.3d 491, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Finally, Chinweze's waiver was intelligent. Both he and his counsel signed and submitted in open court a written waiver of jury trial form that indicated that Chinweze had attended four years of college. “[A] defendant's understanding [of waiver of a jury trial] may be inferred when he and his attorney both sign a written waiver of the jury trial right and file it in open court.” Poore v. State, 681 N.E.2d 204, 207 (Ind. 1997) (“The evidence tends to show that [the defendant] could read and that he thus had the ability to understand the short waiver form he signed.”). On this record, we cannot say that Chinweze did not knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial. Chinweze has not met his burden to demonstrate that his jury trial waiver was invalid.

[13] To the extent that Chinweze asserts that his waiver was somehow induced or coerced due to an “unconstitutional condition” whereby the trial court “forced [him] to choose between his right to a jury trial or his right to obtain evidence in his favor,” Appellant's Brief at 10-11, the record does not support such assertion. Chinweze suggests that “[h]ad [he] asserted his right to a jury trial, they would have proceeded with T.N.’s testimony either that day or the next, depriving his counsel the opportunity to investigate this new evidence” and that “it is evident that the only avenue for [him] to investigate this impeachment evidence was to waive his right to a jury trial and agree to a bifurcated bench trial.” Id. at 16. However, Chinweze's assertion in this regard consists of mere speculation as he concedes that “it appears the critical conversations ․ were conducted off record.” Id. at 15.¹ We cannot say reversal is warranted on this basis.

II.

[14] Chinweze next challenges the court's denial of his motion for continuance made on the first day of trial. Rulings on non-statutory motions for continuance are within the trial court's discretion and will be reversed only for an abuse of that discretion and resultant prejudice. Robinson v. State, 91 N.E.3d 574, 577 (Ind. 2018). “There is a strong presumption that the trial court properly exercised its discretion.” Id. (quoting Warner v. State, 773 N.E.2d 239, 247 (Ind. 2002)). “We will not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion unless the defendant can demonstrate prejudice as a result of the trial court's denial of the motion for continuance.” Stafford v. State, 890 N.E.2d 744, 750 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Continuances to allow more time for preparation are not favored. Id. (citing Timm v. State, 644 N.E.2d 1235, 1237 (Ind. 1994)). Further, motions to allow more time for preparation “require a specific showing as to how the additional time would have aided counsel.” Zanussi v. State, 2 N.E.3d 731, 734 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013).

[15] The record reveals that, in denying Chinweze's motion for continuance made on the morning of trial, the court considered extensive arguments by both parties and weighed the competing interests. In addition, the court called for an immediate recess for Chinweze to conduct some brief investigation, and further ordered the trial bifurcated so that T.N. would be called as a witness on a much later date to allow Chinweze additional opportunity to investigate the existence of a settlement involving Chinweze's former co-defendant. Significantly, as noted by the court in considering Chinweze's oral motion to correct error on this issue during the sentencing hearing, the evidence sought with the continuance regarding what turned out to be a nonexistent settlement was not even “potentially exculpatory.” Transcript Volume II at 186. Chinweze has not demonstrated prejudice or that reversal is warranted.

III.

[16] Chinweze asserts that the court abused its discretion in admitting the video surveillance footage because the State failed to properly “authenticate the video under the silent witness theory.” Appellant's Brief at 21. Specifically, he maintains that the State “failed to make a ‘strong’ showing of competency.” Appellant's Reply Brief at 8 (capitalization and emphasis omitted).

[17] The trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind. 2016). A trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence is generally accorded a great deal of deference on appeal. Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015), reh'g denied.

[18] Ind. Evidence Rule 901(a) provides that “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” “Photographs and videos can be authenticated through either a witness's testimony or, in instances in which no witness observed what a photograph or video portrays, the silent-witness theory.” McFall v. State, 71 N.E.3d 383, 388 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). The foundational requirements for the admission of evidence under the silent witness theory are more stringent than those required for demonstrative evidence. Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1282 (Ind. 2014). There must be “a strong showing of authenticity and competency, including proof that the evidence was not altered.” McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 561-562 (Ind. 2018).

[19] To the extent Chinweze relies on the silent witness theory to exclude the video evidence as improperly authenticated, we find such reliance misplaced. Here, when the State introduced the video footage during Dewitt's testimony, defense counsel objected to the footage, stating that Dewitt could not “testify to whether or not what she saw actually happened on that day or not.” Transcript Volume II at 55. The prosecutor responded, “I can ask further questions to identify people in the footage, but she's testified to how the system works” and “how it's stored and what kind of time stamps are associated with that, if the Court would like.” Id. The prosecutor further explained that Dewitt “was able to confirm when this happened because she found the footage,” but that the prosecutor would also “be calling the victim” to confirm that the incident indeed happened. Id. The court ruled, “I am going to admit it. Again, this is a bench trial. Expecting the State to close the loop with - - with the next witness.” Id.

[20] The State, in fact, did close that loop as, T.N., a witness to most of what the video portrayed, testified as to the relevant events depicted in the video. Accordingly, the contents of the video were properly authenticated through her testimony and there was no need to satisfy the silent witness theory. Moreover, where, as here, the court conducts a bench trial, we presume the trial court knows and properly applies the law and considers only evidence properly before the court as the court reaches a decision. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 873 (Ind. 2012). Thus, we presume the court did not consider any evidence that it was not persuaded to a relative certainty of its competence and authenticity. We find no abuse of discretion or reversible error on this issue.

[21] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Chinweze's conviction.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We find Chinweze's reliance on Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), misplaced. In Simmons, the defendant claimed that he was forced to choose between his Fourth Amendment rights and his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Simmons Court indeed held that the exercise of one constitutional right may not be conditioned on the waiver of another constitutional right, but the court specifically stated that its holding did not apply in cases where the defendant “makes no objection.” Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394 (“We therefore hold that when a defendant testifies in support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no objection.”). Here, Chinweze made no objection at the time he alleges he traded one constitutional right (his right to present a complete defense) for another (his right to a jury trial).

Brown, Judge.

Felix, J., and Scheele, J., concur.