RHOTON v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Corey Rhoton was convicted of eight counts of child molesting and was sentenced to an aggregate term of sixty-four years. Rhoton filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court (“PC Court”) granted Rhoton's initial motion for a continuance of the post-conviction hearing. The PC Court, however, denied Rhoton's subsequent motions for a continuance, conducted an evidentiary hearing, and denied Rhoton's petition for post-conviction relief on the merits. Rhoton now appeals and argues that the PC Court abused its discretion by denying his motion for a continuance. We find Rhoton's arguments without merit and, accordingly, affirm.

Issue

[2] Rhoton raises two issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as whether the PC Court abused its discretion in denying Rhoton's motion to continue the evidentiary hearing.

Facts

[3] On November 13, 2017, Rhoton was convicted following a jury trial of ten counts of child molesting and was sentenced to an aggregate term of sixty-four years. On direct appeal, this Court reversed two of Rhoton's convictions and remanded for resentencing. Rhoton v. State, No. 19A-CR-2851, slip op. pp. 1-5 (Ind. Ct. App. June 12, 2020) (mem.) (affirming in part, reversing in part, and remanding; holding evidence insufficient to support Counts 5 and 6). On remand, the trial court again imposed an aggregate sixty-four-year sentence, which Rhoton appealed. In his second direct appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. Rhoton v. State, No. 21A-CR-458, slip op. pp. 1-3 (Ind. Ct. App. Aug. 10, 2021) (mem.) (affirming sentence on remand).

[4] On August 17, 2022, Rhoton filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR”), alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. App. Vol. II pp. 23-24.¹ On November 19, 2024, the public defender withdrew from Rhoton's case after investigating the matter, concluding that Rhoton's “post-conviction claims lack merit” and that continued representation was not in the interests of justice. Id. at 55. Rhoton proceeded pro se and, on December 18, 2024, moved to continue the post-conviction evidentiary hearing then set for January 15, 2025. The PC Court granted the motion on December 23, 2024, continuing the evidentiary hearing to April 23, 2025, and stated that it did “not anticipate granting any further continuances.” Id. at 63. Thereafter, Rhoton filed two additional motions to continue—on March 19, 2025, and April 17, 2025—each requesting an additional 180 days to process the record and conduct research, without providing further supporting information. The PC Court denied both motions and emphasized that the post-conviction hearing would proceed as scheduled.

[5] The post-conviction evidentiary hearing was held on April 23, 2025. At the outset, Rhoton again requested a continuance. When the PC Court asked Rhoton to explain the basis for his request, Rhoton stated that he was “trying to dig things” and “trying to find things,” without elaborating. Tr. Vol. II p. 6. Rhoton also testified that he was asking for a continuance because he felt like “there might be more.” Id. The State objected to Rhoton's motion to continue due to the length of time the post-conviction petition had been pending and Rhoton's lack of specificity regarding the grounds for the request. The PC Court explained that it was required to balance the interests of all parties, including the petitioner, the State, victims, and witnesses, given that it had been two and a half years since the post-conviction petition was filed and more than seven years since the underlying criminal case. The PC Court denied Rhoton's motion and proceeded with the evidentiary hearing.

[6] The PC Court began by asking Rhoton if there was “anything that [he] th[ought] [wa]s relevant for ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 9. Rhoton responded that he “[did not] have anything with [him] to argue.” Id. After Rhoton was sworn, the PC Court asked him again to explain his claim of “ineffective assistance of counsel” during his testimony. Id. at 11. Rhoton, however, responded that “[he] c[ould not] really think of a whole lot of anything.” Id. at 12. When the PC Court then asked Rhoton to explain how counsel was ineffective during his two direct appeals, Rhoton stated that the only thing he could think of concerned his lack of criminal history as a mitigating factor at sentencing. But on direct appeal, Rhoton's appellate counsel had already raised that point, and it was identified as a mitigator in the appellate decision. See Rhoton, No. 21A-CR-458, slip op. pp. 1-3. The PC Court took judicial notice of the prior record, and the State moved to have the PC Court dismiss the petition because Rhoton “has failed to present by preponderance of evidence that there was ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. at 15.

[7] On April 23, 2025, the PC Court entered an order denying Rhoton's motion to continue and denying his post-conviction petition on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Rhoton now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[8] Rhoton appeals the PC Court's denial of his motion to continue and denial of his post-conviction relief petition with prejudice. Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings in which a defendant may present limited collateral challenges to a conviction and sentence. Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 681 (Ind. 2019); Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(b). “The scope of potential relief is limited to issues unknown at trial or unavailable on direct appeal.” Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681. “Issues available on direct appeal but not raised are waived, while issues litigated adversely to the defendant are res judicata.” Id. The petitioner bears the burden of establishing his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Id.; P.-C.R. 1(5).

[9] When, as here, the petitioner “appeals from a negative judgment denying post-conviction relief, he ‘must establish that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court's decision.’ ” Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681 (quoting Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2000)). When reviewing the post-conviction court's order denying relief, we will “not defer to the post-conviction court's legal conclusions,” and the “findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1279 (Ind. 2019). When a petitioner “fails to meet this ‘rigorous standard of review,’ we will affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief.” Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681 (quoting DeWitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 169-70 (Ind. 2001)).

[10] We note that Rhoton proceeds in this appeal pro se, as he did before the PC Court. Under Indiana law, “ ‘a pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.’ ” Stark v. State, 204 N.E.3d 957, 963 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014)). Like a trained attorney, a pro se litigant is responsible for “following procedural and evidentiary rules.” Jefferson v. State, 891 N.E.2d 77, 87 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Piper v. State, 770 N.E.2d 880, 883 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)), trans. denied. Accordingly, we must hold Rhoton to the standard of a trained attorney.

[11] A trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to continue is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, and there is a strong presumption the trial court properly exercised its discretion. Gunashekar v. Grose, 915 N.E.2d 953, 955 (Ind. 2009). A denial of a motion for a continuance is an abuse of discretion only if the movant demonstrates good cause for granting it. Id. No abuse of discretion will be found, however, when the moving party has not demonstrated that he or she was prejudiced by the denial. Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Office of Fam. & Child., 841 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied.

[12] Rhoton mainly argues that the PC Court abused its discretion in denying his motion to continue because most of the delay in the proceedings was not attributable to him.² We find his argument unpersuasive.

[13] Here, Rhoton did not provide the PC Court with any specific reason for a continuance. Instead, he told the PC Court that he was “trying to find things” and “trying to dig things” because “there might be more.” Tr. Vol. II p. 6. Nor was this Rhoton's first request for a continuance. The PC Court granted Rhoton's first motion to continue on December 23, 2024, and the PC Court expressly stated that it did “not anticipate granting any further continuances.” App. Vol. II p. 63. That order also reset the post-conviction evidentiary hearing from January 15, 2025, to April 23, 2025, giving Rhoton more than three months of additional time.

[14] Before the April 23 hearing, Rhoton filed two more motions to continue, which the PC Court denied. In those motions, Rhoton asserted only that he was attempting to obtain “trial counsel's client file,” “other documents,” and that there was an “unavailability of a material witness.” Id. at 66. But Rhoton did not identify the witness, the file, or any other specific information that would allow the PC Court to assess the requests. At the April 23 hearing, Rhoton again moved to continue the hearing for the fourth time. Although more than four months had passed since his first motion to continue, he still failed to articulate any specific cause, failed to show how he would benefit from the additional time requested, and failed to demonstrate prejudice from the denial. Under these circumstances, the PC Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rhoton's motion to continue.

[15] Rhoton also argues that the PC Court clearly erred in denying his post-conviction petition. See Appellant's Br. pp. 17-18. But at the April 23, 2025 PCR hearing, Rhoton did not allege any specific basis for post-conviction relief. Rhoton did not identify any facts or conduct or present any witness or evidence at the hearing showing that counsel rendered ineffective assistance. When the PC Court asked him about his petition, he responded that he “[did not] have anything with [him] to argue.” Tr. Vol. II p. 9. Instead, he referred only generally to “ineffective assistance of counsel” based on “meritorious issues” as stated in his initial post-conviction petition in 2022. App. Vol. II p. 24.

[16] Likewise, in his appellate brief, Rhoton primarily challenges the denial of his motion to continue, and he mentions the denial of his post-conviction petition only briefly in the conclusion. By failing to present a cogent argument supported by authority and citations to the record regarding the denial of his PCR petition, Rhoton has waived the issue and, accordingly, we need not address it. See Ind. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a) (“The argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on, in accordance with Rule 22.”) (emphasis added).

Conclusion

[17] The PC Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rhoton's motion to continue. Additionally, Rhoton has failed to demonstrate that the PC Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief is clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The following day, the PC Court appointed the State Public Defender's Office to represent Rhoton. On September 16, 2022, the State Public Defender entered an appearance and filed a Notice of Present Inability to Investigate. On September 18, 2022, the PC Court stayed the proceedings. In November 2023, a new public defender substituted for prior counsel. On August 20, 2024, the PC Court, sua sponte, scheduled a hearing on dismissal for failure to prosecute for more than 180 days. The public defender moved to vacate the hearing, and the PC Court granted the motion on September 27, 2024.

2.   Rhoton also argues that the denial of his continuance motion violated his “due process” rights. Appellant's Br. p. 17. But in this portion of his brief, Rhoton largely repeats his abuse-of-discretion argument—that the PC Court did not give him enough time to work on his case. The record shows that, after the public defender withdrew, the PC Court granted Rhoton's initial motion to continue and reset the post-conviction evidentiary hearing to April 23, 2025. Under these circumstances, Rhoton's repetition of the same claim, coupled with only a vague reference to the Fourteenth Amendment and the absence of cogent argument or supporting authority, does not present a constitutional claim for review. See Ind. App. R. 46(A)(8)(a) (“The argument must contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning. Each contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on, in accordance with Rule 22.”) (emphasis added).

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.