SMITH v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Christopher A. Smith was convicted of Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug and found to be a habitual offender. He now appeals, asserting two issues for our review: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to convict him of the Level 2 felony and (2) whether his sentence is inappropriate. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On December 27, 2023, Detective Jordan Corral of the Huntington City Police Department was working with “Austin”—a confidential informant (CI)–to conduct controlled drug buys. Tr. Vol. II p. 145. The CI texted the “target,” Bethany Kinney, and arranged to meet her at a gas station in Roanoke to purchase “fentanyl pills[.]” Id. at 149, 188.

[3] Officers provided the CI with $600 and followed him to the gas station in unmarked vehicles. Officers then watched two individuals, later identified as Smith and Kinney, arrive in a silver Chevrolet Impala. Kinney got out of the Chevrolet Impala, approached the CI's vehicle, got in, gave him a “baggie containing 150 fentanyl pills” in exchange for $600, and then left with Smith in the Chevrolet Impala. Id. at 191. Later testing revealed the pills weighed approximately 20.95 grams and contained fentanyl.

[4] Officers began investigating Kinney, including obtaining warrants for her social-media accounts and cell phone. On the day of the controlled buy, Kinney sent the following messages from her social-media account: “Dopefien Austin just spent 600 but I split it with Chris[,]” “Austin was like yo you shorted me and literally me and Chris counted them out[,]” and “I just grabbed the load 75 I threw in and 75 Chris through [sic] in[.]” Ex. Vol. IV pp. 36-37. Officers also discovered the Chevrolet Impala was registered to Smith's sister and determined through Smith's BMV photo that his physical appearance was consistent with the individual present at the controlled buy.

[5] The State charged Smith with Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug and alleged he was a habitual offender. A jury trial was held in August 2025. Kinney testified that in December 2023 she was using and selling controlled substances, mainly fentanyl, and that her “primary source” for fentanyl was Smith. Tr. Vol. II p. 187. She stated that on December 27, Smith provided her transportation to the sale, contributed half the pills, and received half of the money from the sale. Kinney contributed the other half of the pills, although she testified she had previously purchased those pills from Smith. Kinney also confirmed that she was charged with Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug for her involvement in this matter and that she entered into a plea agreement with the State. She stated the plea agreement required her to “testify truthfully[.]” Id. at 193.

[6] The jury found Smith guilty of the Level 2 felony, and he admitted to being a habitual offender. At sentencing, the court found the following aggravators: (1) Smith's criminal history—consisting of eleven felonies and thirty-two misdemeanors—which the court indicated was “the worst” it had ever seen, and (2) that he was on probation at the time of the offense. Tr. Vol. III p. 14. The court sentenced Smith to twenty-eight years for the Level 2 felony, enhanced by seventeen years for being a habitual offender, for an aggregate sentence of forty-five years fully executed in the Indiana Department of Correction. Smith now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Sufficiency of Evidence

[7] First, Smith contends the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug. Specifically, he asks us to disregard Kinney's testimony under the doctrine of incredible dubiosity. Under this doctrine, we can impinge upon a fact-finder's responsibility to judge the credibility of the witnesses when “the testimony is so incredibly dubious or inherently improbable that no reasonable person could believe it.” Hampton v. State, 921 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), reh'g denied, trans. denied. The doctrine “requires that there be: 1) a sole testifying witness; 2) testimony that is inherently contradictory, equivocal, or the result of coercion; and 3) a complete absence of circumstantial evidence.” Moore v. State, 27 N.E.3d 749, 756 (Ind. 2015). Application of this rule is rare. Leyva v. State, 971 N.E.2d 699, 702 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied.

[8] Smith first argues Kinney's testimony is contradictory, pointing to the fact that she testified first that Smith provided half of the 150 pills, but then later testified all of the pills came from Smith. But as the State points out, this contradiction was explained at trial. Kinney testified that while she and Smith both contributed seventy-five pills, her seventy-five pills originally came from Smith, so he was the source of all. This testimony is not inherently contradictory. Smith also argues Kinney's testimony was the result of coercion, namely that she testified against Smith as part of a plea agreement with the State in which she received “substantially less incarceration time tha[n] [she] could have faced with no implication of Smith[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 15. But Kinney's plea agreement with the State merely required her to testify truthfully. And the existence of the agreement alone is not evidence of coercion. See Murray v. State, 761 N.E.2d 406, 409 (Ind. 2002).

[9] In any event, application of the incredible-dubiosity doctrine also requires a complete absence of circumstantial evidence, which does not exist here. Officers who surveilled the controlled buy connected the silver Chevrolet Impala to Smith, and photos taken by those officers show an individual who matches Smith's description. Furthermore, messages Kinney sent on the day of the controlled buy indicate “Chris” was involved in the buy and provided at least half the pills. Ex. Vol. IV p. 37. This is all circumstantial evidence which precludes the use of incredible-dubiosity doctrine.

II. Sentencing

[10] Smith next argues his sentence is inappropriate and asks us to revise it under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits us to revise a sentence if it “is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B)). We give the trial court “considerable deference” when reviewing a sentence under Rule 7(B). Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008)). We will not revise a sentencing decision absent “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1093 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)). The burden is on the defendant to persuade us that his sentence is inappropriate. Id. at 1092.

[11] A Level 2 felony carries a sentencing range of between ten and thirty years, with an advisory sentence of seventeen and a half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5 (2014). With an underlying Level 2 felony conviction, a habitual-offender adjudication carries a sentencing range of between eight and twenty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8(i)(1) (2023). Smith was sentenced to twenty-eight years for the Level 2 felony, enhanced by seventeen years for being a habitual offender, for an aggregate sentence of forty-five years.

[12] Looking first at the nature of the offense, Smith acknowledges that fentanyl is a “scourge” on society but argues the amount involved here—approximately twenty-one grams—is “on the lower side[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 18. But we note the statutory threshold for a Level 2 felony is ten grams, see Ind. Code 35-48-4-1(e)(1), and thus the amount here is more than double the amount necessary to constitute the offense. See Quintanilla v. State, 146 N.E.3d 982, 988 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (In sentencing, courts may consider whether “the amount of drugs actually in the defendant's possession is greater than the statutory threshold required to prove the charged offense.”). As for Smith's character, his criminal history—described by the trial court as the worst it had ever seen—consists of eleven felony convictions and thirty-two misdemeanors. He was also on probation at the time of this offense. Such an extensive criminal history reflects poorly on his character. Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“Even a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.”). In sum, Smith has failed to persuade us that his above-advisory sentence is inappropriate.

[13] Affirmed.

Scheele, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.