COPPER BEECH TOWNHOME COMMUNITIES EIGHT LLC v. LIVESAY (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Copper Beech Townhome Communities Eight, LLC, appeals the denial of its motion to vacate a judgment for Erin B. Livesay. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In November 2018, Copper Beech and Livesay, a Purdue student, entered into a Housing Agreement for the 2019-2020 school year. The agreement stated that Livesay, after signing, had to provide one of the following: (1) “a signed Guaranty by an acceptable Guarantor” or (2) “prepayment of the final two installments.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 16. Livesay's mother offered to be the guarantor, but Copper Beech rejected her. Because Livesay didn't have another guarantor and couldn't pre-pay two months of rent, she never moved in. Copper Beech nevertheless took the position that Livesay was responsible for the full year's rent, approximately $5,300, and sent the matter to a collection agency.

[3] In May 2021, Livesay filed a small-claims notice of claim against Copper Beech, alleging that Copper Beech “breached any agreement” between the parties and requesting $1 in damages and a declaratory judgment that she “do[esn't] owe [Copper Beech] anything.” Id. at 14. The next month, Copper Beech filed a counterclaim against Livesay. Noting that Livesay signed the Housing Agreement but “never moved in,” never “paid any of the rent due,” and “never found a sub-tenant or replacement [t]o take over,” Copper Beech claimed that, under the agreement, it was entitled to $300 for attorney's fees it incurred in defending Livesay's suit. Id. at 26.

[4] The small-claims court held a trial and, in July 2021, ruled that the parties’ actions “resulted in the termination of this contract” and precluded Copper Beech from “collecting rents under its terms.” Id. at 52. Accordingly, the court (1) granted Livesay's “request for a declaratory judgment that she does not owe [Copper Beech] money for rent or non-performance” under the Housing Agreement and (2) denied Copper Beech's counterclaim for attorney's fees under the agreement. Id. at 48.

[5] Copper Beech didn't appeal the judgment, but more than two years later, in November 2023, it moved to vacate the judgment under Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6). It argued, for the first time, that small-claims courts don't have subject-matter jurisdiction over requests for declaratory judgment and that as a result the judgment is void. After oral argument and briefing from the parties, the small-claims court denied Copper Beech's motion. The court concluded that Copper Beech's counterclaim for attorney's fees under the Housing Agreement gave the court subject-matter jurisdiction regardless of the nature of Livesay's claims:

4. [Copper Beech's] counterclaim for attorney fees was a contractual claim for damages related to a residential lease clearly within the Court's small claims jurisdiction. Moreover, [Copper Beech's] counterclaim was premised on the enforceability of the same contract [Livesay] had asked the Court to review. Thus, to address [Copper Beech's] counterclaim, the Court was obligated to undergo the same contractual analysis necessary to determine [Livesay's] claims. [Livesay] prevailed on both her original claims and [Copper Beech's] counterclaim because the Court's interpretation of the contract, its enforceability, and its termination compelled the same result on the competing claims. To state it differently, the Court could not determine [Copper Beech's] contractual based counterclaim on attorney fees without first determining the enforceability of the contract generally and who was at fault for any alleged breach specifically.

5. [Copper Beech] having injected the same issues before the Court on a clearly jurisdictionally sound small claims footing cannot now, for the first time, complain that [Livesay's] original complaint was not appropriately filed in the small claims court. Counterclaims generally are permissive rather than mandatory under the small claims docket. [Copper Beech] was not obligated to file their counterclaim. Specifically in this case, if [Copper Beech's] jurisdictional arguments are controlling, [Copper Beech] had the option to seek dismissal of [Livesay's] original claim at its inception (without the need to be heard on [Copper Beech's] counterclaim). [Copper Beech] chose not to raise the jurisdictional concerns at anytime prior to the Court's judgment (or even post judgment on appeal). [Copper Beech] did not raise them until nearly 2.5 years after the Court's judgment. Rather, [Copper Beech] chose to avail [itself] of the small claims court's jurisdiction to seek [its] own damages. [Copper Beech], having been unsuccessful on [its] own claim, now seek[s] to avoid those consequences by suggesting [its] undeniably jurisdictionally sound claim was somehow slaved to [Livesay's] allegedly jurisdictionally infirm claim. Neither the small claims rules with respect to counterclaims nor the parties’ conduct with respect to these issues raised at trial suggest that to be the case. It is worth noting that pursuant to the small claims rules, dismissal of [Livesay's] complaint would not dismiss [Copper Beech's] counterclaim. Further, pursuant to small claims rules, a [d]efendant who elects to pursue a counterclaim to decision waives some jurisdictional objections at least with respect to the amount of their own claim.

6. [Copper Beech] chose [ ] not to raise any jurisdictional challenges to [Livesay's] original complaint in favor of having their own counterclaim heard on the merits. The possible inconvenience of that choice nearly three years later does not require amelioratory action by this Court now. Had [Copper Beech] raised the jurisdictional issues initially, this case could have been transferred to the plenary docket avoiding the very issue of which [Copper Beech] now complains. Interestingly, [Copper Beech], despite years of time, could show no single factual, evidentiary, legal, or procedural discrepancy which would have potentially changed the outcome of the hearing had it occurred outside the small claims rules. Further, had [Copper Beech] prevailed on [its] counter claim it is doubtful [it] would now be asserting [its] enforceable judgment was somehow rendered invalid by whatever irregularities [it] chose to overlook with respect to [Livesay's] complaint. The force of [Copper Beech's] arguments on these issues would compel that [it is] free to ignore any issues with [Livesay's] complaint at the outset, seek [its] own judgment to [its] own benefit on the same contract, and if unsuccessful, raise [its] previously ignored challenges at anytime convenient to [it] into perpetuity. Further, [it] assert[s] that argument without pointing to any definitive legal framework compelling that conclusion.

7. Thus, without reaching the jurisdictional attacks [Copper Beech] raise[s] as to the relief sought from [Livesay], the Court concludes as follows:

a. that [Copper Beech] sought [its] own relief from the Court,

b. that the relief sought by [Copper Beech] (both as plead and argued) was clearly within the small claims jurisdiction,

c. that [Copper Beech's] f[i]ling of a counterclaim was permissive rather than mandatory,

d. that [Copper Beech's] counterclaim, once filed, existed independent of [Livesay's] original complaint, vesting the Court with independent jurisdiction to hear that issue,

e. that the conclusions reached in the Court's July 23, 2021 order were as relevant to the denial of [Copper Beech's] claimed relief as they were to the granting of [Livesay's] requested relief,

f. and [Copper Beech] ha[s], therefore, presented insufficient justification for the setting aside of the Court's July 23, 2021 order pursuant to Rule 60 of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure.

8. The Court, having found that [Copper Beech's] counterclaim awarded sufficient jurisdiction to the small claims court, does not reach issues raised by [Copper Beech] as to if [Livesay's] original complaint would have, on its own, awarded sufficient jurisdiction. As noted above, [Copper Beech] chose not to make the jurisdictional sufficiency of [Livesay's] complaint an issue before seeking their own remedy, and the Court sees no reason (and [Copper Beech] has offered none) requiring it to evaluate that jurisdictional sufficiency independent of [Copper Beech's] counterclaim now.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 10-12.

[6] Copper Beech now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Copper Beech renews its argument that the small-claims court didn't have subject-matter jurisdiction over Livesay's request for declaratory judgment and that therefore the original judgment is void and should be vacated. Copper Beech correctly notes that our review of a Trial Rule 60(B)(6) motion is de novo, see T.D. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 719, 724 (Ind. 2023), but we agree with the small-claims court's thoughtful decision. In short, even if the court didn't have jurisdiction over Livesay's request for declaratory judgment, it did have jurisdiction over Copper Beech's counterclaim for attorney's fees. And because that counterclaim was based on the Housing Agreement, the small-claims court had to address the enforceability of the agreement regardless of whether it had subject-matter jurisdiction over Livesay's request for declaratory judgment. The court did so and concluded that the parties’ actions resulted in the termination of the Housing Agreement, meaning Copper Beech is precluded from collecting any rent and isn't entitled to attorney's fees under the agreement. Copper Beech could have appealed that judgment but chose not to. Because Copper Beech's counterclaim independently invoked the small-claims court's subject-matter jurisdiction, its new argument that the court lacked jurisdiction is without merit. The small-claims court properly denied the motion to vacate the judgment.

[8] Affirmed.

Vaidik, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Pyle, J., concur.