IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: P.S. (Minor Child) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] On June 6, 2023, P.S. (“Child”) was found to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”) after the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received reports that K.S. (“Mother”) had abandoned Child at the hospital shortly after Child's birth. Although Mother did not initially engage in services, once she did, she failed to make meaningful progress towards reunification with Child. Given Mother's failure to make progress towards reunification, on July 9, 2024, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child. Following a fact-finding hearing, the juvenile court issued an order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child.¹ Mother contends, for the first time on appeal, that her due-process rights were violated and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Since well before Child's birth, Mother has had a documented history of mental-health and substance-abuse issues. She has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and other mental-health disorders. Mother has two other children, both of whom have been removed from her care and for whom she pays child support.

[3] Child was born to Mother on February 12, 2023.

[Child] was brought by EMT ambulance to a hospital after a home birth. Mother had a home birth and ․ was refusing to go to the hospital for the birth but her roommate called the ambulance. The umbilical cord was still attached when the ambulance got them to the hospital. [Mother] then abandoned [Child] at the hospital after saying some unusual statements to nurses. Wanting the nurses to only give the child water and not formula.

Tr. Vol. II pp. 17–18. DCS removed Child from Mother's care and, on February 14, 2023, filed a petition alleging that Child was a CHINS.

[4] After Mother left the hospital, DCS was unable to locate her for “a couple of months.” Tr. Vol. II p. 18. DCS eventually located Mother after learning that she “had been arrested and was being held in the Vanderburgh County jail.” Tr. Vol. II p. 18. When DCS family case manager (“FCM”) Paula Wilson spoke with Mother at the jail, Mother “was very dismissive of [Child]. Stated things like [Child] would be okay on his own. He doesn't need a Mother.” Tr. Vol. II p. 26. When reminded by FCM Wilson that Child was an infant and did need a caregiver, Mother responded “ ‘[n]o, he'll be fine on his own.’ ” Tr. Vol. II p. 26.

[5] On June 6, 2023, Child was adjudicated to be a CHINS. Following a dispositional hearing, Mother was ordered, inter alia, to contact the FCM every week to allow the FCM to monitor Mother's progress and notify the FCM of any arrests, changes in address, household composition, employment, or telephone number; allow the FCM or other services provider to make announced or unannounced visits to the home to monitor Mother's compliance with court orders and progress; sign all necessary releases and keep all appointments with any service provider, DCS, or the court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”); maintain suitable, safe and stable housing; secure a legal source of income; refrain from consuming any illegal controlled substances and alcohol; obey the law; complete parenting and substance-abuse assessments and successfully complete all recommendations; submit to random drug screens; meet all personal medical and mental-health needs in a timely and complete manner; attend all scheduled visitation with Child; provide Child with a safe, secure, and nurturing environment that is free from abuse and neglect; and participate in any available programming while incarcerated.

[6] Mother spent “several months” in jail before the criminal court found her to be incompetent to stand trial and ordered that she be confined in a State hospital until her competency could be restored. Tr. Vol. II p. 19. Mother was confined in a State hospital “for about six months and she was released [in] early June of 2024 and sent back to the Vanderburgh County jail.” Tr. Vol. II p. 19. Mother was released from jail on June 14, 2024. After being released from jail, she completed a substance-abuse assessment and participated in drug screenings. Mother routinely tested “negative for anything that she's not prescribed.” Tr. Vol. II p. 23.

[7] FCM Wilson visited Mother's home, where Mother shared a bedroom with her sister J.S. The bedroom, which did not have a crib, was “covered with clothing, blankets all over the floor, unmade beds” and was inappropriate for Child. Tr. Vol. II p. 22. Mother indicated that if Child was returned to her care, she “would just give [Child] her bed and she would sleep on the floor.” Tr. Vol. II p. 22.

[8] Although Mother was employed at a convenience store, she did not have a lease or pay rent at her residence. J.S. had a felony conviction for dealing in methamphetamine from January of 2024, and a conviction for driving while suspended conviction from February or March of 2024. The homeowner, who also lived in the residence, had “some criminal history involving methamphetamine” and battery charges. Tr. Vol. II p. 22. Mother, admittedly, is “very forgetful” and relies on J.S. to ensure that she “remembered to go to [her] appointments” and to “keep track of that stuff” for her. Tr. Vol. II p. 24.

[9] Mother attended visitation with Child once a week, as scheduled. She participated in two parenting assessments, although the first one, which was started at the jail, could not be completed because she was unable to answer the questions. Mother completed a recommended parenting class. Nevertheless, FCM Wilson opined that she would not be able to place Child with Mother because the parenting assessment indicated that Mother would not be able to care for Child on her own.

[10] Home-based therapist Michele Gamache completed Mother's parenting assessment. Gamache initially had difficulty contacting Mother because Mother did not respond to Gamache's messages. Gamache visited Mother's home on three occasions and “[e]very time [she] was in the home it did smell like marijuana.” Tr. Vol. II p. 31. Gamache found Mother to be delusional during interviews. During one session, Mother was unkempt and inappropriately dressed, with “[h]er breasts ․ falling out of her shirt throughout the session.” Tr. Vol. II p. 33. She believed that “the FBI was following her[,]” and during another session, Mother wrongly believed that there was a cat inside the home. Tr. Vol. II p. 32. Mother's descriptions of her substance-abuse and criminal history did not match relevant records. Mother denied her prior substance-abuse issues and failed to acknowledge that at least some of her arrests had been related to her substance-abuse issues.

[11] A separate assessment completed by Gamache indicated that Mother's “verbal receptive language skills ․ measured in at the age of 5 years and 7 months” and her “interpersonal relationship score was 3 years and one month.” Tr. Vol. II p. 34. The level of these skills would likely affect Mother's “ability to communicate with teachers, care providers, [and] doctors” and would likely impede her ability “to advocate for [Child] if that needed to occur.” Tr. Vol. II p. 34. Mother also had an elevated “maladaptive behavior scale” score. Tr. Vol. II p. 34. The main concern from this score is that Mother “avoids interactions with others. She also loses awareness of what's happening around her. This would mean that it would be important for someone to be with her to monitor her ability to be aware of what [Child is] needing.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 34–35. To many of Gamache's questions, Mother answered that she did not know or that she did not remember. Many times during the assessment, Mother would “gaze off and kind of stare off.” Tr. Vol. II p. 35. Gamache opined that Mother would have difficulty understanding information regarding Child's needs, would not be able to care for Child on her own, and would need “a responsible adult to monitor [Mother's] care of a child.” Tr. Vol. II p. 36.

[12] Child was placed in his current pre-adoptive relative placement when he was ten days old. Mother's other two children are also placed in the home. The home is “the only home” that Child has “ever known.” Tr. Vol. II p. 26. Child suffers from significant development delays but is “a very happy baby” and is bonded to his foster mother, who meets all of his needs. Tr. Vol. II p. 39.

[13] On July 9, 2024, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child. Mother failed to appear for the first day of the fact-finding hearing, despite being aware of the date and time of the hearing. The hearing continued in Mother's absence with Mother's counsel present to protect Mother's interests. Both FCM Wilson and CASA Joannie Hollis-Smith opined during the fact-finding hearing that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests.

[14] Mother appeared and testified at the second day of the fact-finding hearing. Mother testified that she was “not sure” of Child's date of birth, except that it was in February. Tr. Vol. II p. 53. Mother indicated that she worked, lived in a home with J.S. and others, and paid child support for her other children. Mother acknowledged that J.S. “gets drug tested every week” and is “on house arrest” but claimed that she had “no idea” why. Tr. Vol. II p. 65. Mother further acknowledged that her parent-aide services had been terminated because the services conflicted with Mother's schedule. Mother outlined the services that she had completed as well as continued services and therapy which she claimed to be participating in. Mother indicated that she had routinely visited with Child and believed that she and J.S. could make a bedroom available for Child, should he be returned to her care. Mother indicated that she believed that she could provide appropriate care for Child and, in the future, would be able to help him with his homework and participate in activities with him. On March 25, 2025, the juvenile court issued its order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child.

Discussion and Decision

[15] “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights, therefore, are not absolute and must be subordinated to the best interests of the child. Id. Termination of parental rights is proper where the child's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that their physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

I. Due Process

[16] Mother contends that she was denied due process, claiming that DCS had failed to make reasonable efforts to provide her with necessary services towards reunification in compliance with federal and state laws in light of her low cognitive function. Mother, however, did not raise her due-process argument below or request additional services. She raises it for the first time on appeal.

[17] “[A] party on appeal may waive a constitutional claim, including a claimed violation of due process rights, by raising it for the first time on appeal.” In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1173 (Ind. 2016).

At a minimum, a party must show that it gave the trial court a bona fide opportunity to pass upon the merits of the claim before seeking an opinion on appeal. The policy reasons behind this requirement—preservation of judicial resources, opportunity for full development of the record, utilization of trial court fact-finding expertise, and assurance of a claim being tested by the adversary process—apply with particular force where, as here, the claim is a constitutional one.

Endres v. Ind. State Police, 809 N.E.2d 320, 322 (Ind. 2004).

[18] Mother did not request additional services below. “ ‘[A] parent may not sit idly by without asserting a need or desire for services and then successfully argue that he was denied services to assist him with his parenting.’ ” J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)) (brackets in J.W.), trans. denied. Because Mother did not request additional services or give the juvenile court a bona fide opportunity to address her due-process claims below, we conclude that she has waived appellate review of this contention.²

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[19] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights, our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, whether the findings support the legal conclusions. Id.

[20] In deference to the juvenile court's unique position to assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court's findings and judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom to support it.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact, or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

[21] Mother contends that the evidence is insufficient to support the termination of her parental rights to the Child. In order to terminate a parent's parental rights to a child, DCS must prove that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child and that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2)–(3).³ As is relevant to this case, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) further provides that DCS must also prove the existence of one or more of the following circumstances:

(2) That:

(A) the child has been removed from the parent and has been under the supervision of a local office or probation department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date the child is removed from the home as a result of the child being alleged to be a [CHINS] or a delinquent child; and

(B) despite [DCS's] reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d). Mother does not argue on appeal that DCS failed to prove that it has a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of Child, with that plan being adoption. In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support termination of her parental rights to Child, Mother argues that DCS failed to prove Indiana Code sections 31-35-2-4(c)(1) and (c)(3).

A. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1)

[22] In this case, DCS alleged that termination of Mother's parental rights was warranted under subsections (d)(2), (d)(3), and (d)(4). Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) explicitly provides that DCS must prove “one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d)[.]” (Emphasis added). Thus, DCS was only required to prove one of the circumstances listed in subsection (d) in support of its petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child. See generally In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 854 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (addressing the prior version of the statute and explaining that because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) had used the word “or” and had therefore been written in the disjunctive, the juvenile court had only been required to find that one prong of subsection (B) had been proven by clear and convincing evidence), trans. denied.

[23] Initially we note that Mother concedes that “Child was out of the home pursuant to [a] dispositional decree for at least six (6) months prior to the filing of the termination action and/or has been under the supervision of DCS for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months.” Appellant's Br. p. 16. It is also undisputed that despite Mother being offered and participating in various services offered by DCS, Child has not been returned to Mother's care since removal from her care. While this fact and Mother's concession would appear to satisfy Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d)(2), the juvenile court did not make a specific finding on this subsection. As such, we will move on to subsection (d)(3).

[24] Pursuant to subsection (d)(3), the juvenile court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's continued placement outside of Mother's home will not be remedied.

When determining whether a reasonable probability exists that the conditions justifying a child's removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied, the trial court must judge a parent's fitness to care for his or her children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions. In so doing, the trial court may consider the parent's response to the services offered through [DCS]. A pattern of unwillingness to deal with parenting problems and to cooperate with those providing social services, in conjunction with unchanged conditions, support a finding that there exists no reasonable probability that the conditions will change. Additionally, [DCS] was not required to rule out all possibilities of change; rather, it needed to establish only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.

In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 18–19 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied.

[25] With respect to the reasonable probability that the conditions for Child's continued placement outside Mother's care would not be remedied, the juvenile court made numerous findings regarding Mother's failure to make progress towards reunification or remedy the factors leading to Child's continued removal from his care. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's order terminating Mother's parental rights to Child, we address Mother's challenges to some of the juvenile court's factual findings.

1. Finding C.1.

[26] Mother challenges factual finding C.1., claiming that it is not supported by the evidence. Finding C.1. provides as follows:

Mother testified she did not know Child's date of birth, but that she was sure it was during the month of February. She further testified that she has a total of three children, none of whom remain in her care or custody. Child is the youngest and is in placement at the same home as his siblings. Placement is relative placement with Child's aunt, Mother's sister. Mother further testified that she does not have any parenting time/visitation with the two older siblings, but that she has visits one time each week with Child, through DCS and Ireland Home Based Services, a third party. Mother stated she had only been visiting Child for about four months, at the time of the trial herein, and that she did not have any contact with Child for the first one and a half (11/212) years of his life.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 84 (footnote omitted). In challenging this finding, Mother merely points to other statements she made regarding her relationship with her other children and her incarceration and hospitalization following Child's birth. This finding, however, correctly summarizes Mother's testimony, in which she admitted that she did not know Child's date of birth; has two other children, both of whom are placed with her sister and with whom she does not visit; and had no contact with Child for the first one and one-half years of Child's life. Mother's challenge to this factual finding amounts to nothing more than a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

2. Finding C.2.

[27] Mother also challenges factual finding C.2., claiming that it is not supported by the evidence. Finding C.2. provides as follows:

Mother, FCM Wilson, [Gamache], and [CASA Hollis-Smith], all testified that Mother was currently residing with another sister and sister's two roommates, in a two bedroom home. [Gamache], who had been in the home three times, and CASA [Hollis-Smith] both testified each time they had been in the home, the home had an odor of THC (marijuana). Mother denied anyone in the home using drugs; however, she testified that her sister/roommate was on house arrest and required to engage in weekly drug screens, although she indicated she “had no idea why”. Mother admitted that the home where she was currently living did not have any bedrooms available for her and child, but that she was “planning to branch out on her own”.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 84. Mother claims that this finding ignores the fact that Mother tested negative on each of her drug screens. While this may be true, the record indicates that the residence smelled of marijuana each of the three times Gamache visited the residence. Mother's challenge to this factual finding essentially amounts to a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

3. Finding C.3.

[28] Mother also challenges factual finding C.3., claiming that it is not supported by the evidence. Finding C.3. provides as follows:

FCM Wilson testified that the home Mother was living in did not meet DCS minimal standards, and that the criminal history of the adults in the home would make the home not appropriate for the child. FCM Wilson further testified that she discussed the issues with the home with Mother, but no changes had occurred or been made.

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 84. Mother does not dispute the accuracy of this finding, but rather merely claims that given Mother's alleged mental deficiencies, “[o]ther developmentally appropriate services should have been used to assist Mother in understanding and determining the steps necessary to resolve the concern.” Appellant's Br. p. 18. Mother, however, does not indicate what other services allegedly should have been offered. Her challenge to this finding again effectively amounts to a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

4. Findings C.4., C.6., and C.8.

[29] Mother also challenges factual findings C.4., C.6., and C.8., claiming that they are not supported by the evidence. These findings provide as follows:

4. FCM Wilson testified that she did not believe she could put Child safely in Mother's home. FCM Wilson and [Gamache] both testified that Mother admitted to each of them that she was forgetful and relies on other people to keep track of things for her.

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6. A Parenting Assessment and Vinland Assessment was conducted during the pending CHINS and [Gamache] testified that the assessment included a combination of index scores and self-reports. [Gamache] further testified that, based on the assessment, the findings regarding Mother were: She suffered from delusions (believing the FBI was following her), visual illusions in the home (seeing a cat in the home), inappropriate attire at the appointments (wearing clothing with her breasts falling out), her self-reporting about drug usage and known facts did not match, and self-reporting about being forgetful yet saying she remembered to take her medication did not match. Additionally, [Gamache] testified the assessment scores showed Mother's verbal skills were at the age of 5 years and 7 months; her interpersonal relationship score, which relates to ability to communicate and relate with teachers or others were at the age of three (3) years and 1 month; and that the scores indicated Mother avoids interactions with others in that she's not aware of others around her. [Gamache] testified that her conclusion was that Mother needs and would continue to need a responsible adult at all times, when caring for a child. [Gamache] also testified that during the assessments, Mother would many times answer “I don't know, or I don't remember” and would gaze off a lot.

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8. CASA [Hollis-Smith] and FCM Wilson testified that during a child family team meeting (CFTM) where Mother was living, Mother and the sister with whom she resides were present and Mother never spoke, despite CASA [Hollis-Smith] encouraging her to do so. They testified that Mother's sister always spoke for her, or on her behalf.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 85–86 (footnote omitted). Mother claims that these findings are not supported by the evidence but also acknowledges that the concerns raised in these findings are “consistent with the findings” of the assessment. Appellant's Br. p. 18. Review of the record reveals that these findings are supported by the testimony of FCM Wilson, Gamache, and CASA Hollis-Smith. Mother's challenge to these findings again amounts to a request for this court to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879. Further, while Mother asserts that mental or cognitive disabilities alone are not a proper basis for terminating parental rights, citing Z.B. v. Ind. Dept. of Child Servs., 108 N.E.3d 895, 902 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied, the juvenile court's findings make it clear that the juvenile court did not only consider Mother's alleged cognitive disabilities, but rather Mother's ability and/or willingness to provide Child with an appropriate, safe, and stable living environment, in terminating Mother's parental rights to Child.

5. Finding A.8. and Conclusion 6

[30] In both Finding A.8 and Conclusion 6, the juvenile court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that led to Child's removal from Mother's care would not be remedied. This conclusion is supported by the record.

[31] Child was initially removed from Mother's care when Mother abandoned him at the hospital shortly after his birth. Mother did not see Child or participate in services aimed at reunification for the first one and one-half years of Child's life due to Mother's incarceration and hospitalization. Since engaging in services, Mother has participated in services but has not made improvement towards reunification.

[32] Mother is employed but does not have stable housing that is appropriate for Child. Mother has been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia and claims to take all medication as prescribed but has admitted to service providers that she is forgetful. Although Mother's testimony at the fact-finding hearing suggests that she is capable of interacting and speaking at levels beyond those testified by Gamache, evidence in the record establishes that Mother suffers from some mental deficiencies. Given these mental deficiencies, Mother would require constant assistance in caring for Child. Mother claimed that she would rely on her sister, who was on house arrest at the time of the fact-finding hearing, for this assistance. Mother had been offered parent-aid services, but the unchallenged findings indicate that the services had been terminated due to conflicts with Mother's schedule. We accept this unchallenged finding as true. See Madlem v. Arko, 592 N.E.2d 686, 687 (Ind. 1992) (providing that unchallenged findings must be accepted as correct). In addition, Mother has established a historical pattern of being unable to care for her children as her other two children have previously been removed from, and remain out of, her care.

[33] Mother's historical pattern of instability, coupled with failure to make progress towards reunification, despite completing the court-ordered services aimed at reunification, sufficiently establishes a reasonable probability that the conditions that have resulted in Child's continued placement outside of Mother's care will not be remedied. Mother's claim to the contrary is nothing more than a request that we reweigh the evidence, which again, we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

B. Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(3)

[34] We are mindful that in considering whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. “A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the [child].” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied.

The [juvenile] court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.

In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (internal citations omitted).

[35] In challenging the juvenile court's determination that termination of her parental rights was in Child's best interests, Mother challenges the following factual findings:

4. Both FCM Wilson and CASA [Hollis-Smith] believed the best interest of the Child is that termination of parental rights occur and the Child be adopted due to the inability of Mother to provide appropriate care and supervision for the child. Mother left the child at the hospital and was not involved in Child's life for the first 1 1/212 years; Child is now two (2) years old. Both testified that Mother's mental health is frail and that she is dependent on others for day to day living and has struggled with criminal behavior. [Gamache] also concluded that Mother would need a responsible adult with her at all times, when caring for a child. Mother testified that her sibling, with whom she resides, is currently on house arrest and submitting to random drug screens, although Mother did not know why.

5. Both FCM Wilson and CASA [Hollis-Smith] believe that termination of the parent-child relationship and adoption by the foster (relative) placement is in the child's best interest. The child is happy and doing well in their care and is placed in the same home where his two biological half-siblings reside. The Court finds that adoption by the foster (relative) placement is in the child's best interest.

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7. The Court finds that the evidence of Mother's pattern of substance abuse, housing instability, involvement in criminal activity, inability to parent other biological children, and mental health issues indicate that maintaining a parent-child relationship with the child is not in the best interests of the child.

Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 86–87. In challenging these findings, Mother merely argues that “the testimony of the family case manager and CASA alone should not serve as the basis for termination in this matter solely because the child has a better place to live.” Appellant's Br. p. 23. Despite Mother's argument, we have previously concluded that the testimony of a case worker and CASA can support a best-interests finding. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 374 (providing that the testimony of the case worker, guardian ad litem, or a CASA regarding the children's best interests supports a finding that termination is in the children's best interests).

[36] The juvenile court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests. FCM Wilson testified that at no time since removal has she been able to recommend that Child be returned to Mother's care because Mother had not shown “the ability to be able to parent this child.” Tr. Vol. II p. 24. FCM Wilson opined that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Child's best interests, explaining

[Child] is in the only home he's ever known. His Mother ․ was unable to visit with him due to her criminal and mental health history issues. When I did talk to [Mother] in the jail in the booking area she was very dismissive of [Child]. Stated things like [Child] would be okay on his own. He doesn't need a Mother. When I said he is an infant, he does need a care giver she just dismissed, “No, he'll be fine on his own.” Just things that did not make any sense. The parenting assessment, the second one that was done, shows that she would not be able to care for [Child] on her own. That she should always have a second care giver with her if she's ever unsupervised caring for [Child].

Tr. Vol. II p. 26.

[37] CASA Hollis-Smith testified that Child “is a very happy baby” but that he suffers from “significant delays.” Tr. Vol. II p. 38. CASA Hollis-Smith opined that “[b]ased on Mother's pattern of behavior, past criminal history, past mental health history, and what I have observed in meeting her where she's so dependent on others, I do believe her parental rights should be terminated.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 39–40. CASA Hollis-Smith further stated concerns for Mother's mental health, indicating that given that Mother

was in the State Hospital for a certain amount of time, as well as statements she's made that appear - I mean, unless the FBI really is following her ․ Plus she just - she's a very frail appearing person. I don't mean physically, but mentally seems very frail, very unsure of herself. Almost scared ․ to speak or interact with anybody.

Tr. Vol. II p. 40.

[38] FCM Wilson and CASA Hollis-Smith's testimony supports the juvenile court's finding that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 374 (providing that the testimony of the case worker, guardian ad litem, or a CASA regarding the children's best interests supports a finding that termination is in the children's best interests). This is especially true given Child's need for permanency ⁴ and assistance in overcoming his developmental delays and Mother's historical pattern of instability. The record reveals that despite engaging in services, Mother was unable to provide Child with the level of care he required. Mother's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support this conclusion again effectively amounts to an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See In re S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d at 879.

[39] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The identity of Child's father is unknown and no individual purporting to be Child's father participates in this appeal.

2.   In any event, even if Mother had not waived her due process claims, Mother's due process claims are without merit. Again, Mother did not request any additional services beyond what had been offered by DCS. Furthermore, while Mother argues that the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and state law entitle her to additional services, “it is well settled ․ that the ADA does not apply in termination proceedings[,]” N.C. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 56 N.E.3d 65, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied, and that a violation of a state law does not establish a due-process violation. See Ind. Land Co., LLC v. City of Greenwood, 378 F.3d 705, 711 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Garwood v. State, 77 N.E.3d 204, 220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), aff'd in relevant part, 84 N.E.3d 624 (Ind. 2017).

3.   Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4 was amended effective March 11, 2024, and again effective July 1, 2025. DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child on July 9, 2024. Although Mother cites to a prior version of the statute in her appellate brief, like the juvenile court, we apply the version of the statute in effect at the time DCS petitioned to terminate Mother's parental rights.

4.   “[A] child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 224.

Bradford, Judge.

May, J., and Altice, J., concur.