HARVEY v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Sean Lee Harvey, Jr. (“Harvey”) appeals from the trial court's order revoking his probation. Harvey argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve the balance of his suspended time as a sanction for his probation violation.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] During the evening hours of November 12, 2022, Harvey arrived at the home of James and Makenzi Grubb (collectively, “the Grubbs”), wearing nothing but pants and wrapped in a blanket. The Grubbs let Harvey into the home where he rested on the couch. Harvey previously resided with the Grubbs but had moved to Texas the previous year. The Grubbs were unaware that Harvey had returned to Indiana.

[4] At some point in the evening, Harvey started making weird laughing, crying, and moaning noises and entered the Grubbs’ bedroom. James left the room to retrieve Harvey's blanket and when he returned to his room, Harvey was pointing an AR-15 pistol at him. James asked Harvey why he was trying to kill him and then Harvey pulled the trigger, but the gun failed to discharge because there was no round in the chamber. James then rushed towards Harvey, and a physical altercation ensued. Harvey struck James in the face with the pistol, but James was able to subdue Harvey, secure the firearm, and force Harvey from the home.

[5] Makenzi called law enforcement, and Harvey was subsequently arrested and transported to the Monroe County Jail. During the transport to the jail, Harvey was banging his head against the patrol vehicle, making remarks that did not make sense, and discussing events that were not occurring.

[6] On November 14, 2022, Harvey was charged with Level 5 felony battery by means of a deadly weapon, Level 6 felony pointing a firearm, and Level 6 felony criminal recklessness. On March 29, 2023, Harvey filed a Motion Requesting Competency Evaluation, and the trial court appointed three separate psychiatrists or physicians to evaluate Harvey's comprehension to stand trial and evaluate his sanity. All of the reports noted that Harvey's mental health and lucidity had improved since beginning a long-term monthly injectable form of anti-psychotic medication. Appellant's App. Vol. II pp. 32, 35, 44, 47, 54, 67. After a hearing, the trial court concluded that Harvey was competent to stand trial. See id. at 81–82.

[7] Eventually, Harvey entered into a plea and sentencing agreement with the State where he agreed to plead guilty to Level 5 felony attempted battery with a deadly weapon ¹ and to serve a four-year sentence with placement at the discretion of the trial court. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the pointing a firearm and criminal recklessness counts. See id. at 83. The trial court accepted Harvey's plea of guilty and on April 3, 2024, Harvey was sentenced to four years (1,460 days) executed with 779 days suspended to supervised probation.² In addition to the standard terms of probation, the trial court imposed the following special conditions of probation: day reporting until further order of the court, maintaining medication compliance, completing mental health and substance abuse evaluations, and following up with all treatment recommendations. See id. at 85. Harvey was released from incarceration on April 5, 2024, and began his supervised probation. See id.

[8] On June 27, 2024, the State filed a Petition to Revoke Suspended Sentence (“the First Petition”), which alleged that Harvey failed to attend day reporting on four occasions, failed to appear for a scheduled appointment with his probation officer, and failed to maintain compliance with his medications. That same day, the trial court issued a warrant for Harvey's arrest. The next day, the First Petition was amended to include an allegation that Harvey had been arrested and was taken into custody for allegedly committing Class C misdemeanor public nudity. On January 2, 2025, Harvey admitted to violating his probation by failing to attend day reporting on four occasions, failing to appear for a scheduled appointment with his probation officer, and failing to maintain compliance with his medications.

[9] A disposition hearing was scheduled for February 19, 2025, but continued on the day of the hearing because Harvey refused to appear in court. See id. at 7. The rescheduled hearing was conducted on March 27, 2025. Probation Officer Lexi Lemon explained that Harvey was not compliant with day reporting and had missed four days, had missed a scheduled appointment with her, and was not in compliance with his medications. With respect to Harvey's mental health treatment, she recommended that Harvey “do outpatient services” and stay on the long-term injectable shot because he “seems to do a lot better” while on that medication. Tr. Vol. 1 p. 18. The State objected to Harvey's release back to supervised probation claiming Harvey posed a risk to the safety of the community. Ultimately, the trial court revoked 399 days of the previously suspended sentence and returned Harvey to probation under the same terms. The trial court specifically ordered that Harvey be released from jail on April 21, 2025, at 1:00 p.m. and then report to probation.

[10] On April 25, 2025, the State filed another Petition to Revoke Suspended Sentence (“the Second Petition”) alleging that Harvey failed to meet with his service provider prior to being released from jail and that he failed to report to probation within 72 hours of his release from jail. The trial court issued a warrant, and Harvey was arrested on May 7, 2025.

[11] On May 14, 2025, Harvey admitted to both allegations in the Second Petition and the trial court heard testimony and evidence with respect to disposition. Harvey testified that, when he was released from incarceration, he had found a place to stay in Ellettsville, Indiana that would provide him with transportation. Harvey explained that he was “kicked out [of the place] the same day” and he “was on the streets for like a week over there” before being able to get “back to this side of town[.]” Id. at 45. Harvey's probation officer testified and explained that Harvey received his last medication injection on April 18, 2025, and that he refused to meet with the Stride Center representative prior to his release from jail. Ultimately, the probation officer recommended that Harvey's sentence should be revoked. The State agreed that Harvey's sentence should be revoked, but defense argued that he should be given another opportunity based on his voluntary admissions to the violations and ongoing issues affecting his mental health. See id. at 57. The trial court continued the disposition hearing for “one rotation” of his medication to see if Harvey would “agree to take [his] medications in jail” and reset the matter for a hearing on June 11, 2025. Id. at 61.

[12] On June 11, 2025, the trial court reconvened the dispositional hearing and noted that Harvey had received an injection of his medication. Nonetheless, the trial court revoked the entirety of Harvey's suspended sentence, ordered him to serve 382 days executed with credit for 36 actual days in jail, and discharged him unsuccessfully from probation. Harvey now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[13] Harvey does not dispute that he violated a condition of his probation, rather, he argues that the trial court abused its discretion “in revoking the maximum possible sentence for his violations of probation.” Appellant's Br. p. 10. We note that “[p]robation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which a criminal defendant is entitled.” Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007) (citing Sanders v. State, 825 N.E.2d 952 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.). “The trial court determines the conditions of probation and may revoke probation if the conditions are violated.” Id. Probation revocation is a two-step process. Sanders, 825 N.E.2d at 955. “First, the trial court must make a factual determination that a violation of a condition has occurred.” Overstreet v. State, 136 N.E.3d 260, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Sanders, 825 N.E.2d at 955), trans. denied. “If a violation is proven, then the trial court must determine if the violation warrants revocation of the probation.” Id.

[14] If the trial court determines that a person violated a condition of probation, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

I.C. § 35-38-2-3(h).

[15] “[A] probationer who admits the allegations against him must still be given an opportunity to offer mitigating evidence suggesting that the violation does not warrant revocation.” Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 640 (Ind. 2008) (citing United States v. Holland, 850 F.2d 1048, 1051 (5th Cir.1988) (per curiam)). “We review the appeal from a trial court's probation determination and sanction for an abuse of discretion.” Overstreet, 136 N.E.3d at 263 (citing Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances.” Id. (citing Smith v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1110, 1112 (Ind. 2012)).

[16] “Proof of a single violation is sufficient to permit a trial court to revoke probation.” Hammann v. State, 210 N.E.3d 823, 832 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (citing Killebrew v. State, 165 N.E.3d 578, 582 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied), trans. denied. We note that, “in determining the appropriate sentence upon finding a probation violation, trial courts are not required to balance aggravating and mitigating circumstances.” Killebrew, 165 N.E.3d at 582 (citing Treece v. State, 10 N.E.3d 52, 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied).

[17] Harvey argues that the trial court abused its discretion in “revoking the maximum possible sentence for his violations of probation” in light of his mental health diagnosis, lack of criminal history, voluntary admission to the allegations, and the technical nature of his violations. Appellant's Br. pp. 9–10.

[18] The evidence presented to the trial court established that Harvey violated his probation twice (the First Petition on June 27, 2024, and the Second Petition on April 25, 2025) within a year. After admitting to the violations in the First Petition, the trial court ensured that Harvey received an injection of his medication and returned Harvey to probation. However, Harvey almost immediately violated his probation by failing to report to probation upon his release from jail and refusing to meet with his service provider. From our review of the transcript, it is clear the court acknowledged that Harvey had not refused his latest injection and considered returning Harvey to probation but also considered Harvey's failure to comply with his mental health requirements and the risk that posed to the safety of the community. See Tr. Vol. 1 p. 74 (explaining “the question really is ․ if there is only one way to keep Mr. Harvey safe and the community safe.”). All in all, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining that Harvey's repeat violations demonstrate that he is not a suitable candidate for community placement and revoking the entirety of his previously suspended sentence.

[19] Harvey also suggests that the trial court misapprehended the law, acting under the false impression that “it had no discretion to not fully revoke the entire sentence.” Appellant's Br. p. 13. “An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances” or when “the trial court misinterprets the law[.]” Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013) (internal citation omitted) (citing State v. Cozart, 897 N.E.2d 478, 483 (Ind. 2008)).

[20] Here, the transcript does reveal that the trial court appeared unclear about its authority under the circumstances. During the hearing, the trial court did state, “I will say the number of days you have to serve on probation or in jail, one or the other the time left is not within my discretion because the agreement was the four years and then placement was to the Court.” Tr. Vol. 1 p. 70. We note that Indiana Code section 35-38-2-3(h)(3) provides that if a trial court determines a person has violated a condition of probation a trial court may “[o]rder execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.” However, the trial court's statement about lacking discretion to impose a sentence less than the original sentence of four years was immediately challenged by defense counsel and resulted in a long discussion between the trial court and counsel and a brief recess by the court.

[21] By the conclusion of the discussion and recess, we are confident that the trial court understood the law and realized that it could impose something less than a fully executed sentence. The trial court acknowledged defense counsel's point about the scope of its discretion and specifically stated that “[i]n this case [it was] not going to do it differently anyway.” Tr. Vol. 1 p. 72. After discussing an apparent discrepancy in the calculation of Harvey's jail credit and sentence, the trial court stated “[i]f my numbers [are] right I'm not revoking the entire sentence. If my numbers are, if your numbers are right, I'm revoking the entire sentence[.]” Id. at 81. In addition, the State agreed with defense counsel that the trial court had the discretion to revoke less than the balance of Harvey's suspended sentence. See id. at 77. When reviewed collectively, the trial court's remarks indicate its decision to fully revoke Harvey's probation was not based on any misapprehension of law.

Conclusion

[22] We conclude that the trial court's decision to revoke Harvey's probation was not an abuse of discretion and its sanction decision was based on Harvey's repeat violations, rather than a misinterpretation of law.

[23] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that an amended information was filed on March 25, 2024. See Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 84.

2.   Harvey was credited with 509 days of accrued time and 170 days of good time credit, equaling 679 total days, meaning Harvey had two more days in jail prior to beginning his supervised probation. See Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 85.

Foley, Judge.

May, J. and Altice, J., concur.