MARTINEZ v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Osmin Martinez asks us to exercise our authority under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) to revise his aggregate sixty-four-year sentence for murder with a firearm sentence enhancement. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Martinez was born in Honduras in 1998 and lived there until moving to the United States in 2019. In the Summer of 2023, Martinez was living in a townhome in Indianapolis with several others, including a Guatemalan man named Angel Rodriguez. Martinez and Rodriguez both worked as roofers. One day, Martinez told Rodriguez's girlfriend that she was dating “someone from Guatemala and ․ that he was going to kill him.” Transcript Vol. 2 at 184. One week later, Rodriguez and his girlfriend were in the kitchen preparing to eat lunch when Martinez arrived home, told Rodriguez that he was about to go work on a roofing job, and asked to borrow one of Rodriguez's tools.

[3] When Rodriguez left to retrieve the tool, Martinez tried to kiss Rodriguez's girlfriend and got close enough to her that she could smell alcohol on him. She rejected Martinez's advance and pulled away from him. At the same time, Rodriguez entered the room and saw what was happening. He told Martinez “to be respectful” and asked him “why he [did] that.” Id. at 177. Martinez's only response was to show Rodriguez that he was carrying a handgun.

[4] When Rodriguez saw the gun, he told Martinez “that they should just talk about it calmly” and “take care of things but not with a weapon.” Id. at 178. Martinez then walked outside, and Rodriguez followed him. A few moments later, a neighbor saw Martinez raise his gun, point it at Rodriguez, and fire multiple shots into him. Rodriguez suffered fatal wounds, and an autopsy later revealed that he had been shot five times. Specifically, he had been shot (1) underneath his chin; (2) through his arm and into his torso; (3) in his lower back and through his shoulder; (4) in his buttocks and through his chest; and (5) in the back of his head and through his face.

[5] The State charged Martinez with murder, a felony,¹ and sought a firearm sentence enhancement.² At trial, a jury found Martinez guilty of murder. He waived jury trial on the sentence enhancement, and the trial court found him guilty of using a firearm to commit the crime.

[6] At the sentencing hearing, the State offered into evidence Martinez's presentence investigation report and read a letter from Rodriguez's family into the record. Martinez's attorney then explained to the court that Martinez had two dependents in Honduras and before his arrest had been working construction jobs to send money to his family. He explained that Martinez's life in Honduras had been difficult, and he had come to the United States “to try to do better for himself and for his family[.]” Tr. Vol. 4 at 93. Finally, his attorney said that Martinez had “somewhat of a substance abuse disorder in that he would frequently drink,” and that his father had died six months before Martinez murdered Rodriguez, “which led to a hardship on his life.” Id. at 94.

[7] The State asked the trial court to sentence Martinez to fifty-eight years for murder, enhanced by nine years for the firearm enhancement, for a total sentence of sixty-seven years. Martinez asked for a forty-five-year sentence for murder and five years for the enhancement, for a total of fifty years. The court found that the “nature and circumstances” of the offense were significant aggravating factors, specifically because “despite [Martinez's] best efforts to present it otherwise, ․ [he] acted fairly abruptly in fairly close quarters by firing multiple shots in a fairly small space[.]” Id. at 98. The court recognized Martinez's lack of prior convictions as a mitigator but found that it was outweighed by the nature and circumstances of the murder.

[8] Ultimately, the court imposed a fifty-seven-year sentence for murder, enhanced by seven years for the firearm enhancement, for a total of sixty-four years executed in the Department of Correction. Martinez now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Martinez argues his sentence is inappropriate and asks us to “reduce [it] to the minimum fifty [ ] years” under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Appellant's Brief at 12. Rule 7(B) permits us to revise a sentence if it “is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” McCain v. State, 148 N.E.3d 977, 985 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B)). We give the trial court “considerable deference” when reviewing a sentence under Rule 7(B). Oberhansley v. State, 208 N.E.3d 1261, 1267 (Ind. 2023) (quoting Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1222 (Ind. 2008)). We will not revise a sentencing decision absent “compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard[,] and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1093 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)). The burden is on the defendant to persuade us that his sentence is inappropriate. Id. at 1092.

1. Nature of the Offense

[10] Martinez first contends that his sentence is inappropriate considering the nature of his offense. When evaluating the nature of an offense, we “look at the extent, brutality, and heinousness of the offense.” Borroel v. State, 241 N.E.3d 8, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024), trans. denied. We begin with the advisory sentence as “the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime committed.” Anglemeyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). We note that in sentencing Martinez to fifty-seven years for murder, the trial court did not deviate far from the fifty-five-year advisory sentence. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a). And while the legislature did not provide an advisory sentence for the firearm sentence enhancement, the court's imposition of a seven-year enhancement was only two years above the statutory minimum of five years. I.C. § 35-50-2-11(g).

[11] All in all, Martinez was facing a maximum sentence of sixty-five-years, which could have been enhanced by as many as twenty years because he used a firearm to commit the offense. I.C. §§ 35-50-2-3(a), 35-50-2-11(g). His aggregate sixty-four-year sentence was therefore relatively lenient when compared to the maximum eighty-five-year sentence he faced. Accordingly, Martinez carries a heavy burden to demonstrate that his sentence is an outlier in need of revision. See Kincaid v. State, 171 N.E.3d 1036, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (noting the “principal role of [our] review is to attempt to leaven the outliers, and not to achieve a perceived correct sentence.”) (quoting Scott v. State, 162 N.E.3d 578, 584 (Inc. Ct. App. 2021)) (internal quotation marks omitted), trans. denied. In determining whether Martinez carried that burden, we consider “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d 803, 806-07 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)).

[12] Martinez contends that the facts of his crime “do not exceed the moral revulsion inherent in” murder because “[t]he murder was not long and tortuous[,] ․ especially heinous or cruel, or committed in a depraved manner involving protracted physical abuse to [Rodriguez].” Appellant's Br. at 9. We disagree and find the present circumstances comparable to those in Burkhart v. State, 259 N.E.3d 347 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied. There, a panel of this Court found “no question” that a murder “was not accompanied by restraint, regard, or lack of brutality” when the defendant shot his father in the back of the neck and head twice, even after “[t]he first shot alone was fatal[.]” Id. at 355. The panel further found that the defendant “clearly contemplated [his] [f]ather's death prior to shooting him, as evidenced by text messages he sent his girlfriend the day before the murder.” Id.

[13] As in Burkhart, Martinez shot Rodriguez multiple times, including three times in the back of his body and head. Particularly notable was the execution-style shot to the back of Rodriguez's head that exited through his face, which in no way exemplified restraint, regard, or lack of brutality. And we find no evidence supporting Martinez's additional claim that the murder did not involve “substantial planning and premeditation.” Appellant's Br. at 9. Quite the opposite. One week before the murder, Martinez told Rodriguez's girlfriend “that he was going to kill” her Guatemalan boyfriend, demonstrating that he clearly contemplated Rodrequez's death for at least a week prior to shooting him. Tr. Vol. 2 at 184.

[14] We also note the utter senselessness of the murder. It followed no provocation by Rodriguez and was done for no apparent reason other than that Martinez took issue with Rodriguez's Guatemalan nationality and perhaps had a romantic interest in Rodriguez's girlfriend. And after inflicting the fatal wounds, Martinez did nothing to render aid to Rodriguez and instead fled the scene and lied to police officers about his involvement when they interviewed him several hours later.

[15] In light of the brutal, heinous, and utterly senseless nature of the murder, Martinez has failed to show that his sentence is inappropriate considering the nature of his offense.

2. Character of the Offender

[16] Given the nature of his crime, Martinez was required to make a strong showing that his sentence was inappropriate because of his good character. Lane v. State, 232 N.E.3d 119, 127 (Ind. 2024) (“[T]o the extent the evidence on one prong militates against relief, a claim based on the other prong must be all the stronger[.]”). In considering Martinez's character, “we engage in a broad consideration of [his] qualities[.]” Burkhart, 259 N.E.3d at 355 (quoting T.A.D.W., 51 N.E.3d at 1211). This includes “whether [he] has ‘substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character[.]’ ” Id. (quoting Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122).

[17] To support his argument, Martinez first contends that he “has no criminal history.” Appellant's Br. at 10. He then highlights his experiences growing up in Honduras, which included leaving school after sixth grade to help his father in the fields and later having a daughter with one woman, marrying another, and having a second daughter with her. He also draws our attention to the fact that he came to the United States so he could work and send money back home to support his children and parents. Finally, he contends that “[h]e shows a strong work ethic[,]” plans to obtain his GED and take college courses while in prison, and hopes “to build[ ] future opportunities for his children.” Id. at 11.

[18] Starting with Martinez's supposed lack of a criminal history, we note that he admitted to working without legal authorization for several years after immigrating to the United States. This reflects poorly on his character. See Bonilla v. State, 907 N.E.2d 586, 590 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding that the defendant's “failure to abide by the laws” after immigrating to the United States reflected poorly on his character), trans. denied. As to Martinez's desire to work hard to support his family in Honduras, we agree with the State that it does not reflect well on Martinez that he—as a married man who ostensibly came to the United States to support his family—tried to kiss another woman and then killed her boyfriend after she rejected his advances. And, in any event, this Court does not generally consider a defendant's willingness to work to be a factor that warrants a reduction of his sentence. See Holmes v. State, 86 N.E.3d 394, 399 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), (“[M]any people are gainfully employed; therefore, a defendant's employment is not necessarily a mitigating factor.”), trans. denied.

[19] Finally, as for Martinez's desire “to build[ ] future opportunities for his children[,]” Appellant's Br. at 11, it's not clear to us how the five-decade-sentence Martinez asks us to impose would be less burdensome on his dependents than his sixty-four-year sentence. See Jones v. State, 218 N.E.3d 3, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (“[H]ardship to a defendant's dependents can be given little consideration when the defendant fails to show why incarceration for a particular term will cause more hardship than incarceration for a shorter term[.]” (citing Weaver v. State, 845 N.E.2d 1066, 1074 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied)), trans. denied. Either way, Martinez's children will be well into adulthood by the time he completes his sentence.

[20] For these reasons, Martinez has failed to meet his burden to produce compelling evidence that his sentence is inappropriate in light of his character.

Conclusion

[21] Because Martinez failed to show that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense or his character, we affirm.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-50-2-11(d).

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.