HALL v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Following a jury trial, Zaquan V. Hall was convicted of seven felonies and sentenced to a partially suspended, aggregate term of sixty years in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC). Hall asserts, and the State concedes, that the trial court exceeded its authority when it sentenced Hall above the statutory cap for non-violent felonies arising out of a single episode of criminal conduct.

[2] We reverse and remand.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Following a period of investigation and surveillance, police executed a search warrant in February 2024 at Hall's home. Among other things, officers discovered multiple kinds of drugs – including cocaine, fentanyl, marijuana, and methamphetamine – along with scales, baggies, and other items. On March 4, 2025, the State charged Hall with fourteen offenses, including multiple counts of dealing and possessing drugs and one count of maintaining a common nuisance. The State also charged Hall with unlawful possession of a firearm as a serious violent felon (SVF), which was based on police observations during surveillance prior to the search.

[4] Before trial, the State dismissed two of the drug charges, leaving twelve counts for the jury's consideration. At the conclusion of the one-day jury trial, the jury found Hall guilty of all charged offenses and determined that he possessed a firearm. Hall then pled guilty to the predicate conviction for the SVF count. Due to double jeopardy considerations, the trial court entered convictions only on seven counts.

[5] At the May 2025 sentencing hearing, the State and Hall agreed that all of the convictions, other than the SVF conviction, were non-violent crimes that arose out of a single episode of criminal conduct and thus were subject to the sentencing cap found in Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(d) (the Sentencing Cap Statute). The trial court acknowledged the applicability of the Sentencing Cap Statute and recognized that the maximum total of imprisonment “would be 32 [years]” on all counts except for the SVF count. Transcript at 243.

[6] The court then sentenced Hall as follows:

• Count I (Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug): 18 years – with 16 years executed in the DOC and two years suspended

• Count III (Level 2 felony dealing in methamphetamine): 18 years – with 16 years executed in the DOC and two years suspended

• Count IV (Level 2 felony dealing in cocaine): 18 years – with 10 years executed on community corrections home detention and 8 years suspended

• Count V (Level 2 felony dealing in a Schedule I controlled substance): 18 years – with 16 years executed in the DOC and two years suspended

• Count X (Level 4 felony unlawful possession of firearm by a SVF): 6 years executed in the DOC

• Count XI (Level 6 felony maintaining a common nuisance): 2 years executed in the DOC

• Count XIII (Level 6 felony dealing in marijuana): 2 years executed in the DOC

The trial court ordered Counts I, III, IV, and X to be served consecutively and ordered Counts V, XI, and XIII to be served concurrent with Count I. Excluding the SVF sentence, the trial court sentenced Hall to an aggregate of fifty-four years. Hall now appeals.

Discussion & Decision

[7] Because our legislature is responsible for fixing criminal penalties, a trial court's sentencing discretion must not exceed the limits prescribed by statute. Fix v. State, 186 N.E.3d 1134, 1143 (Ind. 2022). Hall argues, and the State concedes, the aggregate fifty-four-year sentence imposed by the trial court violates the Sentencing Cap Statute.

[8] That statute provides that, if the most serious crime for which a defendant is convicted and sentenced is a Level 2 felony, as is the case here, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment for convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct may not exceed thirty-two years. I.C. § 35-50-1-2(d). It is undisputed that all of Hall's convictions, except the SVF conviction, arose out of a single episode of criminal conduct.

[9] Here, the trial court ordered that Hall serve his fifty-four-year sentence in such a manner that his executed time in the DOC was thirty-two years. While the trial court apparently believed that this complied with the Sentencing Cap Statute, it does not. That is, as both parties observe, our Supreme Court has recognized that “[a]ny period of suspended sentence must be included when calculating the maximum aggregate sentence” under the Sentencing Cap Statute, as a suspended sentence “leaves open the real possibility” that an individual will be sent to incarceration for some period. Mask v. State, 829 N.E.2d 932, 936 (Ind. 2005).

[10] The maximum aggregate sentence that Hall could receive for Counts I, III, IV, V, XI, and XIII (non-violent offenses that arose out of a single episode of criminal conduct) was thirty-two years.¹ We remand to the trial court for resentencing in accordance with our decision.

[11] Judgment reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   As Hall acknowledges, the SVF conviction (Count X) is statutorily defined as a “crime of violence.” I.C. § 35-50-1-2(a)(20). Consequently, Hall's sentence for that offense falls outside of the statutory restriction, and the six-year sentence imposed by the trial court may be added to the aggregate sentence for the non-violent convictions without running afoul of the Sentencing Cap Statute.

Altice, Judge.

Brown, J. and DeBoer, J., concur.