RUETH v. SCHRAGE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Timothy Rueth (“Timothy”) and Susan Rueth (“Susan”) (collectively, “the Rueths”) filed a complaint against Centier Bank (“the Bank”), its president, and the law firm and attorneys who represented the Bank (collectively, “the Defendants”) in which the Rueths sought to collaterally attack a charging order entered in 2012 and a foreclosure proceeding that concluded in 2022. The Rueths claimed that the Defendants committed fraud by using false interrogatory responses in obtaining the charging order against Timothy's membership interest in an LLC. The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. The Rueths appeal and claim that the trial court erred by granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. We conclude that the Rueths have waived their appellate claims by failing to make a cogent argument. Accordingly, we affirm.

Issue

[2] The Rueths purport to present twelve issues,¹ which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred by granting the Defendants’ motion to dismiss and for summary judgment.

Facts

[3] The origins of this case go back to 2009, when the Bank filed a commercial foreclosure action (the “Commercial Foreclosure Action”) against Briar Ridge Country Club Unit 16, LLC (“BRCC Unit 16”) and against Timothy as guarantor of the loan secured by the mortgage held by the Bank. The Bank obtained a judgment in that case in the amount of $3,634,760.49. The property that secured this loan was sold at a sheriff's sale in August 2011 for $2,000,000, leaving a balance of $1,634,760.49. During proceedings supplemental to the Commercial Foreclosure Action, the Bank obtained a charging order ² against Timothy's interest in Nondorf Farms, LLC (“Nondorf Farms”). Timothy did not challenge this order through a motion to correct error or appeal.

[4] In March 2009, the Bank filed an action to foreclose its mortgage on the Rueths’ residence (“the Residential Foreclosure Action”). The Rueths then individually filed numerous bankruptcy petitions to stave off the foreclosure and delay or prevent collection of the judgments.³ And in February 2012, the Bank was granted summary judgment in the Residential Foreclosure Action.⁴

[5] On May 20, 2024, the Rueths filed an independent action under Trial Rule 60(B) in which they claimed that the Defendants: (1) committed fraud on the court on January 18, 2012, and continued to do so; (2) took action to prevent the Rueths from paying income taxes; (3) committed fraud as to the ownership of the interests in Nondorf Farms; (4) charged unnecessary and false fees; and (5) caused personal injury and financial damages to the Rueths. On July 29, 2024, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment in which they claimed that the Rueths’ action was barred by the statute of limitations, res judicata, and several trial rules.

[6] On October 1, 2024, the trial court granted the Rueths’ motion to amend their complaint and cancelled the hearing previously scheduled on the Defendants’ motion to dismiss and for summary judgment. The Defendants then filed a second motion to dismiss and for summary judgment on October 21, 2024. The trial court held a hearing on the Defendants’ motion on December 20, 2024. The trial court entered an order on January 3, 2025, and granted the Defendants’ motion as follows:

For the reasons stated above, the [Defendants’] Motion is granted pursuant to T.R. 12(B) and 56. Based on the designated evidence contained within Defendants’ filings, which Plaintiffs have failed to refute and which show that there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute and that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, the Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice, and Plaintiffs shall not have an opportunity to file any further amendments to their complaint.

Appellants’ App. Vol. II pp. 14-16. On February 3, 2025, the Rueths filed a motion to correct error. The trial court denied this motion, and the Rueths now appeal.

Discussion and Decision

A. Applicable Standards

[7] Indiana Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) requires that the argument section of a brief “contain the contentions of the appellant on the issues presented, supported by cogent reasoning.” Also, “[e]ach contention must be supported by citations to the authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on Appeal relied on ․” Ind. Appellate R. 46(A)(8)(a). We will not consider a claim on appeal when there is no cogent argument supported by authority and there are no references to the record as required by the rules. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Although we prefer to decide cases on their merits, arguments are waived where an appellant's noncompliance with the rules of appellate procedure is so substantial it impedes our appellate consideration of the errors. Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 983).

[8] The Rueths also proceed pro se on appeal, as they did below. Accordingly, we reiterate that “a pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). “This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Picket Fence Prop. Co. v. Davis, 109 N.E.3d 1021, 1029 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (citing Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 983-84). “ ‘We will not become an advocate for a party or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.’ ” Picket Fence, 109 N.E.3d at 1029 (quoting Basic, 58 N.E.3d at 984).

B. The Rueths make no cogent arguments.

[9] The Rueths purport to raise twelve issues on appeal, but the argument section of the Rueths’ brief is woefully inadequate.⁵ Their first argument, which is one of their more developed arguments, combines Issues 1-3 and provides in full:

The Court did not give Timothy and Susan Rueth a reasonable time to respond to Summary Judgment as required under T.R. 12(B) [sic]. Timothy and Susan Rueth's statutory rights were taken away. This take away makes the defendant's contention that there are no genuine issues of material fact moot.

The defendants contention that the Statute of Limitations makes the defendants entitled to judgment as a matter of law is incorrect because the Court is deeming the 1/23/2012 hearing was not set aside timely under T.R. 60 and alternatively the Court has ruled that the Statute of Limitation for fraud has also passed. The ruling in [sic] incorrect because part of the Amended Complaint has no tie to 1/23/2012. Count III in particular. Further, the defendants employing the 1/23/2012 Order to the defendant's benefit on 7/10/2023 and 9/13/2024 is fraudulent.

Appellants’ Br. pp. 10-11. Other than cursory mentions of Trial Rule 60, this argument cites no authority for the conclusory claim that the trial court's ruling was improper, nor does it cite to the record as required. The Rueths’ remaining arguments are similarly deficient.

[10] The combined argument for Issues 4-5 is merely:

The Defendants maintain the 1/23/2012 order is the control date and the Court agrees: As noted in Issued [sic] 1-3 the date is not the control date due to reasons given.

Id. at 11. And the argument for Issue 6 states only:

Res judication [sic] does not apply to the issues in the Amended Complaint that have not been litigated with Count II being a specific example. Further, the doctrine of res judicata allows for a judgment/order obtained through fraudulent means to be challenged. As noted earlier the Statute of Limitations for the Fraud and the T.R. 60 are met due to the recurrence of fraud on 7/10/2023 and 9/13/2024.

Id. This argument also contains no citation to relevant authority or the record.

[11] The only citation to any authority in the Rueths’ arguments is in combined Issues 7-8, which provides:

The defendants maintained and the Court agreed that Price v. Kuchaes, 950 N.E. 2d 1218, 1226 (Ct. App. Ind 2011) [sic] prevents Timothy Rueth from suing the defendants. The cited case in no way indicates Susan Rueth cannot sue the defendants. The case in no way indicates that Timothy Rueth cannot sue the attorney defendants. Furthermore, [the Bank] sought the abandonment of the Nondorf Farms interest from Timothy Rueth's estate and the trustee of Timothy Rueth's case agreed to the abandonment. The trustee agreed with the abandonment.

Id. at 11-12. Although the Rueths cite Price, they do not explain the holding of that case or why it is distinguishable from the facts of this case. Combined Issues 9-11 are also conclusory and simply claim that the Rueths and their children (who are not parties to the instant litigation) have not had their “day in court.” Id. at 12. Lastly, Issue 12 is similarly conclusory and provides no citation to authority or the record.

[12] Given the inadequacy of the Rueths’ contentions, we conclude that they are waived for failure to make a cogent argument as required by Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a).⁶ To adequately address the issues presented, we would have to comb through the record and effectively become an advocate for the Rueths. This is not our role. See Legacy Healthcare, Inc. v. Barnes & Thornburg, 837 N.E.2d 619, 639 n.29 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that an appellate court will not “scour the record” to find evidence supporting an appellant's argument), trans. denied; Picket Fence, 109 N.E.3d at 1029 (noting we cannot act as an advocate for a party whose arguments are too poorly developed to be considered).

Conclusion

[13] The Rueths’ appellate contentions are waived for failure to develop a cogent argument. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The Rueths list the following issues in the Issues section of their brief: (1) whether the trial court violated the Rueths’ legal rights by not providing them a reasonable time to respond to the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment; (2) whether the Defendants made a prima facie showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (3) whether the Rueths’ designated evidence demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial; (4) whether there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the tolling of the statute of limitations under Trial Rule 60(B) and/or the commission of other fraud; (5) whether the Rueths demonstrated that the current action was timely under Trial Rule 60(B); (6) whether the Rueths’ claims are barred by res judicata; (7) whether Timothy's Chapter 7 bankruptcy prevents Susan from bringing the current claims against the Defendants; (8) whether Timothy's Chapter 7 bankruptcy prevents him from bringing the current claims against the Defendants; (9) whether the trial court's ruling prevents Susan from having her day in court; (10) whether the trial court's ruling prevents Timothy from having his day in court; (11) whether the trial court's ruling prevents the Rueths’ children from having their day in court; and (12) whether the trial court properly ruled that it could not act under Trial Rule 12(B)(6).

2.   A “charging order” is “[a] statutory procedure whereby an individual partner's creditor can satisfy its claim from the partner's interest in the partnership.” Charging Order, Black's Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024); see also Ind. Code § 23-18-6-7(a) (“On application to a court with jurisdiction by a judgment creditor of a member, the court may charge the interest of the member in the limited liability company with the payment of the unsatisfied amount of the judgment with interest.”).

3.   Timothy filed a pro se petition for bankruptcy on behalf of BRCC Unit 16 in October 2010, shortly before the sheriff's sale in the Commercial Foreclosure Action. This bankruptcy action was dismissed because Timothy was only a fifty-percent shareholder in BRCC Unit 16 and did not show the consent of the other fifty-percent shareholder. Timothy then filed a second bankruptcy petition, via counsel, on behalf of BRCC Unit 16 in March 2011. This petition was dismissed for the same reason as the first petition.Susan first filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition in July 2010, shortly before the summary judgment hearing in the Residential Foreclosure Action, but this bankruptcy action was dismissed in March 2011 after Susan failed to make payments under the bankruptcy plan. In June 2011, Susan filed a second Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, again shortly before the summary judgment hearing in the Residential Foreclosure Action. And this second bankruptcy was again dismissed that October for failure to make payments under the bankruptcy plan. In May 2012, shortly before the sheriff's sale in the Residential Foreclosure Action, Susan filed a third bankruptcy petition. This bankruptcy was, yet again, dismissed in January 2016 for failure to make monthly payments under the Chapter 13 plan. Undeterred, Susan filed a fourth bankruptcy petition in March 2016. This case was dismissed by an agreed order in March 2019, which also imposed on Susan a one-year ban on filing additional bankruptcy petitions.In September 2019, Timothy filed a bankruptcy petition. In that case, the Bank obtained an order lifting the bankruptcy stay as to the Rueths’ residence. This bankruptcy estate was closed in June 2022. Susan filed a fifth bankruptcy petition in March 2022, again shortly before the sheriff's sale scheduled in the Residential Foreclosure Action. On the Bank's motion, the bankruptcy court entered an order stating that there was no bankruptcy stay vis-à-vis the sheriff's sale. Susan's fifth bankruptcy petition was dismissed in April 2022.

4.   There is no indication that the Rueths appealed this judgment.

5.   The Statement of Facts in the Appellant's Brief also does not comply with our Appellate Rules, which require the appellant to set forth the facts “in narrative form.” App. R. 46(A)(6)(c). The Rueths’ Statement of Facts is instead replete with arguments and conclusory statements.

6.   Another panel of this Court recently reached a similar conclusion in a related case involving Timothy and the Bank. Rueth v. Centier Bank, No. 24A-MF-2936, 2025 WL 2963826 (Ind. Ct. App. Oct. 21, 2025).

Tavitas, Chief Judge.

Bailey, J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.