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Amanda Sue LEE, Appellant-Defendant v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
MEMORANDUM DECISION
[1] Amanda Sue Lee appeals her convictions for residential entry as a level 6 felony and distribution of an intimate image as a class A misdemeanor. She contends that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence and that the State presented insufficient evidence to support her residential entry conviction. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In the spring of 2024, Lee lived with her husband, Ronnie Lee, and their three children in a “family oriented” residential neighborhood in New Palestine. Transcript Volume II at 79. Nick and Stephanie Carter, along with their three children, lived directly across the street. The families were “close,” the Lee and Carter children often played together, and the families had “cookouts.” Id. In April of 2024, Ronnie and Stephanie began “sharing an intimate relationship.” Id. at 80. Lee found out about the affair and sent Stephanie a text message asking Stephanie “if [she] had had an affair with her husband,” but Stephaine denied that the affair occurred. Id.
[3] On April 27, 2024, Nick and Stephanie were in bed asleep with their youngest daughter, I.C., when at 11:37 p.m., Lee rang their doorbell. Nick went downstairs and opened the door while holding I.C. When Nick opened the door, Lee told him that she had “confirmation” that Stephanie and Ronnie had been having an affair. Id. at 139. Lee was “emotional” and “physically shaking” as she spoke with Nick. Id. at 140. Nick told Lee that he was going to “go grab Stephanie” and he returned upstairs, placed I.C. in her crib, and he and Stephanie went into the master bedroom to talk. Id. Shortly thereafter, Lee came up the stairs toward the master bedroom. Nick, who was standing in the doorway, told Lee to “hold on,” but Lee entered the bedroom yelling, “You f-ked my husband,” repeatedly at Stephanie. Id. at 83, 140.
[4] The three adults eventually went downstairs to the living room to discuss the affair. When Lee's tone of voice “escalated” to yelling, Stephanie attempted to “remove” herself from the conversation by going back upstairs. Id. at 85. Lee followed Stephanie, so Stephanie started running and locked herself in the master bathroom with her back against the door. Lee tried to enter by “jiggling” the door handle and hitting the door. Id. at 86. Ultimately, Lee went back downstairs and left the house.
[5] After Lee left, Nick and Stephanie discussed the affair in their living room. At 12:38 a.m., Lee returned to the Carters’ home and entered through the closed front door without ringing the doorbell or knocking. Nick, Stephanie, and Lee continued to discuss the affair, but the conversation “escalated in intensity,” and Lee again left the home. Id. at 90. This time, Nick locked the front door so that Lee could not just walk back in if she were to return. Lee indeed returned to the Carters’ home a third time at 1:21 a.m. She knocked and rang the doorbell, and Nick let her in. After more conversation, Lee left the home at 1:36 a.m.
[6] In the days that followed those encounters, Stephanie's mother and grandmother began receiving messages from a Facebook Messenger account under the name “Amanda Sue Lee.” State's Exhibit 16-17, 19-20. One of the messages included a nude picture of Stephanie and stated, “This is what your grand daughter is blasting to married men. Unbelievable you need to get her in check. Before I do.” State's Exhibit 16.
[7] On May 15, 2024, the State charged Lee with criminal confinement as a level 6 felony, residential entry as a level 6 felony, battery resulting in bodily injury as a class A misdemeanor, and distribution of an intimate image as a class A misdemeanor. The court held a jury trial on April 22, 2025. During trial, the State offered the screenshots of messages from Stephanie's phone that her grandmother had received, including the message that included the nude photograph of Stephanie. Lee objected to the messages based on lack of foundation and the court admitted the messages over her objection. The State also offered a copy of Lee's Facebook page, showing her name and profile picture, which was admitted without objection. Stephanie testified that, in addition to her mother and grandmother, other members of her family had received similar messages from Lee. Stephanie also testified that it was not a common practice or allowable for Lee or any member of Lee's family to just walk into the Carters’ house “without permission.” Id. at 133.
[8] At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Lee guilty of residential entry as a level 6 felony and distribution of an intimate image as a class A misdemeanor and not guilty of criminal confinement and battery. Following a sentencing hearing held on May 16, 2025, the court sentenced Lee to concurrent sentences of 545 days, with ninety days executed and 445 days suspended to probation, for the residential entry conviction, and 364 days, with ninety days executed and 275 days suspended to probation, for the distribution conviction.
Discussion
I.
[9] We first address Lee's challenge to the court's admission of certain evidence. She asserts that the court abused its discretion “in admitting Facebook and text messages received by the alleged victim's family members.” Appellant's Brief at 8. She claims that the State failed to properly authenticate the text messages as being authored by her.
[10] The trial court has broad discretion to rule on the admissibility of evidence. Bradley v. State, 54 N.E.3d 996, 999 (Ind. 2016). A trial court's ruling on the admission of evidence is generally accorded a great deal of deference on appeal. Hall v. State, 36 N.E.3d 459, 466 (Ind. 2015), reh'g denied.
[11] “To lay a foundation for the admission of evidence, the proponent of the evidence must show that it has been authenticated.” Pavlovich v. State, 6 N.E.3d 969, 976 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Hape v. State, 903 N.E.2d 977, 989 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied.), trans, denied. “This authentication requirement applies to the substantive content of text messages purported to be sent by a party.” Id. Ind. Evidence Rule 901(a) provides that “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” One way to satisfy the requirement of authenticating a text message is through “[t]he appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.” Ind. Evidence Rule 901(b)(4). “Absolute proof of authenticity is not required.” Fry v. State, 885 N.E.2d 742, 748 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied. The proponent of the evidence needs to establish only a reasonable probability that the document is what it is claimed to be. Id. Once this reasonable probability is shown, any inconclusiveness regarding the exhibit's connection with the events at issue goes to the exhibit's weight, not its admissibility. Id. “Additionally, authentication of an exhibit can be established by either direct or circumstantial evidence.” Pavlovich, 6 N.E.3d at 976 (citing Newman v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1109, 1111 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)).
[12] Our review of the record reveals that the State laid an adequate foundation for admission of the text messages by establishing a reasonable probability that Lee sent the text messages. The State presented evidence that the messages were sent from a Facebook messenger account under the name of Amanda Sue Lee that included Lee's picture. State's Exhibit 16. The State also offered a copy of Lee's Facebook page, showing the same name and profile picture, which was admitted without objection. The messages were sent shortly after Lee discovered the affair between Stephanie and Ronnie, and the message that included the nude photograph of Stephanie included the statement: “This is what your grand daughter is blasting to married men. Unbelievable you need to get her in check. Before I do.” Id. This content indicated knowledge of the affair, anger at Stephanie, and knowledge that the nude image had been previously sent to Ronnie. The totality of the evidence, including this familiarity with unique matters, was sufficient to establish a reasonable probability that Lee sent the messages. See Pavlovich, 6 N.E.3d at 979 (familiarity with and detailed knowledge “of highly unique” matters were sufficient to establish a reasonable probability that the messages at issue were written by the defendant). Any lingering doubts about whether Lee wrote and sent the messages in question went to their evidentiary weight, not their admissibility. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the messages.
II.
[13] We next address Lee's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction for residential entry as level 6 felony. When reviewing claims of insufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of witnesses. Jordan v. State, 656 N.E.2d 816, 817 (Ind. 1995), reh'g denied. We look to the evidence and the reasonable inferences therefrom that support the verdict. Id. The conviction will be affirmed if there exists evidence of probative value from which a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[14] To prove Lee committed residential entry, the State was required to establish that she knowingly or intentionally broke and entered the dwelling of another person. Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5. Lee does not dispute that she knowingly or intentionally broke and entered the Carters’ residence; rather, she asserts that she had their permission to do so. Lack of consent is not an element of the offense that the State is required to prove. Townsend v. State, 33 N.E.3d 367, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Instead, “ ‘it is the defendant who must claim and prove the defense of consent. A defendant's belief that [s]he has permission to enter must be reasonable’ ” for a defendant to invoke the defense. Id. (quoting McKinney v. State, 653 N.E.2d 115, 118 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)). Once a defendant successfully raises the defense of consent, “the State has the burden of disproving the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Holman v. State, 816 N.E.2d 78, 81 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.
[15] The evidence indicates that during the first visit to the Carters’ home on the evening in question, Lee appropriately rang the doorbell. Nick let her in, and then, after a very heated conversation about the extramarital affair, Nick escorted Lee out of the home. She returned in the middle of the night, at 12:38 a.m., and barged in the home through the closed front door without knocking or ringing the doorbell. Lee presented no evidence that would suggest that the Carters’ expected her to return more than forty minutes after the first interaction, or that she reasonably believed that she had permission to enter. Nick testified that although he neglected to lock the door after Lee left the first time, he was sure to lock it after she left the second time to prevent another unauthorized entry.
[16] Lee suggests that the prior “friendly nature of the relationship” between herself and the Carters led her to reasonably presume she had permission to enter their home “without ‘knocking’ first” on the night in question. Appellant's Brief at 11. However, Stephanie testified that, even under ordinary circumstances, this was not the case. Moreover, the circumstances of the evening would not support a reasonable belief that Lee had the Carters’ permission to enter the home. Lee's assertions on appeal are merely a request for us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. Evidence of probative value exists from which a reasonable jury could find Lee guilty of residential entry beyond a reasonable doubt.
[17] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Lee's convictions.
[18] Affirmed.
Brown, Judge.
Altice, J., and DeBoer, J., concur
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Docket No: Court of Appeals Case No. 25A-CR-1487
Decided: February 12, 2026
Court: Court of Appeals of Indiana.
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