Johnathan David Bell, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] A jury found Johnathan David Bell guilty of resisting law enforcement, as a Level 6 felony. On appeal, Bell argues that his conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence. We disagree and therefore affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Shortly before 3:00 a.m. on March 5, 2025, Jefferson County Sheriff's Sergeant Devlin McMindes was driving north on State Road 7 when he saw an approaching southbound vehicle driven by Bell that “appeared to be traveling at a high rate of speed.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 90. The sergeant's radar clocked Bell at eighty-one miles per hour in a fifty-five-miles-per-hour zone. Bell drove past Sergeant McMindes, who activated the red-and-blue emergency lights on the rear of his vehicle. The sergeant looked in his driver's side mirror and “immediately saw [Bell's] brake lights come on.” Id. at 92. Sergeant McMindes began to turn his vehicle around and activated all of its red-and-blue emergency lights. He saw the brake lights on Bell's vehicle go off before he got “completely turned around, and then [he saw] it continue southbound[.]” Id.

[3] Sergeant McMindes pursued Bell's vehicle, which “still didn't pull over.” Id. at 94. It navigated a set of S-curves before entering the town of Dupont. Bell's vehicle was “still traveling at a ․ higher rate of speed, where the center of gravity shifting in the curves indicated that it was still traveling at a ․ pretty good pace.” Id. The sergeant saw Bell's vehicle “turn left and drive through [a] gas station parking lot at the intersection of State Road 7 and Main Street in Dupont.” Id. It “proceeded east” and “came to a stop by the Dupont Post Office in the front yard of the residence across the street.” Id. at 95. Sergeant McMindes ordered Bell to exit his vehicle and walk backward toward the sergeant's vehicle, where he was handcuffed. The sergeant estimated that the pursuit lasted approximately one minute and covered approximately 1.7 miles.¹

[4] The State charged Bell with resisting law enforcement, as a Level 6 felony. A jury found him guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to 545 days in the Department of Correction. Bell now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Bell asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Our standard of review is well settled:

For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we look only at the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).

[6] The State alleged that Bell committed resisting law enforcement, as a Level 6 felony, by knowingly fleeing from Sergeant McMindes, using a vehicle, after the sergeant “identified himself by visible or audible means, including operation of [his] siren or emergency lights, and visibly or audibly identified himself ․ and ordered [Bell] to stop[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 13; Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3), (c)(1)(A).² “A person engages in conduct ‘knowingly’ if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so.” I.C. § 35-41-2-2(b).

[7] Bell argues that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly fled from Sergeant McMindes. He claims that “he parked his vehicle on the street in a well lit area so as not to cause any harm to him or the officer[,]” that “[h]is vehicle was still running with its lights on demonstrating that he was not trying to flee[,]” and that he obeyed the sergeant's command to exit his vehicle “holding his license and registration.” Appellant's Br. at 9. Bell asserts, “People attempting to evade police do not conduct themselves in such a manner. This was a simple traffic stop that was blown out of proportion.” Id.

[8] We disagree. This Court has explained that “ ‘ “flight” in this context should be understood to mean a knowing attempt to escape law enforcement when the defendant is aware that a law enforcement officer has ordered him to stop or remain in place once there.’ ” Woodward v. State, 770 N.E.2d 897, 901 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Wellman v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1061, 1063 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)), trans. denied. In Woodward, after a police officer “activated his emergency lights and siren” behind the defendant's vehicle, the defendant continued driving “at approximately forty-five miles per hour for approximately a mile without stopping, slowing, or otherwise acknowledging” the officer. Id. at 898. Woodward “finally turned into an apartment complex and parked his vehicle in a parking space[,]” after which he was taken into custody and charged with resisting law enforcement. Id. At trial, Woodward claimed that he “wanted a clear, well-lighted place to stop where there would be someone who knew him.” Id. at 901. On appeal, this Court noted that the testimony was clear that Woodward was aware of the officer's presence and that the officer “wanted him to pull his vehicle over to the side of the road, yet he failed to do so except on his own terms.” Id. In affirming Woodward's conviction, the Court ultimately concluded, “[W]e cannot say that a person who has admitted to knowing that a police officer wishes to effectuate a traffic stop can, without adequate justification, choose the location of the stop.” Id. 902.³

[9] Here, the facts and inferences most favorable to the jury's verdict establish that Bell was aware of Sergeant McMindes's presence and that the sergeant wanted him to pull his vehicle over to the side of the road, yet he failed to do so except on his own terms after driving almost two miles from the spot where the sergeant activated his emergency lights. Bell has offered no adequate justification for choosing the location of the stop, so we affirm his conviction.⁴

[10] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Based on the sergeant's estimation, Bell's vehicle averaged a speed of 102 miles per hour over this distance.

2.   We cite the version of the statute in effect when Bell committed his crime. The statute was revised effective July 1, 2025.

3.   In response to Woodward's argument that “ ‘there are police/citizen encounters in which citizens may not be comfortable ․ stopping where an officer selected,’ ” the Court stated, “we must also be cognizant of the dangers that could await a police officer stopping where the citizen selects.” Woodward, 770 N.E.2d at 902 (citation to appellant's brief omitted).

4.   After Bell was handcuffed, Sergeant McMindes pointed out to him that he could have stopped his vehicle on the shoulder of State Road 7 or in one of the parking lots of several establishments along that road before he reached Dupont. State's Ex. 1 (sergeant's bodycam video). Bell claimed that he did not stop in those parking lots because his headlights were not very bright and he did not want to hit something, id., but the jury was not required to believe this self-serving statement. Bell also claimed that his brakes were not working properly and that he drove through the gas station parking lot to slow down. But Sergeant McMindes determined that the brake reservoir “had a sufficient amount of fluid” and “that the brake pedal had pressure.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 101. A sheriff's deputy “actually got in, put [Bell's] vehicle in reverse, and then as soon as he hit the brakes, it immediately stopped.” Id.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.