PICKETT v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Caleb Pickett appeals the thirty-eight-year aggregate sentence imposed by the trial court after he was convicted of six felonies. Pickett raises two issues, but we find one dispositive: whether the trial court imposed a sentence that exceeded the length allowed by law.¹ Finding the court erred in this respect, we reverse Pickett's sentence and remand for resentencing.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In October 2024, Pickett went to his mother's house where his son also lived. Pickett's mother thought his behavior was concerning and he had a gun, so she went to her room to call 911. While she was on the phone with the operator, Pickett held his mother and son at gunpoint and fired multiple shots. When Pickett ran out of bullets, his son tackled him, grabbed the gun, and a SWAT team entered the home and detained Pickett.

[3] The State charged Pickett with Counts I and II: Criminal Confinement, as Level 3 felonies; Count III: Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Serious Violent Felon, a Level 4 felony; Counts IV and V: Criminal Recklessness, as Level 6 felonies; Count VI: Pointing a Firearm, a Level 6 felony; and Count VII: Unlawful Possession of a Firearm by a Domestic Batterer, a Class A misdemeanor. The State also alleged that Pickett was a habitual offender. Pickett refused to attend his trial, and the jury found him guilty as charged and found he was a habitual offender.

[4] At sentencing, the trial court vacated Count VII due to double jeopardy concerns. The court then sentenced Pickett to twelve years for each count of criminal confinement, eight years for unlawfully possessing a firearm as a serious violent felon, and two years for each of the three other convictions. The second count of criminal confinement was ordered to be served consecutively to the remaining concurrent sentences. That count was also enhanced by fourteen years due to Pickett's habitual offender status. Altogether, this produced a thirty-eight-year aggregate sentence which Pickett was ordered to execute in the Department of Correction.

Discussion and Decision

[5] Pickett argues, and the State agrees, that his sentence violates Indiana law regarding consecutive sentences. Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(c) limits the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment to which a defendant may be sentenced when he commits multiple non-violent offenses arising out of a single episode of criminal conduct.² Where, as here, the most serious of such convictions is a Level 3 felony, “the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment may not exceed twenty [ ] years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-1-2(d)(7).

[6] The trial court ordered Pickett to serve his sentences concurrently except for his twelve-year sentence for criminal confinement on Count II. Given Pickett's crimes and the sentences imposed, the total of his consecutive terms of imprisonment was subject to the twenty-year limitation. While “crimes of violence” are excluded from the limitation and Pickett's crimes were aggressive in nature, the statute lists “precise names and citations of what [are] to be considered ‘crimes of violence,’ ” and the Legislature did not include criminal confinement on that list. Coleman v. State, 952 N.E.2d 377, 381 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); see also I.C. § 35-50-1-2(a)(20) (defining unlawful possession of a firearm by a serious volent felon to be a “crime of violence”).³ Moreover, Pickett's crimes all arose from a single episode of criminal conduct—that is, each crime occurred when he confined his mother and son in a bedroom and fired multiple shots. See I.C. § 35-50-1-2(b) (defining “episode of criminal conduct” as “offenses or a connected series of offenses that are closely related in time, place, and circumstance”).

[7] Accordingly, the trial court erred when it sentenced Pickett to consecutive terms of imprisonment—twelve-year sentences for both counts of criminal confinement—that exceeded twenty years in total.⁴

Conclusion

[8] We reverse the trial court's sentencing decision and remand for resentencing consistent with this opinion.

[9] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Because Pickett's sentence requires reversal and remand for resentencing, we decline to consider his claim that his sentence is inappropriate and therefore subject to revision under Appellate Rule 7(B). See Ousley v. State, 24A-CR-2106, at *1 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2025) (mem.) (finding defendant's Rule 7(B) claim was “premature” and declining to review the same because his sentence required reversal and remand for resentencing on other grounds).

2.   In pertinent part, Indiana Code section 35-50-1-2(c) states thatexcept for crimes of violence, the total of the consecutive terms of imprisonment, exclusive of terms of imprisonment under [certain statutes regarding sentence enhancements for habitual offenders] to which the defendant is sentenced for felony or misdemeanor convictions arising out of an episode of criminal conduct shall not exceed the period described in subsection (d).As such, Pickett's habitual offender enhancement was not subject to the limitation on consecutive sentencing.

3.   We note that the statutory limitation on consecutive sentencing does not apply “between a crime of violence and those that are not crimes of violence[,]” so Pickett's sentence for unlawfully possessing a firearm as a serious violent felon was not subject to the consecutive sentencing limitation. Ellis v. State, 736 N.E.2d 731, 737 (Ind. 2000).

4.   Pickett also argues that the trial court erred by failing to designate which criminal confinement count it enhanced with the habitual offender term of imprisonment. See I.C. § 35-50-2-8(j) (“The court shall attach the habitual offender enhancement to the felony conviction with the highest sentence imposed and specify which felony count is being enhanced.”). This argument fails because the trial court's sentencing order made clear the enhancement attached to Count II.

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.