MILLS v. COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Kyle Mills appeals the trial court's dismissal of his complaint for failure to properly serve the defendant. Concluding that he has failed to present cogent arguments relevant to the central issue in this appeal, and that he has failed to demonstrate that the trial court was biased, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 5, 2025, Mills filed a complaint against the “APPELLATE COURTS[.]” Appellees’ App. Vol. 2, p. 4. He claimed that “the APPELLATE COURTS Of the indiana [sic] Supreme Court Have OBSTRUCTED JUSTICE[.]” Id. Mills further claimed Indiana's appellate courts “Cover[ed] Up the truth Regarding Domestic Abuse[.]” Id. In the certificate of service, Mills alleged he had served his complaint upon “APPELLATE COURTS” using “US LEGAL PRO[.]” Id. at 5.

[3] Next, Mills moved to waive the filing fee. The trial court denied his motion.

[4] In August 2025, the Office of the Attorney General filed a Motion to Dismiss on behalf of the Indiana Court of Appeals.¹ The Attorney General alleged that Mills had failed to properly serve his complaint and summons on the defendant. Mills objected to the motion. The trial court granted the Motion to Dismiss and dismissed Mills’ complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed.

Issues

[5] We address two dispositive issues raised in Mills’ Appellant's Brief:²

I. Whether the trial court erred when it granted the Motion to Dismiss.

II. Whether the trial court displayed bias against Mills.

Discussion and Decision

[6] Before we turn to Mills’ claims, we note that “a pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). “This means that pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016).

I. Dismissal of Complaint

[7] Mills argues that the trial court erred when it granted the motion to dismiss. The court cited “Indiana Trial Rules 12(B)(2), (4), and (5)[ ]” in its order. Appellee's App. Vol. 2, p. 21. Trial Rule 12 provides that a defendant may raise certain defenses in either a responsive pleading or a motion to dismiss. Trial Rule 12(B)(2) addresses “[l]ack of jurisdiction over the person,” Trial Rule 12(B)(4) addresses “[i]nsufficiency of process[,]” and Trial Rule 12(B)(5) addresses “[i]nsufficiency of service of process[.]”

[8] “A trial court does not acquire personal jurisdiction over a party if service of process is inadequate.” Munster v. Groce, 829 N.E.2d 52, 57 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). A determination of the existence of personal jurisdiction is entitled to de novo review because personal jurisdiction presents a question of law. LinkAmerica Corp. v. Cox, 857 N.E.2d 961, 965 (Ind. 2006).

[9] In general, a plaintiff must serve the complaint and summons upon a defendant. Ind. Trial Rule 4(E). The plaintiff must also give the trial court clerk a copy of the summons when filing the complaint. Ind. Trial Rule 4(B). When the defendant is a state governmental organization, the plaintiff must serve the summons and complaint upon the organization's executive and the Attorney General of Indiana. Ind. Trial Rule 4.6(A)(3).

[10] In the current case, Mills alleged in the certificate of service attached to his complaint that he had served his complaint “Upon the APPELLATE COURTS” using “US LEGAL PRO[.]” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 5. The Appellee argues that Mills’ service of process was inadequate because, among other grounds, he failed to provide a summons with the complaint.

[11] We are unable to reach the merits of this issue because Mills has failed to discuss service of process in his Appellant's Brief. He does not cite to any facts or authorities on this point, choosing to instead claim the trial court should have granted his fee waiver, complain of unfair treatment by the trial court clerk, and allege bias by the trial court. “We prefer to decide cases on the merits, if such can be done.” Wenner v. Hensley, 224 N.E.3d 339, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023). “We will not become a party's advocate, nor will we address arguments that are inappropriate, improperly expressed, or too poorly developed to be understood.” Jones v. Hawk, 233 N.E.3d 1061, 1067 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). In the absence of any argument by Mills on the key issue in the case—personal jurisdiction via sufficient service of process—we must affirm the trial court's dismissal order.³

II. Allegations of Judicial Bias

[12] Mills argues that the trial judge showed “Prejudice and Bias” against him. Appellant's Br. p. 7. “It is well settled that adjudication by an impartial tribunal is one of the fundamental requirements of due process imposed on the courts of this state by the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution.” Mathews v. State, 64 N.E.3d 1250, 1253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied. “The law presumes a judge is unbiased.” Dan Cristiani Excavating Co., Inc. v. Money, 941 N.E.2d 1072, 1082 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. dismissed. “To overcome this presumption, the moving party must establish that the judge has personal prejudice for or against a party.” L.G. v. S.L., 88 N.E.3d 1069, 1073 (Ind. 2018). “Adverse rulings and findings by a trial judge are not sufficient reason to believe the judge has a personal bias or prejudice.” Id.

[13] Mills has also waived this issue for appellate review. He did not allege trial court bias during proceedings on the motion to dismiss. A party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal.⁴ See Husainy v. Granite Mgmt., LLC, 132 N.E.3d 486, 500 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (claim of judicial bias waived for failing to present it during trial court proceedings).

[14] Waiver notwithstanding, Mills points to the trial judge's denial of his request to waive the filing fee, and the judge's dismissal of the complaint, as proof of bias. But these are merely adverse rulings. In addition, Mills claims that the trial judge “Criticized My Complaints And Defamed My Character[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 6 (capitalizations in original). He does not direct us to any evidence to support his claim or any legal authorities on this point. Mills also states, without elaboration or proof, that “Bribery” was involved. Id. at 7. Mills has failed to demonstrate the trial judge's decisions were the result of personal bias against him. See L.G., 88 N.E.3d at 1073-74 (appellant failed to prove bias; appellant pointed to adverse rulings as the only proof).

Conclusion

[15] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mills referenced Indiana's appellate courts in his complaint, but the Attorney General appeared on behalf of only the Indiana Court of Appeals. In addition, the trial court's order dismissing the case referred only to the “Indiana Court of Appeals.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2, p. 21. Mills did not object to the absence of the Indiana Supreme Court from this litigation. As a result, we list only the Court of Appeals as an appellee.

2.   Mills has moved for Judge Altice's recusal from this case, referring to decisions Judge Altice made in this case when he was Chief Judge. We deny Mills’ motion by separate order.Mills has also requested oral argument. We deny his request by separate order.

3.   We also decline to address Mills’ argument about the fee waiver and assertions of mistreatment by the trial court clerk's employees. He cites no pertinent authority to support either claim.

4.   We note that the State cited a memorandum decision on the subject of bias without identifying it as such or asking the Court to consider it for persuasive value, in violation of Indiana Appellate Rule 65(D)(2). Appellee's Br. pp. 10-11 (citing Lloyd v. State, Case No. 21A-CR-1265, 2023 WL 1809363 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2023)). The other cases cited by the State are sufficient to preserve the waiver argument.

Robb, Senior Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.