IN RE: the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of A.V. and S.V. (Minor Children) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] B.V. (“Father”) appeals the trial court's order terminating his parental rights over his minor children, A.V. and S.V. (collectively, “the Children”).¹ We affirm.

Issues

[2] Father raises two issues for our review, namely:

1. Whether this Court should take judicial notice of certain reports written by the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”).

2. Whether the court committed fundamental error when it terminated Father's parental rights.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] A.V. was born on January 13, 2017, and S.V. was born on January 31, 2019, and they were both born to Father and T.W. (“Mother”) (collectively, “Parents”). In addition to the Children, Parents have another child, J.V., who was born on May 8, 2013. On July 13, 2021, DCS filed a petition alleging that the Children and J.V. were Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”) after it had substantiated reports of abuse and neglect. All three children were removed from Parents’ care and placed together in relative care. Thereafter, J.V. admitted that he had sexually assaulted the Children and was ultimately placed in a residential treatment facility. The Children were moved to foster care.

[4] At a hearing, Mother admitted to the allegations in the CHINS petition, and Father waived his right to a fact-finding hearing. As such, the court adjudicated all three children to be CHINS. Following a dispositional hearing, the court ordered Father to participate in visits with the Children and the Father Engagement Program and to follow all recommendations made by service providers.

[5] In October 2022, a service agency called Claravida received a referral to provide supervised visits between Father and the Children. However, that service was closed out “unsuccessfully in March 2023 due to Father's lack of compliance.” Appealed Order at 4. The court then held a permanency hearing on March 17, 2023. Following that hearing, at which Father failed to appear, the court changed the permanency plan from reunification to adoption “due to the age of the case, parents[’] minimal progress in services, and that the children require permanency[.]” Id. at 5.

[6] In January 2024, DCS Family Case Manager (“FCM”) Chiba Israel was assigned to the case. At that time, Father “was not visiting the Children consistently.” Id. at 13. Father told FCM Israel “that he was the ‘non-offending parent’ and that he should be able to visit without restriction.” Id. During FCM Israel's time on the case, “services ha[d] been consistently available to each parent if they had wished to participate.” Id. However, Father did not “consistently engage[ ] in visits with the Children in a manner that would allow the team to recommend transitioning visits into Father's home.” Id. at 14. Further, FCM Israel believed that Father needed “special parenting education to keep the boys safe[.]” Id. That “parenting education ha[d] been available to Father but never undertaken.” Id. Claravida received another referral for visitation services between Father and the Children in June 2024, but that referral was also closed out “unsuccessfully.” Id. at 6.

[7] On June 17, 2024, Brooklyn Hill, a therapist, was referred by DCS to provide therapeutic supervised visits between Father and the Children. The referral allowed Hill to supervise up to twelve hours of visits per week. Hill supervised the first visit, which occurred on July 26, and then two visits in August. Hill “did not think there was much of a bond between Father and the Children.” Id. at 7. Following the visits, the Children “would experience regression in their behaviors.” Id. at 12. After August, Father was “noncompliant” with visits. Id. at 7. Father reported to Hill that he “was trying to dedicate more time to visits with” J.V. Id. Hill closed her referral in December, but she “would have been available to supervise visits” from August to December if “Father had wished to see” the Children. Id. During that time, Father had “consistent” visits with J.V. “almost every Saturday[.]” Id. Then, in October 2024, J.V. was returned to Father's care on a trial home visit.

[8] DCS filed petitions to terminate Father's parental rights as to the Children on January 23, 2025. In March, Father requested a meeting with the Children's foster parents. However, Father failed to attend that meeting. The court then held a fact-finding hearing on DCS's petitions on July 8. Father failed to personally appear but was represented by counsel.

[9] During the hearing, Kathy Kiebel, who provided behavior modification services to A.V., testified to concerns that she had initially observed with A.V.’s behavior but noted that he had improved during the time with his foster family. She further opined that it “would be detrimental for him to be removed from that home.” Id. at 10. A.V.’s therapist, Ellen Grosh, began working with A.V. in May 2022. Grosh “believes the relationship between [A.V.] and Father is essentially non-existent” and that A.V. “could need more intensive therapy if his father was to come back into his life[.]” Id. at 11.

[10] S.V.’s therapist also testified to the work she had done with S.V. since June 2024. During her testimony, she expressed “concerns for [S.V.’s] mental wellbeing if he was to visit with Father[.]” Id. at 10. Sarah Andrews, a family support therapist, indicated her belief that, “if either parent was to return to the lives of the Children, the Children's mental health would decline[.]” Id. at 11. Similarly, the Children's Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”) “reasonably believes there is no bond between the Children and either parent” and that Father would not “take the necessary steps in his home to protect the Children” because “Father does not believe the Children need any services.” Id. at 12-13.

[11] Following the fact-finding hearing, the court found that the Children cannot be placed back in Father's care “due almost solely to his utter lack [of] participation in their lives. Father has made the conscious choice to dedicate himself to raising [J.V.], and at [the] expense of abandoning [S.V.] and [A.V.] to the care of DCS and their foster parents.” Id. at 14. The court further found that there “is no current indication that parents are making new efforts to engage with their Children[.]” Id.

[12] Based on those findings, the court entered the following conclusions:

14. DCS has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the Children have been removed from the parents and have been under the supervision of the local office for at least fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months and, despite the department's reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify the child's family under IC 31-34-21-5.5, the parent has been unable to remedy the circumstances that resulted in the child being placed in care outside the parent's home.

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17. No provider is recommending that the Children [be] returned to the care of either parent.

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19. Father has only seen the Children two to three times in the last twenty months. These children have experienced sexual trauma that requires them to have love, support and consistency in their lives. Father has refused to provide even the most basic of parental supports to the Children. The Children are not in Father's care because he has made the choice to abandon the Children to the care of DCS and their foster parents. Father has the ability to safely care for his son [J.V.], and is unwilling to make the effort to safely care for [S.V.] and [A.V.].

20. Neither parent is participating in the lives of the Children in any way as of the time of trial. The parents[’] complete lack of engagement in this case indicates that it is unlikely they would be in a position to have the Children in their care in the near future.

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25. The Children have been removed from their parents’ care for four years and five months. They have never had even one unsupervised visit in that time. The parents have had more than ample time to demonstrate even the most minute interest in the lives of the Children and have consistently failed to do so. There is absolutely no evidence that either parent is any closer to reunification than they were [the] day the Children were removed.

Id. at 17-18.

[13] Accordingly, the court concluded that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for the Children's removal from Father's care or continued placement outside of his care will not be remedied; that there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Children's well-being; that termination of the parental rights is in the Children's best interests; and that DCS has a satisfactory plan for the Children, that being adoption. Therefore, the court terminated Father's parental rights. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Judicial Notice

[14] Father first asks us to take judicial notice of various permanency, modification, and progress reports from DCS that he has included in his supplemental appendix. Father acknowledges that these reports were not “presented before the trial court in the termination proceeding[.]” Appellant's Br. at 6. Nevertheless, Father asks us to consider those documents because the trial court had “received each of these reports and utilized them to make prior decisions regarding placement and permanency for the Children.” Id. at 7. In addition, he contends that the “reports are representations made by the State's actors” and that the facts within those reports “can be readily determined from a source that no party to this appeal can reasonably question.” Id.

[15] However, as “a general rule, matters not contained in the record are not proper subjects for review.” Herron v. State, 808 N.E.2d 172, 178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Further, it is “axiomatic that appellate review of the factfinder's assessment is limited to those matters contained in the record which were presented to and considered by the factfinder.” Dollar Inn, Inc. v. Slone, 695 N.E.2d 185, 188 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied. And we believe that that is especially true, where, as here, we are asked to review a trial court's determination regarding a termination of parental rights, which is a proceeding in which we give “deference” to the trial court's “unique position” to assess the evidence. Judy S. v. Noble Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. Because Father did not provide the DCS reports to the trial court during the termination proceedings, he cannot now use those same reports in an attempt to fill an evidentiary gap. Dollar Inn, Inc., 695 N.E.2d at 188. We therefore decline Father's request to take judicial notice of the DCS records contained in his supplemental appendix.

Issue Two: Due Process

[16] Father next contends that the court erred when it terminated his parental rights. In particular, he contends that DCS did not make reasonable efforts to reunify him with the Children, thereby violating his due process rights. Father acknowledges that he did not raise this issue to the trial court. Thus, in order to succeed on appeal, Father must show that any error constituted fundamental error. To qualify as fundamental error, “an error must be so prejudicial to the rights of the defendant as to make a fair trial impossible and must constitute a blatant violation of basic principles.” T.S. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs. (In re D.T.), 981 N.E.2d 1221, 1225 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “The harm or potential for harm must be substantial, and the resulting error must deny the defendant fundamental due process.” Id.

[17] “When the State seeks to terminate parental rights, it must do so in a manner that meets the requirements of due process.” T.K. v. Ind. Dep't. of Child Servs. (In re T.W.), 135 N.E.3d 607, 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. The nature of the process due in any proceeding is governed by a balance of three factors: the private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure. Id. This Court has described those interests in the context of termination proceedings as follows:

The private interest affected by the proceeding is substantial—a parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her child. And the State's interest in protecting the welfare of a child is also substantial. Because the State and the parent have substantial interests affected by the proceeding, we focus on the risk of error created by DCS's actions and the trial court's actions.

K.M. v. Ind. Dep't. of Child Servs. (In re S.L.), 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (internal citations omitted).

[18] Again, Father asserts that his due process rights were violated when, according to him, DCS “failed to make reasonable efforts to preserve the family.” Appellant's Br. at 11. Specifically, he contends that DCS failed to “properly facilitate” visits between him and the Children and that it “thwarted” his visitation by working with the foster family's schedule over his own and by changing providers. Id. at 9, 11. And Father maintains that that failure by DCS caused the “reduced engagement” with the Children on his part and ultimately led to the lack of a bond that resulted in the termination of his rights. Id. at 10.²

[19] However, contrary to Father's argument, the record demonstrates that DCS provided Father with numerous opportunities to engage in visitation with his Children but that he chose not to do so. Indeed, Claravida received the first referral for supervised visits in October 2022, but that referral was closed in March 2023 “due to Father's lack of compliance.” Appealed Order at 4. Claravida received another referral in June 2024, but it was again closed out “unsuccessfully.” Id. at 6. Then, on June 17, Hill was referred by DCS to provide up to twelve hours of supervised visits between Father and the Children per week. Hill supervised the first visit on July 26, and she supervised two in August. However, after August, Father was “non-compliant” and told Hill that “he was trying to dedicate more time to visits with [J.V.].” Id. at 7. Indeed, during that time, Father had “consistent” visits with J.V. and was able to have J.V. placed back in his home on a trial home visit in October 2024, where he remained at the time of the fact-finding hearing. Hill ultimately closed her referral for visits with the Children in December but clarified that she “would have been available to supervise visits from August to December 2024 if Father had wished to see” the Children. Id.

[20] Stated differently, DCS started visitation services on three different occassions, which gave Father numerous opportunities to engage in visits with the Children. But Father chose not to participate, visiting with the Children only three times in the twenty months prior to the fact-finding hearing on DCS's petition. In addition, DCS provided “parenting education” to Father, but it was “never undertaken.” Id. at 14. As such, DCS provided numerous chances for Father to participate in services and work to be reunited with the Children. But instead of taking advantage of those opportunities, Father focused his efforts on reunifying only with J.V. and not the Children. As such, DCS did not violate Father's due process rights, and Father has failed to show that the court committed any error, let alone fundamental error, when it terminated his parental rights.

Conclusion

[21] We decline Father's request to take judicial notice of records that were not presented to and considered by the trial court. And the court did not commit fundamental error when it terminated Father's parental rights. We therefore affirm the trial court's order.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   In the same order, the trial court also terminated the rights of the Children's mother; however, she does not participate in this appeal.

2.   To support his argument, Father relies almost exclusively on “facts” contained within his supplemental appendix. However, as discussed above, the documents in that supplemental appendix were not presented to the trial court, and we will not now take judicial notice of them.

Bailey, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.