RANDLE v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Jermaine Randle learned that two men living in the apartment above his had allegedly sexually assaulted his girlfriend while she was incapacitated. Four days later, those men were shot and killed at their apartment. In connection with their deaths, Randle was convicted of two counts of murder and sentenced to a total of 110 years imprisonment. He now appeals, arguing that the State presented insufficient evidence to prove he committed the murders and that his sentence is improper. We affirm.

Facts

[2] In January 2023, Randle lived with his girlfriend, B.S., and their young child in an Indianapolis house that had been divided into multiple apartments. One day, B.S. told Randle that their two upstairs neighbors—Larry Moorman and Shawn Barnett—had drugged and sexually assaulted her while Randle was at work. Together, B.S. and Randle reported the alleged crime to police. The officers to whom they spoke had concerns about B.S.’s account due to its inconsistencies but nevertheless opened an investigation. At one point during the police interview, Randle said that he would be the first person to be blamed if something happened to Moorman and Barnett.

[3] In the days that followed, Randle sent multiple text messages to others accusing the upstairs neighbors of drugging and raping B.S. and expressing anger about what he believed had occurred. One acquaintance urged Randle not to take action that would damage his future. Four days after Randle learned of the alleged assault, Barnett and Moorman were shot and killed at their upstairs apartment, with Moorman's body found in the bathroom and Barnett's body found on the landing outside the door to their apartment.

[4] Around the time of the shooting, a downstairs resident saw Randle's van parked in front of the residence. Shortly thereafter, the resident heard a single gunshot. Five to ten minutes later, several more shots rang out, followed by a brief pause and then more gunfire. After the final shots, the resident heard someone running down the stairs.

[5] During this time, an upstairs resident awoke to the sound of someone running up the stairs and knocking on the door of the apartment where Moorman and Barnett lived. The upstairs resident then heard someone say, “Why did you rape my wife?” followed by gunshots. Tr. Vol. III, p. 206. The resident, who had previously overheard Randle speak during an argument with B.S., recognized the voice as Randle's. Moments later, the resident heard someone run back downstairs and say, “[H]oney let's hurry up, get out of here.” Id. at 207.

[6] The upstairs resident called his parents, who immediately came to the home and found Barnett's body in the landing. The parents then called 911. The responding police officers discovered the bodies of both Moorman and Barnett with multiple gunshot wounds.

[7] A neighbor's doorbell camera recorded Randle's van leaving the area shortly after the gunshots. On the morning of the shootings, Randle sent a text message to an acquaintance stating that he and B.S. were coming over because Randle had “nowhere else to go.” Tr. Vol. IV, p. 77.

[8] Randle was charged with and convicted after a jury trial of two counts of murder. At sentencing, the trial court imposed advisory sentences of 55 years on each count and ordered the sentences to be served consecutively, for an aggregate sentence of 110 years. Randle appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Randle claims the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the two murders. He also challenges his 110-year sentence. We conclude the evidence sufficiently supported Randle's murder convictions and that his sentence is neither erroneous nor inappropriate.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[10] When reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. Cupp v. State, 267 N.E.3d 1018, 1022 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the convictions. Id. We affirm unless no reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[11] To prove Randle guilty of the double murder, the State was required to show beyond a reasonable doubt that Randle knowingly or intentionally killed Moorman and Barnett. Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1). In arguing that the State did not meet that standard of proof, Randle emphasizes that no witness saw him fire a gun and that the State's case was circumstantial. But a murder conviction may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone. Lacey v. State, 755 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Ind. 2001). And the State is not required to negate every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Thornton v. State, 712 N.E.2d 960, 963 (Ind. 1999). Rather, circumstantial evidence is sufficient if the inferences that may reasonably be drawn from it enable the trier of fact to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

[12] Here, the circumstantial evidence allowed the jury to reasonably conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Randle murdered Moorman and Barnett. The State's evidence showed that, in the days immediately preceding the murders, Randle accused Moorman and Barnett of raping his girlfriend and expressed anger toward them. Randle even appeared to preview his crimes when he told police that if something happened to the two men, he would be the first blamed. And the evidence placed Randle and his vehicle at the scene during the narrow window when the murders occurred.

[13] The jury also heard evidence tying Randle to the killings in real time. Witnesses described a sequence of gunfire consistent with a confrontation followed by the sound of someone fleeing the victims’ apartment. At nearly the same time, an upstairs resident heard the person at the victims’ door confront them about the alleged sexual assault—“Why did you rape my wife?”—immediately before the shots were fired. Tr. Vol. III, p. 206. That resident, who identified the voice as Randle's, then heard the same person hurry back downstairs, urging, “Honey, let's hurry up, get out of here.” Id. at 207, 211-12. Randle's van was also seen leaving the area shortly after the gunfire. No one else was shown to be present in or at the door of the apartment during the shootings, and no one other than Randle was known to have a motive to harm Barnett or Moorman.

[14] Taken together, this evidence permitted the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Randle knowingly or intentionally killed Barnett and Moorman. Randle's contrary argument—that the evidence could support a different inference—asks us to reassess witness credibility and reweigh competing interpretations of the evidence, which we may not do on appeal. Bailey v. State, 907 N.E.2d 1003, 1005 (Ind. 2009). His challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence therefore fails.

II. Sentencing Issues

[15] At sentencing, the trial court imposed advisory sentences of 55 years for each murder conviction. In doing so, the court expressly identified Randle's criminal history and the nature and circumstances of the offenses as aggravating circumstances. The judge then stated that she was “sentencing those consecutively because I think that a consecutive sentence is appropriate in this matter.” Tr. Vol. IV, p. 144.

[16] Randle challenges this sentence in two ways. First, he claims the trial court erred by relying on two aggravators: (1) that he had opportunities to “change course” (part of the offenses’ nature and circumstances, which the court found aggravating); and (2) that the murders reflected “two separate decisions,” which Randle contends was the basis for the consecutive sentencing. Second, Randle claims the sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) in light of the nature of the offense and his character. We find neither claim persuasive.

A. No Abuse of Discretion

[17] We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the trial court relies on reasons that are improper as a matter of law or unsupported by the record. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490-491 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). In doing so, we review the sentencing statement as a whole, not by isolating individual phrases from the court's explanation. Id.

[18] Randle's claim that the trial court abused its discretion by improperly finding two aggravating circumstances—that Randle had opportunities to “change course” and that the killings involved “two separate decisions”—is unsupported by the record. These were mere observations by the trial court. The court did not identify either point as an aggravator. Its “change course” comment was part of the broader nature and circumstances of the offenses aggravator, which Randle does not specifically challenge. And its “separate decisions” remark was made in explaining why the two victims’ deaths warranted two separate punishments. Indiana law permits consecutive sentences when multiple crimes of violence result in harm to multiple victims because each victim represents a distinct injury. See Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (“[I]t is well-settled that ‘[c]onsecutive sentences reflect the significance of multiple victims.’ ”) (quoting Pittman v. State, 885 N.E.2d 1246, 1259 (Ind. 2008)).

[19] Viewed as a whole, the trial court's sentencing statement reflects a straightforward application of the court's discretion. The trial court imposed advisory sentences, identified two largely unchallenged aggravators (Randle's criminal history and the nature and circumstances of the crimes), and explained why those sentences would be served consecutively. Randle's argument rests on extracting phrases from that explanation and treating them as aggravators when the record does not support that reading. We find no error.

B. No Inappropriate Sentence

[20] Randle claims his sentence is inappropriate under Appellate Rule 7(B). This rule permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” App. R. 7(B). In reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence, our principal role is to attempt to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived “correct” sentence. Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014) (quotations omitted).

[21] We therefore give “substantial deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision. Id. The trial court's judgment should prevail unless it is “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense ․ and the defendant's character.” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015). Whether a sentence is inappropriate turns on the Court's sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and other factors that come to light in a given case. Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008).

1. Nature of the Offenses

[22] When assessing the appropriateness of a sentence in light of the nature of the offense, we first consider the statutory range established for that class of offense. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494. Randle was convicted of two counts of murder. When neither death nor life without parole are sought, the sentencing range for murder is 45 to 65 years, with an advisory sentence of 55 years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3(a).

[23] Randle does not challenge the propriety of the 55-year sentence imposed as to each murder conviction. Instead, he contends the trial court erred in ordering the 55-year sentences to be served consecutively. He suggests “the court made no finding that there was anything more egregious about the offense as committed by Randle that made it different from the typical offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” Appellant's Br., p. 17.

[24] Randle also disputes the court's view that the two murders resulted from “two different decisions that” Randle made “in very short succession.” Tr. Vol. IV, p. 144. He contends the record shows that, in his mind, “there were never two individuals that raped or violated his girlfriend.” Appellant's Br., p. 17. Instead, Randle argues that he viewed Moorman and Barnett as essentially a single two-person unit and “made one decision against both of the people that hurt B.S.” Id. at 18. Yet Randle acknowledges that his actions “tragically affected two lives.” Id. As previously noted, consecutive sentences are appropriate when the defendant is convicted of separate counts against two individuals. See Hancz-Barron, 235 N.E.3d at 1248. Thus, Randle has failed to show his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense.

2. Randle's Character

[25] Randle argues that his character also rendered the consecutive sentences inappropriate. He argues that his criminal history (three prior felony and five prior misdemeanor convictions), mental illness, and early childhood abuse do not justify a 110-year sentence for the two murders. But “[e]ven a minor criminal history” reflects poorly on a defendant. Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 448 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Randle fails to connect his mental illness or child abuse to these crimes or offer reasons why these particular mitigating circumstances effectively barred consecutive sentencing. He has failed to meet his burden of establishing his sentence is inappropriate under Rule 7(B). See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 494.

Conclusion

[26] As the evidence was sufficient to support Randle's convictions for murder and his sentence was neither inappropriate under Rule 7(B) nor the product of an abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bradford, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.