WOOLEY v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Kari Wooley stole over $70,000 from the estate of a deceased family friend, in part, by repeatedly cashing checks on which she had forged the signature of the estate's personal representative. For this, Wooley was convicted of 2 counts of theft and 18 counts of counterfeiting—all Level 6 felonies. At sentencing, the trial court “merged” one of Wooley's counterfeiting convictions (Count III) with one of her theft convictions (Count I) due to double jeopardy concerns. The court then sentenced Wooley to a total of 15 years imprisonment.

[2] Wooley appeals her 15-year sentence, arguing that the trial court improperly considered her maintaining her innocence as an aggravating factor. She also challenges the appropriateness of her sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). Finding neither argument persuasive, we affirm Wooley's sentence. But we sua sponte conclude that “merging” Wooley's convictions on Counts I and III did not resolve the trial court's double jeopardy concerns. We therefore remand for the trial court to vacate Wooley's conviction on Count III and to correct the Abstract of Judgment, which includes a 1-year concurrent sentence on that count.

Facts

[3] Dorothy Hockersmith died without a will in January 2018, after a long battle with diabetes-related illnesses. She left behind two adult daughters—Laura Millsaps and Stacy Parke—each of whom have an unspecified “cognitive disability.” Tr. Vol. VII, pp. 10, 42. Millsaps can function on her own but has “major anxiety.” Tr. Vol. VI, p. 156. When put on the spot, she gets “stressed out,” goes “fog brain,” and forgets what she is doing. Id. She is also “a little slower” with reading and math. Parke's disability is more “severe.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 147.

[4] Wooley was a “close family friend” of Millsaps's. Tr. Vol. II, p. 138. The two had known each other through their mothers’ friendship for roughly 15 years and referred to each other as “sister.” Tr. Vol. VI, p. 153. When Hockersmith fell ill in 2017, Wooley reached out to Millsaps and encouraged her to obtain Hockersmith's power of attorney. As Hockersmith's health worsened, Wooley visited Millsaps and offered emotional support. And after Hockersmith died, Wooley assisted Millsaps with Hockersmith's funeral arrangements and offered to help Millsaps in any other way she could.

[5] Through her own parents’ deaths, Wooley had experience with estates. She therefore offered to serve as personal representative of Hockersmith's Estate, but Millsaps declined. After consulting with an attorney, Millsaps petitioned to be and was ultimately appointed as the Estate's personal representative. But she quickly turned to Wooley for assistance. Nervous about handling the large amount of money expected to pass through the Estate, Millsaps specifically enlisted Wooley to organize Hockersmith's bills and facilitate their payment.

[6] In April 2018, Wooley accompanied Millsaps to a bank in Crawfordsville (the Bank) to open an Estate bank account. Millsaps did her personal banking at the Bank, and it had flagged her as a “protected person” due to her disability. Tr. Vol. II, p. 136. According to one bank employee, Millsaps asked a lot of questions and did not always seem to understand “regular banking things,” such as account fees, minimum balances, and different types of deposits. Id. Millsaps and Wooley met with this same employee when opening the Estate account, and the employee could tell that Millsaps “really trusted and respected [Wooley's] opinions on things.” Id. at 138.

[7] Millsaps was concerned that her boyfriend and roommate, Kenny, would try to steal money from the Estate's bank account. To avoid bank statements being sent to Millsaps's home in Crawfordsville, she and Wooley decided to designate the address of Wooley's Lafayette home as the account's mailing address. The bank employee who opened the account approved of this plan but advised Millsaps and Wooley that only Millsaps could sign checks from the account. Though they understood this instruction, Millsaps and Wooley decided to keep the Estate's checkbook at Wooley's house so Kenny could not find it.

[8] Millsaps soon deposited more than $100,000 into the Estate's bank account. She also gave Wooley two boxes of Hockersmith's bills. According to Millsaps, her and Wooley's general plan was as follows: When Wooley identified bills that needed to be paid, she would bring the Estate's checkbook to Millsaps's home, fill out a check for Millsaps to sign, and then—because Millsaps did not have a driver's license—drive Millsaps to wherever the check needed to be delivered.

[9] Between April 30 and October 3, 2018, Millsaps signed and delivered 10 checks pursuant to her and Wooley's plan. Meanwhile, unbeknownst to Millsaps, Wooley stole $60,750 from the Estate's bank account by writing herself 19 different checks from the Estate's checkbook, forging Millsaps's signature thereon, and cashing them at the Bank. Because Wooley did not have an account at the Bank, each of these checks was subject to a 2% transaction fee.

[10] Millsaps did not notice the Estate's dwindling account balance until she visited the Bank again in the summer of 2018. When she advised a bank employee that the balance was incorrect, the employee suggested opening an investigation. Millsaps decided to speak with Wooley first. On July 16, Millsaps directly asked Wooley if she was stealing money from the Estate. Wooley denied any theft, and Millsaps believed her. Millsaps, however, continued to discuss the Estate's account balance with bank employees, and the situation was eventually reported to the Bank's fraud department.

[11] In October 2018, the Bank's fraud department placed a freeze on the Estate's bank account that only permitted in-person cash withdrawals. The following month, Wooley twice instructed Millsaps to withdraw cash so they could pay Hockersmith's bills. Because Millsaps still trusted Wooley, she complied. On November 13, Millsaps withdrew $7,000 cash. Wooley then drove Millsaps to a local storage facility, where she had rented several storage units to hold Hockersmith's personal property. After Millsaps paid around $500 in fees owed on the units, Wooley took the remaining cash home with her to Lafayette. A week later, on November 19, Millsaps withdrew $5,000 cash, which Wooley also took home.

[12] By January 2019, additional fees were owed on the storage units. Millsaps sent Wooley repeated messages about paying the fees from the cash in Wooley's possession. Wooley initially did not respond, but she eventually assured Millsaps that she would pay the fees in the coming days. Meanwhile, Wooley sent the storage facility an email indicating she did not want the facility to tell Millsaps that the fees remained unpaid. The facility alerted Millsaps anyway, but Millsaps held out hope that Wooley would make a payment. She never did.

[13] In February 2019, Millsaps and her adult son, James, drove to Lafayette to retrieve the Estate cash in Wooley's possession. Wooley did not give it to them; “[s]he said something about it's on a card and there was something wrong with the card.” Tr. Vol. III, p. 119. A few months later, Millsaps and James tried again to no avail. This time, however, they managed to retrieve the Estate's checkbook from Wooley.

[14] Finally, in November 2019, Millsaps reported Wooley to the police. After an investigation, the State charged Wooley with 21 Level 6 felonies: Counts I and II alleged theft and Counts III through XXI alleged counterfeiting. Count IV was eventually dismissed on the State's motion, but Wooley proceeded to a jury trial on the remaining 20 counts.

[15] While her trial was pending, Wooley forged Millsaps's signature on a backdated, handwritten contract that purported to absolve Wooley from liability for missing Estate assets. Among other things, this contract stated:

[Wooley] will write checks out as [Millsaps] says (to whom, the amount). [Millsaps] will sign checks and do with money as she wants. [Wooley] is just helping [Millsaps] as [Millsaps] needs.

Exhs. Vol. IX, p. 144.

[16] When her trial finally commenced, Wooley maintained her innocence and testified in her own defense. Wooley explained her and Millsaps's general plan to pay Hockersmith's bills as follows: each week, after identifying three or four bills that needed to be paid, Wooley would drive with the Estate checkbook to Millsaps's home. Millsaps would round up each bill to the nearest dollar amount, add the amounts together, and then arbitrarily round the subtotal up to the nearest 50 or 100. Next, Wooley would fill out a single check for this amount—made payable to herself—and Millsaps would sign it. Wooley alone would then drive the check to the Bank, cash it, and return the cash to Millsaps at her home. According to Wooley, Millsaps would ultimately take the cash somewhere and purchase money orders with which to pay the bills.

[17] Wooley acknowledged this plan was “strange” but stated Millsaps insisted on it. Tr. Vol. VI, p. 166. When asked about the 2% non-client service fee imposed each time Wooley alone cashed a check at the Bank, Wooley stated: “That is a question for [Millsaps] because I can't tell you what she thinks. That's how she had me do it.” Tr. Vol. VII, p. 29.

[18] According to Wooley, she at one point suspected that Millsaps may have been using their bill-paying plan to embezzle Estate funds that would otherwise go to her sister, Stacy. But Wooley continued to help Millsaps because Millsaps was “family,” and according to Wooley, “[y]ou don't walk away from family.” Id. at 42. When asked if this mantra applied even when someone is “stealing from their even more severely cognitively disabled sister,” Wooley indicated that it did, adding, “That's between them.” Id.

[19] The jury found Wooley guilty as charged, and the trial court entered judgments of conviction on all 20 charges—2 counts of Level 6 felony theft and 18 counts of Level 6 felony counterfeiting. For sentencing purposes, however, the trial court “merged” Wooley's conviction on Count III (counterfeiting) with her conviction on Count I (theft) due to double jeopardy concerns. Tr. Vol. VIII, p. 76. The trial court's sentencing order likewise notes that Count III “merge[d]” with Count I. App. Vol. IV, p. 70. But the Abstract of Judgment lists a 1-year concurrent sentence on Count III.

[20] At sentencing, the trial court considered three mitigating circumstances: this was Wooley's first criminal conviction, incarceration would be an undue hardship on Wooley's children, and Wooley had the support of her family and friends. As aggravating circumstances, the court considered that Millsaps had a cognitive disability, that Wooley targeted Millsaps while her mother was dying, and that Wooley took advantage of her position of trust with Millsaps. The court also considered the repetitive nature of Wooley's offenses and her lack of remorse.

[21] The trial court ultimately sentenced Wooley to a total of 15 years in prison: 2 years on Count II, and 1 year each on the remaining 18 counts, with Counts I and V-VI served consecutively, and Counts XVII-XXI served concurrently. The Cout also ordered Wooley to pay $72,013.12 in restitution.

Discussion and Decision

[22] Wooley appeals her 15-year sentence, arguing that the trial court improperly considered her maintaining her innocence as an aggravating factor.¹ She also challenges the appropriateness of her sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). We affirm on both grounds but sua sponte find that the trial court's double jeopardy concerns were not resolved by “merging” Wooley's convictions on Counts I and III. We therefore remand for the court to vacate Wooley's Count III conviction and to correct the Abstract of Judgment, which lists a 1-year concurrent sentence on that count.

I. Maintaining Innocence

[23] Wooley first argues that the trial court improperly considered her maintaining her innocence as an aggravating factor at sentencing. “[S]entencing decisions rest within the sound discretion of the trial court and are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. “An abuse of discretion occurs if the decision is ‘clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.’ ” Id. (quoting K.S. v. State, 849 N.E.2d 538, 544 (Ind. 2006)). When imposing a sentence for a felony offense, a trial court is required to enter a sentencing statement explaining the reasons it imposed a particular sentence. Id. One way a trial court may abuse its discretion is by considering reasons that are improper as a matter of law. Id. at 490-91.

[24] “It is improper ․ to rely on a defendant's maintaining [their] innocence as an aggravator” at sentencing. Angleton v. State, 686 N.E.2d 803, 816 (Ind. 1997). But “[a] trial court may find a defendant's lack of remorse to be an aggravating factor.” Veal v. State, 784 N.E.2d 490, 494 (Ind. 2003). “A defendant lacks remorse when he displays disdain or recalcitrance, the equivalent of ‘I don't care.’ ” Rogers v. State, 878 N.E.2d 269, 273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). “This has been distinguished from the right to maintain one's innocence, i.e., ‘I didn't do it.’ ” Id.

[25] Wooley contends the trial court improperly considered her maintaining her innocence when it stated the following during its oral sentencing statement:

The Court would note, I know that Ms. Wooley is standing on her innocence, but there's been no remorse whatsoever. There's been nothing, not even a, I'm sorry I didn't get this paperwork to you. I'm sorry that you feel this. It's – there's nothing. It's just like I'm self-righteous. I didn't do anything wrong. And there's been zero emotion portrayed that indicates that she believes in her mind at all that she did anything wrong, whether she's agreeing or going along with the fact that she stole this money, this $72,000. In her mind she didn't do a single thing wrong. And so even if you took out of the picture the amount of money and the repeated acts, just the sheer way that she handled this situation was wrong. It was just wrong.

Tr. Vol. VIII, p. 65.

[26] Wooley claims the trial court considered her maintaining her innocence when it characterized her demeanor as “I'm self-righteous” and “I didn't do anything wrong.” Id. The court, however, expressly indicated that it was considering Wooley's lack of remorse, not her maintaining her innocence. And when explaining its lack of remorse finding, the court specifically “took out of the picture” Wooley's acts of theft and counterfeiting. Id. The court then clarified that the “wrong” it referred to was the general way that Wooley “handled this situation.” Id. We understand this as a reference to the convoluted and nonsensical plan by which Wooley purportedly sought to “help” Millsaps with Hockersmith's Estate. That is, the court saw lack of remorse in Wooley's indifference to how badly the Estate was managed.

[27] As the trial court did not consider Wooley's maintaining her innocence as an aggravating factor at sentencing, we find no abuse of discretion.

II. Appropriateness of Sentence

[28] Wooley next argues that her sentence is inappropriate under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B). That Rule permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, “after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Ind. Appellate Rule 7(B). In reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence, our principal role is to attempt to leaven the outliers, not to achieve a perceived “correct” sentence. Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014). Accordingly, we give “substantial deference” to the trial court's sentencing decision. Id. The trial court's judgment should prevail unless it is “overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense ․ and the defendant's character.” Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 112 (Ind. 2015).

[29] In assessing the appropriateness of a sentence, we first look to the statutory range established for that class of offense. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. Setting aside Wooley's conviction on Count III, which we determine below should have been vacated, each of Wooley's 19 remaining Level 6 felony convictions had a sentencing range of 6 months to 21/212 years and an advisory sentence of 1 year. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-7(b). The trial court sentenced Wooley to 2 years on Count II and 1 year each on the other 18 counts. The court then ordered Wooley to serve all but five of her 1-year sentences consecutively, for a total sentence of 15 years.

[30] Wooley does not challenge the propriety of her individual sentences. Instead, she contends the trial court erred by ordering her to serve all but five of her 1-year sentences consecutively. According to Wooley, a total executed sentence of 6 years is appropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and her character.

A. Nature of the Offenses

[31] As to the nature of her offenses, Wooley claims there was nothing egregious about her acts of theft and counterfeiting, each of which involved a sum at the lower end of the monetary spectrum for Level 6 felony thefts. See Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2(a)(1)(A) (making theft a Level 6 felony when “the value of the property is at least seven hundred fifty dollars ($750) and less than fifty thousand dollars ($50,000)”).² Wooley also highlights that, if she had stolen all $70,000 at once, it would have been a Level 5 felony, for which the maximum sentence is only 6 years. See Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2 (a) (2)(A) (making theft a Level 5 felony when “the value of the property is at least fifty thousand dollars ($50,000)”); Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b) (Level 5 felony sentencing range).

[32] But Wooley ignores several aspects of her offenses that are egregious. First and foremost is her victim. Millsaps was a “close family friend” whom Wooley referred to as her “sister.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 138; Tr. Vol. VI, p. 153. She had a cognitive disability of which Wooley was aware, and she trusted Wooley to a fault. Yet, under the guise of helping Millsaps with her recently deceased mother's estate, Wooley systematically took advantage of Millsaps's disability, abused her trust, and ultimately stole more than $70,000 from the Estate's bank account.

[33] The repetitive nature of Wooley's offenses was also egregious. Between May 2 and July 16, 2018, Wooley cashed 9 counterfeit checks, totaling more than $34,000. Millsaps then confronted Wooley about the dwindling balance of the Estate's bank account and directly asked if Wooley was stealing. But only two weeks later, Wooley began cashing counterfeit checks again. Between July 30 and October 3, 2018, Wooley cashed another 9 checks, totaling more than $26,000. A month later, the Bank put a freeze on the Estate's bank account, but Wooley was not deterred. In November 2018, she twice instructed Millsaps to go around the freeze by withdrawing cash from the account in person. Wooley then stole most of the $12,000 total that Millsaps withdrew.

[34] For these reasons, the nature of Wooley's offenses does not compel us to revise her 15-year sentence.

B. Character of the Offender

[35] As to her character, Wooley emphasizes that this case represents her first ever criminal convictions and only her third time being criminally charged.³ But Wooley's lack of a criminal history does not shine brightly on her character in the shadows of her repetitive crimes. In fact, that darkness grows deeper when we consider Wooley's attempt to cover up her crimes by forging Millsaps's signature on a backdated contract that purported to absolve her from liability.

[36] Wooley also notes that she suffers from depression and has suicidal ideations, but she does not explain how those issues paint her character in a positive light. She points to the “State's evidence at trial,” claiming it suggested that Wooley's mental health “went hand-in-hand with her offenses.” Appellant's Br., p. 31 (citing Tr. Vol. VII, p. 209). The State, however, argued that Wooley's offenses drove her to suicidality, not the other way around. See Exhs. Vol. XI, p. 209 (Facebook posts in which Wooley expressed suicidal ideations around the time Bank placed freeze on Estate's bank account).

[37] Finally, Wooley highlights that she has maintained steady employment her entire adult life. But this accomplishment alone does not compel us to revise Wooley's sentence. Overall, we are not persuaded that Wooley's 15-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses or her character.

III. Double Jeopardy Concerns

[38] As an additional matter, we sua sponte address the trial court's “merger” of Wooley's convictions on Count I (theft) and Count III (counterfeiting). Because the trial court entered judgments of conviction on both charges, merging the offenses was not enough to resolve the court's double jeopardy concern. See Spry v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1167, 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (“Merging, without also vacating the conviction[ ], is not sufficient to cure double jeopardy violation.”), trans. denied. We therefore remand for the trial court to vacate Wooley's conviction on Count III and to correct the Abstract of Judgment, which lists a 1-year concurrent sentence on that count.

Conclusion

[39] We affirm Wooley's total sentence of 15 years on 2 counts of theft and 17 counts of counterfeiting—all Level 6 felonies. However, we sua sponte remand for the trial court to vacate Wooley's “merged” conviction on Count III and to correct the Abstract of Judgment.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Wooley also argues that the trial court improperly considered the repetitive nature of her offenses as an aggravating factor. But this argument has no merit. “The law is settled that the fact of multiple crimes is a valid aggravating factor.” McDonald v. State, 868 N.E.2d 1111, 1114 (Ind. 2007).

2.   Wooley's counterfeit checks ranged in value from $1,000 to $6,250, with an average value of $3,375.

3.   Wooley's two prior criminal charges—Class A misdemeanor criminal recklessness in 2008 and Class A misdemeanor driving while suspended in 2012—were dismissed after Wooley successfully completed pretrial diversion programs.

Weissmann, Judge.

Bradford, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.