ENGLE v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Following a jury trial, Jaxon W. Engle (“Engle”) was convicted of three offenses for conduct he committed when he was seventeen years old: (1) Level 1 felony aiding, inducing, or causing dealing in a controlled substance resulting in the death of Javin Nichols (“Nichols”)¹ ; (2) Level 1 felony dealing in a controlled substance resulting in the death of Kamron Lacy (“Lacy”)² ; and (3) Level 5 felony conspiracy to commit dealing in a narcotic drug.³ Engle appeals and presents the following three restated issues for our review:

I.  Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in waiving jurisdiction over Engle;

II.  Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Engle's incriminating statements to law enforcement; and

III. Whether there was sufficient evidence that Engle's actions proximately caused Nichols's death.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] At approximately 12:30 p.m. on July 14, 2023, Nichols was found unresponsive in his bedroom. His stepmother began performing CPR while his stepsister called 911. Emergency responders observed that Nichols's body was stiff and cool to the touch, indicating that he died at least two hours before they arrived. A responding officer found Nichols's wallet in his bed and noticed a bulge in one of the pockets. Inside the wallet was a rolled-up $20 bill and a tied-off plastic bag containing a white powdery substance. There was also a Ziploc bag containing a round blue pill with M on one side and 30 on the other side, and a partial blue pill that “appeared to be the same as the whole tablet.” Tr. Vol. II p. 84. Subsequent testing indicated that (1) the whole blue pill contained fentanyl, (2) the white powdery substance contained cocaine, and (3) there was cocaine on the $20 bill. An autopsy indicated Nichols sustained pulmonary edema, which is consistent with an overdose. Nichols's blood was determined to contain fentanyl at a concentration of 5.8 nanograms per milliliter where the range associated with a fatal overdose is typically between three and twenty nanograms per milliliter. The forensic pathologist performing the autopsy determined that Nichols's cause of death was acute fentanyl intoxication.

[4] Law enforcement obtained the passcode for Nichols's phone and found text messages between Nichols and Michael Reed (“Reed”). Reed later admitted he and his friend, Alec Thornburg (“Thornburg”), met with Engle on July 13, 2023, at the Youth Opportunity Center off Kilgore Avenue to obtain drugs. Reed was driving the vehicle, Thornburg was in the passenger seat, and Engle entered the backseat of the vehicle. All three of them shared a blue M-30 pill, which was a counterfeit pill laced with fentanyl. After they snorted the pill, Engle handed two torn grocery bags to Thornburg that contained the same type of pills. One bag was for Reed and Thornburg; the other was for Nichols. Engle said he could not deliver the pills to Nichols and “was wondering if one of [them] could.” Id. at 128. Reed and Thornburg agreed to deliver the pills, then Engle exited the vehicle. Reed and Thornburg later decided that Reed would deliver the pills. Reed texted Nichols and told him he was outside his residence. Nichols came outside, the two smoked marijuana, and Reed gave Nichols the same bag that Engle had given to Thornburg. Nichols gave Reed money in return. Reed and Engle later met in Reed's neighborhood where Reed gave Engle the money Nichols had given him. Engle gave Reed another pill and some money, which Reed considered compensation for the delivery.

[5] In the early afternoon of September 16, 2023, Lacy was found unresponsive in his bedroom. Lacy's great-aunt called 911 while his grandmother stayed beside him, noticing he was cold, stiff, and beyond resuscitation. She also noticed a portion of a round blue pill sitting on Lacy's nightstand, and she gave the pill to a responding officer. Law enforcement subsequently found a white powder in a vehicle outside the residence. Laboratory testing of the partial round blue pill identified the presence of fentanyl. An autopsy was performed, which revealed fentanyl in Lacy's blood at a concentration of 3.8 nanograms per milliliter, a concentration consistent with an overdose. There was also a metabolite of cocaine in Lacy's blood. The forensic pathologist performing the autopsy determined Lacy's cause of death was acute fentanyl and cocaine intoxication.

[6] In November 2023, Engle and his grandparents came to the Delaware County Sheriff's Office to meet with law enforcement. Engle and his grandparents went to an interview room, where the police said they were there to talk about Nichols. Engle was orally advised of his rights, including the right to remain silent, and he had the opportunity to meet privately with his grandparents. After meeting privately with his grandparents, Engle agreed to speak with the police. Engle and his grandfather signed a juvenile rights advisement form that set forth Engle's rights, including the right to remain silent. During the ensuing interview, Engle denied knowing Nichols. Engle recalled that he personally tried M-30 pills and had almost died from taking them. Engle eventually admitted he sold M-30 pills to Thornburg for $5 apiece, but he maintained that he had only sold M-30 pills to Thornburg. Engle said that Thornburg “would get the pills off of [him] and then [Thornburg] would go give them to whoever.” State's Ex. 41 at 47:12–47:16. Engle stated: “Once I gave them to [Thornburg], I no longer knew where they went from there.” Id. at 47:16–47:21.

[7] Later in November 2023, Engle and his grandparents returned to the police station and again went to an interview room. Engle received oral advisements about his rights. Thereafter, Engle agreed to be interviewed, and he and his grandparents signed a written rights advisement form. At that point, the interviewing officer told Engle that he had questions about Lacy. Engle admitted that he saw Lacy the night before he died, but Engle initially denied giving him a pill. Engle acknowledged that he knew that M-30 pills were laced with fentanyl, and he admitted to purchasing M-30 pills from Ricky Taylor (“Taylor”). Eventually, Engle admitted that he sold Lacy one M-30 pill for $10. Engle said he contacted Taylor via Facebook Messenger, and his biological father gave him a ride to Taylor's residence, where he purchased pills. Law enforcement obtained a Facebook Messenger conversation between Engle and Taylor along with text messages between them. The communications indicated that Engle obtained narcotics from Taylor, with Engle at one point requesting the darker blue pills because he knew they were the ones getting people high.

[8] On November 9, 2023, the State requested authority to file a petition alleging that Engle was a delinquent child for committing acts that, if committed by an adult, would be criminal counts of Level 1 felony aiding, inducing or causing dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death, Level 1 felony dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death, Level 1 felony conspiracy to commit dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death, and two counts of Level 5 felony dealing in a narcotic. On November 14, 2023, the State filed a petition to waive Engle into adult court pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-30-3-5. The juvenile court authorized the filing of a delinquency petition and set a hearing on the waiver issue, which was held on November 29, 2023.

[9] At the waiver hearing, there was evidence that Engle was seventeen years old at the time of the alleged delinquent acts. There was also evidence that Engle had multiple prior contacts with the juvenile justice system, one of which led to a delinquency adjudication for conduct in 2021 that, if committed by an adult, would have been Level 6 felony auto theft, Level 6 felony residential entry, Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement, and Class C misdemeanor reckless driving. Engle was placed on six months’ supervised probation with home-based case management. In June 2023, there was a referral alleging delinquent acts of Class A misdemeanor battery resulting in bodily injury and leaving home without permission of a parent, guardian, or custodian. Engle was sent to Delaware County for an intake and “referred to Centerstone, so that [Engle] could receive necessary counseling services.” Waiver Hearing Tr. Vol. 2 p. 75. Centerstone could not confirm that Engle participated in the intake process, which would have “look[ed] at substance abuse disorder” with “a possibility for treatment.” Id. at 77. The trial court admitted exhibits regarding Engle's prior contact with the juvenile justice system, and it took judicial notice of particular cases.

[10] As of the waiver hearing, there were two other pending delinquency cases against Engle. In one case, Engle was alleged to have used fake money to buy a computer. In that matter, Engle and his grandfather consented to a residential search, which revealed fake hundred-dollar bills in Engle's wallet, and Engle admitted where he got them. A probation officer who previously supervised Engle opined that Engle “ha[d] received exhaustive services from the Delaware County Juvenile Probation Department” and there were not “further programs that could be provided at this point.” Id. at 76.

[11] The juvenile court took the matter under advisement, and on December 4, 2023, granted the petition to waive its jurisdiction over Engle. In its written order, the juvenile court applied the pertinent statute and determined the State had established (1) there was probable cause to believe Engle committed the alleged delinquent acts, (2) the alleged acts included three Level 1 felonies if committed by an adult, and (3) Engle was over the age of sixteen when the alleged acts were committed. The court also said the State “ha[d] established, pursuant to [Indiana Code section] 31-30-3-5, that it [was] not in the best interests of [Engle] and of the safety and welfare of the community for [Engle] to remain within the juvenile justice system.” Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 78.

[12] On December 13, 2023, the State charged Engle as an adult with Level 1 felony aiding, inducing, or causing dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death, Level 1 felony dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death, Level 5 felony conspiracy to commit dealing in a narcotic, and two counts of Level 5 felony dealing in a narcotic. Ahead of trial, the State obtained dismissal of both Level 5 felony charges of dealing in a narcotic. On December 2, 2024, Engle filed a motion to suppress his statements to law enforcement. The trial court held a hearing on December 4, 2024. In related briefing, Engle argued he lacked a meaningful opportunity to consider waiving the right to remain silent and his subsequent waiver of this right was invalid or otherwise not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. Engle ultimately sought suppression because “[t]he State presented no evidence to show that the persons who consulted with [Engle] prior to his giving of statements,” i.e., his grandparents, “had the legal status to meet the legal definition of a person with whom [he] could meaningfully consult.” Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 233. The court denied the motion on December 10, 2024, noting that Engle's grandparents were either his actual guardians or his de facto guardians, and that either status satisfied the requirement for meaningful consultation and supported valid waiver.

[13] A jury trial began on December 17, 2024. At trial, Engle objected to the admission of his statements to law enforcement for the reasons he identified when moving to suppress. The trial court overruled the evidentiary objection. The jury ultimately found Engle guilty as charged. The trial court held the sentencing hearing on January 14, 2025, where it imposed an aggregate term of sixty years in the Indiana Department of Correction. Engle now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

I. Waiver of Jurisdiction

[14] Engle challenges the juvenile court's decision to waive its jurisdiction. In general, juvenile courts have “exclusive original jurisdiction” over children alleged to be delinquent. See Ind. Code § 31-30-1-1(a). However, Indiana Code section 31-30-3-5 contemplates the waiver of jurisdiction in certain scenarios. In pertinent part, this statute provides that “the court shall, upon motion of the prosecuting attorney and after full investigation and hearing, waive jurisdiction if it finds” (1) “the child is charged with an act that, if committed by an adult, would be ․ a Level 1 felony”; (2) “there is probable cause to believe that the child has committed the act”; and (3) “the child was at least sixteen (16) years of age when the act charged was allegedly committed[.]” I.C. § 31-30-3-5. “Proof of these elements creates a presumption in favor of waiver.” Moore v. State, 723 N.E.2d 442, 446 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). The presumption is rebuttable, with the statute providing an exception if “it would be in the best interests of the child and of the safety and welfare of the community for the child to remain within the juvenile justice system.” I.C. § 31-30-3-5. “[T]he burden is on the juvenile to present evidence and prove that waiver is not in his best interest or that of the safety and welfare of the community.” Moore, 723 N.E.2d at 446.

[15] We review a juvenile court's waiver decision for an abuse of discretion. Id. at 445. An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court's decision was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, or the court misinterpreted the law. E.g., J.Q.R. v. State, 252 N.E.3d 919, 924 (Ind. 2025). In conducting our review “[w]e will not weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses, ‘considering both the record of the waiver hearing’ and the reasons stated by the juvenile court.” State v. J.T., 121 N.E.3d 605, 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Goad v. State, 516 N.E.2d 26, 27 (Ind. 1987)). Indeed, “[i]t is for the juvenile court judge, after weighing the effects of retaining or waiving jurisdiction, to determine which is the more desirable alternative.” Vance v. State, 640 N.E.2d 51, 57 (Ind. 1994).

[16] Here, the juvenile court determined that (1) Engle faced at least one Level 1 felony allegation, (2) there was probable cause to believe Engle committed the act, and (3) Engle was at least sixteen years old when the act charged was committed. On appeal, Engle does not challenge these determinations, which created a presumption in favor of waiver. Rather, he argues the juvenile court abused its discretion in waiving its jurisdiction over him because it was in his best interests to remain in the juvenile justice system.

[17] Notably, Engle fails to challenge the court's determination that it was not in the best interests of the safety and welfare of the community for Engle to remain in the juvenile justice system. See I.C. § 31-30-3-5 (providing an exception to waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction only where “it would be in the best interests of the child and the safety and welfare of the community to remain within the juvenile justice system” (emphasis added)). In any case, Engle's arguments regarding his best interests amount to requests to reweigh the evidence, which we must decline. Indeed, Engle focuses on the evidence most favorable to his position, including that he had only one previous delinquency adjudication. He points out that “[h]e was enrolled in the Youth Build Program at the time of the waiver hearing.” Appellant's Br. p. 26. Engle also notes that, at his initial hearing in the criminal cause—which took place after the waiver decision—he was permitted to remain at the Delaware County Juvenile Detention Center to work toward his high school equivalency diploma “since these services were not available at the Delaware County Jail.” Id. Engle claims he “would have been provided with services and opportunities to rehabilitate himself more effectively if he remained in the juvenile justice system than if he was in the adult justice system.” Id.

[18] Although Engle claims there were superior services available in the juvenile justice system, Engle failed to establish that he took his rehabilitation seriously in his prior contact with the system. Cf. Moore, 723 N.E.2d at 446 (“[T]he burden is on the juvenile to present evidence and prove that waiver is not in his best interest or that of the safety and welfare of the community.”). For example, the State presented evidence that Engle had a prior opportunity for counseling and treatment of substance abuse issues through Centerstone, but there was ultimately no evidence he ever attended the intake. Given evidence of Engle's prior contact with the juvenile justice system along with scant evidence of his efforts to take advantage of previous rehabilitation opportunities—and because Engle has not challenged the juvenile court's determination regarding the best interests of the safety and welfare of the community—we conclude Engle has not identified an abuse of discretion in the court's waiver decision.

II. Admission of Evidence

[19] Engle maintains that his statements to law enforcement were obtained in violation of his right to remain silent. On appeal, Engle focuses on whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. However, because Engle is appealing after a completed trial, this issue is “best framed” as “challenging the admission of evidence at trial.” Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013). We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, which occurs when the ruling was clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, or the court misinterpreted the law. J.Q.R., 252 N.E.3d at 924.

[20] Juveniles have certain constitutional rights, among them, the right to remain silent. See generally id. at 924–25. To protect this right, a juvenile is entitled to procedural safeguards before statements made during a custodial interrogation may be used against the juvenile in court. See id. at 925. Those procedural safeguards have been codified in Indiana Code section 31-32-5-1, which states in pertinent part that a child's constitutional rights may be waived “by the child's custodial parent, guardian, custodian, or guardian ad litem” only if:

(A) that person knowingly and voluntarily waives the right;

(B) that person has no interest adverse to the child;

(C) meaningful consultation has occurred between that person and the child; and

(D) the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver[.]

[21] Here, Engle points out that he was accompanied by his grandparents at his interviews with law enforcement. Engle acknowledges he had the opportunity to confer with his grandparents before executing a written waiver of the right to remain silent; however, Engle argues there was no valid waiver because he was not accompanied by a biological parent.⁴ The trial court rejected this argument, referring to caselaw indicating that the term guardian encompasses “de facto guardians acting in loco parentis” such that having access to close relatives—like sisters and grandparents—satisfies the requirement for meaningful consultation regarding whether to waive the right to remain silent. Appellant's App. Vol. III p. 238 (collecting cases) (quoting Whipple v. State, 523 N.E.2d 1363, 1369 (Ind. 1988)). Additionally, the court referred to evidence that Engle had lived with his grandparents for most of his life, and during the police interview process, they were referred to as Engle's guardians multiple times without correction.

[22] For the same reasons the trial court identified, we conclude Engle had the opportunity for meaningful consultation regarding whether to waive the right to remain silent, satisfying the procedural requirement. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 441 N.E.2d 194, 198 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (“We find no error in allowing [d]efendant's grandmother to confer with him before [he] executed the waiver of rights and gave a statement.”). Thus, Engle has not identified an abuse of discretion in the admission of his statements to law enforcement based on his opportunity to confer with his grandparents rather than a biological parent.

[23] Next, to the extent Engle asserts that he did not knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently waive the right to remain silent, his argument again appears to be premised on the fact that only his grandparents were present when he decided to speak with the police. As earlier discussed, Engle had the opportunity for meaningful consultation consistent with the required procedural safeguards. Thus, Engle has not demonstrated his decision to waive the right to remain silent was tainted due to his opportunity to confer only with his grandparents.⁵

III. Sufficiency of Evidence

[24] Engle challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for Level 1 felony aiding, inducing, or causing dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death. In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, “we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses.” Cole v. State, 69 N.E.3d 552, 556 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. Rather, “we consider only the evidence supporting the conviction and the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom.” Id. A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if there is substantial evidence of probative value supporting each element of the offense “such that a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1090 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Hancz-Barron v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1237, 1244 (Ind. 2024)).

[25] A person commits Level 1 felony dealing in a controlled substance resulting in death if a person delivers a controlled substance or analog “that, when the controlled substance is used, injected, inhaled, absorbed, or ingested, results in the death of a human being who used the controlled substance[.]” I.C. § 35-42-1-1.5(a) (2019). Notably, “[i]t is not a defense ․ that the human being died” after voluntarily ingesting the substance or “as a result of using the controlled substance or controlled substance analog in combination with alcohol or another controlled substance or with any other compound, mixture, diluent, or substance.” I.C. § 35-42-1-1.5(d). Here, Engle was convicted under a theory of accomplice liability for providing the M-30 pills later delivered to Nichols. See I.C. § 35-41-2-4 (“A person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense[.]”).

[26] Engle claims there was insufficient evidence his conduct caused Nichols's death. In criminal cases, the State must prove the defendant's actions were the “proximate cause of the injury, and not merely a contributing cause.” Cole, 69 N.E.3d at 556. “A finding of proximate cause embodies a value judgment as to the extent of the physical consequences of an action for which the actor should be held responsible.” Id. (quoting Moore v. State, 49 N.E.3d 1095, 1107–08 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)), trans. denied. Proximate cause issues are “often couched in terms of foreseeability” in that “an actor is not held responsible for consequences which are unforeseeable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Moore, 49 N.E.3d at 1107). Put differently, a defendant will be held criminally responsible for “the foreseeable results of his actions.” Id. at 558.

[27] Here, Engle challenges the foreseeability of Nichols's death, arguing: “It was not reasonably foreseeable that when [Engle] passed the M-30 pills to [Thornburg] that they would be transferred to [Reed] who would then transfer them to [Nichols] who would then ingest them and die.” Appellant's Br. p. 29–30. Engle's argument amounts to a request to reweigh evidence, which we decline. Here, Engle admitted to knowing M-30 pills were laced with fentanyl and that he at one point nearly died from taking one of the pills. Further, Engle met with Thornburg while Reed was present and asked for help delivering M-30 pills to Nichols. He then met with Reed after the transaction to receive the money Reed collected from Nichols. This was sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Nichols's death was a foreseeable result of Engle's dealing activity. In other words, we conclude the State presented sufficient evidence that Engle's actions proximately caused Nichols's death.

Conclusion

[28] The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in waiving jurisdiction over Engle, nor did the trial court abuse its discretion in admitting Engle's incriminating statements to law enforcement. Furthermore, the State presented sufficient evidence that Engle's actions were a proximate cause of Nichols's death.

[29] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1.5(a), 35-41-2-4.

2.   I.C. § 35-42-1-1.5(a).

3.   I.C. §§ 35-42-1-1.5(a), 35-41-5-2.

4.   Engle does not address evidence indicating that his biological mother is deceased, his biological father's parental rights have been terminated, and his biological father had an adverse interest in that he drove Engle to Taylor's residence where Engle bought M-30 pills.

5.   At one point, Engle argues his statements to law enforcement were inadmissible because he received inadequate advisements regarding the right to remain silent. Engle has waived this theory by presenting it for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Leonard v. State, 80 N.E.3d 878, 884 n.4 (Ind. 2017) (finding waiver of a constitutional argument presented for the first time on appeal, noting that declining to review an unpreserved claim is a cardinal principle of sound judicial administration). Waiver notwithstanding, Engle exclusively focuses on whether law enforcement apprised him of the nature of potential charges against him. However, the recordings of the police interviews establish that Engle knew he was being interviewed about the overdose deaths of Nichols and Lacy. Thus, although the issue is waived, the record does not reflect evidentiary error.

Foley, Judge.

Kenworthy, J. and Scheele, J., concur.