IN RE: The Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of KI.H. AND KE.H. (Minor Children); (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] A.H. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental relationships with her three-year-old twin sons, Ki.H. (“Ki.H.”) and Ke.H. (“Ke.H.”) (collectively “the children”). Mother argues that the trial court's order terminating her parental relationships with the children is clearly erroneous. Concluding that the trial court's order is not clearly erroneous, we affirm the trial court's judgment.¹

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court's order terminating Mother's parental relationships with the children is clearly erroneous.

Facts

[3] Mother is the parent of the children, who were born in February 2022. The day after the children were born, the Department of Child Services received a report that the children were victims of neglect. Specifically, the report alleged that there were concerns about Mother's mental health, her possible cognitive deficiencies, and her ability to care for the children. Following an investigation, DCS filed a petition alleging that the children were children in need of services (“CHINS”) in March 2022. In addition, in March 2022, DCS removed the children from Mother. Because Mother did not give DCS the names of any family members who would be able to care for the children, DCS placed the children in foster care.

[4] Mother admitted that the children were CHINS, and in April 2022, the trial court issued a dispositional order that required Mother to: (1) complete a parenting assessment and follow all recommendations; (2) complete an initial clinical assessment and follow all recommendations; (3) participate in individual therapy; (4) participate in home-based case management services; and (5) attend supervised visits with the children.

[5] Mother initially complied with services. At some point, Mother was diagnosed with schizophrenia and prescribed medication. In early 2023, Mother suffered “a brief psychotic break” but continued with her services. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 21). Also, in early 2023, DCS became concerned about Mother's lack of engagement with the children during visits. In May 2023, the children's foster mother experienced health issues, and DCS moved the children to another foster family.

[6] In July 2023, Mother became “extremely combative” in therapy and “expressed interest to not continue therapy services.” (Ex. Vol. 2 at 102). According to the therapist's report, there had been a “breakdown in client and therapist relationship.” (Ex. Vol. 2 at 102). One month later, in August 2023, Mother told the visitation provider that she was giving her parental rights to the children's father and would no longer be participating in services. In September 2023, Mother “disappeared for an entire month[.]” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 27). Specifically, DCS was unable to contact Mother, and Mother did not participate in any services or attend any visits with the children.

[7] Mother re-established contact with DCS in October 2023 and resumed her visits with the children in her home. However, during one visit in early January 2024, Mother sat the children in high chairs in front of the television in the living room while she was “babbling” in the kitchen. (Ex. Vol. 3 at 20). Mother had no interaction with the children during that visit. In addition, during that visit, Mother directed the visitation supervisor to sit in a specific chair and demanded to know what the visitation supervisor was writing in her notes. When the visitation supervisor refused to allow Mother to see the notes, Mother became angry, and the visitation supervisor did not feel safe. DCS unsuccessfully attempted to contact Mother's psychiatrist and eventually moved Mother's visits with the children to a third-party facility.

[8] Also, in early 2024, Mother continued to have difficulty engaging with the children during visits. Further, Mother stopped taking her medication because she did not like the way that it made her feel. Thereafter, Mother became paranoid and combative. In addition, Mother's compliance with services became sporadic. In March 2024, Mother started taking her medication again, and DCS noticed some improvement in Mother's compliance with services. In April 2024, Mother told the visitation supervisor that she was having difficulty bonding with the children.

[9] One month later, in May 2024, Ki.H. began having seizures and had to take daily medication to prevent them. However, Mother did not believe that the children needed to take medication. The first DCS case manager assigned to the case (“the first FCM”) was also concerned that Mother could not differentiate her identical twins. As a safeguard, the twins began wearing bracelets of different colors; however, Mother cut off the bracelets.

[10] By June 2024, the first FCM was concerned that Mother had not successfully completed services. The first FCM also had safety concerns for the children because despite redirection, Mother did not know how to engage with the children during visits. Although the first FCM considered filing a termination petition, she decided to give Mother more time because Mother had made the effort to visit the children and had been complying with services. When the first FCM ended her involvement in the case in July 2024, Mother was stable, and the first FCM was hopeful that Mother “would be able to pull it all together” and ultimately succeed in reunifying with the children. (Tr. Vol. 2 at 39).

[11] At the end of July 2024, Mother's case was assigned to a second DCS family case manager (“the second FCM”). In August 2024, Mother continued to comply with services but was not benefiting from them. In addition, Mother continued to struggle with engaging with the children and simultaneously caring for the needs of both children during visits.

[12] In October 2024, the second FCM became concerned when Mother asked her psychiatrist to discontinue her medication. Although Mother's psychiatrist refused Mother's request, service providers counted Mother's pills and suspected that Mother was not consistently taking her medication. Also, Mother's behavior became erratic, and she began talking to herself during visits with the children. In addition, the second FCM was concerned that Mother had made no progress in her ability to parent the children. For example, the visitation supervisor still needed to direct Mother on how to engage with the children and often had to redirect the children's behavior. Further, the second FCM was concerned that Mother often met random men at gas stations and invited them to her home. Service providers had multiple conversations with Mother regarding the dangers of this behavior, but Mother continued to engage in it. In light of these concerns, the second FCM ordered Mother to participate in a psychological assessment.

[13] Also, in October 2024, Mother provided to the second FCM the name of a cousin (“the cousin”) who Mother stated would be willing to take placement of the children. However, when the second FCM contacted the cousin, she stated that she could be a support to Mother but never indicated that she was willing to accept placement of the children.

[14] In early November 2024, Mother continued to exhibit concerning behaviors during visits. For example, during one visit, while Mother was on her cell phone, Ki.H., the child who suffers from seizures, hit his head three times. Mother told the visitation supervisor that Ki.H. was “wild like his momma and we going to go to the zoo.” (Ex. Vol. 4 at 174). In addition, during the same visit, Mother let Ke.H. stand on a table and told him to jump. Later in November 2024, Mother stopped visiting the children and “went missing again.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 63).

[15] At the end of December 2024, DCS was able to re-establish contact with Mother. Three months later, in March 2025, Mother still was not taking her medication, and she continued to demonstrate erratic behavior. In mid-March 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental relationship with the children.

[16] In April 2025, Mother participated in a psychological examination. The psychologist who administered the examination (“the psychologist”) diagnosed mother with an unspecified personality disorder with paranoid and narcissistic features and borderline intellectual functioning. Further, the psychologist opined that Mother's “psychological and cognitive limitations raise[d] substantial concerns about her capacity to parent safely and effectively.” (Ex. Vol. 5 at 40).

[17] The trial court heard the facts as set forth above at a June 2025 termination hearing. In addition, the first FCM testified that although Mother had been compliant with services, she had not benefited from them. The first FCM also testified that during the pendency of the CHINS proceedings, Mother had never given her the names of any family members who could take placement of the children. According to the first FCM, Mother had only mentioned a male cousin who could stop in to check on her. Further, the second FCM's supervisor (“the supervisor”) testified that termination of the parent-child relationships was in the children's best interests. According to the supervisor, the plan for the children was foster parent adoption. The supervisor also testified that the children were bonded with their foster parents with whom they had lived for two years and were thriving in foster care. In addition, the supervisor testified that Mother did not have a bond with the children.

[18] Further, the cousin testified that she was willing to help Mother with the children. Specifically, the cousin testified that she would be willing to allow Mother and the children to stay with her. However, she also testified that she lived in Section 8 housing and would need a larger apartment to accommodate Mother and the children. The cousin did not testify that she was willing or able to accept placement of only the children.

[19] In July 2025, the trial court issued an order terminating Mother's parental relationship with the children. In its order, the trial court concluded, in relevant part, that DCS had proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that: (1) the conditions that had resulted in the children's removal from Mother's home would not be remedied; and (2) the continuation of the parent-child relationships posed a threat to the children's well-being. The trial court also concluded that termination of the parent-child relationships was in the children's best interests.

[20] Mother now appeals.

Decision

[21] Mother argues that the trial court's order terminating her parental relationships with the children is clearly erroneous. We disagree.

[22] The traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1187-88 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of her children when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Id. at 1188. Termination of the parent-child relationship is proper where the children's emotional and physical development is threatened. Id. Although the right to raise one's own children should not be terminated solely because there is a better home available for the children, parental rights may be terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental responsibilities. Id.

[23] Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 provides, in relevant part, that DCS must allege in its termination petition as follows:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances:

* * * * *

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4.² DCS must prove these alleged circumstances by clear and convincing evidence. K.T.K. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Dearborn County Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013).

[24] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, this Court will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. In re Involuntary Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). We consider only the evidence and any reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom that support the judgment and give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses firsthand. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1229.

[25] In addition, as a general rule, appellate courts grant latitude and deference to trial courts in family law matters. Matter of D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). “This deference recognizes a trial court's unique ability to see the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and scrutinize their testimony, as opposed to this court[ ] only being able to review a cold transcript of the record.” Id.

[26] As a preliminary matter, we note that Mother does not challenge the trial court's factual findings. As a result, she has waived any argument relating to whether these unchallenged factual findings are clearly erroneous. See Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (explaining that unchallenged trial court findings are accepted as true), trans. denied. We now turn to the substantive issue in this case.

[27] Mother argues that the trial court's order terminating her parental relationships with the children is clearly erroneous. Specifically, she first argues that DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in the children's removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home would not be remedied. However, we note that the trial court also found that clear and convincing evidence established that the continuation of the parent-child relationships posed a threat to the children's well-being. Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d) is written in the disjunctive. The trial court, therefore, needs only to find one of the requirements of this subsection by clear and convincing evidence. See In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) (interpreting a previous version of the statute), reh'g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied. “Standing alone, the finding that the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the well-being of the children satisfies the requirement listed in subsection ([d]).” Id. (interpreting a previous version of the statute). In other words, we need not reach Mother's argument related to Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(d)(3).

[28] Nevertheless, in light of Mother's constitutional right to raise her children, we choose to address her argument that the evidence is insufficient to show that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the children's removal or the reasons for placement outside Mother's home will not be remedied. In determining this statutory factor, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014). We first identify the conditions that led to removal or placement outside the home and then determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. The second step requires trial courts to judge a parent's fitness at the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions and balancing any recent improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. Habitual conduct may include a parent's prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and a lack of adequate housing and employment. A.D.S. v. Indiana Department of Child Services, 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The trial court may also consider a parent's mental health. K.H. v. M.M., 151 N.E.3d 1259, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied.

[29] Further, the trial court may consider services offered to the parent by DCS and the parent's response to those services as evidence of whether conditions will be remedied. A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1157. DCS “is not required to provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of change; rather, it need only establish that there is a reasonable probability that the parent's behavior will not change.” Id. (cleaned up). A parent “simply going through the motions of receiving services alone is not sufficient if the services do not result in the needed change[.]” Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 50 (Ind. 2019) (cleaned up), cert. denied.

[30] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that DCS removed the children from Mother because of concerns about her mental health, her possible cognitive deficiencies, and her ability to care for the children. During the three-year pendency of the CHINS proceedings, Mother complied with services but did not successfully complete them or benefit from them. Specifically, Mother failed to consistently take her medication and frequently exhibited mental health issues. Further, Mother twice went missing for a month or more. In addition, despite visiting with the children during the pendency of the proceedings, she did not have an ability to engage with them and never developed a bond with them. The totality of this evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that DCS proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in the children's removal or the reasons for their placement outside Mother's home would not be remedied.

[31] Mother also argues that the trial court's order terminating her parental relationships with the children is clearly erroneous because DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the terminations were in the children's best interests. Mother specifically contends that “it was an error of the court to find that termination was in the best interests of the minor children when the court failed to consider other viable options of placement including kinship and/or relative placement[.]” (Mother's Br. 20).

[32] However, our review of the record reveals that during the first nineteen months of the CHINS proceedings, Mother did not identify any family members who could take placement of the children. In October 2024, Mother identified the cousin as a possible placement. However, when the second FCM contacted the cousin, she did not indicate that she was willing to take placement of the children. Further, at the termination hearing, the cousin testified only that Mother and the children could live with her but that she lived in Section 8 housing and would need a larger apartment. She did not testify that she would be able to take placement of the children. Because Mother never identified other viable placement options for the children during the pendency of the CHINS proceedings, her argument fails.

[33] We further note that in determining whether termination of parental rights is in the children's best interests, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. In re Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the parent to those of the children involved. Id. In addition, a child's need for permanency is a central consideration in determining that child's best interests. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009), reh'g denied. Further, the recommendation of the family case manager, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests. A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158-59.

[34] Here, our review of the evidence reveals that at the time of the termination hearing, three-year-old Ki.H. and Ke.H. had been out of Mother's home for three years. Also, the supervisor testified that termination was in the children's best interests. In addition, the trial court concluded that DCS had proved by clear and convincing evidence that there was a reasonable probability that the conditions that had resulted in the children's removal would not be remedied, and we have found that the evidence supported that conclusion. The totality of this evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the termination of Mother's parent-child relationship with the children was in their best interests. Accordingly, the trial court's order terminating Mother's parental relationship with the children is not clearly erroneous.

[35] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court also terminated the children's father's parental relationships with the children. Father is appealing the terminations under a separate cause number.

2.   The General Assembly amended Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 effective March 11, 2024. Because DCS filed the termination petition in this case in March 2025, the amended version of the statute applies here. Additionally, we note that the General Assembly further amended Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4 during the 2025 legislative session, and that amendment became effective July 1, 2025. The 2025 amendment does not apply to this case.

Pyle, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.