CREDICO v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Justin Credico, pro se, appeals the post-conviction court's grant of the State's motion for summary disposition of his petition for post-conviction relief. Credico raises several issues for appellate review, which we consolidate and restate as: Did the post-conviction court err when it granted summary disposition for the State and denied Credico's petition for post-conviction relief? We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 6, 2024, the State charged Credico with Level 5 felony intimidation and Class B misdemeanor disorderly conduct. The trial court held a plea hearing on August 7 during which Credico was represented by a public defender. After conferring with his attorney, Credico pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of Level 6 felony intimidation. In exchange, the State dropped the remaining charge. Per Credico's agreement with the State, the trial court sentenced him to 192 days—which amounted to time served.

[3] On June 25, 2025, Credico filed a petition for post-conviction relief. In his petition, Credico alleged he was deprived of the ability to communicate with counsel during “plea negotiations and trial preparation.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 11. In particular, Credico maintained newly discovered evidence showed letters he mailed to trial counsel while detained awaiting trial were returned as undeliverable after he agreed to plead guilty. Although Credico filed a grievance “regarding the mailing issue” two days before entering a plea of guilty, he argued the “evidence was not discoverable earlier because [he] only received the returned envelope after release[.]” Id. at 10, 11. According to Credico, these circumstances amounted to a Sixth Amendment violation of his right to counsel. Credico also contended because he “remained unable to communicate with counsel” and “participate in his defense,” he was denied due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 13. Lastly, Credico claimed new evidence revealed the “peering” of a state agent into his car constituted an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment and “the tainted investigation pressured [him] into a guilty plea[.]” Id. at 14–15.

[4] In response, the State filed a motion arguing for summary disposition of Credico's petition for post-conviction relief on two grounds: (1) Credico's petition was not in compliance with Post-Conviction Rule 1; and (2) Credico failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted in any of his substantive claims. On July 15, the post-conviction court granted the State's motion and summarily denied Credico's petition.

The post-conviction court did not err in summarily disposing Credico's petition for post-conviction relief.

[5] Post-conviction proceedings are civil proceedings in which a petitioner may present limited collateral challenges to a conviction and sentence. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(b); Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 681 (Ind. 2019), cert. denied. “The scope of potential relief is limited to issues unknown at trial or unavailable on direct appeal.” Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681. “Issues available on direct appeal but not raised are waived, while issues litigated adversely to the defendant are res judicata.” Id. (quoting Ward v. State, 969 N.E.2d 46, 51 (Ind. 2012)). The petitioner bears the burden of establishing his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Isom v. State, 170 N.E.3d 623, 632 (Ind. 2021); see also P.-C.R. 1(5). We will affirm the post-conviction court's denial of relief when the petitioner fails to meet this “rigorous standard of review.” Gibson, 133 N.E.3d at 681 (quoting DeWitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 169 (Ind. 2001)).

[6] Under Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(g), the post-conviction court may “grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the petition when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, stipulations of fact, and any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”

[7] We review the grant of a motion for summary disposition in post-conviction proceedings “on appeal in the same way as a motion for summary judgment in a civil matter.” Brown v. State, 131 N.E.3d 740, 742 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citing Norris v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (Ind. 2008)), trans denied. “[S]ummary disposition, like summary judgment, is a matter for appellate de novo determination when the determinative issue is a matter of law, not fact.” Scott v. State, 264 N.E.3d 1214, 1220 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citation omitted). The moving party has the burden to demonstrate there is no genuine issue of material fact, and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. McClure v. State, 71 N.E.3d 845, 847 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003–04 (Ind. 2014)), trans. denied. But “a trial court's grant of summary judgment is clothed with a presumption of validity, and the party who lost in the trial court ․ has the burden of demonstrating that the grant of summary judgment was erroneous.” Id.

Credico's plea forecloses presentation of new evidence.

[8] “A conviction entered pursuant to a guilty plea stands on grounds substantially different from one entered based on a determination of guilt following the presentation of evidence.” Norris, 896 N.E.2d at 1151. In such a case, the plea rests largely upon a defendant's admission of the facts alleged. See id. “A plea of guilty thus forecloses a post-conviction challenge to the facts adjudicated by the trial court's acceptance of the guilty plea and resulting conviction.” Id. at 1153.

[9] In this case, Credico argues new evidence regarding his offense has been discovered. At his change of plea hearing in the trial court, the State provided the factual basis necessary for the court to accept Credico's guilty plea. After consulting his attorney, Credico of his own free will pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense, Level 6 felony intimidation. He cannot now challenge the facts established by his plea through a petition for post-conviction relief. See Norris, 896 N.E.2d at 1153. Credico attempts to present evidence of material facts not previously presented to or heard by the trial court, an outcome foreclosed by the Indiana Supreme Court in Norris. Id. Therefore, the post-conviction court did not err in granting the State's motion for summary disposition and denying Credico's petition for post-conviction relief on this claim.

Credico did not demonstrate a constitutional violation.

[10] A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Mosley v. State, 908 N.E.2d 599, 604 (Ind. 2009) (citing Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–45 (1963)). The right to an attorney “guarantees the assistance of counsel at critical stages of prosecution up through trial, sentencing, and various post-trial matters.” Id. “Absent some effect of challenged conduct on the reliability of the trial process, the Sixth Amendment guarantee is generally not implicated.” United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). The accused has the burden of demonstrating a constitutional violation. Id. In limited instances, “circumstances of extreme magnitude may justify ‘a presumption of ineffectiveness’ [of counsel] and such circumstances are, in and of themselves, ‘sufficient without inquiry into counsel's actual performance at trial.’ ” Minnick v. State, 698 N.E.2d 745, 751 (Ind. 1998) (quoting Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662), cert. denied.

[11] Here, Credico argues the Sixth Amendment is implicated because the State's “provision of an incorrect address [for trial counsel] constitutes interference with counsel, and counsel's failure to ensure communication or investigate key facts ․ was deficient[.]” Appellant's Br. at 12. In light of this evidence, Credico posits he unwittingly “entered a plea without being able to fully explor[e] defenses[.]” Id.

[12] Yet Credico had the benefit of counsel during the plea hearing, and he had the opportunity to consult with his attorney before entering a guilty plea. He filed a grievance regarding the mailing issue before the hearing, and nothing prevented him from discussing the contents of his letters with appointed counsel in person before submission of his plea. As the State suggests, he “also had the option [to] not plead guilty and contest the charges, thereby giving him additional time to contact counsel.” Appellee's Br. at 16. Credico's case is not the rare instance when “unfavorable conditions justify a presumption of ineffective assistance.” Minnick, 698 N.E.2d at 752. And because he failed to demonstrate a constitutional violation under the Sixth Amendment, the post-conviction court did not err in summarily disposing of his petition for relief. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658 (noting “the burden rests on the accused to demonstrate a constitutional violation”).¹

Conclusion

[13] The post-conviction court did not err in granting the State's motion for summary disposition and denying Credico's petition for post-conviction relief.

[14] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent Credico raises a procedural due process violation distinct from his Sixth Amendment claim, he has waived such a claim for failure to provide a cogent argument on this issue. See Isom, 170 N.E.3d at 639 (holding petitioner for post-conviction relief waived appellate contentions for failing to develop an argument, citing Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a)); Jervis v. State, 28 N.E.3d 361, 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied. Credico's additional argument over the State's supposed failure to disclose material evidence, Appellant's Br. at 15, is similarly waived as he raises it for the first time on appeal and he fails to offer a cognizable claim. See Shorter v. State, 144 N.E.3d 829, 841 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020), trans. denied; Tibbs v. State, 59 N.E.3d 1005, 1020 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (listing the elements necessary to establish a due process violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)).

Kenworthy, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Bailey, J., concur.