HYATT v. HYATT (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] DaLynda Hyatt (“Wife”) appeals the trial court's division of marital property and equalization payment. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Wife and Charles Hyatt (“Husband”) were married in January 2017. On October 5, 2023, Husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. On November 2, 2023, Wife filed a counter-petition for dissolution of marriage and a motion for provisional orders including an order “[t]hat the parties be prohibited from transferring, selling, dispersing, or otherwise liquidating any assets or property whether owned individually or jointly with each other or any person until the divorce decree is issued.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 16. Following a hearing, the court issued an Agreed Entry on Motion for Provisional Orders on January 4, 2024, granting Wife's motion. On May 13, 2025, the court held a final hearing at which the parties presented evidence.

[3] In June 2025, the trial court issued a decree of dissolution of marriage. The court found the parties had entered into a prenuptial agreement providing that, in the event of their separation, each of them would receive certain property, “[e]verything purchased after January 7, 2017, was to be split on a 50-50 basis,” and “any debts acquired after the agreement was executed were to [be] the responsibility of both parties equally.” Id. at 42. The court stated that, on January 4, 2024, it entered provisional orders prohibiting the transfer of property until the dissolution decree was issued. The court found:

10. Nevertheless, in July of 2024, [Wife] transferred her interest in Skin & Body Empire & Med Spa, LLC (the Business) to Michelle Teepe, an individual who [Wife] had employed at the business. The business was formed by the parties in November 2018, after the parties’ marriage. While there was testimony that it was “her” business in her name only, according to the terms of the parties’ Prenuptial Agreement, the business was “shared property,” and is a marital asset subject to division.

11. Both parties contributed to the business, which included $85,000 from joint funds received from the “flip” of a Walnut Street house and used to repay a startup loan received from [Wife's] father.

12. The business owned valuable equipment, including lasers, one of which is worth at least $60,000. The testimony of [Wife] and of Ms. Teepe established that [Wife] transferred the business to Ms. Teepe in order to “save the business.” The business was heavily in debt. While there was little to no documentation involved in the transfer, Ms. Teepe acquired a $50,000 loan, and in turn, [Wife] paid the business debts, including debts on the business equipment. Ms. Teepe testified that in order to retain a significant portion of the business's client base, she and [Wife] entered into an agreement whereby [Wife] would work in the business and receive a 40% commission, rather than the 30% commission other employees received. [Wife] may stay or leave her position at any time. While there is little monetary value from the business to divide, as most of what was transferred other than ownership was debt, testimony did reveal that at least one of the lasers used in the business was valued at $60,000. Evidence showed that the parties still owed debt on the machine. However, from the evidence introduced, the Court is unable to determine the amount of that debt. While [Wife] has taken responsibility for the entire business debt, [Husband] is entitled to share equally in the value of the only identifiable asset. Therefore, the Court awards [Husband] $30,000 as his share of the business.

Id. at 43-44.

[4] The court awarded the marital residence to Wife pursuant to the prenuptial agreement. It found that “any increase in value of the real estate should have been expected by a reasonable person, and [Wife] is entitled to the award of the marital residence as set forth in the terms of the parties’ agreement regardless of whether it increased or decreased in value” and “[a]dding to the home's value by remodeling or making other improvements was a choice the parties made during the marriage.” Id. at 44. It further found:

[D]uring the marriage, the parties did purchase an additional parcel of real estate adjacent to the marital home. This separate parcel is “shared property” subject to division. The parcel was purchased for $2,000. Testimony revealed that the value of the residence increased by .48 from the time of purchase until the filing of the Verified Petition for Dissolution of Marriage. The purchase of the additional parcel improved the value of the home. Utilizing the numbers provided during testimony, the Court finds the value of the lot is now $2,960. Consequently, the petitioner is entitled to one-half of the value of the adjacent lot.

Id. The court also awarded Wife a 2017 Chevrolet Silverado and a Legend trailer. It found that Wife was entitled to recover the cost of a motorcycle which she purchased for Husband during the marriage and that Husband shall reimburse her the amount of $8,000. The decree provided, “[b]ased upon all the above, the Court Orders that [Husband] is entitled to an equalization payment from [Wife] in the amount of $31,480.” Id. at 45.

[5] Wife filed a motion to correct error requesting an amended decree containing certain clarifying language regarding title to the Chevrolet Silverado and the Legend trailer and asking the court to “correct its error as to the value of the laser and the equalization payment due to the Husband.” Id. at 48. The court issued an order granting Wife's motion with respect to including the requested clarifying language regarding title to the Chevrolet Silverado and Legend trailer and denying Wife's motion with respect to the value of the marital property and the ordered equalization payment.

Discussion

[6] Wife disputes the values of the parcel adjacent to the marital residence and her business assigned by the trial court for purposes of calculating her equalization payment. The Indiana Supreme Court has expressed a “preference for granting latitude and deference to our trial judges in family law matters.” In re Marriage of Richardson, 622 N.E.2d 178, 178 (Ind. 1993). The division of marital property is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Love v. Love, 10 N.E.3d 1005, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). We consider only the evidence most favorable to the court's disposition. Id. Although the facts and reasonable inferences might allow for a different conclusion, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Id. We generally review a ruling on a motion to correct error for an abuse of discretion. Miller v. Rosehill Hotels, LLC, 45 N.E.3d 15, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).

[7] The court must divide the marital estate in a just and reasonable manner, and an equal division is presumed just and reasonable. McGrath v. McGrath, 948 N.E.2d 1185, 1187-1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5). The presumption may be rebutted by evidence of certain factors including the contribution of each spouse to the acquisition; the extent to which the property was acquired before the marriage or through inheritance or gift; the economic circumstances of each spouse at the time of the disposition; the conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to the disposition or dissipation of their property; and the earnings or earning ability of the parties. Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5. The court is not required to explicitly address each factor provided that a court on review is able to infer from the court's findings that the statutory factors were considered. Love, 10 N.E.3d at 1012. We will reverse a property distribution only if there is no rational basis for the award. Id. at 1013.

[8] The party challenging the court's division must overcome a strong presumption that it considered and complied with the applicable statute. McGrath, 948 N.E.2d at 1188. The court's disposition of the marital estate is to be considered as a whole, not item by item. Id. Further, the trial court's valuation of marital assets will be disturbed only for an abuse of discretion. Morey v. Morey, 49 N.E.3d 1065, 1069 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). As long as the evidence is sufficient and reasonable inferences support the valuation, an abuse of discretion does not occur. Id.

A. Adjacent Land Parcel

[9] Wife argues the trial court found that testimony revealed “that the value of the residence increased by .48 from the time of purchase” until the filing of the dissolution petition, Appellant's Brief at 8 (citing Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 44), but that “neither of the parties testified as to such increase.” Id. Husband argues the evidence showed that the parties purchased the adjacent parcel for $2,000, there was an increase in the marital residence's value, and the purchase of the adjacent parcel increased the marital residence's value and provided a significant benefit by preventing development next door.

[10] The record reveals that the parties purchased the parcel adjacent to the marital residence during their marriage. When asked, “[d]o you agree that the purchase of that adjacent lot would increase the property value,” Wife answered “[w]e paid ․ ($2,000.00) for it. We just didn't want somebody to put a tailor [sic] in next door.” Transcript Volume II at 15. When asked, “did it increase the value [ ] of the home or the two thousand dollars ($2,000.00),” she replied, “[i]t really has [sic] increased any, no.” Id. Husband agreed that the parties purchased the adjacent parcel for $2,000, and when asked “[d]o you think that the acquisition of the adjacent lot increased the property value,” he answered “Oh definitely - definitely.” Id. at 44. When asked “did it increase it at two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) exactly or did it increase,” Husband testified: “No, it was more than two thousand (2,000), its [sic] increased to quite a bit. It [ ] made the property so much bigger and it couldn't be sold so we had it land locked, so it couldn't put, nobody else could pay to put a tailor [sic] on it, we had it was a bush pile we cleaned it all out cut down trees and cleared it off so made it look really nice.” Id. Given the testimony regarding the purchase of the adjacent parcel and how the purchase benefited the marital residence, we cannot say the court abused its discretion in determining the value of the parcel for purposes of dividing the marital property.

B. Business

[11] Wife further asserts the trial court erred in valuing her business. She argues “[t]here is no evidence that one of the lasers was still valued at $60,000.00,” “[t]he laser at issue also had a loan which [she] testified was $28,279.03 as of the date of filing,” and “[n]ot taking the debt on the laser into account results in the distribution between the parties’ being incorrect.” Appellant's Brief at 9. Husband argues that “Wife's own misconduct and dissipation of the asset made an accurate accounting impossible” and “[w]ith the Business's overall value and debt rendered indeterminable by [ ] Wife's actions, the Trial Court acted reasonably by valuing the ‘only identifiable asset’ not completely dissipated.” Appellee's Brief at 8, 10 (quoting Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 44).

[12] The record reveals Wife's testimony that she started the business in 2018, her father gave her a loan to start the business, and she transferred the business to Teepe in 2024. When asked, “when you transferred it to [Teepe,] what did you get in [ex]change for it,” Wife stated “I was trying to get out of the debt that I was left with,” and when asked “[w]hat was the debt you were left with,” she replied “[o]h some where in the neighborhood of about eighty five thousand dollar[s].” Transcript Volume II at 5. Wife testified “their [sic] where [sic] some lasers” and “I think one (1) of the laser[s] were [sic] purchased right around sixty five seventy thousand dollars ($65 / $70, 000.00). The other one I think it was like 15. There was some other equipment that were [sic] purchased as well.” Id. at 5-6. She testified that, in addition to the two lasers, she had a “hydrafacial machine, microneedling, dialysis, um just spa chairs, computers things like that.” Id. at 6. She indicated that she paid “around thirteen fourteen (13-14) thousand” for the hydrafacial machine and that she had “skin care products, and chemical peels, and tattoo equipment.” Id. When asked, “[t]he arrangement with [Teepe] is for her to ․ pay [ ] off your debt,” Wife stated, “[t]ransfer ownership right and help. And help a little pay some with the laser.” Id. at 11-12. When asked “[h]ow else was [Teepe] compensating you,” Wife indicated that she would earn a 40 percent commission whereas the other employees earned a 30 percent commission. Id. at 12. Wife indicated that Respondent's Exhibit C “is the [ ] loan I had for the laser that was still owned [sic] back um this still shows that back in October 2023 when we filed this I still owned [sic] ․ ($28,279.00) on [ ] one of the lasers at the spa.” Id. at 24.

[13] Teepe testified that she purchased the spa from Wife in 2024. When asked, in addition to paying Wife “forty percent (40%) instead of thirty percent” in commission, “what else did you have to do financially,” Teepe answered, “we paid off whatever equipment was there I paid that off and product,” and when asked “[w]hat do you mean by product,” she replied, “[w]hatever we had there was like, I think it was like fifty thousand (50,000) that I paid. I have a loan out and I pay that monthly and it was just to cover what she had left on her end. As far as the equipment and stuff.” Id. at 37-38. When asked “[h]ow much could you sell the lasers for,” Teepe replied, “I honestly could not tell you, it depends on how old they are. I mean maybe thirty (30), fifteen (15) a piece ․ I mean brand new they would be expensive. But their [sic] used, so.” Id. at 38. When asked, “[s]o you pay her ․ ($50,000.00) plus ten percent (10%) extra per for commission per month for who knows how long and in exchange for that you get a [ ] up and running business,” and Teepe replied, “Yes ․ she was afraid of losing the business and ․ I did not want to lose it.” Id. at 41. When asked how much “[d]o you recall exactly how much you paid [Wife] to off the debt,” Teepe replied, “I want to say it was fifty (50) I do not know exactly” and “[Wife] just said that she was going to pay the equipment and the product and then that way I wouldn't owe anything.” Id. Husband testified, “For ․ ($60,000.00) ․ she got ․ ($30,000.00) worth of [ ] products,” “if she was to take all of those products and sell them she could get ․ ($30,000.00),” “so essentially she bought a sixty thousand dollar ($60,000.00) laser [w]ith thirty thousand (30,000) in products she could sell to help make up half the cost of that laser,” “[t]he [ ] hydrafacial machine also came from the laser agent out of Indianapolis,” and “[w]e paid fifteen thousand ($15,000.00) for it.” Id. at 45-46.

[14] Based on the evidence, including Wife's transfer of the business to Teepe in violation of the court's order, Teepe's payment of approximately $50,000 and Wife's higher commission rate, and the testimony regarding the business's assets and debts, we cannot say that the court abused its discretion in valuing the business for purposes of dividing the marital property and calculating Wife's equalization payment.

[15] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

[16] Affirmed.

Brown, Judge.

Felix, J., and Scheele, J., concur.