ROSS v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Tamika L. Ross (“Ross”) appeals the post-conviction court's (“PCR court”) denial of her petition for post-conviction relief (“Order”). On appeal, Ross raises numerous issues for our review, but we find the following restated issues dispositive:

 I. Whether the PCR court erred in denying her petition for post-conviction relief; and

II. Whether she is entitled to relief because the PCR hearing was tainted by judicial bias.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] At times relevant to Ross's criminal and post-conviction proceedings, Judge Matthew J. Elkin was the presiding Judge.¹ The criminal proceedings against Ross originated from her conduct in the early morning hours of July 1, 2022. At that time, Ross was driving her vehicle when Officer Ryan Adams (“Officer Adams”) of the Kokomo Police Department observed Ross make a U-turn without using her turn signal. When Officer Adams began speaking with Ross, he detected the “odor of an alcoholic beverage omitting [sic] from [her] breath and person” and observed that Ross had red, watery eyes and was slurring her words. Tr. Vol. II p. 24. Ross denied having anything to drink that evening. Officer Adams asked Ross if she had any weapons on her person, which Ross twice denied. Thereafter, Officer Adams asked Ross to exit the vehicle, conducted a pat down search of her person, and discovered a firearm. Ross then participated in three different field sobriety tests, failed each test, and refused a portable breath test. Officer Adams applied for a search warrant for a blood draw, which was later granted. Upon later testing, Ross's blood alcohol concentration was determined to be 0.187. See Ex. Vol. III. p. 72.

[4] On July 1, 2022, the State charged Ross with operating a vehicle while intoxicated, a Level 6 felony. On September 19, 2023, Ross filed a motion to proceed pro se, which the trial court granted the next day. In anticipation of pleading guilty pursuant to a plea agreement, on February 21, 2024, Ross signed a written waiver of rights. See id. at 241–42. By signing the waiver of rights, Ross acknowledged that by pleading guilty she would be giving up, in part, the following rights: the right to a speedy and public trial; the right to face and cross-examine witnesses; the right to remain silent; the right to have the State prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt; and the right to appeal her conviction. In addition, Ross acknowledged that pleading guilty could affect her status on probation or parole and her ability to possess a firearm. In exchange for Ross's plea of guilty, the State agreed to recommend a sentence to the Howard County Criminal Justice Center for one year, all suspended except for twenty days which were to be executed. The recommendation further stated that Ross satisfied her license suspension “by the ignition interlock device” and that she would have the ability to petition the trial court to have the felony reduced to a Class A misdemeanor “upon successful completion of Probation.” Id. at 243. In the agreement, Ross agreed that it was “made of [her] own free and voluntary act and that no one has threatened or promised [her] anything[.]” Id.

[5] At the change of plea hearing, held the same day, the trial court confirmed with Ross her desire to plead guilty after advising her that she would be giving up her right to trial, right to subpoena and confront witnesses, right to have the State prove her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, right to remain silent, and right to appeal her conviction. After granting Ross's motion to withdraw her not guilty plea, entering a formal plea of guilty, and entering judgment thereon, the trial court proceeded to sentencing where the trial court stated that it would impose the recommended sentence. The trial court informed Ross of the opportunity to petition the court upon successful completion of her probation to have her conviction reduced to a Class A misdemeanor. The following day, Ross filed a Motion to Amend Plea Deal, identifying six points of concern she had with her plea agreement, which the trial court subsequently denied. On March 1, 2024, the trial court issued its sentencing order “[p]ursuant to the Recommendation of Plea Bargain[.]” Ex. Vol. IV pp. 3–4.

[6] In January 2025, Ross filed a pro se “Motion to Vacate Judgment Due to Lack of Jurisdiction/Manifest Injustice[,]” which the trial court regarded as a petition for post-conviction relief (“the Petition”). Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 18–54.² In the Petition, Ross (1) challenged jurisdiction, (2) challenged discovery she received, (3) challenged the evidence that led to her initial traffic stop, (4) alleged that the prosecutor fabricated evidence, (5) alleged her firearm was confiscated illegally, (6) alleged that material evidence was excluded, (7) claimed transcripts that she obtained were altered or incomplete, and (8) asserted that due to the aforementioned allegations, she was coerced into taking a plea deal due to “COERCION and DURESS which derived from all Government Officials acting in COLLUSION involved in the above-mentioned Cause [number].” Id. at 24–25. At times in the Petition, Ross relied on the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) as support for her arguments. See, e.g. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 27–29. Finally, Ross challenged “the Court's authority over the subject, subject-matter[,] and the individual.” Id. at 22.

[7] In early February 2025, a hearing was held on the Petition, and the PCR court treated all the documents Ross filed as “a giant exhibit.” Tr. Vol. II p. 54. The PCR court explained to Ross that she was “in control of [her] case[,]” and informed her that they could have the entire hearing that day, just have argument, or could schedule the hearing for a future date in order for Ross to engage in discovery. Id. at 55. Ross elected to proceed with the hearing and repeatedly asserted that she only wanted to focus on jurisdiction. Indeed, the PCR court asked Ross what she “want[ed] to do?” Id. Ross responded: “I'm just gonna [sic] see if the State has the ․ proof of jurisdiction that I requested. And to also give you a certified copy of a court case file.” Id. Shortly thereafter, the PCR court asked Ross, “[H]ow do you want to proceed, do you wanna [sic] do any testimony or do you wanna [sic] do argument or what?” Id. at 56. Ross again focused on the issue of jurisdiction, stating: “I'm just here to see if the State has proof of what I asked for, which is the personal territorial subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. The State responded that it was Ross's burden to prove the allegations in the Petition. Ross limited her presentation to her jurisdiction argument, arguing that “the judgment [was] void” if it was “entered without proper jurisdiction[.]” Id. at 57. She also lodged several objections and insisted that the State had the burden to “prove jurisdiction.” Id.

[8] When the PCR court asked if Ross had “any additional argument [she] want[ed] to make[,]” Ross responded: “Yes, I'm objecting because I need standard certified verifiable proof in a formal contract or any other affidavit that you have proper jurisdiction.” Id. at 58. The PCR court proceeded to take judicial notice of “the statutes of Indiana creating the circuits and superior courts of Indiana under IC 33-33-34-2 and IC 33-33-34-13, along with IC 33-29-11.5 which basically states that all standard superior courts have, especially in Howard County, original concurrent jurisdiction in all civil cases in [sic] all criminal cases.” Id. at 58. The PCR court then explained to Ross that the UCC does not apply to her case. Thereafter, the PCR court again asked Ross whether she had “any other arguments [she] want[ed] to make[,]” noting that it was obligated to “write findings of fact and conclusions of law.” Id. at 60. Ross responded: “Well, I should have been [given] proper notice first off to be brought under the jurisdiction, which I was never given proper notice.” Id. Shortly thereafter, the court asked Ross whether she had “[a]ny other arguments[,]” and Ross replied: “I'm objecting to all everything [sic] you just said because you do not have jurisdiction and that's my argument.” Id. Ross failed to make any presentation or argument in support of the other claims raised in the Petition, limiting her entire presentation to the jurisdiction issue.

[9] On February 13, 2025, the PCR court issued its Order, which included the court's finding of facts and conclusions of law and denied the Petition, focusing exclusively on Ross's jurisdiction claim. In relevant part, the Order stated:

24. [Officer] Adams indicated the reason for the stop was an illegal U-turn by reversing direction on Washington Street without the use of a turn signal.

․

35. A probable cause affidavit, electronically signed by Officer Adams, was included with the Information and enhanced penalty filing.

36. Magistrate Shepherd found probable cause for the arrest on July 1, 2022[,] and fixed bond at $10,000.00 with 10%.

․

48. On January 13, 2025[,] the State of Indiana filed State's Answer to Motion to Vacate Judgment.

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56. Ross had the evidence disclosed to her.

57. Ross [s]ubpoenaed evidence from the Indiana State Police Lab.

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60. Ross [d]eposed witnesses regarding their testimony.

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69. Ross understood the terms of the agreement.

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72. The court has subject matter jurisdiction over the Ross cause as Howard superior court No. 1 was created prior to the charges in this case.

73. The court has subject matter jurisdiction over the Ross cause as Howard superior court No. 1 has original and concurrent jurisdiction for all criminal matters within the geographic area of Howard [C]ounty.

74. The statute under which Ross was charged was created before the date of the events as alleged in the Information filed.

75. The Information set forth the charge(s) against Ross.

76. Howard superior court No. 1 has personal jurisdiction over Ross as the State of Indiana brought charges pursuant to an Information filed July 1, 2022.

77. Howard superior court No. 1 has personal jurisdiction over Ross as she received an initial hearing and appeared at hearings regarding the cause.

78. Howard superior court No. 1 has jurisdiction over Ross as she waived argument regarding jurisdictional issues when she admitted the events occurred in Howard [C]ounty when she accepted her plea agreement.

79. No administrative agency, commercial activity and/or contract activity occurred that negates the creation of Howard superior court No. 1 and its legal power to hear and adjudicate criminal matters occurring within Howard County, Indiana.

80. The Petition for Post-Conviction Relief is denied.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 pp. 69–78 (internal footnote omitted). Ross now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[10] At the outset, we note that Ross appeals pro se in this matter. Our Supreme Court has previously explained that “a pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” In re G.P., 4 N.E.3d 1158, 1164 (Ind. 2014) (citing Gunashekar v. Grose, 915 N.E.2d 953, 955 (Ind. 2009)).

I. Denial of the Petition

[11] Ross claims the PCR court erred by denying the Petition. Generally, “[a]ny person who has been convicted of, or sentenced for, a crime by a court of this state ․ may institute at any time a proceeding under [Indiana Post Conviction Rule 1(a)(1)–(a)(6)] to secure relief.” Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1. “In post-conviction proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing his claims by a preponderance of the evidence.” Isom v. State, 170 N.E.3d 623, 632 (Ind. 2021) (citing Wilkes v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1236, 1240 (Ind. 2013)); P-C.R. 1(5). “If [s]he fails to meet this burden and receives a denial of post-conviction relief, then [s]he proceeds from a negative judgment and on appeal must prove ‘that the evidence, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to the post-conviction court's decision.’ ” Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1279 (Ind. 2019) (quoting Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 738 N.E.2d 253, 258 (Ind. 2000), cert. denied.). “In other words, the defendant must convince this Court that there is no way within the law that the court below could have reached the decision it did.” Wilkes, 984 N.E.2d at 1240 (citing Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Ind. 2002), cert. denied.).

[12] As an initial matter, Ross argues the PCR court erred because the Order addressed only her jurisdiction argument and not the other claims set forth in the Petition. Ross directs us to Post-Conviction Rule 1(6), which specifies that the PCR court “shall make specific findings of fact, and conclusions of law on all issues presented, whether or not a hearing is held.” Ross claims the PCR court was obligated to enter additional findings and conclusions—beyond the issue of jurisdiction—because she properly presented issues other than jurisdiction. The State responds that Ross affirmatively limited her PCR claim to jurisdiction at the hearing, and therefore, the PCR court was only required to address jurisdiction, which it did. See Appellee's Br. pp. 12–13.

[13] We agree with the State. The PCR court gave Ross wide latitude in how she wished to proceed at the fact-finding hearing, with the PCR court asking Ross on multiple occasions to identify her arguments or evidence in support of her request for relief. Throughout the hearing, Ross repeatedly responded that she only wanted to present the issue of jurisdiction. It is well-settled that “[a] party may not assume a position in a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted.” GEICO Ins. Co. v. Rowell, 705 N.E.2d 476, 481 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Indeed, to allow otherwise would compromise the “essential integrity of the judicial process” by allowing parties to play “fast and loose” with the courts. Id.; cf. Isom, 170 N.E.3d at 654–55 (explaining that a PCR petitioner waived claims by failing to argue them in proposed findings and conclusions, even though the additional claims were in the PCR petition). Based on Ross's insistence that she was only arguing that the criminal court lacked jurisdiction, we cannot say the PCR court erred by limiting its findings and conclusions to the issue of jurisdiction, which as a result, was the exclusive claim before the PCR court.³

[14] Turning to the jurisdiction issue, Ross maintains she was entitled to relief due to a lack of jurisdiction, and she challenges several of the PCR court's findings and conclusions on this issue. In general, whether a court has jurisdiction is a question of law subject to de novo review. In re Custody of M.B., 51 N.E.3d 230, 233 (Ind. 2016) (citing In re B.C., 9 N.E.3d 745, 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)). Moreover, “[w]hen reviewing the court's order denying relief, we will ‘not defer to the post-conviction court's legal conclusions,’ and the ‘findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error—that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.’ ” Bobadilla, 117 N.E.3d at 1279 (quoting Humphrey v. State, 73 N.E.3d 677, 682 (Ind. 2017)). “We do not reweigh the evidence presented at the post-conviction proceedings, and we examine only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the post-conviction court's determination.” Kelly v. State, 257 N.E.3d 782, 792 (Ind. 2025) (citing Conley v. State, 183 N.E.3d 276, 282 (Ind. 2022)), cert. denied. “But we review pure legal questions de novo.” Id. (citing State v. Stidham, 157 N.E.3d 1185, 1190 (Ind. 2020)). “[W]hen findings of fact are unchallenged, this Court accepts them as true.” Moriarty v. Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d 616, 626 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (citing Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019)), trans. denied. Moreover, “if the unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the judgment, we will affirm.” Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d at 626.

[15] Regarding jurisdiction, it is worth pointing out that Ross pleaded guilty to the underlying criminal offense. Our Supreme Court has previously explained that “[p]lea bargaining is a tool used by both prosecutors and defendants to expedite the trial process ․ [and] [d]efendants waive a whole panoply of rights by voluntarily pleading guilty.” Mapp v. State, 770 N.E.2d 332, 334–35 (Ind. 2002) (internal footnote omitted). “These include the right to a jury trial, the right against self-incrimination, the right of appeal, and the right to attack collaterally one's plea based on double jeopardy.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Games v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1132, 1135 (Ind. 2001)). Furthermore, in Alexander v. State, our Supreme Court held that a defendant waived his challenge to jurisdiction by pleading guilty. 514 N.E.2d 292, 293 (Ind. 1987) (explaining “[defendant] entered guilty pleas to both predicate felonies. Thus, he submitted to the court's jurisdiction and any error in the failure to have a probable cause hearing is waived by his personal appearance and plea of guilty.”). Because Ross pleaded guilty, and thereby voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court, she has waived any challenge to the criminal court's jurisdiction.

[16] Waiver notwithstanding, we address Ross's challenge to jurisdiction. “There are three kinds of jurisdiction: subject matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction, and jurisdiction over a particular case.” Pivarnik v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 636 N.E.2d 131, 137 (Ind. 1994) (citing Mishler v. Cnty. of Elkhart, 544 N.E.2d 149, 152–53 (Ind. 1989)). At the hearing on the Petition, Ross challenged the State's “personal territorial subject matter jurisdiction.” Tr. Vol. II p. 56. In her brief, Ross alleged that the “trial court's assertion and exercise of jurisdiction over [her] was arbitrary and unsupported by the legal prerequisites necessary to confer jurisdiction.” Appellant's Br. p. 9. Our Supreme Court has previously explained that subject matter jurisdiction:

[R]efers only to the power of a court to hear and decide a particular class of cases. The only relevant inquiry in determining whether any court has has [sic] subject matter jurisdiction is to ask whether the kind of claim which the plaintiff advances falls within the general scope of the authority conferred upon such court by the constitution or by statute.

Pivarnik, 636 N.E.2d at 137 (quoting State ex rel. Young v. Noble Cir. Ct., 332 N.E.2d 99, 101 (Ind. 1975)). Indiana Code section 33-33-34-2 confers “Howard County” as the “sixty-second judicial circuit.” Within Howard County, there are “established four (4) superior courts of record[.]” I.C. § 33-33-34-3. Indiana Code section 33-29-1-1.5 provides that all “standard superior courts have: (1) original and concurrent jurisdiction in all civil cases and in all criminal cases [and] (2) original and concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts in all user fee cases[.]” The Howard Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over Ross's criminal case. Although Ross takes issue with certain findings, she fails to challenge or identify any factual findings that indicate that her criminal offense occurred anywhere other than in Howard County, Indiana. Because the undisputed evidence is that the criminal offense occurred in Howard County, Indiana, we cannot say the PCR court erred in denying Ross relief due to the alleged lack of jurisdiction. See Moriarty, 150 N.E.3d at 626.

II. Judicial Bias

[17] Ross next alleges that Judge Elkin engaged in judicial misconduct during the PCR hearing such that she is entitled to relief. Specifically, Ross argues that “[t]he pattern of unexplained denials and judicial hostility, combined with [J]udge Elkin's now-public disciplinary charges, supports [her] contention that the [J]udge failed to act impartially and independently as required under Canons 1–3 of Ind. Code of Judicial Conduct.” Appellant's Br. p. 14.

[18] We confine our review of Ross's allegations of judicial misconduct to those that are alleged to have occurred during the PCR hearing. Our court previously explained in Perry that “[w]hen the impartiality of the trial judge is challenged on appeal, we will presume that the judge is unbiased and unprejudiced.” Perry v. State, 904 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Smith v. State, 770 N.E.2d 818, 823 (Ind. 2002)), trans. denied. “[T]o rebut that presumption, a defendant must establish from the judge's conduct actual bias or prejudice that places the defendant in jeopardy.” Id. Our Supreme Court has also held that “[p]rejudice is not inferred from adverse judicial rulings.” State ex rel. Allen v. Carroll Cir. Ct., 226 N.E.3d 206, 217 (Ind. 2024) (quoting Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 269 (Ind. 2014)). “ ‘To assess whether the judge has crossed the barrier into impartiality, we examine both the judge's actions and demeanor.’ ” Perry, 904 N.E.2d at 307–08 (quoting Timberlake v. State, 690 N.E.2d 243, 256 (Ind. 1997)).

[19] On appeal, Ross argues that at the time of the hearing on the Petition, Judge Elkin was facing nine formal disciplinary charges, that he advocated on behalf of the State, and made inappropriate remarks on the record directed towards her. Appellant's Br. pp. 15–16. Ross identifies the following comments by the PCR court as support: responding to Ross and stating “yeah, I just read it to you. I just gave it to you. You can literally put it in your phone[,]” and stating to Ross “if you argue UCC, you are literally arguing that you are a slave in the [S]tate of Indiana[.]” Id. at 16–17. Ross also identified a comment the State made, “she can object all she wants to,” as the PCR court's “tacit approval” of the prosecutor's conduct (commenting on the frequency of Ross's objections at the hearing on the Petition). Id.

[20] Although Ross identified unfavorable remarks and responses by the PCR court, Ross has failed to establish how those comments placed her in jeopardy. See Smith, 770 N.E.2d at 823. We therefore cannot say Ross has identified any grounds for relief based on the alleged judicial misconduct at the evidentiary hearing.

Conclusion

[21] Ross has not demonstrated that the PCR court erred in denying her petition for post-conviction relief, nor has Ross demonstrated that the fact-finding hearing was tainted by judicial bias.

[22] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   We note that Judge Elkin is no longer a presiding trial court judge. See In re Elkin, 266 N.E.3d 215 (Ind. 2025).

2.   Due to the pages in the Appellant's Appendix not being consecutively paginated as required under Indiana Appellate Rule 51(C), we refer to the electronic page number rather than the handwritten page number as it appears in the Appellant's Appendix.

3.   Having reached this conclusion, we do not address the merits of other claims set forth in the PCR petition.

Foley, Judge.

Kenworthy, J. and Scheele, J., concur.