STATE v. MYERS (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] The State appeals the trial court's grant of an Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) motion for discharge filed by Thomas Jordan Myers. The State raises one issue, namely, whether the trial court clearly erred when it granted Myers’ motion. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On January 22, 2024, the State charged Myers with theft, as a Level 6 felony, in cause number 53C02-2401-F6-44 (“F6-44”). Then, on February 2, 2024, the State charged Myers with one count of child molesting, as a Level 1 felony, in cause number 53C02-2402-F1-77 (“F1-77”). He was subsequently arrested on February 21. And, on February 22, the State charged Myers with several felonies and misdemeanors in cause number 53C02-2402-F6-141 (“F6-141”). At a pretrial conference in May, the court set an initial trial date for all three causes for October 14.

[3] On September 5, the State filed a notice of its intent to try the F6-44 case on October 14, which was consistent with a local rule that generally required the oldest cases to be tried first. On September 11, Myers filed a notice of outstanding discovery in all three cause numbers. The court then held a pretrial conference on October 3. During that conference, Myers indicated that he was “not super enthusiastic” about going to trial on the Level 6 felony case before the Level 1 felony case, so he stated that he “would accept a February trial setting” for the three causes, “with the understanding that [the parties will] do the F1” first. Tr. Vol. 2 at 30. Myers then stated that, while he did not have “all the discovery” in the F1 case, he would “accept” a trial date in February. Id. at 31. As such, the court reset the trial date for all three causes to February 3, 2025.

[4] On November 14, 2024, Myers filed a motion to exclude certain pieces of possible evidence in F1-77 based on the State's failure to provide those items during discovery. At a hearing on the motion to exclude, the State acknowledged its failure, accepted fault, and agreed that the challenged evidence should be excluded.

[5] The court then held a final pretrial conference on January 23, 2025. During that conference, Myers informed the court that he had reached an agreement with the State to enter into a guilty plea that would dispose of all three cause numbers, and he requested “that the jury trial be vacated on the defense motion” and that the court set a change of plea hearing. Id. at 55. The court scheduled the change of plea hearing for March 28. Myers failed to appear at the March 28 hearing, and he failed to appear for the rescheduled hearing on April 4. The court declined to schedule a new hearing until it knew “what's going on” with Myers. Id. at 56.

[6] Myers was subsequently arrested on April 11, and the court held a pretrial conference on all three cause numbers on May 8. During that hearing, Myers rejected the plea agreement and indicated his intent to file a motion for discharge. Myers filed his Indiana Criminal Rule 4(C) motion for discharge in all three cause numbers on May 12. Myers asserted that, while the delay from January 23 through April 11, 2025, was attributable to him, more than one year had elapsed without the State bringing him to trial. The court granted the motion the same day without a hearing.

[7] On June 10, the State filed a motion to correct error. In that motion, the State contended that more of the delay than the period cited by Myers was attributable to him such that a year had not elapsed. Following a hearing, the court granted the State's motion as to F6-44 but denied it as to F1-77 and F6-141. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

[8] The State contends that the court erred when it granted Myers’ Criminal Rule 4(C) motion for discharge in F1-77 and F6-141. “In reviewing Criminal Rule 4 claims, we review questions of law de novo, and we review factual findings under the clearly erroneous standard.” State v. Harper, 135 N.E.3d 962, 972 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.¹ As our Supreme Court has reiterated, “ ‘[t]he State bears the burden of bringing the defendant to trial within one year.’ ” Battering v. State, 150 N.E.3d 597, 601 (Ind. 2020) (quoting State v. Larkin, 100 N.E.3d 700, 703 (Ind. 2018)). To enforce this burden, Criminal Rule 4(C) provides, in relevant part:

No person can be held on recognizance or otherwise to answer a criminal charge for a period in aggregate exceeding one year from the date the criminal charge against such defendant is filed, or from the date of the arrest on such charge, whichever is later. Delays caused by a defendant, congestion of the court calendar, or an emergency are excluded from the time period. If a defendant is held beyond the time limit of this section and moves for dismissal, the criminal charge against the defendant must be dismissed․

[9] As the rule suggests, criminal defendants extend the one-year period “ ‘by seeking or acquiescing in delay resulting in a later trial date.’ ” Battering, 150 N.E.3d at 601 (quoting Pelley v. State, 901 N.E.2d 494, 498 (Ind. 2009)). Further, “when a defendant takes action which delays the proceeding, that time is chargeable to the defendant and extends the one-year time limit, regardless of whether a trial date has been set at the time or not.” Cook v. State, 810 N.E.2d 1064, 1066-67 (Ind. 2004). “And any action that postpones the proceeding of the case will likely cause a delay in the trial date.” Id. at 1067. Indeed, “[w]hen a party delays a task which must be completed before a trial can take place, that party can and often does delay the setting of the case for trial, and through that, the trial itself.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).

[10] Here, the parties agree that the one-year time limit began on February 21, 2024, for F1-77 and February 22 for F6-141. Further, both parties agree that the days between February 21 and 22 through October 14 (236 days in F1-77 and 235 days in F6-141) were not attributable to Myers and therefore counted toward the one-year limit.² And the parties agree that the time between January 23, 2025, when Myers indicated his intent to enter into a guilty plea, and April 11, when he was ultimately arrested again, are attributable to Myers. However, the parties dispute whether the time period from the original trial date of October 14, 2024, through January 23, 2025, or the time period from Myers’ arrest on April 11 through May 8, when he expressly rejected the plea agreement, were attributable to Myers.

October 14, 2024, through January 23, 2025

[11] The State first contends that the time period from October 14, 2024, through January 23, 2025, should be attributed to Myers and not count toward the one-year time limit. In particular, the State argues that “[i]t was on [Myers’] motion that no trial occurred on October 14 and all three cases were continued to” a February trial setting, which was ultimately cancelled when, on January 23, 2025, Myers indicated his intent to plead guilty. Appellant's Br. at 12. We agree.

[12] Here, after Myers was charged in three cause numbers, the trial court set all three for trial on October 14, 2024. Then, at the final pretrial conference on October 3, the court stated that its “understanding” was that the parties would try the F6-44 case on the 14th. Tr. Vol. 2 at 29. Myers responded that he would “be ready to go” and that the “case [would] be prepped” but that he was not “super enthusiastic” about trying a Level 6 felony case when he had a pending Level 1 felony case. Id. at 29-30. As such, Myers stated that he was “willing to continue on [his] motion” F6-44 so that he could “shift [his] priority” to the F1-77. Id. at 30. And he stated that he “would accept” a February trial setting for all three cases, with the “understanding” that F1-77 would be tried on that day. Id. Accordingly, the court set a trial date of February 3. However, at the final pretrial conference on January 23, Myers indicated his intent to enter into a plea agreement that would resolve all three cases. Thus, it was Myers’ desire to try the Level 1 felony case first that caused the trial court to reschedule the trials from October 14 to February 3.

[13] Still, Myers contends that the “impossibility of trying F1-77 on October 14, 202[4], was a result of the State's consistent and repeated failure to meet its discovery obligations in that case[.]” Appellee's Br. at 10. In other words, Myers contends that the delay from October 14, 2024, through January 23, 2025, should not be chargeable to him because it was a result of the State's failure to comply with discovery requests.

[14] We acknowledge that the State failed to comply with certain discovery requests made by Myers in F1-77. And because of those failures, the court excluded certain evidence from a future trial. However, as discussed above, the reason given in support of Myers’ request for a later trial date was that he wished to be tried on the Level 1 felony charge first. Indeed, pursuant to a local rule, the State had previously indicated its intent to try the F6-44 case, which was the oldest case, at the October 14 trial. And at the final pretrial conference, Myers indicated that he would be “ready to go” and that the “case [would] be prepped.” Tr. at 29-30. Thus, the only reason the parties did not go to trial as expected on October 14 was Myers’ request to be tried on the Level 1 felony first. And, while Myers indicated that he did not “have all of the discovery in the F1 case,” he nonetheless “accept[ed]” the February trial date for all three cause numbers. Id. at 31.

[15] Stated differently, the court rescheduled the trial date due to Myers’ desire to be tried in F1-77 first, not based on any failure by the State to comply with discovery requests. See Carr v. State, 934 N.E.3d 1096, 1101 (Ind. 2010) (holding that a delay caused by the defendant's motion for a continuance was chargeable to the defendant despite his argument that the delay was caused by his failure to receive certain evidence when the stated reasons for the delay were defense counsel's scheduling conflicts and his need for time to work with a pathologist). Because the delay from October 14, 2024, through January 23, 2025, was due to Myers’ request to be tried on the Level 1 felony first, that delay is chargeable to him and did not count toward the one-year time limit under Rule 4(C).

April 11 through May 8, 2025

[16] The State also asserts that the time period from Myers’ arrest on April 11, 2025, through his rejection of a plea agreement on May 8 should be chargeable to Myers. Both parties agree that the “rule period remains tolled unless and until the trial court rejects the plea agreement or one of the parties withdraws from the agreement, thereby resurrecting the need for a trial.” Appellant's Br. at 17; Appellee's Br. at 14 (emphasis removed from Appellee's Brief).

[17] As outlined above, on January 23, 2025, Myers indicated his intention to enter into a plea agreement to resolve all three cases. And Myers acknowledges that, as of that date, time stopped accruing toward the one-year time limit. However, the parties dispute whether time ever began to accrue after that date. The State argues that it did not, while Myers argues that the clock began to run again on April 14 when, he contends, the State withdrew from the plea agreement. We again agree with the State.

[18] After Myers indicated his intention to plead guilty on January 23, the court scheduled a change of plea hearing for March 28, at which Myers failed to appear. And Myers also failed to appear for the rescheduled change of plea hearing on April 4. Thus, at the time Myers was arrested on April 11, it was still his stated intent to plead guilty.

[19] However, on April 14, the State and Myers communicated via email regarding the plea agreement. In particular, Myers stated that he would “possibly” be receiving a new theft charge, and he asked the State to review the situation and determine if they “could still do” the change of plea. Ex. at 16. The State responded that it “need[ed] a little more time” and that it “was not inclined to go forward with a plea” because Myers had failed to appear twice and because he was only in custody “because he stole a bike.” Id. Myers then asked the State to “let [him] know ASAP[.]” Id. The State responded that the “deal needs to change a little” because of Myers’ two failures to appear and new charges. Id. at 15. Myers stated that the deal had been “contentiously negotiated,” and the State responded that Myers was “the one who created this situation” and that it “may need to add a couple of years for the new theft.” Id.

[20] According to Myers, that email conversation demonstrates that, as of April 14, the “State withdrew from the previous agreement” and that time began to accrue toward the one-year time limit. Appellee's Br. at 14. However, we do not agree with Myers’ interpretation of the conversation. Rather, the State was simply continuing to engage in plea negotiations based on Myers’ new criminal charges and his two failures to appear. The fact that the State was negotiating the terms of the agreement demonstrates that the State intended to move forward with a plea, not that it was withdrawing. It was not until May 8 that Myers indicated that he would not enter into a plea agreement and would, instead, be filing his Rule 4(C) motion for discharge. At no time prior to that date did either party inform the court of an intent to withdraw, and the court did not reject any proposed plea agreements.

[21] Myers indicated his intent to plead guilty on January 23, and that remained both his intent and the intent of the State's until May 8. As such, contrary to Myers’ argument, the Criminal Rule 4(C) clock did not begin to run on April 14, and the time from April 11 through May 8 was attributable to Myers.

Conclusion

[22] The one-year time limit began on February 21, 2024, for F1-77 and February 22 for F6-141. The days between February 21 and 22 through October 14, which total 236 days in F1-77 and 235 days in F6-141, were not attributable to Myers and therefore counted toward the one-year limit. And the days between January 23 and April 11, 2025, were undisputedly attributable to Myers. However, the remaining time periods in dispute—October 14, 2024, through January 23, 2025, and April 11 through May 8, 2025—were both attributable to Myers. Only the time period from February 21 in F1-77 and February 22 in F6-141 through October 14 counted toward the one-year time limit, and, as such, the one-year period had not yet elapsed when Myers filed his motion for discharge. We therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

[23] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The trial court here did not make any factual findings.

2.   Our Supreme Court has clarified that Criminal Rule 4(C) “does not call for any attribution of delay to the State but only for delay attributable to the defendant or insufficient time due to court congestion or emergency” and, thus, that “the phrase ‘chargeable to the State’ is an unfortunate misnomer, inexact, and potentially misleading.” Carr v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1096, 1100 (Ind. 2010).

Bailey, Judge

Vaidik, J., and Scheele, J., concur.