R.D. (Mother), Appellant-Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee-Petitioner. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] R.D. (Mother) appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to S.D. (Child).¹ Mother presents two issues, which we consolidate and restate as: Was the trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights clearly erroneous?

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] For many years, Mother struggled with substance abuse, including methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine, and fentanyl. On January 4, 2022, Mother gave birth to Child, who was immediately removed from Mother's care at the hospital after Child tested positive for opiates and fentanyl. Just prior to giving birth, Mother had also tested positive for opiates and admitted that she had used heroin earlier that day.

[4] On January 11, 2022, the Indiana Department of Child Services (DCS) filed a petition alleging Child was a child in need of services (CHINS) due to Mother's drug use. On Mother's admission, the trial court adjudicated Child a CHINS on March 23, 2022.² The court entered a dispositional decree ordering Mother to participate in reunification services, including random drug screens, supervised visitation, individual counseling, and intensive outpatient treatment (IOP). DCS placed Child in foster care and referred Mother for services.

[5] Although Mother started out slow, she soon became compliant with the dispositional decree. Regarding drug screens, Mother was directed to call a number at Cordant for random screening, but when she did not follow through, Family Case Manager (FCM) Tangala Parker made special arrangements for Mother to do screens through her. Thereafter, Mother followed the case plan: she submitted negative drug screens through FCM Parker, complied with IOP, and participated in supervised visitations. By August 2022, Mother had progressed to a point where DCS requested, and the court ordered that Mother have unsupervised visitation with Child in her home. Although Mother was compliant with services, FCM Parker found Mother to lack personal motivation and attributed Mother's success to FCM Parker's involvement and encouragement. On September 22, 2022, Mother tested positive for fentanyl,³ which resulted in her visitations reverting to supervised visitation.

[6] FCM Diana Sargent took over the case on October 31, 2022. She did not know of FCM Parker's agreement to personally screen Mother and assumed that Mother was complying with the court's order to screen by calling the number for Cordant. Thus, Mother did not comply with the drug screen requirement until January 2023, when FCM Sargent became aware of the previous arrangement and the court ordered FCM Sargent to personally screen Mother.

[7] From February to April 2023, Mother partially complied with the case plan, participating in approximately one-third of the scheduled supervised visits and required drug screens. Mother was, however, consistently engaging in individual therapy. After a positive screen in May 2023, Mother refused to submit additional drug screens, telling FCM Sargent that her screens “would just be positive.” Transcript at 31. Despite her noncompliance with screens, Mother attended all but three scheduled visits between her and Child. She also participated in about two-thirds of her individual therapy appointments during that time.

[8] On June 29, 2023, DCS requested that the Child's permanency plan be changed to termination of parental rights and adoption, citing Mother's refusal to continue screening and Child's need for permanency. The trial court changed the permanency plan and ordered that Mother's supervised visits be held at a third-party facility rather than Mother's home. Mother remained noncompliant with screens for the latter half of 2023 and did not consistently participate in visitation or individual counseling.

[9] Mother's compliance did not improve in 2024. Between January and March, Mother did not visit with Child. Thereafter, Mother had “low involvement” with visitations, was not engaged in therapy, did not stay in touch with DCS, and did not submit drug screens. Id. at 43. By Mother's own admission, she was in relapse from May 2023 until November 2024.

[10] In October 2024, FCM Sargent learned that Mother had been arrested on drug-related charges in August and September 2024. Mother was in jail for sixty days between September and November 2024. After her release, Mother restarted individual therapy with the therapist she had previously worked with for two and a half years. Since reengaging in therapy, Mother has been mostly compliant, attending eighty percent of her scheduled sessions. Mother's therapist testified that Mother has made “significant improvement” toward sobriety and her overall motivation to remain sober. Id. at 115. Mother's therapist found her to be more motivated to attain and maintain sobriety than she had been at the start of the underlying CHINS action.

[11] On January 24, 2025, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother's parental rights.⁴ The court held a fact-finding hearing on the termination petition on June 25 and July 2, 2025.

[12] Five days after the termination petition was filed, Mother began screening again. In February 2025, Mother reengaged in IOP services with New Seasons. Stephen Hernandez, Mother's substance abuse counselor at New Seasons, noted that Mother's participation in 2024 was “erratic” and resulted in discharge from the program. Id. at 175. After restarting the program, Mother became compliant with counseling services and IOP. Then, on May 19, 2025, Mother screened positive for fentanyl. Mother disputed the result and paid for a confirming test. The confirming test, which was less sensitive than the original, was negative for fentanyl. As part of her IOP, Mother also participated in treatment with suboxone. Mother was not compliant with her treatment, missing three doses at the end of April and five doses in May.

[13] In May or June 2025, Mother began home-based casework. At that time, Mother had housing, but faced eviction, so the goals of home-based casework were to help Mother find sustainable housing and employment. With a service provider's help, Mother secured employment.

[14] Mother also resumed supervised visitation with Child in February, but the visits did not occur on a regular basis until May 2025. Between May 9 and the termination fact-finding hearing on June 25, 2025, Mother had eleven visits with Child. According to the visit supervisor, Child was eager to see Mother and engaged with Mother throughout the visits. Overall, Mother's visits with Child were appropriate; Mother provided meals for Child, and Mother and Child had a playful relationship and interacted well. Shortly after visits resumed, however, Child started having behavioral changes, such as regressing in some of her skills, reverting to using a pacifier, waking at night screaming, being more aggressive, and being clingy with her foster mom. Child also started having periods of incontinence and picking at her nails and cuticles to the point of bleeding. Child was distressed when she returned from visits, and it took her a long time to calm down.

[15] Due to her behavioral changes, DCS referred Child to Theresa Petruska, a licensed therapist. Petruska began working with Child in February 2025 and met with her weekly thereafter. Petruska believed that Child's behavioral changes, which occurred after visits with Mother, were attributable to Child's anxiety surrounding visits with Mother. Petruska testified that Child, who was then three years old, told her she did not like visiting Mother and that she would try to avoid visits by making herself ill.

[16] Petruska also testified that there was no bond between Mother and Child, but Child was “very well bonded” with foster parents. Id. at 102. Petruska opined that termination of Mother's parental rights “would give [Child] some relief” and afford her stability of not being bounced back and forth. Id. at 103. She believed that removing Child from the only home she has ever known for the three and a half years of her life would be “devastating” to her. Id.

[17] At the fact-finding hearing, FCM Sargent testified that Child would be devastated if she had to reunify with Mother because of her close bond with her foster family. FCM Sargent recommended termination, testifying that Mother had not remedied the reasons for Child's continued placement outside Mothers home as she had not maintained sobriety. FCM Sargent also opined that termination was in Child's best interests. DCS's plan for Child was adoption by her foster family, the only family she has known since she was released from the hospital after her birth.

[18] On July 15, 2025, the court entered its order terminating Mother's parental rights. The trial court concluded that Child had been removed for at least fifteen out of the last twenty-two months; there was a reasonable probability that Mother would not remedy the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and continued retention in foster care; that there was a reasonable probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to Child's well-being; that termination was in Child's best interests; and that there was a satisfactory plan for Child's care, which was adoption by her foster family. Mother now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

Standard of Review

[19] Our standard of review in termination cases is highly deferential. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). Thus, when reviewing a trial court's decision to terminate parental rights, we will not reweigh the evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses; we will consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the trial court's judgment. Matter of Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d 41, 45 (Ind. 2019). In deference to the trial court's unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside its judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous. In re S.K., 124 N.E.3d 1225, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.

[20] Our review for clear error is confined to two steps: whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. In re R.S., 56 N.E.3d 625, 628 (Ind. 2016). Reviewing whether the evidence “clearly and convincingly” supports the findings, or the findings “clearly and convincingly” support the judgment, is not a license to reweigh the evidence. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014) (observing that weighing the evidence under the clear and convincing evidence standard applicable to termination cases is the trial court's prerogative, not ours). Further, we must accept any unchallenged findings as true. See Matter of To.R., 177 N.E.3d 478, 485 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied.

Discussion & Decision

[21] Although parental rights are of constitutional dimension, the law provides for the termination of these rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. In re R.H., 892 N.E.2d 144, 149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In addition, a court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding the termination. In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1188 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied.

[22] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights may occur, DCS must allege and prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) the existence of one or more of the circumstances described in I.C. § 31-35-2-4(d) (Subsection (d)); (2) there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the child; and (3) termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests. I.C. § 31-35-2-4(c); I.C. § 31-34-12-2. Subsection (d) contains a lengthy list of circumstances supporting termination of parental rights, including, as pertinent here:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

While two circumstances listed in Section (d) were alleged in this case, we observe that either one of them would be sufficient on its own. In other words, if we affirm one of the circumstances found by the trial court, we need not address the others.⁵ See In re J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1045 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), trans. denied.

[23] Mother argues that the trial court was “premature” in terminating her parental rights because “DCS failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that [she] was not compliant in services.” Appellant's Brief at 12. Mother is essentially challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in Child's removal or reasons for placement outside the home will not be remedied.⁶

[24] We first note that Mother seemingly challenges only one of the court's findings, i.e., that she “testified positive for fentanyl as recent as May 2025 to which [Mother] disputes.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 13. She asserts that for ten months prior to the termination hearing she had clean screens and claims that the trial court's finding to the contrary is clearly erroneous because the court failed to consider her “direct evidence ․ that the initial [May 2025] test result was false.” Appellant's Brief at 15.

[25] The challenged finding is not clearly erroneous. As noted herein, on May 19, 2025, Mother screened positive for Fentanyl. At the termination hearing, Mother testified that she paid for a confirmation test and she submitted the results of that test, which indicated she was negative for Fentanyl on May 19. But, the scales of the original positive test and the confirmation test were different with the original test being more sensitive. Thus, the second test does not necessarily negate the first test. Therefore, there is evidence supporting the trial court's finding that Mother tested positive for fentanyl in May 2025.

[26] Mother's challenge aside, the trial court's unchallenged findings must be accepted as true. J.W., 259 N.E.3d at 1046. Mother did not challenge the trial court's findings regarding her history of substance abuse, her history with DCS, her non-compliance with or outright refusal to participate in services for much of the underling CHINS action, or her recent criminal charges related to illegal substances. She also does not challenge the court's findings relating to the ten-month period immediately preceding the termination hearing that she was non-compliant with DCS drug screen requirements, was not compliant with her suboxone treatments, and did not become consistent with her visits with Child until two months prior to the termination hearing. The trial court commended Mother for her recent efforts but ultimately found her “eleventh-hour attempt at compliance” was overshadowed by her long history of non-compliance. Appellant's Appendix Vol. II at 13. To the extent Mother argues that she should be given more time, she is mistaken because she has had ample time—three and a half years. Given Mother's history, the court found it “unlikely that [M]other would be able to obtain stability and sobriety for reunification to occur in the near future.” Id. The court's conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for Child's removal and continued detention outside Mother's home will not be remedied is not clearly erroneous.

[27] Mother also challenges the trial court's determination that termination of her parental rights is in Child's best interests. When making a best-interest determination, a trial court must look at the totality of the evidence and, in doing so, subordinate the parent's interests to those of the child, with the child's need for permanency being a central consideration. See Ma.H., 134 N.E.3d at 49. Further, “we have previously held that recommendations of the case manager and court-appointed advocate, in addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests[.]” In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1006 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[28] Here, FCM Sargent opined that Child would be devastated if she had to reunify with Mother. FCM Sargent recommended termination, believing that such was in Child's best interests as Mother had not remedied the reasons for Child's continued removal after three and a half years. Further, Child's therapist opined that termination of Mother's parental rights would be a relief for Child and give her stability. She was also of the opinion that reunifying Mother and Child would be detrimental to Child's well-being.

[29] Indeed, the record shows that after a long break from visitation between Mother and Child due to Mother's relapse, it was difficult for Child to restart visits. Child exhibited signs of anxiety and developed negative behaviors after the visits restarted, and Child was distressed when she returned from visits. In contrast, Child has stability and an opportunity for permanency with her foster parents, with whom she has a strong bond.

[30] In concluding that termination is in Child's best interests, the court emphasized Child's need for permanency. In light of the facts of this case, the trial court did not clearly err in so concluding.

[31] Judgment affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Child's father is unknown.

2.   Mother has prior involvement with DCS stemming from two previous CHINS actions involving Mother's older children, P.D. and J.D. Those cases were closed after maternal grandparents obtained guardianship over P.D. and J.D. Similar to the instant CHINS action, J.D. was born with methadone and opiates in her system.

3.   Mother also tested positive for fentanyl and other illicit substances on September 29 and October 6, 2022.

4.   This was the third termination petition filed in this case. DCS had dismissed the two previous petitions, filed in May 2023 and June 2024, to afford Mother additional time to comply with the case plan.

5.   Because Mother did not include the termination petition in her appellate materials, it is unclear as to the specific circumstances alleged by DCS as the basis for the termination. It is clear from the trial court's order that, at a minimum, DCS alleged the circumstances in Subsection (d)(3) and (d)(4), and Mother does not suggest otherwise.

6.   Mother makes no argument regarding the trial court's conclusion under Subsection (d)(4).

Altice, Judge.

May, J. and Foley, J., concur.