IN RE: F.P. (Child in Need of Services) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] M.P. (“Mother”) appeals the dispositional order entered by the trial court following its adjudication that her minor child, F.P. (“Child”), is a child in need of services (“CHINS”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On March 10, 2025, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging Child, born in January 2009, is a CHINS after Child was physically abused by Mother. Specifically, Child reported that Mother hit him multiple times with a golf club, causing extensive bruising. Mother did so because she was angry at Child because “he would not do chores.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 29. Child reported that Mother had also disciplined him “by hitting him with belts, cords, wooden spoons and spatulas.” Id. Child also reported chronic food scarcity in the home and that he did not feel safe living with Mother. On July 2, 2025, the court held a hearing and adjudicated Child a CHINS. During the hearing, DCS presented evidence of a chaotic home life, Mother's mental health challenges, and prior reports of Mother having angry outbursts and displaying irrational and extreme levels of anger and aggression toward Child.¹

[3] The court held a dispositional hearing on July 30, 2025. Mother appeared with counsel, and her counsel advised the court that she had received and reviewed the predispositional report with Mother. DCS presented the testimony of Family Case Manager Emma Osowski (“FCM Osowski”). FCM Osowski testified that, for Mother, DCS was recommending “a clinical interview, individual counseling, supervised visitation, and home-based case management.” Transcript Volume II at 153. When asked why DCS was recommending those services, FCM Osowski explained that DCS was recommending “a mental health evaluation to address [Mother's] mental health needs” as well as home-based case management “to address employment and to provide visitation to facilitate the parent-child relationship.” Id. FCM Osowski indicated that “the therapy services” had already started and that Mother had “been in that service for about two months.” Id. at 154. FCM Osowski also indicated that Mother was not “currently engaging in any formal parenting time” with Child because neither she nor Child wished “to participate in parenting time quite yet[.]” Id. at 155. FCM Osowski stated that DCS recommended Mother participate in family counseling with Child.

[4] After FCM Osowski's testimony, DCS stated that it had no other witnesses and, when asked if she had any evidence to present, Mother's counsel responded “No, your honor.” Id. at 160. When asked if Mother was in agreement “with the services” ordered, Mother's counsel responded, “yes.” Id. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court stated it was “ordering the services as recommended by DCS.” Id. at 161. The court further explained that it would order the uncontested services as well as “standard orders of the court ․ ordered in every case” such as “things like maintain housing, maintain employment, don't use drugs, don't use alcohol, those types of things.” Id. The court advised the parties to review the written order and then asked, “Any questions about what needs to be done?” Id. Mother's counsel responded, “No, your honor.” Id. In relevant part, the court ordered Mother to: not consume or possess any legend drug or controlled substance, not consume or possess alcohol, submit to random drug screens upon request, ensure Child has acceptable personal hygiene when in her care, complete a clinical interview and assessment, participate in family counseling, participate in home-based family centered casework services, participate in individual counseling, participate in visitation as agreed upon by the parties, and complete a mental health evaluation.

Discussion

[5] Mother challenges the trial court's dispositional order. We observe that, as a general matter, a trial court has “broad discretion in determining what programs and services in which a parent is required to participate” following a CHINS determination, but “the requirements must relate to some behavior or circumstances that was [sic] revealed by the evidence.” In re B.W., 266 N.E.3d 744, 751 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1258 (Ind. 2012)), trans. denied. “Thus, we review a trial court's order of services and conditions in a CHINS case for abuse of discretion.” Id. A court abuses its discretion when its action is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual inferences drawn therefrom. Id.

[6] Mother argues that the court abused its discretion in entering a dispositional order that included “standard orders” such as requiring her “to not consume or possess alcohol, any legend drug or controlled substance; submit to random drug screens; and ensure that [Child] has acceptable personal hygiene” because there was no “evidence presented that Mother abused drugs or alcohol, or failed to ensure that [Child] had acceptable personal hygiene.” Appellant's Brief at 10. DCS asserts that Mother's challenge is waived.

[7] It is well established that a party may not raise an issue for the first time on appeal, N.C. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 56 N.E.3d 65, 69 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied, and a party's failure to object to an alleged trial error results in waiver of that claim on appeal. In re Eq.W., 124 N.E.3d 1201, 1214 (Ind. 2019). Here, Mother not only failed to object when the court advised that the dispositional order would include the standard orders that she now complains are unsupported by the evidence, her counsel responded “no” when specifically asked if she had any questions about the inclusion of such orders. Transcript Volume II at 161. Indeed, our review of the record reveals that Mother and her counsel were asked multiple times during the dispositional hearing whether they had reviewed the dispositional order and whether they agreed with or had any questions or concerns regarding the order. On each occasion, there was neither inquiry nor objection.² Under the circumstances, we find that Mother has failed to preserve any error.³

[8] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court's dispositional order.

[9] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Mother does not challenge the CHINS adjudication or the evidence supporting it.

2.   We observe that had Mother given it the opportunity, the court could have explained its reasoning for why Mother's sobriety and Child having acceptable personal hygiene were appropriate and necessary components of the dispositional order to ensure stability in the home to which Child ultimately may be returned. Indeed, given the evidence of the chaotic home life, history of Mother's erratic behavior and violent aggression toward Child, and Mother's admitted mental health challenges, we would be hard pressed to say that the trial court's order that Mother simply refrain from alcohol and illegal drug use is an abuse of discretion. Moreover, ensuring access to proper food and personal hygiene if and when Child is in Mother's care is not unreasonable given the goal of stabilizing that chaotic home life and the ultimate goal of Child's safety upon reunification.

3.   We observe that, in B.W., we declined to find waiver despite the mother's failure to object to the dispositional requirements in the trial court because “[w]ithout any discussion of the specific requirements included in the proposed order submitted by DCS, the trial court made an in-court ruling adopting DCS's proposed [dispositional] order as submitted and gave Mother no opportunity to object.” B.W., 266 N.E.3d at 751. The B.W. Court also observed that the mother “made no ․ concession to the trial court and tendered her own proposed dispositional order which was not adopted by the trial court.” Id. We find the present case distinguishable. To the extent that B.W. goes on to suggest that this Court “may review” the appeal of dispositional requirements “without insisting that the claim first be presented to the trial judge,” id., we decline to do so under the circumstances presented for the reasons stated above. See In re V.H., 967 N.E.2d 1066, 1073 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (reversing CHINS adjudication but noting in dicta that “even if we had affirmed the juvenile court's CHINS adjudication, the participation order would have been vacated, insofar as there were procedural errors made and requirements ordered that were unrelated to the CHINS adjudication” due to the inclusion of “standard services”; however, waiver was not asserted and the record indicated that the mother preserved error by moving for a continuance of the dispositional hearing until the CHINS transcript was completed and available so that the factfinding evidence would be before the court prior to ordering services); In re A.C., 905 N.E.2d 456, 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (vacating portions of CHINS dispositional decree that were unrelated to any behavior or circumstance that was revealed by the evidence and discouraging the court's use of “boilerplate language” in such decrees; however, waiver was not asserted and the court found that Mother specifically disagreed on the record that she needed certain services).

Brown, Judge.

Altice, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.