COOLEY v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION ON REHEARING

[1] We recently handed down a memorandum decision that affirmed Richard Cooley's conviction of murder – for shooting his wife in the heart with his gun pressed against her chest – but vacated his conviction of pointing a firearm on double jeopardy grounds. Cooley v. State, No. 24A-CR-2234, 2025 WL 3281109 (Ind. Ct. App. Nov. 25, 2025). Cooley petitions for rehearing to argue we should not have held the invited error doctrine precluded his appellate challenge to the admission of State's Exhibit 2. Exhibit 2 included seven minutes and twenty seconds of the body camera video from Officer David Hudson, who encountered Cooley in the driveway of Cooley's house as police and paramedics were arriving in response to Cooley's 911 call reporting that he accidentally shot his wife. The State has not responded to Cooley's petition for rehearing, and we grant rehearing to address Cooley's argument.

[2] On appeal, Cooley argued the trial court should have sua sponte excluded the final ninety-five seconds of State's Exhibit 2 because those ninety-five seconds contained a custodial interrogation that occurred without Miranda warnings.¹ We held Cooley's challenge to the admission of State's Exhibit 2 was precluded by the invited error doctrine, in part, because Cooley had played State's Exhibit 2 for the jury during his closing argument and relied on it to argue Cooley's distress demonstrated the shooting was accidental. Id. at *5. On rehearing, Cooley asserts he did not play all of State's Exhibit 2 during closing argument – he stopped the video before the ninety-five seconds that he challenged on appeal – and, in support, he notes the State's closing argument at trial pointed out that defense counsel had not played the challenged portion during closing argument. (Pet. for Reh'g at 6) (citing Tr. Vol. VI at 103).² Even if we assume arguendo that we erred when we held Cooley invited any error that occurred, Cooley nevertheless cannot demonstrate fundamental error ³ in the admission of the challenged ninety-five seconds of State's Exhibit 2.

[3] First, we disagree with Cooley that what he experienced was a custodial interrogation that required Miranda warnings. Cooley was invited to sit in Officer Hudson's police car after telling Officer Hudson that he had swallowed an unknown quantity of pain pills to hurt himself. Cooley climbed into the police car four minutes into the video. Officer Hudson sat in the driver's seat twenty seconds later and immediately asked Cooley a few questions about the pills he took. Cooley repeatedly asked, “How is she?” (State's Ex. 2 at 4:30, 4:50, & 4:55.) Someone outside the vehicle asked Cooley for his wife's name and birth date and for his phone number as her contact. Then Cooley said, “Can somebody tell me?” (Id. at 5:36-5:37.) Officer Hudson explained: “They're in there working on it, like I said, I didn't go in there, so I'm not sure what happened but they're gonna ․” (Id. at 5:37-5:40.) Cooley continued to repeat, “Oh my God” and Officer Hudson asked simply, “Do you recall what happened?” (Id. at 05:47-05:49.) Miranda does not preclude officers from asking general questions to assess the situation at the scene to which they were dispatched. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966) (“Our decision is not intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in investigating crime․ General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding.”). The record does not suggest any other officer had talked to Cooley prior to Officer Hudson, and the question Officer Hudson asked was the type of open-ended question any officer might ask when arriving at the scene of an accident – What happened?

[4] Second, Cooley's statement to Officer Hudson was not inherently prejudicial, as it was an explanation of how his wife was accidentally shot. The prejudice alleged by Cooley arises from inconsistencies between that statement and statements Cooley gave at other times. The State's closing argument highlighted several examples of inconsistencies in Cooley's story and inconsistencies between Cooley's explanation and the forensic evidence. Because the State could point to multiple examples of inconsistencies, any possible prejudice produced by the admission of Cooley's statement to Officer Hudson is lessened. See, e.g., Carter v. State, 683 N.E.2d 631, 632 (Ind. 1997) (“An error in the admission of evidence is not prejudicial if the evidence is merely cumulative of other evidence in the record.”).

[5] Finally, the evidence that Cooley “knowingly or intentionally kill[ed]” his wife was overwhelming. See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1 (defining murder as knowing or intentional killing of a person). Cooley's wife had decided to leave their marriage, and she was to move out of the marital residence with their daughter a few days later. Cooley came home on the morning of the shooting after working only a few hours because he was upset. Cooley was sufficiently distressed about his life to have stayed home from work the entire prior week and to have attempted suicide a week earlier, and he was sufficiently frustrated with his wife to threaten her with a gun.

[6] Cooley's Ring doorbell camera recorded Cooley arriving home at 10:28 a.m. At 10:30 a.m., his wife received a phone call about her new living arrangements, and that call lasted two minutes. Cooley reported that, while his wife was on the telephone, he retrieved his handgun from the upstairs closet, and he returned to the living room. Cooley, by his own admission, pointed the gun at her and demanded that she tell him the truth about what was happening. Cooley told Detective Kurt Biggs that the couple argued for only thirty seconds to one minute after he came down with the gun and before the gun went off. (State's Ex. 438 at 1:06:41 – 1:07:30.) At 10:42:05 a.m., the Ring camera turned on because Cooley opened the front door and said, “oh my God.” (State's Ex. 442.) At 10:42:50 a.m., Cooley called 911. (State's Ex. 1.) Unless it took Cooley ten minutes to retrieve his gun and return to the living room, nearly nine minutes between 10:32 a.m. and 10:42 a.m. are unaccounted for, which would permit a jury to infer that Cooley delayed calling 911, especially when forty-five seconds passed between the Ring camera activation and the 911 call.

[7] Forensic testing determined Cooley's gun would not fire with the safety engaged. Nor would it fire unless the trigger was pulled. Cooley was experienced with weapons, and a fellow gun-enthusiast testified Cooley had never handed him a gun without confirming that the gun was unloaded because people, including Cooley and himself, who keep guns for home defense routinely keep a bullet in the chamber. These facts lead to inferences that Cooley pointed the gun at his wife with the safety off and that he pulled the trigger without removing the bullet that he knew was in the chamber.

[8] Forensic testing also determined the muzzle of the gun was pressed against his wife's chest and the bullet went through her aorta, which would have caused her to die from blood loss within thirty seconds. His wife's had blood on her right hand and purse, which suggests she had tried to stop her own bleeding. Cooley, in contrast, had no blood on him, which indicates he did not attempt to render aid to his wife after he shot her. Failing to render aid and delaying a call to 911 are not the behaviors of a person who accidentally shot a loved one. Even if killing his wife was not what Cooley intended, it is hard to imagine any jury could determine from all these facts that Cooley's killing of his wife was accidental, rather than knowing.

[9] For all these reasons, Cooley cannot demonstrate fundamental error arose from the trial court's failure to sua sponte exclude the final ninety-five seconds of State's Exhibit 2. Having granted rehearing, we again affirm Cooley's conviction of murder.

[10] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966), a person in police custody “must be warned of the right to remain silent, or to discontinue answering questions at any time, that his answers may be used against him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” State v. Keller, 845 N.E.2d 154, 162 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006).

2.   At that transcript page, the State argued: “[Y]ou have to consider what the defendant said in State's Exhibit No. 2. Oh, yeah, defense played part of that in the closing but skipped over the part that [sic] where Richard Cooley says ‘We're arguing and there was a tussle over the gun and she reached for it.’ ” (Tr. Vol. VI at 103.)

3.   Fundamental errors are those that deny a defendant an opportunity for due process. Richey v. State, 210 N.E.3d 329, 342 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), reh'g denied. “The fundamental error exception is extremely narrow and applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles [and] the harm or potential for harm is substantial[.]” Id. (quoting Mendenhall v. State, 963 N.E.2d 553, 567 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied). “To constitute fundamental error, a defendant must show greater prejudice than ordinary reversible error.” Id. at 343.

May, Judge.

Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur