IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: K.G. and Ru.G. (Minor Children) (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] After a petition to terminate Ra.G.’s (“Mother”) parental rights to her children was filed, Mother failed to appear in person for the factfinding hearing as ordered. Upon Mother's day-of-hearing request, the trial court permitted Mother to attend remotely. Although the factfinding hearing was previously continued, Mother then requested an additional continuance to enable her to have even more time to communicate with her counsel. The other parties objected, and the trial court denied the motion. During the ensuing hearing, Mother's remote connection was interrupted several times; consequently, Mother made two additional motions for a continuance, which were also denied. Following the hearing, the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to her children. Mother now appeals ¹ and raises one issue for our review: Whether the trial court erred by denying her motions to continue.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] K.G. was born on October 13, 2015, and Ru.G. was born on September 17, 2020 (K.G. and Ru.G. are collectively referred to as “Children”). Children were removed from Mother's care in September 2023 based in part on Mother's failure to provide stable and appropriate housing for Children. The Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) filed a petition alleging Children were children in need of services (“CHINS”). The trial court adjudicated Children as CHINS and ordered that Children remain outside of Mother's care. The trial court also ordered Mother to participate in services.

[4] Mother failed to meaningfully engage in services, so DCS filed a petition to terminate her parental rights. The trial court initially set the factfinding hearing on this petition for May 15, 2025. Mother was ordered to appear in person. Prior to that hearing, DCS requested a continuance because its counsel was ill. The trial court continued the factfinding hearing to June 25.

[5] Mother declined DCS's offer of transportation to the June 25 in-person hearing and did not appear. At the beginning of that hearing, Mother's counsel requested that Mother be permitted to appear remotely because Mother resides “out of county.” Tr. Vol. II at 5. The trial court granted that request, and a WebEx link was sent to Mother. After Mother logged in and consulted with her counsel, Mother's counsel made an oral motion to continue the factfinding hearing because she and Mother had “had limited contact” and counsel wanted to have “continued contact.” Id. at 14. DCS objected, noting that Mother's court appearances in the CHINS proceeding, as well as her participation in visits and services, were “inconsistent to the point of impact[ing the] mental health of the children.” Id. DCS also pointed out that there was a prior continuance of the termination factfinding hearing, so Mother already received additional time to consult with her counsel. The child advocate also objected. The trial court denied the motion to continue because “Mother had sufficient notice of the proceedings and time to consult with counsel.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 103.

[6] Although Mother successfully logged into WebEx for the hearing, she experienced technical difficulties that made it difficult for the trial court to understand her, and she disconnected multiple times throughout the hearing. When the difficulties first became apparent, the trial court noted that Mother was “supposed to be [ ] in person,” and that the trial court was “allowing [her] to participate remotely, but if [Mother's] ability to participate is impeded by [her] remote attendance,” it was Mother's fault alone. Tr. Vol. II at 18. Mother's counsel was present throughout the factfinding hearing and cross-examined DCS's witnesses.

[7] At the close of DCS's case, Mother was logged out of the hearing; Mother's counsel did not present any evidence, and the parties began closing arguments. Mother rejoined during DCS's closing, so upon motion, the trial court permitted Mother to reopen the case to testify. Mother's technical difficulties persisted, however, and the trial court could not understand her. This led to Mother's second oral motion to continue, which the trial court denied. The trial court again pointed out that Mother was ordered to appear in person, so the “difficulty [she was] experiencing” was her own fault. Tr. Vol. II at 61. Further, the trial court noted, “I haven't heard any allegations that there is a justifiable reason for [Mother] not to be here today in person.” Id. The trial court then offered to let Mother testify over the phone rather than through WebEx. Mother failed to answer the trial court's phone calls or respond to DCS's text messages, so Mother's counsel made a third motion to continue, which the trial court denied. The parties finished closing arguments in Mother's absence, and the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights to Children. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying Mother's Motions to Continue

[8] Mother challenges the trial court's denial of her three motions to continue.² In doing so, she raises two distinct issues: (a) Whether the trial court erred in determining that Mother failed to establish good cause for the continuance, and (b) Whether the trial court's denial of Mother's motions violated her due process rights. We address each in turn.

a. Good Cause

[9] Mother first argues that the trial court's denial of her motions to continue was an abuse of discretion because she demonstrated good cause for a continuance. We review a trial court's decision on a motion to continue for an abuse of discretion. In re K.W., 12 N.E.3d 241, 243–44 (Ind. 2014) (citing Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 841 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied). An abuse of discretion occurs if the trial court's decision “was against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before” it, Willow Haven on 106th St., LLC v. Nagireddy, 252 N.E.3d 418, 422 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Wisner v. Laney, 984 N.E.2d 1201, 1205 (Ind. 2012)), or if it misinterpreted the law, id. (citing Members of Med. Licensing Bd. of Ind. v. Planned Parenthood Great Nw., Haw., Alaska, Ind., Ky., Inc., 211 N.E.3d 957, 964 (Ind.), reh'g denied, 214 N.E.3d 348 (Ind. 2023)).

[10] Here, the trial court denied Mother's first motion to continue because Mother was given sufficient notice of the hearing and had already had plenty of time to consult with counsel. The trial court denied the second motion because Mother's participation issues were her own fault and because Mother had failed to provide any justification for failing to appear in person. The trial court denied Mother's third motion to continue without specifically providing a reason; however, in its written order, the trial court stated, “Any limitations Mother encountered at trial were caused by her own failure to appear in person as ordered.” Appellant's App. Vol. II at 104.

[11] Prior to January 1, 2025, Trial Rule 53.5 governed continuances. Order Amending Rules of Trial Proc. & Admin. Rules, No. 24S-MI-1 (Ind. Oct. 30, 2024) [hereinafter Order]. That rule provided in relevant part that a continuance “shall be allowed upon a showing of good cause established by affidavit or other evidence.” Ind. Trial Rule 53.5 (effective Jan. 1, 1983, to Dec. 31, 2024). As of January 1, 2025, Trial Rule 7 governs continuances. Order, No. 24S-MI-1 (Ind. Oct. 30, 2024). Trial Rule 7 does not have a good cause standard. See T.R. 7. “Instead of establishing a standard by which a request to continue ‘shall’ be granted, the new rule focuses on the mechanics of requesting a continuance.” In re Z.R., ––– N.E.3d ––––, 2025 WL 3248405 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (citing T.R. 7), cert. pending. For instance, Trial Rule 7 requires, among other things, that a party's motion for a continuance include “a good faith estimate of the time needed for the rescheduled hearing or trial.” T.R.7(D)(4)(b).

[12] In her reply brief, Mother makes no argument that she complied with Trial Rule 7’s requirements, and it is clear from the record that none of Mother's motions did so comply. Instead, Mother asks us to read a “good cause” standard into Trial Rule 7 because failing to do so “would mark a significant change in the practice of CHINS and termination proceedings” and “defy the intent of the legislature.” Appellant's Reply Br. at 6 (citing Ind. Code §§ 31-34-11-1, 31-35-2-6)³ . We decline Mother's invitation to consider whether the good cause standard of Trial Rule 53.5 should be read into Trial Rule 7 because even if the standard did survive the repeal of Trial Rule 53.5, Mother failed to establish good cause for a continuance. While Mother argues that “technology issues deprived her of her ability to testify” and that the “technological failures were beyond [her] control,” Appellant's Br. at 10, she acknowledges that DCS offered to transport her to the factfinding hearing and that she failed to explain the reason for her failure to attend in person. Indeed, we found no evidence presented during the hearing or immediately thereafter—explaining why Mother failed to appear in person for the factfinding hearing and failed to answer her phone when the trial court called her for her testimony. Mother was notified of the date, time, and location of the hearing, ordered to appear in-person, and offered transportation by DCS—which she declined. Mother's technological issues were therefore not “beyond [her] control.” Id. Based on the record in this case, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by denying Mother's motions.

b. Due Process

[13] Mother also argues that the trial court's denial of her continuance requests violated her due process rights. Mother's fundamental (but not absolute) right to raise Children is protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See In re I.P., 5 N.E.3d 750, 751–52 (Ind. 2014) (citing Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). “[W]hen the State seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship, it must do so in a manner that meets due process requirements.” Id. (citing In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 917 (Ind. 2011)). Appellate courts balance three factors to determine the process due in a termination case: “(1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.” Id. (citing C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 917).

[14] “Both a parent's interest in the care, custody, and control of a child, and the State's parens patriae interest in protecting a child's welfare are substantial.” I.P., 5 N.E.3d at 752 (emphasis in original) (citing C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 917). At issue here is whether the trial court's denial of Mother's motions—that is, its decision to hold the factfinding hearing substantially in Mother's absence—created a risk of error such that a due process violation occurred.

[15] A parent does not have an “absolute constitutional right ․ to be present at a termination hearing,” K.W., 12 N.E.3d at 248 (citing C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 921), but the parent “does have the right to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,” id. at 249 (quoting Tillotson v. Clay Cnty. Dep't of Fam. & Child., 777 N.E.2d 741, 745 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied). In the termination context, a party's due process rights typically are not violated when a court proceeds with the factfinding hearing in the party's absence so long as the party was represented by counsel at that hearing and counsel was able to make argument and cross-examine witnesses. In re C.C., 170 N.E.3d 669, 677 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing In re J.T., 740 N.E.2d 1261, 1264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), trans. denied, abrogated in part on other grounds by Baker v. Marion Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 810 N.E.2d 1035, 1041 (Ind. 2004)). Counsel's representation of the absent parent's interests at the factfinding hearing “vastly reduce[s] the risk of error,” making the risk of error “minimal.” Id.

[16] Here, Mother was represented by counsel at the factfinding hearing, and Mother does not claim that her counsel was unable to make argument or to cross-examine witnesses. Further, Mother does not challenge any of the findings or conclusions supporting the termination of her parental rights. Instead, Mother merely speculates that her “testimony could have had a profound impact on the proceedings.” Appellant's Br. at 13 (emphasis added). The risk of error in proceeding with the factfinding hearing in Mother's absence was therefore minimal. In balancing Mother's fundamental interest, the State's substantial interest, and the minimal risk of error from the trial court's decision to proceed in Mother's absence where Mother was represented by counsel, we conclude that the trial court did not violate Mother's due process rights by denying Mother's motions.

Conclusion

[17] In sum, the trial court neither abused its discretion nor violated Mother's due process rights by denying Mother's motions to continue. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[18] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Children's biological father, D.H., does not participate in this appeal.

2.   On appeal, Mother does not challenge the findings or conclusions supporting the termination of her parental rights. Mother challenges only the trial court's denial of the continuance requests.

3.   Mother's cited statutory sections do not pertain to continuances, so they are not applicable.

Felix, Judge.

Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.