SHEWMAKER v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Ronald Shewmaker appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The relevant facts as discussed in Shewmaker's direct appeal follow:

Shewmaker first met Lisa McQuirt at a strip or dance club, and they were later engaged to be married. Shewmaker was unaware that McQuirt was married and that she was also in a relationship with Norman Wolfe. Shewmaker gave McQuirt and her children money and gifts, including money toward a down payment for a car and a rental house so she could move out of the motel where she was living.

In the early morning of February 18, 2013, Shewmaker visited a strip club where a friend of McQuirt told him that she had known McQuirt for a long time, that McQuirt was married, and that she had also scammed someone else. Shewmaker “was agitated” and “p––––– off and went to look for McQuirt. He first went to McQuirt's mother's house, found that McQuirt's car was not there, and then drove around Clarksville until he remembered another place he had previously dropped off McQuirt which he believed was the house of another dancer. At approximately 4:00 a.m., Shewmaker found McQuirt's vehicle parked near a duplex apartment unit. [ ]

Wolfe and McQuirt, along with Jeremy Walker, Tesla Matthews, Anthony McGhee, McQuirt's daughter, and several other adults and children were inside Wolfe's apartment. Shewmaker was unsure which apartment unit McQuirt was in and knocked on the door of the unit immediately next door to Wolfe's unit. Walker and McGhee heard the knocking and opened the door. Shewmaker asked if McQuirt was there and stated that her car was out front. McGhee said that he did not know who McQuirt was or whose car was out front, shut the door, and went to tell Wolfe. Wolfe went to the door and opened it, and Shewmaker pointed at McQuirt's vehicle and asked if that was McQuirt's car and where McQuirt was located, and Wolfe told Shewmaker that he did not know McQuirt's car, that the vehicle had been parked there for several weeks, and closed or slammed the door on Shewmaker. Shewmaker took a knife out of his pocket and stabbed the four tires of McQuirt's vehicle to “[d]isable it so she couldn't drive it.” Wolfe told McQuirt “to go outside and talk to him,” and McQuirt went outside.

McQuirt approached Shewmaker, who was sitting in his truck, and Shewmaker fired four shots, one of which struck McQuirt in the chin and another struck her in the back. McQuirt was bleeding from the gunshot wounds, was able to walk or stumble inside the door of the apartment, and collapsed on the floor just inside the door. Shewmaker drove away, and Walker called the police. Police and emergency personnel arrived at the scene. McQuirt died as a result of the gunshot wounds. After leaving the location of the shooting, Shewmaker called his friend Ron House and stated “that he had made a mistake” and that “there was nothing he could do about” it, but that he was going to go home and see his mom and dad. House was concerned Shewmaker was going to commit suicide and called the police.

Shewmaker surrendered to Harrison County Officer Gary Gilley at his home. Officer Gilley permitted Shewmaker to sit down on a picnic table to smoke a cigarette before transporting him to the jail. Shewmaker asked Officer Gilley “is she dead,” and Officer Gilley answered that he did not know. Shewmaker was transported to the Harrison County Sheriff's Department, turned over to the detectives from Clarksville, and transported to Clark County jail. At the police station, Shewmaker was given his Miranda rights, and he immediately invoked his right to remain silent. Police recovered a bullet on the street, a bullet on the sidewalk, a bullet which had fragmented by a child's bedroom, part of which was on the sill and part of which was between the two windows in the window channel, and a bullet in front of a curve where it had impacted a vehicle.

On February 22, 2013, the State charged Shewmaker with murder. Prior to trial, Shewmaker filed a motion in limine requesting the court to issue an order instructing the prosecutor and witnesses offering testimony on behalf of the State to refrain from making any statements, comments, or questions during trial pertaining to, among other things, the advisement of Shewmaker of his Miranda rights and Shewmaker's silence or refusal to answer questions following the Miranda advisements, and the court granted the motion.

Shewmaker v. State, No. 10A05-1401-CR-2, 2014 WL 4809804, at *1-2 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2014) (record citations and footnotes omitted), trans. denied.

[3] A jury trial began on November 5, 2013. After the State's case-in-chief, defense counsel moved for a directed verdict arguing, “[t]aking in account all the evidence to this case, we don't believe the State's proved beyond a reasonable doubt presumption in their favor.” Trial Transcript Volume III at 644. The court denied the motion. Thereafter, Shewmaker testified that he shot McQuirt after she pointed a gun at him. During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Shewmaker about his statements to House and Officer Gilley and then stated in part, “[y]ou didn't say nothing about shooting her in self-defense and on November 4th of 2013 nine months later, you come in here and start talking about self-defense.” Id. at 688. Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial on grounds that the prosecutor improperly commented on Shewmaker's right to remain silent. After hearing arguments, the court denied the motion and instructed the jury to disregard the statement.

[4] At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Shewmaker guilty as charged. The court imposed a sixty-five-year sentence. On direct appeal, Shewmaker asserted that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for mistrial and during sentencing, and he also asserted that his sentence was inappropriate. This Court affirmed Shewmaker's conviction and sentence in a memorandum decision. Shewmaker, No. 10A05-1401-CR-2, 2014 WL 4809804 at *13. The Indiana Supreme Court unanimously denied Shewmaker's petition to transfer on December 4, 2014.

[5] On September 19, 2016, Shewmaker filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief. On May 13, 2019, the trial court judge, Judge Anderson Adams, recused himself from the case. Judge Susan Orth was appointed as special judge. On October 15, 2019 and July 1, 2020, the post-conviction court held a bifurcated hearing on Shewmaker's petition. At the October 15, 2019 hearing, the trial transcript was admitted into evidence. At the July 1, 2020 hearing, one of Shewmaker's trial counsel, Bart Betteau, testified. On direct examination, Betteau indicated that he would have certainly been watching for whether the State presented sufficient evidence to identify Shewmaker as the shooter. He further stated that he generally makes a motion for a directed verdict but he “wouldn't be able to give you the subject matter of the motion at this time.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 29. When asked if there would be any strategic reason not to include in the motion for directed verdict that the State had not made an identification, Betteau answered “absolutely not.” Id. When asked if he had realized that “an identification hadn't been made,” whether he would have called Mr. Shewmaker as a witness, Betteau responded, “No.” Id. On cross-examination, Betteau indicated that self-defense was the “main defense” in the case. Id.

[6] On October 1, 2020, Judge Orth denied Shewmaker's petition. Shewmaker appealed that order under Court of Appeals Case No. 20A-PC-1927. On February 9, 2021, this Court issued an order dismissing the appeal without prejudice and remanded the case to the post-conviction court due to the lack of specific findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(6). See Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 57 (order stating that “[t]his Court has previously held that failure to include the required findings of fact and conclusions of law is grounds for remand. Pierce v. State, 135 N.E.3d 993, 1002 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied.”).

[7] On February 24, 2021, Judge Orth recused herself due to a “conflict of interest,” id. at 59, and Judge J. Terrence Cody was appointed as special judge on March 12, 2021. On September 5, 2023, Judge Cody held a hearing and heard argument of counsel. On February 8, 2025, Judge Cody issued extensive findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order denying Shewmaker's petition for post-conviction relief.

Discussion

[8] The petitioner in a post-conviction proceeding bears the burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004); Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5). When appealing from the denial of post-conviction relief, the petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative judgment. Fisher, 810 N.E.2d at 679. We will not reverse the judgment unless the evidence as a whole unerringly and unmistakably leads to a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. Id. “A post-conviction court's findings and judgment will be reversed only upon a showing of clear error – that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. The post-conviction court is the sole judge of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id.

[9] Generally, to prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a petitioner “must show (1) that his counsel's performance fell short of prevailing professional norms, and (2) that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his defense.” Gibson v. State, 133 N.E.3d 673, 682 (Ind. 2019) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984)), reh'g denied, cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 553 (2020). A showing of deficient performance under the first of these two prongs requires proof that legal representation lacked an objective standard of reasonableness, effectively depriving the defendant of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. To demonstrate prejudice, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the proceedings below would have resulted in a different outcome. Id. It is well established that isolated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment do not necessarily render representation ineffective. Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 746 (Ind. 2002).

[10] Shewmaker contends that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance “for failing to request a directed verdict on the issue of the shooter's identity and instead calling Shewmaker [as a witness] who then filled this deficit in the evidence.” Appellant's Brief at 16. As already noted, Shewmaker's counsel did move for a directed verdict; Shewmaker essentially complains that counsel made the wrong argument in support of such motion.

[11] A motion for a directed verdict, also known as a motion for judgment on the evidence, is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Ind. Trial Rule 50. A trial court may grant this motion “only ‘where there is a total absence of evidence upon some essential issue, or where there is no conflict in the evidence and it is susceptible of but one inference, and that inference is in favor of the accused.’ ” State v. Taylor, 863 N.E.2d 917, 919 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting State v. Patsel, 240 Ind. 240, 245, 163 N.E.2d 602, 604 (1960) (noting that “[w]here a determination of the issue involves the weight of the evidence or the credibility of witnesses, it is an invasion of the province of the jury for the court to direct a verdict”)).

[12] Here, although trial counsel did not use the term “identity,” counsel did move for a directed verdict arguing that the State had failed to establish a prima facie case for murder against Shewmaker. We disagree with Shewmaker that such argument was below an objective standard of reasonableness under the circumstances presented or in light of the primary theory of the defense, which was self-defense. To be sure, during opening statement, defense counsel argued, “Ronald Shewmaker did not, did not intentionally murder Lisa McQuirt” but that he shot McQuirt in self-defense after McQuirt confronted him with a firearm. Trial Transcript Volume I at 45. Accordingly, Shewmaker's identity as the shooter was not an issue at trial.

[13] Moreover, even had counsel specifically drawn the court's attention to the sufficiency of the State's evidence on Shewmaker's identity as the shooter, we cannot say that such challenge had any likelihood of success. It is well established that identity, like other facts, may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Sansom v. State, 562 N.E.2d 58, 59 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). “In a circumstantial case, no single piece of evidence in isolation—no ‘smoking gun’—is offered to persuade the jury to convict.” Young v. State, 198 N.E.3d 1172, 1176-1177 (Ind. 2022). Rather, “a jury may be convinced, beyond a reasonable doubt, by looking at ‘a web of facts in which no single strand may be dispositive.’ ” Id. (quoting Kriner v. State, 699 N.E.2d 659, 664 (Ind. 1998)). “Indeed, the ‘evidence in the aggregate may point to guilt where individual elements of the State's case might not.’ ” Id.

[14] Here, the State presented ample circumstantial evidence that Shewmaker was the shooter. The State presented evidence that the handgun used to shoot McQuirt was in Shewmaker's possession when he turned himself in to police, that Shewmaker asked Officer Gilley if McQuirt was dead, indicating his knowledge as to what had occurred, and the State presented multiple witnesses who identified Shewmaker as the individual at the scene of the murder who was looking for McQuirt. In short, we cannot say that there was a total absence of evidence on the identity issue, or that the evidence was susceptible of but one inference, and that inference was in favor of Shewmaker. Shewmaker has not demonstrated that his trial counsel was ineffective.¹

[15] As for Shewmaker's suggestion that a new post-conviction evidentiary hearing is warranted because the special judge who issued the findings of fact and conclusions was not the same judge who presided over the evidentiary hearing in contravention of “case law and Indiana Trial Rule 63(A),” Appellant's Reply Brief at 10, we find the argument waived. “A party's failure to object to, and thus preserve, an alleged trial error results in waiver of that claim on appeal.” Batchelor v. State, 119 N.E.3d 550, 556 (Ind. 2019) (citing Durden v. State, 99 N.E.3d 645, 651 (Ind. 2018)). After Judge Orth recused from further proceedings on remand from Shewmaker's appeal from her order denying his petition for post-conviction relief, the parties appeared for a hearing before successor judge, Judge Cody, during which both parties argued the merits of their respective positions regarding the petition for post-conviction relief. Shewmaker's post-conviction counsel made no objection, prior to or during the hearing, to Judge Cody presiding over the case or his consideration of transcribed testimony and evidence from the prior evidentiary hearing in consideration and preparation of findings and conclusions on Shewmaker's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The right to have a successor judge rehear evidence to make an evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence may be waived. Farner v. Farner, 480 N.E.2d 251, 257-258 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985). Shewmaker has waived this argument.

[16] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the post-conviction court's order.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   To the extent Shewmaker challenges additional findings of the post-conviction court, those findings are not relevant to the court's ultimate conclusion that trial counsel was not ineffective. Rather, those findings addressed Shewmaker's freestanding claim on the directed verdict issue and not his ineffective assistance claim which is the only claim he raises in this appeal.

Brown, Judge.

Felix, J., and Scheele, J., concur.