LAMPROPOULOS v. TODD HYDRAULIC REPAIR (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Randy Lampropoulos (“Lampropoulos”) appeals pro se, following a bench trial, the trial court's order entering judgment, in part, in favor of Todd's Hydraulic Repair (“the Repair Shop”) and against Lampropoulos and, in part, against the Repair Shop and in favor of Lampropoulos. Specifically, the trial court entered judgment for $850 in towing fees and $1,500 in storage fees in favor of the Repair Shop and against Lampropoulos and entered judgment against the Repair Shop and in favor of Lampropoulos on the Repair Shop's request for labor, parts, and services costs. Lampropoulos challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred by entering judgment against him for the towing fees and storage fees. Concluding that Lampropoulos has waived his argument on appeal, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

[2] We affirm.

Issue

Whether the trial court erred by entering judgment against Lampropoulos for towing fees and storage fees.

Facts 1

[3] In 2017, Lampropoulos took his 1964 British Alvis Saracen armored troop transport vehicle (“the vehicle”) to the Repair Shop for some repairs, and Lampropoulos paid the Repair Shop for the repairs. Apparently, issues arose, and the vehicle remained at the Repair Shop between 2017 and 2019. Ultimately in 2019, Lampropoulos took the vehicle from the Repair Shop, and, that same day, the vehicle “overheated and would not start.” (App. Vol. 2 at 27). Lampropoulos contacted the Repair Shop, and an employee from the Repair Shop went to where the vehicle was located. “The parties agreed to tow the vehicle back to [the Repair Shop,]” and the Repair Shop paid the “lowboy tow” fee of $850. (App. Vol. 2 at 28).

[4] In June 2023, the Repair Shop filed a complaint against Lampropoulos. The Repair Shop alleged that it had made various repairs to the vehicle and had stored the vehicle since 2019. The Repair Shop sought to recover costs for: (1) repairs, labor, and materials totaling over $22,000; (2) the $850 towing fee from 2019; and (3) storage costs of $68,640 for storing the vehicle after 2019. Thereafter, Lampropoulos, by counsel, filed an answer and a counterclaim against the Repair Shop. Specifically, Lampropoulos sought possession of the vehicle, damages for the detention of the vehicle, and repair of the vehicle.

[5] The trial court held a bench trial in October and December 2024. The Repair Shop was represented by counsel, and Lampropoulos appeared pro se.

[6] In January 2025, the trial court ordered the vehicle to be immediately released to Lampropoulos. Thereafter, in February 2025, the trial court issued its final order in which it found that the Repair Shop had “failed to meet its burden of proof as to repairs, labor, and other materials” and had “failed to prove an agreement between the parties on an hourly rate for labor, the costs of parts and other materials.” (App. Vol. 2 at 28-29, 30). Therefore, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Lampropoulos and against the Repair Shop on the Repair Shop's request for over $22,000 in repairs, labor, and other materials. Additionally, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the Repair Shop and against Lampropoulos and ordered Lampropoulos to pay $850 in towing fees and $1,500 in storage fees. In regard to the $850 in towing fees, the trial court specifically found as follows:

7. In August 2019, [the Repair Shop] contacted [Lampropoulos] and advised the vehicle was ready to be picked up. Within 30 minutes of leaving [the Repair Shop], the vehicle overheated and would not start. [Lampropoulos] contacted [the Repair Shop] who arrived at the site where the vehicle was located. The parties agreed to tow the vehicle back to [the Repair Shop]. The cost of the towing was $850.

* * * * *

14. There is no dispute that [the Repair Shop] hired a tow truck in 2019 to tow the vehicle back to [the Repair Shop's] premises after it broke down. [The Repair Shop's] Exhibit G and [Lampropoulos’] Exhibit #1 both indicate that the “lowboy tow” ․ was $850. The evidence further reveals that [the Repair Shop] paid the cost of the tow truck in 2019. The Court finds [Lampropoulos] permitted his vehicle to be towed to [the Repair Shop's] premises in 2019. The Court[ ] orders [Lampropoulos] to pay the amount of $850.00 to [the Repair Shop] which represents the amount of the tow truck in 2019.

(App. Vol. 2 at 27-28). In regard to the Repair Shop's storage fees, the trial court found that Lampropoulos “acquiesced and permitted at least some of the storage of his vehicle on [the Repair Shop's] premises[,]” rejected the Repair Shop's request for $68,640 in storage fees, and explained that, under Indiana Code § 32-33-10-5(b), the “maximum storage fees permitted” was $1,500. (App. Vol. 2 at 29).

[7] Lampropoulos now appeals.

Decision

[8] At the outset, we note that Lampropoulos has chosen to proceed pro se. “[A] pro se litigant is held to the same standards as a trained attorney and is afforded no inherent leniency simply by virtue of being self-represented.” Zavodnik v. Harper, 17 N.E.3d 259, 266 (Ind. 2014). Pro se litigants are bound to follow the established rules of procedure and must be prepared to accept the consequences of their failure to do so. Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), reh'g denied. We will not become a party's advocate, nor will we address arguments that are inappropriate, improperly expressed, or too poorly developed to be understood. Id. at 984.

[9] Additionally, we note that the Repair Shop did not file an appellee's brief. When an appellee fails to submit an appellate brief, “we will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error.” Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind. 2014) (cleaned up).

[10] Lampropoulos challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and argues that the trial court erred by entering judgment against him for the towing fees and storage fees. However, Lampropoulos has not provided our Court with a transcript of the hearing of the bench trial, which is in violation of Indiana Appellate Rule 9(F)(5).

[11] Indiana Appellate Rule 9(F)(5) provides that if “the appellant intends to urge on appeal that a finding of fact or conclusion thereon is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence, the Notice of Appeal shall request a Transcript of all the evidence.” Additionally, this Rule requires an appellant's notice of appeal to designate “all portions of the Transcript necessary to present fairly and decide the issues on appeal.” Ind. Appellate R. 9(F)(5).

[12] Our Indiana Supreme Court has explained that an “[a]ppellant bears the burden of presenting a record that is complete with respect to the issues raised on appeal” and that “[t]his burden is sustained by submitting a transcript of the trial proceedings or, where no transcript is available, an affidavit setting forward the content of the proceedings” under Indiana Appellate Rule 31(A). Ford v. State, 704 N.E.2d 457, 461 (Ind. 1998) (citing former version of Appellate Rule 31). See also Maw v. Pringle, 263 N.E.3d 790, 794 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (discussing an alternative means of producing a record under Appellate Rule 31(A)). Moreover, our supreme court has held that “[a]lthough not fatal to the appeal, failure to include a transcript works a waiver of any specifications of error which depend upon the evidence.” In re Walker, 665 N.E.2d 586, 588 (Ind. 1996) (cleaned up).

[13] Here, Lampropoulos challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's judgment regarding the towing and storage fees. However, Lampropoulos did not present a record on appeal that is complete with respect to the evidence-based arguments raised on appeal. He did not arrange for the transmission of the transcript of the bench trial; nor did he attempt to produce a statement of the evidence pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 31(A). Because Lampropoulos’ arguments rely on a review of the evidence presented during the bench trial and because he has not provided us with the means to review his arguments, he has waived appellate review of his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. See Maw, 263 N.E.3d at 794 (explaining that the appellant had waived review of his arguments, which relied upon a review of the evidence, where he had failed to provide our Court with a transcription of the testimony or any record of the evidence presented); Lifeline Youth & Family Serv., Inc. v. Installed Bldg. Products, Inc., 996 N.E.2d 808, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (concluding that a party had waived an argument relying on evidence presented at trial where the party had not provided a transcript of the trial on appeal). Concluding that Lampropoulos has waived his evidence-based arguments on appeal, we affirm the trial court's judgment. See Maw, 263 N.E.3d at 794 (affirming the trial court's judgment where the appellant had waived appellate review of his evidence-based arguments).

[14] Affirmed.

Pyle, Judge.

Vaidik, J., and Mathias, J., concur.