MCCOLLOM v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] James McCollom appeals his conviction for Level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor, arguing that the State did not present sufficient evidence to establish proper venue. He separately contends that the ten-year sentence he received is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In March 2024, M.S. and E.W. were best friends and lived near each other in Cannelton. At the time, the girls were fourteen and thirteen years old respectively.

[3] At some point, E.W. began communicating with McCollom via Snapchat. She asked McCollom, who was thirty-seven years old at the time, to obtain vapes for the girls. McCollom picked up M.S. near E.W.’s house a few times and bought them vapes from a gas station. M.S. did not pay for the vapes. And while she never told McCollom her age, she never suggested that she was older than fourteen.

[4] On March 27, M.S. tried to obtain vapes from McCollom. He picked her up in his car and drove her to his house in Tell City. The two went inside and McCollom “led [M.S.] to his bedroom” and locked the bedroom door. Transcript Vol. 2 at 156. McCollom “pushed [M.S.] against the bed ․ and started kissing [her].” Id. He then took off M.S.’s clothes and “continued kissing [her] down [her] neck through [ ] [her] breasts and down.” Id. at 157. McCollom groped M.S., “put his fingers inside” her vagina and anus, and “used his mouth and his tongue on” and inside her vagina. Id. at 158. He also made her put her mouth on his penis. While all this was happening, M.S. felt “[s]cared and [ ] very [ ] alone and [ ] helpless.” Id. at 159. McCollom stopped touching M.S. when E.W. called her and she began talking to E.W. on speaker phone. McCollom then drove M.S. back to E.W.’s house where she stayed the night.

[5] A few days later, M.S. told E.W. what had happened and E.W. in turn told her mother. E.W.’s mother took M.S. to the hospital and someone from the hospital notified the police. After the disclosure, Tell City Police Department detective Jason Shadwick conducted an investigation. He spoke with M.S. and E.W., and it was “obvious[ ]” to him that both were minors. Tr. Vol. 3 at 8. McCollom also agreed to speak with Detective Shadwick at the police station.

[6] After he was advised of his rights, McCollom told police that he had met M.S. on Snapchat through E.W. He explained that when E.W. first introduced him to M.S., he “thought it was just one of those [ ], ‘I'm going to give you my friend so I can have vapes’ ” situations. State's Exhibit 2 at 15:16-15:21. McCollom admitted he had driven M.S. from Cannelton to his house and said they had not discussed M.S.’s age before their sexual encounter.

[7] McCollom stated that he “didn't go too far or do anything too crazy” with M.S. but “just rubbed on it a little,” referring to her vagina. Id. at 56:37-56:40, 57:02-57:10. When asked if M.S. had touched him, McCollom said he had told her that he “wouldn't be able to do anything.” Id. at 57:18-57:21. He explained that he had a variety of medical issues and “was not going to be able to function” and “was too tired to do anything.” Id. at 57:23-57:38.

[8] McCollom told the police that he did not have sex with M.S. In addition to the touching, he recalled that he “did get a vagina pic once.” Id. at 58:58-59:01. He said that after M.S. told him her age, he figured he was being blackmailed and that “it was only a matter of time before [he saw the police] one way or another.” Id. at 10:46-49. Unprompted, McCollom shared that he was “three for three for grabbing a girl by the pussy and getting a blowjob.” Id. at 1:00:15-1:00:19.

[9] In general conversation, McCollom told the police that he had lived in his Tell City house for three to four years. He said that he had lived in Pike County before “mov[ing] down here.” Id. at 18:05. At the end of the interview, McCollom asked to use the restroom and suggested that it might be quicker for him to drive home to do so rather than use the police station restroom.

[10] In April 2024, the State charged McCollom with nine counts, including three counts of rape, three counts of sexual misconduct with a minor, and one count each of criminal confinement, strangulation, and stalking. About a year later, the State successfully moved to dismiss all nine counts and amend its information to charge McCollom with Count I: Sexual Misconduct with a Minor, as a Level 4 felony;¹ Count II: Sexual Misconduct with a Minor, as a Level 5 felony;² Count III: Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor, as a Level 6 felony;³ and Count IV: Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor, as a Level 6 felony.⁴ The State alleged the offenses occurred in Perry County.

[11] In May 2025, McCollom was tried by a jury. At trial, M.S. testified consistently with the facts described above. On cross-examination, McCollom's questions indicated that some of M.S.’s testimony was inconsistent with her earlier descriptions of the offense. E.W. also testified about how the three were introduced, their meetings, and M.S.’s relationship with McCollom, and she described the night of the offense differently than M.S. had. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 185-95. Detective Shadwick testified that M.S. had not immediately told him all the details of the offense and that she eventually admitted she had offered McCollom sex in exchange for vapes. McCollom testified in his defense and said that M.S. had given him a “false age” and that he had believed she was “16 to 18” but they “didn't really talk about it.” Tr. Vol. 3 at 32.

[12] The court instructed the jury on the defense of mistake of age and, in closing, McCollom argued that he was reasonably mistaken as to M.S.’s age.⁵ After deliberating, the jury found him guilty of the sexual misconduct offenses (Counts I and II) and not guilty of the contributing to delinquency offenses (Counts III and IV).

[13] The presentence investigation report showed that McCollom had prior misdemeanor convictions for reckless driving, possession of marijuana, possession of paraphernalia, and leaving the scene of an accident. Additionally, at the time of sentencing, he had pending charges for possession of a controlled substance, possession of marijuana, and possession of paraphernalia. McCollom told the probation officer who prepared the report that he had been “led on and lied to[,]” “framed and falsely accused[,]” and that he felt “used[ ] and conspired against.” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 168, 170-71.

[14] At the sentencing hearing, McCollom argued that his misdemeanor convictions were “very old” and that he had not been in legal trouble for “a 17-year period” before being charged in this case. Tr. Vol. 3 at 80-81. He claimed that his criminal history showed he was “likely to respond affirmatively to probation or short-term imprisonment.” Id. at 80. He also argued that the victim “played a part in facilitating [his] offense.” Id. at 81; see also Ind. Code § 35-38-1-7.1(b)(3) (the court may consider as a mitigating circumstance that “[t]he victim of the crime induced or facilitated the offense”); but see Moon v. State, 823 N.E.2d 710, 718 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (rejecting the premise that a victim younger than sixteen—who cannot consent to sexual contact—can “facilitate” sexual misconduct against themself), reh'g denied, trans. denied.

[15] The court found no mitigating circumstances and identified the “predatory nature of th[e] crime, the lack of remorse” McCollom showed throughout the proceedings, and his criminal history as aggravators. Tr. Vol. 3 at 88. Due to double jeopardy concerns, the court merged the guilty verdict on Count II with Count I. The court then sentenced McCollom to ten years executed in the Department of Correction.

Discussion and Decision

1. Venue

[16] McCollom argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that venue was proper in Perry County, which is where the amended charging information alleged the crimes occurred and where McCollom was tried and convicted.

[17] The State argues that McCollom has waived this claim for appellate review, and we agree. “A defendant waives error relating to venue when he fails to make an objection at the appropriate time in the trial court.” Peacock v. State, 126 N.E.3d 892, 896 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Harkrader v. State, 553 N.E.2d 1231, 1234 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied). Here, McCollom did not challenge venue at any point in the proceedings and thus has waived his ability to do so on appeal. See Floyd v. State, 503 N.E.2d 390, 393 (Ind. 1987) (finding the defendant waived error relating to venue by failing to object to venue), reh'g denied.

[18] Waiver notwithstanding, the State presented sufficient evidence to prove that McCollom committed his crimes in Perry County. A defendant has “a constitutional and statutory right to be tried in the county where the offense was committed.” Peacock, 126 N.E.3d at 897; see also Ind. Const. art 1, § 13(a); I.C. § 35-32-2-1(a). While venue is not an element of a criminal offense, the State is required to prove venue by a preponderance of the evidence, which it may do through circumstantial evidence. Peacock, 126 N.E.3d at 897. In evaluating whether there was sufficient evidence to prove venue, we do not reweigh the evidence and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that support the conclusion that venue was proper. Id.

[19] McCollom argues that the State produced no evidence that he committed the sexual misconduct offenses in Perry County. While McCollom argues “venue [was] completely ignored[,]” Appellant's Brief at 12, the evidence showed the crimes were committed at his house in Tell City, which is in Perry County. During his interview with detectives just weeks after he committed the offenses, McCollom said that he had “moved down here” from Pike County a few years earlier and at one point asked if it would be quicker to use the bathroom at his nearby house instead of the police station. State's Ex. 2 at 18:05. These statements, combined with plenty of additional circumstantial evidence indicating where McCollom committed the crimes,⁶ allowed the jury to infer that he did so in Perry County. See Peacock, 126 N.E.3d at 897 (finding that circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the crime was committed in Marion County).

2. Sentence

[20] McCollom next requests revision of his ten-year sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which “permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 159 (Ind. 2019).

[21] Our review under Rule 7(B) is an “attempt to leaven the outliers,” guided by “our sense of the culpability of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1224, 1225 (Ind. 2008). Because sentencing is a discretionary function, “a trial court's sentencing decision will generally prevail ‘unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard[,] and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character).’ ” Konkle v. State, 253 N.E.3d 1068, 1093 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015)). The defendant has the burden to prove that his sentence is inappropriate. Id. at 1092.

[22] When assessing the nature of the offense, we begin with the advisory sentence. Norton v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1285, 1291 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024). McCollom was convicted of Level 4 felony sexual misconduct with a minor. A Level 4 felony conviction carries a sentence between two and twelve years, with the advisory sentence being six years. I.C. § 35-50-2-5.5. Here, the trial court sentenced McCollom to ten years—four years more than the advisory sentence.

[23] When the trial court deviates from the advisory sentence, we consider “whether there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” Norton, 235 N.E.3d at 1291 (quoting T.A.D.W. v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). In arguing that the nature of his offense was “less egregious” than most instances of sexual misconduct with a minor, McCollom continues to assert that M.S. “induced [his] criminal behavior[.]” Appellant's Brief at 14. He claims that M.S. lied about her age and that his “sexual acts were not [ ] done against [her] will.” Id. McCollum's arguments fail for two reasons.

[24] First, rather than explain why the nature of the offense found by the jury warrants revision, McCollom's arguments seek to reshape his conduct. We will not oblige his transparent request that we reweigh the evidence. The jury found that McCollom knew M.S. was less than sixteen years old and he committed the offense by luring her to his home with the promise of vapes, locking her in his bedroom, stripping off all her clothes, and inserting his fingers into her vagina and anus amongst other touching. McCollom only stopped violating M.S. when E.W. happened to call her, thus interrupting McCollum's crime. He later demonstrated “the predatory nature of [his] crime” when he indicated to detectives that he believed E.W. was “going to give [him] [her] friend” to have sex with in exchange for vapes. Tr. Vol. 3 at 88; State's Ex. 2 at 15:17-15:20. These facts do not show that McCollom's offense was “accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality[.]” Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.

[25] Second, McCollom ignores that “[t]he law [ ] establishes that a victim younger than sixteen cannot consent to sexual contact. This principle, which is at the heart of the prohibitions against child molesting and sexual misconduct with a minor, vitiates the victims’ ability to facilitate these crimes[.]” Moon, 823 N.E.2d at 718 (internal citations omitted). For these reasons, McCollom has failed to persuade us that the nature of his offense justifies appellate revision of his sentence.

[26] McCollum also fails to convince us that his character warrants revision. When considering a defendant's character, “we engage in a broad analysis of [his] ‘qualities, life, and conduct.’ ” Konkle, 253 N.E.3d at 1093 (quoting Cramer v. State, 240 N.E.3d 693, 699 (Ind. 2024)). McCollom argues that “his criminal history is largely limited, particularly recently[,]” and that he has shown past “success with a community corrections sentence[.]” Appellant's Br. at 13. But “[e]ven a minor criminal history is a poor reflection of a defendant's character.” Prince v. State, 148 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). McCollom not only had four prior misdemeanor convictions, but he also had drug charges pending when he was sentenced in this case.

[27] But even if we assigned limited significance to McCollom's criminal history due to “the gravity, nature, proximity, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense[,]” Pritcher v. State, 208 N.E.3d 656, 668 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), McCollom showed poor character in other respects. The trial court found that he demonstrated a “lack of remorse” throughout the proceedings. Tr. Vol. 3 at 88; see also Pritcher, 208 N.E.3d at 668 (noting our “broad consideration of a defendant's qualities” includes remorse or lack thereof). After being convicted, McCollom expressed that he was “led on and lied to[,]” “framed and falsely accused[,]” and that he felt “used[ ] and conspired against.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 168, 170-71. In addition to shirking all responsibility for his offense, these comments contradicted his statement to police that he believed E.W. was trading sex with M.S. for vapes. Moreover, in his police interview, McCollom made multiple comments making light of the situation which do not reflect well on his character, including stating that he was “three for three for grabbing a girl by the pussy and getting a blowjob.” State's Ex. 2 at 1:00:15-1:00:19. For these reasons, we cannot say that McCollom has produced compelling evidence portraying his character in a positive light. Thus, we conclude that McCollom has failed to show that his ten-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of his offense and his character.

Conclusion

[28] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm McCollom's conviction and sentence.

[29] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-42-4-9(a)(1).

2.   I.C. § 35-42-4-9(b)(1).

3.   I.C. § 35-46-1-8(a), (d).

4.   I.C. § 35-46-1-8(a), (d).

5.   See I.C. § 35-42-4-9(c) (“It is a defense that the accused person reasonably believed that the child was at least sixteen [ ] years of age at the time of the conduct.”).

6.   While McCollom's own statements were sufficient to prove venue, we also note that M.S., E.W., and Detective Shadwick all provided testimony from which it could be inferred that the crimes occurred at McCollom's Tell City home. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 156, 171, 189; Tr. Vol. 3 at 17-18.

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.