MOORE v. THOMPSON HOMES INC (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Greg Moore (“Moore”) appeals the trial court's July 22, 2025 order granting a motion for summary judgment filed by Thompson Homes, Inc. (“Thompson”). We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In 2017, Thompson filed a complaint.¹ In 2019, Thompson filed a Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint. On January 2, 2020, the court entered an order granting Thompson's motion.² On January 10, 2020, Thompson filed an Amended Complaint against JM Newburgh, LLC, Moore, Joseph Jarboe, Smoke ‘M Jarbs, LLC, Sandra Shackleford Moore, a/k/a Sandy Moore (“Sandra”), and Spring Creek Subdivision, LLC. Thompson alleged: Count I, breach of contract; Count II, fraud; Count III, civil liability for conversion under Ind. Code § 34-24-3-1; Count IV, “piercing of the corporate veil”; Count V, “class action against the Defendants”; and Count VI, “civil racketeer influenced & corrupt organization claim.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 138-140 (capitalization omitted).

[3] After Jarboe and Smoke ‘M Jarbs, LLC, (collectively, “the Jarboe parties”) failed to timely respond to the amended complaint, Thompson filed a motion for default judgment, which the trial court granted. Jarboe v. Thompson Homes, Inc., 2021 WL 4258834, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2021). The Jarboe parties then filed a motion to set aside the default judgment, which the trial court denied. Id. On September 20, 2021, this Court entered a decision affirming the trial court's denial of the motion to set aside the default judgment against the Jarboe parties.³ Id.

[4] On September 29, 2021, the Clerk of the Warrick Superior Court entered a Notice of Judgment Creditor or Satisfaction of Judgment Pursuant to Trial Rule 58(D) or Small Claims Rule 11(D), which stated that “the judgment, including accrued interest and court costs, entered in this matter has been paid in full in the amount of, and the judgment should be satisfied/released,”⁴ and that, “[if] the judgment creditor does not agree the judgment has been satisfied, the judgment creditor shall, within 30 days from the date of issuance of this notice, file a verified objection.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 109. On October 18, 2021, Thompson filed a Response to Clerk's Notice which asserted that “[t]he Judgment has not been ‘satisfied in full’ in that additional accrued interest and costs are due on the Judgment.” October 18, 2021 Response at 1.⁵

[5] After the filing of multiple pleadings, Magistrate Benjamin R. Aylsworth of the Warrick Superior Court entered an order on February 7, 2022, addressing a “variety of pleadings outstanding.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 101. In part, the court granted Thompson's Motion for Entry of Order Granting Leave to Designate Class Action and Publication Notice, ordered the distribution of funds to Thompson in the total amount of $18,930.33, and ordered that, “[a]fter this payment is completed, any and all remaining funds presently being held by [Thompson's] counsel shall be immediately returned to counsel for the Defendant, Joseph Jarboe solely.” Id. at 102.

[6] On March 21, 2023, the trial court entered an order regarding a cross-claim alleged by Jarboe against Moore and a cross-claim alleged by Moore against Jarboe. The court found that neither party shall take anything by way of their cross-claim and dismissed the cross-claims. Jarboe appealed and argued that he presented overwhelming evidence that Moore breached his fiduciary duty and committed fraud. Jarboe v. Moore, 2024 WL 667367, at *1 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2024). This Court affirmed. Id. at *4.

[7] On July 22, 2025, the trial court entered an “Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment Entry, Denying Plaintiffs’ Petition for Contempt and Sanctions and Denying Defendants’ Motion to Strike or Stay.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 63 (capitalization omitted).⁶ The court granted the “Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment” and awarded the Plaintiff Class “Judgment, jointly and severally, against the Defendants, JM Newburgh, LLC, Greg Moore, Sandra Shackleford Moore and Spring Creek Subdivision, LLC” in the total amount of $71,664.81. Id. at 66. The court denied Plaintiffs’ June 25, 2025 Petition for Order of Contempt and Sanctions, and denied Moore and Sandra's July 8, 2025 Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment or Motion to Stay Proceedings. The order stated “[t]his is a final and appealable Judgment.” Id.

[8] On August 5, 2025, Moore and Sandra filed a Notice of Appeal of the court's July 22, 2025 order.⁷ On August 29, 2025, Thompson and Sandra filed an Agreed Motion to Dismiss Sandra Moore Appeal which stated that “[t]he parties to this joint Motion, being Sandra Moore and the Class, have reached a settlement wherein Sandra ․ will pay an agreed amount to the Class in exchange for dismissal of the Warrick Superior Court action against her, and her parents (which are not parties to the appeal), and [Sandra's] dismissal of her appeal herein.” Agreed Motion to Dismiss Sandra's Appeal at 2. The Agreed Motion also stated that “Sandra ․ and the Class pray and demand a dismissal of [Sandra's] appeal herein with prejudice.” Id.

[9] On September 3, 2025, this Court entered an Order observing that Appellants had filed a Motion to Supplement Record and a Motion to Order Preparation of Transcripts, noting that Appellants had failed to include a request for transcript in their Notice of Appeal, and denying Appellants’ Motion to Supplement Record and Motion to Order Preparation of Transcripts. On September 10, 2025, this Court entered an order dismissing the appeal with prejudice solely as to Sandra. On September 15, 2025, this Court entered an order granting Appellant's Motion to Clarify Record Designation and Direct Transcript Preparation, directing Appellant to file an Amended Notice of Appeal stating the specific hearings he wished to have transcribed. On September 19, 2025, Moore filed an Amended Notice of Appeal requesting transcription of multiple hearings and stating that he was appealing “the Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment entered July 10, 2025, and all interlocutory orders leading up to that ruling.”⁸ September 19, 2025 Notice of Appeal at 1.

Discussion

[10] Moore argues a lack of personal jurisdiction due to defective service and argues that the record contains no valid summons return for the amended complaint. He argues that Magistrate Aylsworth lacked judicial authority to grant leave to amend on January 2, 2020, and to grant the certification of the class after satisfaction in February 2022.⁹ He asserts that “[t]he combination of these two void acts – the ‘double nullity’ – renders all subsequent proceedings legally nonexistent.” Appellant's Brief at 6. He contends that “class certification after judgment satisfaction and appellate affirmance was void.” Id. at 8 (capitalization omitted). He asserts that the $16,000 judgment was satisfied on September 29, 2021. He contends that the February 2022 “class-certification order attempted to revive a case already closed and later affirmed in Jarboe v. Thompson Homes” and “[t]he appellate affirmance extinguished any residual jurisdiction.” Id. Moore also argues “abuse of process and continuing litigation” and asserts that, “[a]fter satisfaction and appellate affirmance, Plaintiffs continued litigation and sought class recovery on extinguished claims.” Id. at 9 (capitalization omitted). He contends that this was an abuse of process.¹⁰

[11] A pro se litigant is held to the same established rules of procedure that trained legal counsel are bound to follow, and the fact that a litigant proceeds pro se does not excuse the litigant from complying with appellate rules. Foster v. Adoption of Federspiel, 560 N.E.2d 691, 692 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). “We will not become an advocate for a party, or address arguments that are inappropriate or too poorly developed or expressed to be understood.” Basic v. Amouri, 58 N.E.3d 980, 983 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (citation and quotations omitted), reh'g denied. With respect to the claims for which Moore fails to cite the record and relevant authority and develop a cogent argument, such claims are waived. To the extent Moore presents cogent arguments, we will address them.

[12] Moore asserts a lack of personal jurisdiction due to defective service and argues that the record contains no valid summons return for the amended complaint. We disagree. Ind. Trial Rule 4.1 provides that “Service may be made upon an individual, or an individual acting in a representative capacity, by ․ delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to him personally ․” “Under Indiana Trial Rule 4.15(F),[¹¹ ] no summons or service of process shall be set aside if either is reasonably calculated to inform the defendant of the impending action against him.” Thomison v. IK Indy, Inc., 858 N.E.2d 1052, 1058 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted). “Thus, Trial Rule 4.15(F) will prevent service of process which is technically deficient from defeating the personal jurisdiction of a court.” Id. (citation omitted). “[A]lthough actual notice alone will not cure defective service, it may be considered in determining whether the notice was reasonably calculated to inform an organization of the action.” Id. at 1058-1059 (citation omitted).

[13] The record reveals that a Summons was filed in January 2020, which listed Moore as a defendant and indicated service was accomplished by personal service by the Warrick County Sheriff. The chronological case summary includes an entry dated January 24, 2020, which states: “Clerk receives return of personal service on Summons and Complaint issued to Sandra Shackelford Moore and Greg Moore, both served 1/23/2020.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 11. Moore made multiple subsequent filings. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the court lacked personal jurisdiction.

[14] With respect to Moore's argument that Magistrate Aylsworth lacked judicial authority, he cites Ind. Code § “33-23-5-5(b).” Appellant's Brief at 6. We note that the version of Ind. Code § 33-23-5-5 in effect between July 1, 2019, and June 30, 2020, did not contain a subsection (b).¹² The legislature repealed Ind. Code § 33-23-5-5 effective July 1, 2020. See Pub. L. No. 162-2020, § 2 (eff. July 1, 2020). We also note that Ind. Code § 33-23-5-8.5 provides: “Except as provided in section 8 of this chapter,[¹³ ] a magistrate has the same powers as a judge.” Reversal is not warranted on this basis.

[15] To the extent Moore asserts that the $16,000 judgment was satisfied on September 29, 2021, and continued litigation constituted an abuse of process, we observe that, on October 18, 2021, Thompson filed a Response to the Clerk's September 29, 2021 Notice and asserted that the judgment had not been satisfied in full. Moore does not mention Thompson's October 18, 2021 Response or develop an argument as to how it was improper. We cannot say reversal is warranted on this basis.

[16] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's order.

[17] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The record does not contain a copy of this complaint.

2.   The chronological case summary contains an entry dated January 2, 2020, which states: “Court examines and approves ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT. (Magistrate BRA/es) (RJO? Y) (Alt Judge R).” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 10-11 (italics omitted). The January 2, 2020 order contains a signature above the description “Judge, Warrick Superior Court.” Id. at 124.

3.   This Court noted that Moore was listed as a named defendant but did not participate in the appeal. Jarboe, 2021 WL 4258834, at *1 n.1.

4.   The notice did not specify the amount that had been paid.

5.   The record does not contain a copy of this Response. Indiana's Odyssey Case Management System contains the Response.

6.   The caption on the order listed Thompson as the Plaintiff.

7.   The Notice of Appeal mentioned the “Order Granting Summary Judgment entered by the Warrick Superior Court 1 on July 22, 2025,” and stated that “Appellants also challenge all interlocutory orders and rulings that culminated in the July 22, 2025 summary judgment, including but not limited to rulings entered by Magistrate Ben Aylsworth without proper judicial authority under IC 33-23-5.8.5 and Indiana Trial Rule 63(C).” August 5, 2025 Notice of Appeal at 1.

8.   The reference to a July 10, 2025 order appears to be a scrivener's error as the chronological case summary does not reveal an order entered on July 10, 2025. Rather, the chronological case summary indicates that the court held a hearing on July 10, 2025, and that the court “will issue a written order.” Appellant's Appendix Volume II at 53. In his brief, Moore challenges the July 22, 2025 order.

9.   In his brief, Moore argues that Magistrate Alysworth's “first unauthorized act occurred January 2, 2020 (granting leave to amend); his second on February 3, 2022 (certifying a class after satisfaction). (Ex. L, App. Vol. 2 pp. 123-24; Ex. F, App. Vol. 2 pp. 100-03.)” Appellant's Brief at 6. The pages to which Moore cites do not contain an order dated February 3, 2022. However, pages 101-102 contain the February 7, 2022 order. It appears that Moore intended to reference the February 7, 2022 order.

10.   In his brief, Moore asserts that “[t]he trial court denied Plaintiff's motion for supplemental relief on December 14, 2021. (Ex. G, App. Vol. 2 pp. 104-07.)” Appellant's Brief at 4. He later argues that “[t]he $16,000 judgment was satisfied September 29, 2021; supplemental relief was denied December 14, 2021. (Ex. H, App. Vol. 2 pp. 108-12; Ex. G, App. Vol. 2 pp. 104-07.) Any subsequent order was ultra vires.” Id. at 7. To the extent Moore references a trial court's order on December 14, 2021, we note that he cites pages 104-107 of Appellant's Appendix Volume II, which contains the February 7, 2022 order, which does not mention a December 14, 2021 order. Further, the chronological case summary does not mention an order on December 14, 2021.Moore also points to his “motions filed July 30 and August 8, 2025: (1) Motion to Stay All Proceedings and (2) Motion to Suspend Proceedings Supplemental. (Ex. Y, App. Vol. 2 pp. 167-68.)” Appellant's Brief at 10. The pages in the appendix to which Moore cites do not include either of the motions. The chronological case summary does not indicate that a motion to stay was filed on July 30, 2025, or that a motion to suspend was filed on August 8, 2025. He asserts that the trial court denied “both motions without hearings or findings. (Ex. B, App. Vol. 2 pp. 62-67.)” Id. The order that appears on pages 62-67 is the July 22, 2025 order.

11.   Ind. Trial Rule 4.15(F) provides: “No summons or the service thereof shall be set aside or be adjudged insufficient when either is reasonably calculated to inform the person to be served that an action has been instituted against him, the name of the court, and the time within which he is required to respond.”

12.   Prior to repeal effective on July 1, 2020, Ind. Code § 33-23-5-5 provided:A magistrate may do any of the following:(1) Administer an oath or affirmation required by law.(2) Solemnize a marriage.(3) Take and certify an affidavit or deposition.(4) Order that a subpoena be issued in a matter pending before the court.(5) Compel the attendance of a witness.(6) Punish contempt.(7) Issue a warrant.(8) Set bail.(9) Enforce court rules.(10) Conduct a preliminary, an initial, an omnibus, or other pretrial hearing.(11) Conduct an evidentiary hearing or trial.(12) Receive a jury's verdict.(13) Verify a certificate for the authentication of records of a proceeding conducted by the magistrate.(14) Enter a final order, conduct a sentencing hearing, and impose a sentence on a person convicted of a criminal offense as described in section 9 of this chapter.(15) Enter a final order or judgment in any proceeding involving matters specified in IC 33-29-2-4 (jurisdiction of small claims docket) or IC 34-26-5 (protective orders to prevent domestic or family violence or harassment).(16) Approve and accept criminal plea agreements.(17) Approve agreed settlements concerning civil matters.(18) Approve:(A) decrees of dissolution;(B) settlement agreements; and(C) any other agreements;of the parties in domestic relations actions or paternity actions.

13.   Ind. Code § 33-23-5-8 provides: “A magistrate does not have the power of judicial mandate.” That exception is not applicable here. See generally Price v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 80 N.E.3d 170, 175 (Ind. 2017) (holding that judicial mandate is appropriate only when two elements are present: (1) the defendant bears an imperative legal duty to perform the ministerial act or function demanded and (2) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to compel the performance of that specific duty).

Brown, Judge.

Felix, J., and Scheele, J., concur.