M.M. (Mother), Appellant/Respondent v. Indiana Department of Child Services, Appellee/Petitioner (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] M.M. (“Mother”) and D.K. (“Father”)¹ (collectively, “Parents”) are the parents of L.M. (“Child”), who was born on October 23, 2023. In early April of 2024, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) removed Child from Parents’ Daviess County residence after an incident of domestic violence and petitioned to have him adjudicated a child in need of services (“CHINS”). In June of 2024, Mother admitted that Child was a CHINS and was ordered to participate in several services, which she did only sporadically. In December of 2024, Mother was arrested and incarcerated, and, in February of 2025, DCS petitioned to terminate her parental rights to Child, which petition the juvenile court granted in June of 2025. Mother challenges one of the juvenile court's findings of fact and contends that it abused its discretion in terminating her parental rights to Child. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother has been diagnosed with anxiety and depression, began abusing marijuana and methamphetamine in 2012 or 2013, and has also used K2 and cocaine. Other than Child, Mother has two biological children: ten-year-old C.M. and five-year-old E.M. In 2014, DCS removed C.M. from Mother's care due to Mother's drug abuse and placed him with Mother's parents, who were later appointed C.M.’s guardians. DCS removed E.M. from Mother's care in February of 2023, also due to Mother's drug abuse.

[3] On October 23, 2023, Child was born, and DCS received a report that Mother had tested positive for marijuana upon admission to the hospital and that Child was a drug-exposed infant. Mother was already participating in services related to E.M., and DCS recommended that Mother participate in an informal adjustment (“IA”), which recommendation the juvenile court approved on November 20, 2023. During the IA, Mother consistently tested positive for marijuana, was involved in a domestic alteration with Father in December of 2023, and missed many drug screens in March of 2024.

[4] On April 1 or 2, 2024, DCS received information that Parents had used methamphetamine and engaged in a domestic altercation while Mother had been holding Child in her arms. On April 2, 2024, DCS Family Case Manager Nikki Rogers (“FCM Rogers”) investigated the report, and Mother confirmed the allegations, as well as testing positive for methamphetamine, amphetamine, and THC. Mother admitted that she had let Father back into the home despite a safety plan's requirement that she not do that. Mother also said that Father had brought methamphetamine into the home and that she and Father had consumed the substance together while Child was in their care. Mother admitted that she and Father had engaged in a physical altercation, which had resulted in a black eye for Mother. DCS removed Child from Parents’ care and placed him in foster care. The State charged Mother with domestic battery, a charge that was still pending at the time of the fact-finding hearing in June of 2025.

[5] On April 3, 2024, DCS petitioned to have Child adjudicated a CHINS. On June 24, 2024, Mother admitted that Child was a CHINS, and on July 1, 2024, the juvenile court ordered Parents into reunification services. The juvenile court ordered Parents to maintain contact with DCS, refrain from abusing illegal substances, participate in substance-abuse treatment, submit to random drug screens, secure and maintain appropriate housing and a stable source of income, meet all medical and mental-health needs, and attend all scheduled visitation with Child.

[6] Meanwhile, soon after the CHINS case had begun, Mother was admitted to a substance-abuse rehabilitation program at Volunteers of America (“VOA”). Mother completed the program, but, in July of 2024, within two weeks of completion, had relapsed on marijuana and methamphetamine. After that, Mother continued using marijuana and methamphetamine. Mother reported going to therapy after she completed the VOA program, but DCS was never able to verify this.

[7] During the CHINS case, Mother consistently screened positive for marijuana, and “at times she would test positive for methamphetamine as well.” Tr. Vol. II p. 73. FCM Heather Britton, who had been assigned to Child's case in October of 2023, observed that Mother was impaired during a visit with Child in September of 2024. Mother's eyes had barely been open, and, when she had sat on the floor and tried to feed Child, she had had difficulty finding his mouth. As it happened, this was either the last, or one of the last, visits Mother had with Child, and by the time of the fact-finding hearing in the termination proceeding, two-year-old Child had not seen Mother for approximately nine months.

[8] Mother admitted that she had failed to keep in touch with DCS or inform it of her arrest within five days as ordered. Mother stopped contacting FCM Britton in September of 2024 and had not kept her appointments with service providers. Mother had also stopped visiting Child and participating in home-based casework. DCS had offered Mother domestic-violence services, but she had not participated, not even completing a domestic-violence assessment.

[9] During the case, the State charged Mother with multiple criminal offenses for alleged incidents occurring between April 1, 2024, and June 12, 2025, including theft of a firearm, possession of a syringe, possession of marijuana, false informing, and several counts of failure to appear in her various criminal cases. Mother was arrested on December 21, 2024. Meanwhile, Mother had signed a voluntary termination of her parental rights to E.M. in late 2024. Mother had been on medication to treat her anxiety and depression, but stopped taking it around the time she voluntarily terminated her parental rights to E.M.

[10] On February 10, 2025, DCS petitioned to have Mother's parental rights to Child terminated. In March of 2025, Mother began working with home-based caseworker Courtney Nash, a registered behavioral therapist. The meetings took place at the jail, and Nash's services included helping Mother find employment and resources and providing therapy. Nash worked with Mother on parenting skills and her mental health. The discussions often involved Father, and Mother gave contradictory answers to questions about whether she wanted to reconcile with Father. Nash was concerned about Mother's ongoing mental health because Mother did not have a support system.

[11] At the fact-finding hearing on June 12, 2025, Mother (who was still incarcerated) indicated that she was prepared to plead guilty to the charges in two of her criminal cases in exchange for the dismissal of the rest of the charges against her. Mother indicated that she was hoping to be placed on home detention after her guilty plea, and her plan was to live at New Beginnings, a drug-rehabilitation facility, and complete a nine-month program there. New Beginnings, however, did not allow children to reside there. Mother testified that she did not currently have stable housing or employment.

[12] FCM Britton testified that DCS had offered Mother services throughout the CHINS and termination cases, including substance-abuse rehabilitation, therapy, and home-based case management but that Mother had kept using illegal substances. FCM Britton was concerned about Mother's failure to maintain sobriety outside of jail or address her domestic-violence issues. FCM Britton was also concerned about Mother's lack of housing and whether she intended to continue addressing her mental-health issues and take medication. FCM Britton opined that Mother had not remedied the reasons for Child's continued removal and that termination was in Child's best interests.

[13] Child's court-appointed special advocate Jean Survance (“CASA Survance”) had also been E.M.’s CASA and was concerned about Mother's mental health and her drug abuse. CASA Survance opined that the reasons for Child's continued removal had not been remedied and that his reunification with Mother would be a threat to his well-being. According to CASA Survance, Child had been in the same placement since his removal from Parents and was thriving and bonded to his foster family, who were meeting his needs. CASA Survance opined that termination was in Child's best interests and supported DCS's plan of termination and adoption.

[14] On July 14, 2025, the juvenile court terminated Mother's parental rights to Child. The juvenile court concluded that

1) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the Child's removal or the reasons for placement outside of the home of the parents will not be remedied;

2) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the Child;

3) There is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Child; and

4) Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interests of the Child;

Appellant's App. Vol. II p. 28.

Discussion and Decision

[15] Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in terminating her parental rights to Child. “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Bester v. Lake Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). Moreover, we acknowledge that the parent-child relationship is “one of the most valued relationships in our culture.” Id. (citation omitted). Although parental rights are of a constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities as parents. In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the child's interests in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. The Indiana Supreme Court has made clear that the “purpose of terminating parental rights is not to punish parents, but to protect the children.” Egly v. Blackford Cnty. Dep't. of Pub. Welfare, 592 N.E.2d 1232, 1234 (Ind. 1992). “Termination of parental rights is proper where the children's emotional and physical development is threatened.” In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d at 773. The juvenile court need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such that his physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. Id.

[16] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, we will not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Invol. Term. of Parental Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider the evidence that supports the juvenile court's decision and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. We recognize the juvenile court's “unique ability to see the witnesses, observe their demeanor, and scrutinize their testimony, as opposed to this court's only being able to review a cold transcript of the record.” Matter of D.P., 72 N.E.3d 976, 980 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).

I. Challenged Finding

[17] Mother challenges one of the juvenile court's findings, that she was unwilling or unable to engage in the actions necessary to bring about reunification with Child. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). We have little hesitation in concluding that this finding is supported by ample evidence. Soon after the CHINS case began, Mother was admitted to a substance-abuse rehabilitation program at VOA. While Mother completed the program, she relapsed on marijuana and methamphetamine within two weeks and continued to use them. Mother reported going to therapy after she completed the VOA program, but DCS was never able to obtain any documentation verifying that. At the termination factfinding, Mother testified that the last time she had attended therapy was in late 2024. DCS also offered Mother domestic-violence services, but Mother never even completed an assessment. The record contains ample evidence to establish either Mother's inability or unwillingness to comply with services and address her substance abuse. The challenged finding is not clearly erroneous.

II. Other Arguments

[18] In order to terminate Mother's parental rights to Child, DCS was required to prove the following:

(c) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege:

(1) the existence of one (1) or more of the circumstances described in subsection (d);

(2) that there is a satisfactory plan for care and treatment of the child; and

(3) that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child's best interests.

(d) A petition filed under subsection (a) must allege the existence of one (1) or more of the following circumstances: [․]

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4.² Because Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c)(1) is written in the disjunctive, DCS was only required to prove one of the circumstances described in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d).

[19] Mother makes no challenge to the juvenile court's finding that there was a satisfactory plan for Child's care and treatment. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2). We further note that while the juvenile court concluded that two of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) were true, Mother challenges only the finding that there was a reasonable probability that Mother would not remedy the conditions that resulted in Child's removal and retention in foster care. Because DCS only needed to prove one of the listed circumstances, we need not address this challenge any further. This leaves only the juvenile court's finding that termination was in Child's best interests.

[20] Mother lists “[w]hether the evidence supports the trial court's finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the best interest of the minor child” and “[w]hether the trial court's judgment is clearly erroneous as a result of the termination of the parent-child relationship not supporting the best interests of the child” in her “Statement of Issues[.]” Appellant's Br. p. 6. While Mother goes on to make no argument specifically designated as a best-interests argument, we will, in the interests of caution, address anything that could be reasonably interpreted as such an argument. We will also address Mother's arguments to the extent that they can be interpreted as claims that DCS failed to make a reasonable effort at unification or that she has been denied due process.

A. Best Interests

[21] To the extent that Mother has made any argument that could be characterized as challenging the juvenile court's finding that termination was in Child's best interests, we are unconvinced. In considering whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child, the juvenile court is required to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. “A parent's historical inability to provide a suitable environment along with the parent's current inability to do the same supports a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the [child].” Lang v. Starke Cnty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 861 N.E.2d 366, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. “Additionally, a child's need for permanency is an important consideration in determining the best interests of a child, and the testimony of the service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citations omitted).

[22] Here, FCM Britton opined that Mother had not remedied the reasons for Child's continued removal and that termination was in Child's best interests, and CASA Survance opined that termination was in Child's best interests and supported DCS's plan of termination and adoption. FCM Britton's and CASA Survance's testimony supports the juvenile court's finding that termination of Mother's parental rights is in Child's best interests. See Lang, 861 N.E.2d at 374 (providing that the testimony of the case worker, guardian ad litem, or a CASA regarding the children's best interests supports a finding that termination is in the children's best interests). There is, however, much more in the record that supports the juvenile court's conclusion regarding Child's best interests.

[23] Evidence establishing the unfitness of a parent—as shown by the juvenile court's probability-of-non-remedy and threat conclusions—may support its legal conclusion that termination is in a child's best interests. In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 221 (“A parent's historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the Child's best interests.”) (citation omitted). The record shows that reunification with Mother would not be in Child's best interests because Mother was unable to maintain sobriety, lacked stable housing or employment, discontinued her therapy even though she admitted that she needed it, discontinued her anxiety and depression medications on her own, and failed to visit Child even when she was not incarcerated.

[24] Finally, the record indicates that Child's pre-adoptive placement has been very positive. Child had been in foster care with the same foster family since his removal from Parents, was thriving, and was bonded to them. Child's foster Parents met his needs, and DCS's plan for Child's care and treatment was adoption by them. Reunification would have meant Child going from the only family he had ever known to Mother, with whom he has had little contact. Mother's arguments in this regard are nothing more than an invitation to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. In re N.G., 51 N.E.3d 1167, 1170 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). The juvenile court's conclusion that termination was in Child's best interests is not clearly erroneous.

B. Reasonable Efforts

[25] To the extent that Mother is arguing that DCS violated statutes requiring that reasonable efforts be made to reunite her with Child, we are similarly unconvinced. Mother's primary argument seems to be that DCS did not provide her with much-needed therapy, but the record indicates that DCS provided her with ample opportunities to receive treatment. At the inception of the underlying CHINS case, Mother was already in therapy connected to E.M.’s case, but her participation became less frequent between February and April of 2024. Mother reported going to therapy after she completed the VOA program in or around July of 2024, but DCS was never able to obtain any documentation verifying that. Mother testified that the last time she had attended therapy had been in late 2024. Starting in March of 2025, while incarcerated, Mother began working with Nash. Nash worked with Mother on parenting skills and her mental health because Mother had suffered significant trauma. Based on this timeline, the longest Mother went without access to therapy was three months, and that was due to her incarceration. The record does not establish that DCS provided marginal mental-health services to Mother.

C. Due Process

[26] Finally, to the extent Mother argues that her due process rights were violated because DCS failed to provide her adequate services, she is incorrect. A parent's right to the care and custody of his or her child is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). In light of the interests and consequences at stake, parents are constitutionally entitled to “fundamentally fair procedures” in termination proceedings. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982).

[27] In all cases, including both CHINS and termination cases, “the process due” turns on balancing the three Mathews factors: (1) the private interests affected by the proceeding; (2) the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and (3) the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure. In re K.D., 962 N.E.2d 1249, 1257 (Ind. 2012). Both a parent's interest in maintaining his or her parental rights and the State's countervailing interests in protecting the welfare of children are substantial. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 918 (Ind. 2011). When faced with a claim of denial of due process in a termination of parental rights proceeding, we most often focus on the risk of error created by the State's actions in the case. Id. Because of the interlocking CHINS and termination statutes, “procedural irregularities in a CHINS proceeding may be of such import that they deprive a parent of procedural due process with respect to the termination of his or her parental rights.” In re A.P., 734 N.E.2d 1107, 1112–13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

[28] Here, the private interests affected by the proceeding are high because Mother has an interest in raising Child, Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65, while the countervailing governmental interests supporting use of the challenged procedure are also high because the State has an interest in protecting Child. In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). In this case, the State's actions did not result in a risk of error for the reasons explained above, i.e., that DCS had provided therapy services for Mother, even if she had not taken full advantage of them.

[29] Moreover, there is no evidence that Mother ever requested additional services. “[A] parent may not sit idly by without asserting a need or desire for services and then successfully argue that he was denied services to assist him with his parenting.” In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). Moreover, in In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied., we concluded that “for a parent's due process rights to be protected in the context of termination proceedings, DCS must have made reasonable efforts to preserve and/or reunify the family unit in the CHINS case (unless the no reasonable efforts exception applies).” Id. at 615. We further explained that “[w]hat constitutes ‘reasonable efforts’ will vary by case” and “it does not necessarily always mean that services must be provided to the parents.” Id. As mentioned, the record in this case simply does not support a conclusion that DCS failed to provide needed or requested services to Mother.

[30] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Father does not participate in this appeal.

2.   The current version of the statute, effective July 1, 2025, which does not apply here, lists thirteen circumstances. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d).

Bradford, Judge.

Weissmann, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.