GIVANS v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] After Christopher Givans was charged in Boone County with resisting law enforcement, criminal recklessness, and reckless driving, he asserted his right for a speedy trial under Criminal Rule 4(B). The trial court set his trial on November 12, 2024—within the seventy-day window required under the rule. Upon defense counsel's motion, and despite Givans’ personal objections, his trial was continued beyond the 4(B) period to March 4, 2025. He now appeals his conviction, asserting his right to a speedy trial under Rule 4(B) was violated when his trial was continued. Finding no violation, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In April 2024, Givans and a friend led a Jamestown police officer on a car chase and subsequently fled into a nearby wooded area. As a result, Givans was charged with Count I: Resisting Law Enforcement, as a Level 6 felony, and Count II: Resisting Law Enforcement, as a Class A misdemeanor.¹ Givans was not apprehended on the night of the chase but was located a few months later in the Montgomery County Jail where he was being held on other charges. On August 28, while still in custody in the Montgomery County Jail, Givans sent a letter to the Boone County court requesting a speedy trial on the underlying charges. On September 7, while still in the Montgomery County Jail, Givans was served with the warrant for his arrest on the underlying charges.

[3] At his Boone County initial hearing two days later, Givans brought up his request for a speedy trial and asked the court, “Now, my speedy trial starts at the day it is notarized on my—on my motion, correct?” Transcript Vol. 2 at 12. In response, the court informed him that “[i]t starts ․ the day the warrant was served on you or your initial hearing whichever comes first. The warrant was served on you on [ ] September seventh. So, it started September seventh.” Id. The court scheduled his jury trial for November 12, 2024. On September 11, Givans requested the appointment of a public defender, which the court granted that same day.

[4] At the pre-trial conference on November 1, defense counsel moved to continue the trial and noted Givans’ objection to that motion. See Tr. Vol. 2 at 13 (“For the record, as his counsel, I am making a motion, as his counsel, he does not join me in that motion, for continuance of the trial.”). Counsel stated that the continuance was necessary because Givans wanted her to depose and call as witnesses almost forty individuals and that process was not yet complete. See id. at 14. She explained to the court that she felt she had “a responsibility to not only honor his request, but also the reality of the fact that between [November 1] and [the] twelfth it is just physically not possible to depose all of these witnesses.” Id. Noting counsel's responsibility to honor Givans’ requests and be “in the best position to represent him and his best interest at trial,” the court granted counsel's motion to continue and reset Givans’ trial for March 4, 2025. Id. at 15.

[5] Despite being represented by counsel, Givans continued to send letters to the court and file various pro se motions. On November 12, he sent a letter to the trial court noting he had not consented to his counsel's request for continuance. Two days later, he filed a pro se motion to dismiss. In February 2025, he wrote another letter stating that he had not consented to the continuance of his trial, and he had never waived his right to a speedy trial. Along with his letter, he also filed another pro se motion to dismiss. The court took no action on any of Givans’ letters or pro se filings.

[6] At a pretrial conference the day before trial and again on the day of trial, defense counsel moved to dismiss the charges and discharge Givans, claiming he was not brought to trial within the seventy-day period. See id. at 21, 37. On both occasions, the court denied the motions and explained to Givans that because he was represented by counsel he could only speak through his attorney, and the court was permitted to disregard his personal objections and pro se correspondence. Givans was found guilty on both counts and sentenced to 730 days in the Department of Correction, with credit for time served and 185 days suspended to supervised probation. Givans only appeals his conviction.

Discussion and Decision

1. Criminal Rule 4(B)

[7] Givans argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to Criminal Rule 4(B), asserting he was entitled to be discharged because his trial took place more than seventy days after his demand for a speedy trial. “Criminal Rule 4 places an ‘affirmative duty’ on the State to bring a defendant to trial.” Talbott v. State, 204 N.E.3d 288, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting Cundiff v. State, 967 N.E.2d 1026, 1028 (Ind. 2012)), reh'g denied, trans. denied. Criminal Rule 4(B) specifically provides that:

A defendant held in jail on a pending charge may move for an early trial. If such motion is filed, a trial must be commenced no later than seventy calendar days from the date of such motion except as follows:

․

(3) an act of the defendant delays the trial.

If a defendant is held beyond the time limit of this section and moves for dismissal, the criminal charge against the defendant must be dismissed.

Ind. Crim. Rule 4(B)(3).

[8] Givans contends that he was brought to trial outside of the rule's seventy-day requirement. He claims the seventy-day clock began on September 3 when the trial court received his letter asserting his right to a speedy trial. However, that was not the relevant date to start the 4(B) clock running. Givans was incarcerated on new charges under a different cause number on September 3. He was not served the warrant on the underlying charges in this case until September 7. Our Supreme Court has made clear that Rule 4(B) is not available to a defendant who is not “incarcerated on the charge for which he seeks a speedy trial[.]” Cundiff, 967 N.E.2d at 1031 (“Criminal Rule 4(B) was not available to [the defendant] on the pending charges for which he sought a speedy trial because he was not incarcerated on those charges.”).

[9] Accordingly, Givans was arrested on the charges in this case when he was served with the warrant for his arrest, which the record shows occurred on September 7, 2024. See Arion v. State, 56 N.E.3d 71, 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (noting that the defendant's arrest for purposes of Rule 4(B) occurred when he was read the warrant for his arrest). Thus, it was only from September 7th on that Givans could request an early trial on the underlying charges under Rule 4(B). While the trial court informed Givans that his September 3 request was premature, it nonetheless credited that letter as properly invoking the Rule 4(B) window as of his September 7 arrest. The court set Givans’ trial for November 12, 2024, which was sixty-six days after Givans was served with the arrest warrant. Therefore, Givans’ initial trial date was within the Rule 4(B) period.

[10] Ultimately however, his trial was reset to March 4, 2025, which is undisputedly outside the seventy-day window, and Givans claims the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss and discharge under Rule 4(B). Preliminarily, we must note that because he was represented by counsel, the court did not have to consider Givans’ personal and pro se objections. Represented defendants may only “speak[ ] to the court through counsel.” Keener v. State, 267 N.E.3d 1137, 1143 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (emphasis in original), trans. denied. “This means that when a defendant has counsel, any objection to a trial setting based on a Criminal Rule 4 deadline must be made through that counsel.” Id. The policy behind this procedure prevents “a hybrid representation to which [defendants are] not entitled.” Id. (quoting Underwood v. State, 722 N.E.2d 828, 832 (Ind. 2000), reh'g denied). Thus, Givans’ many letters and pro se motions did not serve as proper objections to the trial date being scheduled beyond the seventy-day window.

[11] Turning to the merits, it was defense counsel's motion to continue that resulted in the trial being reset to a date outside the seventy-day window. Because defense counsel was speaking for Givans and despite his personal objections, the motion to continue filed by his attorney is charged to Givans and results in waiver of his request for an early trial. Rule 4(B)(3) specifically states that the trial must occur within seventy days except where “an act of the defendant delays the trial.” “[A]fter a defendant has requested a speedy trial, he ‘must maintain a position which is reasonably consistent with the request that he has made.’ ” Talbott, 204 N.E.3d at 297 (quoting Hahn v. State, 67 N.E.3d 1071, 1080 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)). Here, the court moved Givans’ trial to March 4, 2025 after granting defense counsel's motion to continue, and defense counsel did not object to the trial date until the pretrial hearing on March 3. The court was permitted to disregard Givans’ pro se letters and motions asserting his desire for a speedy trial since he was represented by counsel.² In light of his attorney's motion to continue, Givans effectively abandoned his speedy trial request and waived his Rule 4(B) challenge for appellate review.³

[12] Givans acknowledges that established precedent holds a represented defendant speaks through counsel, but he nonetheless argues that “the well-reasoned rule should, under these limited facts, give way to [his] personal assertion of his speedy trial right.” Appellant's Br. at 10. We disagree. The principle and precedent that “a defendant speaks through his counsel” rests not only on sound policy considerations, but also foundational constitutional considerations. Miller v. State, 225 N.E.3d 790, 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), reh'g denied, trans. denied. “To require the trial court to respond to both [the] [d]efendant and counsel would effectively create a hybrid situation to which [the] [d]efendant is not entitled.” Id. (quoting Underwood, 722 N.E.2d at 832). Additionally, to grant Givans’ request to bend the rules in his favor would serve as an incentive to other defendants to file as many pro se motions and send as many letters to the trial court as possible to circumvent the strategic and/or necessary decisions made by their counsel. In consideration of the constitutional and policy considerations that limit represented defendants to speaking through counsel, we decline Givans’ invitation to deviate from that long-standing principle.

2. Merger

[13] Despite rejecting Givans’ Rule 4(B) arguments, we sua sponte address the trial court's merger of his convictions. We recognize that at sentencing the court stated it would not enter judgment of conviction on Count II apparently for double jeopardy concerns. See Tr. Vol. 3. at 23 (“I will find that Count II is the ․ continuation of the same offense and there will be no judgment of conviction or sentencing on Count II[.]”) (emphasis added). However, the sentencing order states: “Judgment of conviction entered on Count I: Resisting Law Enforcement as a Level 6 Felony. Court does enter judgment of conviction on Count II.” Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 79 (emphasis added). The chronological case summary (CCS) lists “Finding of Guilty” as the disposition for Count I, and “Counts Merged” as the disposition for Count II. Id. at 18. Given that the sentencing order indicates the court did enter judgment of conviction on Count II, merely merging it with Count I was insufficient to resolve the presumed double jeopardy issue. See Owens v. State, 206 N.E.3d 1187, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (where the trial court entered judgment of conviction on a lesser included offense, “merging the offenses was not enough to resolve the court's double jeopardy concern”), trans. denied.

[14] Nonetheless, because the court only sentenced Givans on Count I, the court only needs to vacate Givans’ conviction on Count II to cure the error. Thus, we remand to the trial court for the sole purpose of amending the judgment, sentencing order, and CCS to reflect that Count II is vacated.

Conclusion

[15] Finding no violation of Givans’ rights under Criminal Rule 4(B), we affirm his conviction on Count I. However, we remand to the trial court to amend the record to reflect that Givans’ conviction on Count II is vacated.

[16] Affirmed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Givans was originally charged on five counts, but the State dismissed three of them on March 3 and proceeded to trial only on the charges above.

2.   Givans relies in part on Watson v. State to support his contention that his pro se communications and objections should be given weight in our consideration. See Appellant's Brief at 11 (citing Watson v. State, 155 N.E.3d 608, 619 (Ind. 2020)). However, Watson concerned a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial, not Criminal Rule 4(B). 155 N.E.3d at 616. Critically, “Criminal Rule 4 does not cover every aspect of its broader constitutional counterparts. And thus, [ ] review of a Rule 4 challenge is separate from a claimed constitutional violation.” Id. at 615 (internal citations omitted). Given that Givans does not assert any violation of his constitutional speedy trial right, his reliance on Watson is unpersuasive.

3.   In addition, “[i]t is incumbent upon [the] defendant to object at the earliest opportunity when his trial date is scheduled beyond the time limits prescribed by” Rule 4(B). Hahn v. State, 67 N.E.3d 1071, 1080 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Smith v. State, 477 N.E.2d 857, 861-62 (Ind. 1985)), trans. denied. Here, despite Givans’ personal assertions, his attorney did not lodge any objections to the March 4 trial date until the pre-trial conference on March 3. Then she renewed her objection the next day at trial. As a result, Givans failed to object to a trial date set outside the seventy-day period “at the earliest opportunity” and has waived his speedy trial request for appellate review. Id. (quoting Smith, 477 N.E.2d at 861).

DeBoer, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Weissmann, J., concur