ATTORNEYS TITLE AGENCY OF INDIANA v. JOHNSON (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Attorneys Title Agency of Indiana, LLC (ATA) and Melvin Ward appeal the trial court's decision to grant relief from an agreed entry dismissing them with prejudice from a lawsuit filed by Marvin Johnson. They raise one dispositive issue, which is whether Johnson presented any evidence of fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by an adverse party as required by Trial Rule 60(B)(3). Because he did not, we reverse and remand with instructions for the court to deny Johnson's motion.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Johnson alleges that he entered into a contract to purchase two parcels of real estate from Ward. Under that contract, Johnson agreed to make a down payment followed by a series of periodic payments, and Ward was to deliver the deeds for the properties to Johnson once he paid the purchase price in full. While payments were being made, Johnson was permitted to possess and use the properties, but Ward retained legal title to them.

[3] According to Johnson, before he had made the final payment, Ward sold the properties to Fifth Ward Consulting Services, Inc. (Fifth Ward), and one week later purportedly sold the properties again to a separate entity, Project 22A, LLC (Project 22A). Project 22A then transferred its interest in the properties to 4Ward Investment Group, LLC (4Ward).

[4] After becoming aware of this series of transactions, Johnson filed a complaint against ATA, Ward, Fifth Ward, Project 22A, 4Ward, and 4Ward's mortgage lender, alleging they had engaged in “concerted actions to deprive [him] of his rights to the propert[ies].” Appellant's Appendix Vol. 2 at 19. A few months after the complaint was filed, the trial court approved an agreed entry dismissing with prejudice Johnson's claims against all defendants except 4Ward and its mortgage lender. The agreed entry contained signature lines for Johnson, Ward, ATA, and their respective counsel, and appeared to have been signed by all of them. See infra Figure 1.

Figure 1: Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 22.

[5] Five months later, Johnson, who was no longer represented by counsel, filed a pro se motion to set aside the agreed entry which alleged that his former attorney had “affixed [his] electronic signature to [it], without [his] consent or knowledge.” Id. at 25. In a memorandum in support of that motion, Johnson clarified that he was asking for relief from the agreed entry pursuant to Trial Rule 60(B) on the grounds of “fraud ․, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party.” Id. at 27-28 (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 60(B)(3)). Specifically, Johnson argued that his attorney's use of an “unauthorized electronic sign[ature] of [Johnson's] name ․ constitute[d] a fraudulent act that undermines the integrity of the judicial process.” Id. at 28.

[6] ATA did not appear at the Trial Rule 60(B) hearing, and the trial court proceeded in its absence.¹ Johnson called Ward as his sole witness,² and both Johnson and the court asked Ward extensive questions about the contract between Johnson and Ward, the series of transactions alleged in Johnson's complaint, and the several business entities involved in those transactions. But Ward did not testify about the circumstances surrounding the agreed entry, let alone that ATA, Ward, or their counsel had engaged in any misconduct in the creation or filing of that entry.³ After discussing with Ward and Johnson the details of the alleged transactions, the court stated from the bench, “I'm going to just set aside the agreed judgment at this point because I don't know who we need and who we don't.” Transcript at 47-48.

[7] After the hearing, the trial court issued an order granting Johnson's motion for relief from the agreed entry and reinstating ATA, Ward, and the other dismissed defendants as parties to the case, without explaining the reasons for its decision. But the next day, the court issued another order providing the following rationale:

The Court finds that [Johnson] has carried his burden in demonstrating the elements required for a claim brought under T.R. 60(B)(3). The testimony and evidence establish that the [agreed entry] was procured without [Johnson's] knowledge or consent and that his signature was affixed without authorization. These facts constitute a material misrepresentation directly affecting the Court's judgment. Because the misrepresentation goes to the heart of the dismissal agreement and undermines its validity, relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(3) is warranted.

Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 14. ATA and Ward now appeal.⁴

Discussion and Decision 5

[8] Trial Rule 60(B) gives a trial court discretion to grant equitable relief from a judgment under certain circumstances, and the decision to grant such relief is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Radcliff, 18 N.E.3d 1006, 1011-12 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), reh'g denied, trans. denied. We will reverse a decision to grant a Rule 60(B) motion “only if it goes against the logic and effect of the facts or the trial court has misinterpreted the law.” Id. at 1012.

[9] We first note that Johnson has not filed a brief in support of the trial court's decision. In such a case, “we need not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the Appellee's behalf.” Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Trinity Homes, LLC v. Fang, 848 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ind. 2006)). Accordingly, “we will reverse the trial court's judgment if the appellant's brief presents a case of prima facie error[,]” meaning error “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. (quoting Trinity Homes, 848 N.E.2d at 1068).

[10] The trial court here granted relief from the agreed entry under Trial Rule 60(B)(3), which permits courts to grant a party relief from a judgment in the event of “fraud ․, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party[.]” “Under this limited exception to the general rule of finality of judgments,” the party seeking relief is required to “show that fraud[, misrepresentation, or other misconduct] prevented [him] from fully and fairly presenting [his] case.” Auto. Fin. Corp. v. Liu, 250 N.E.3d 406, 412 (Ind. 2025) (quoting Outback Steakhouse of Fla., Inc. v. Markley, 856 N.E.2d 65, 73-74 (Ind. 2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).⁶ The rule does not provide an avenue for relief absent fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct that is “chargeable to an adverse party[.]” Id. (quoting Stonger v. Sorrell, 776 N.E.2d 353, 356 (Ind. 2002)) (emphasis added).

[11] The misconduct Johnson alleged to have been committed was by his own attorney, not by an adverse party. Thus, we agree with ATA and Ward that even assuming as true that Johnson's attorney affixed his electronic signature to the agreed entry and filed it without Johnson's authorization, that would not constitute fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct by an adverse party that would justify relief under Trial Rule 60(B)(3). Indeed, “[r]efusal to relieve a party from a judgment based upon the action of the party's attorney has a long history in Indiana common law.” Weinreb v. TR Devs., LLC, 943 N.E.2d 856, 867 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Morequity, Inc. v. Keybank, N.A., 773 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied), trans. denied.

[12] Our Supreme Court has recognized an attorney's “inherent power ․ to bind the client to the attorney's actions in court[,]” which “is derived from the need for structural integrity of court procedures and the protection of third parties who rely on the finality of those procedures.” Koval v. Simon Telelect, Inc., 693 N.E.2d 1299, 1305 (Ind. 1998). Under this principle, “[a]n attorney may[,] without express authority, bind his client by agreement that judgment may be taken against him, and ․ [i]f [the attorney] acts contrary to the express directions of his client, or to his injury, the client must look to the attorney for redress.” Id. (quoting Thompson v. Pershing, 86 Ind. 303, 310 (1882)). Put differently, if an attorney consents to the entry of a judgment, “[t]he attorney's act was [the client's] act, and if as between them the attorney had no such authority, ․ [the client's] remedy is against the attorney, and not to be relieved from the judgment.” Morequity, 773 N.E.2d at 315 (quoting Kreite v. Kreite, 93 Ind. 583, 586 (1884)).

[13] Here, because Johnson did not accuse ATA, Ward, or any other defendant of misconduct relating to the agreed entry but merely alleged that his own attorney entered into and affixed his signature on it without authority, relief was not available under Trial Rule 60(B)(3).⁷ ATA and Ward have therefore made a prima facie showing that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding that the alleged actions of Johnson's attorney constituted “a material misrepresentation” warranting relief under Rule 60(B)(3). Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 14.⁸

Conclusion

[14] For these reasons, we reverse the trial court's decision to grant Johnson's motion to set aside the agreed entry and remand with instructions for the court to deny that motion.

[15] Reversed and remanded.

FOOTNOTES

1.   On appeal, ATA claims it did not appear at the hearing because it was not served with notice of the motion or the hearing.

2.   Ward also claims he did not receive sufficient notice of the hearing, which is difficult to square with the fact that he testified at it.

3.   Indeed, as the trial court noted from the bench, the only record evidence regarding the creation of the agreed entry was Johnson's testimony at an earlier hearing—which the court continued because Johnson could not prove that he had served notice of it on the dismissed defendants—“that he never gave his prior attorney permission to” sign it on his behalf. Transcript at 46.

4.   Pursuant to Trial Rule 60(C), “[a] ruling or order of the court denying or granting relief, in whole or in part, by motion under [Trial Rule 60(B)] shall be deemed a final judgment, and an appeal may be taken therefrom as in the case of a judgment.”

6.   A party seeking relief under Rule 60(B)(3) must also show “a meritorious claim or defense” and that the motion was brought within one year of the judgment. Liu, 250 N.E.3d at 412 (quoting Outback, 856 N.E.2d at 73). These requirements are not relevant to our decision in this appeal.

7.   We note that “[w]hen a party seeking relief cannot meet Trial Rule 60(B)(3)’s requirements—such as when ‘the fraud is not chargeable to an adverse party’—․ the savings clause [in Rule 60(B)(8)] recognizes a trial court's ‘inherent power’ to ‘set aside its judgment if procured by fraud on the court[.]’ ” Liu, 250 N.E.3d at 412 (quoting Stonger, 776 N.E.2d at 356-57). In light of the long-standing common law prohibition against granting relief to a party based on the conduct of their own attorney, it is unclear whether Rule 60(B)(8) would permit a court to grant relief to a party when their attorney has committed fraud upon the court. We express no opinion on this issue, as we are mindful that we are reviewing the trial court's decision to set aside the agreed entry for prima facie error and so have confined our analysis to Trial Rule 60(B)(3)—the authority cited by the trial court in its order.

8.   Because relief from the agreed entry was not available to Johnson under Trial Rule 60(B)(3), we do not address ATA and Ward's argument that they were not provided notice of Johnson's motion or the hearing.

DeBoer, Judge.

Bradford, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.