GRAY v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] Joe E. Gray appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court following his guilty plea to possession of a destructive device as a level 5 felony and to the violation of his probation. He asserts that the court abused its discretion. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On July 26, 2022, Fort Wayne Police Officers initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle with expired plates. The officers discovered Gray in the driver's seat and a burnt marijuana cigarette in plain view in an ash tray on the center console. They arrested Gray, and during a search of his person incident to arrest, officers found a pill bottle containing a baggie of crystals that field tested positive for methamphetamine.

[3] On July 28, 2022, the State charged Gray with possession of methamphetamine as a level 5 felony and possession of marijuana as a class B misdemeanor under Cause No. 02D04-2207-F5-265 (“Cause No. 265”). On November 2, 2022, Gray entered into a plea agreement with the State in which he agreed to plead guilty to possession of methamphetamine as a level 5 felony in exchange for dismissal of the misdemeanor charge. The plea agreement further provided for a three-year fully suspended sentence and probation. The court accepted the agreement, imposed a three-year suspended sentence, and placed Gray on probation. In June 2023, the State filed a petition to revoke Gray's probation in Cause No. 265 due to his failure to report and failure to complete a substance abuse program. Gray admitted to the violations and was reinstated to probation with additional conditions in August 2023.

[4] In July 2024, the State filed another petition to revoke Gray's probation in Cause No. 265 alleging Gray had again failed to report and complete required programs and had also tested positive for methamphetamine. A warrant was issued for Gray's arrest on July 10, 2024. In March 2025, Gray was located hiding in a garage by community corrections officers and, upon exiting the garage, he told the officers that there were pipe bombs in the garage. The Fort Wayne Police Department Hazardous Device Unit searched the garage and home and found two pipe bombs in the basement next to some of Gray's personal belongings.

[5] On March 11, 2025, the State charged Gray with possession of a destructive device as a level 5 felony under Cause No. 02D05-2503-F5-89 (“Cause No. 89”). The State also filed a petition to revoke Gray's probation in Cause No. 265. On June 26, 2025, Gray pled guilty to possession of a destructive device in Cause No. 89 and to violating his probation in Cause No. 265. The court held a sentencing hearing on July 24, 2025. The court found that Gray's criminal history, multiple failed efforts at rehabilitation, status as a multistate offender, and the fact that he was on probation at the time of the offense as aggravating factors. The court found his guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility as mitigating factors. The court sentenced Gray to three years executed in Cause No. 89 and revoked his probation in Cause No. 265 and ordered him to serve the balance of his previously suspended three-year sentence. The sentences were ordered served consecutively.

Discussion

[6] Gray asserts that the trial court abused its discretion during sentencing “by failing to consider mitigating circumstances that were clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration.” Appellant's Brief at 5. Specifically, Gray suggests that the “trial court ignored the evidence of the undue hardship that imprisonment would cause [him] due to his medical conditions.” Id. at 7.

[7] To the extent Gray challenges his sentence under Cause No. 89, an abuse of discretion during sentencing occurs if the decision is “clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn therefrom.” Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218. A court abuses its discretion if it: (1) fails “to enter a sentencing statement at all;” (2) enters “a sentencing statement that explains reasons for imposing a sentence—including a finding of aggravating and mitigating factors if any—but the record does not support the reasons;” (3) enters a sentencing statement that “omits reasons that are clearly supported by the record and advanced for consideration;” or (4) considers reasons that “are improper as a matter of law.” Id. at 490-491. If the trial court has abused its discretion, we will remand for resentencing “if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record.” Id. at 491. The relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found, or those which should have been found, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion. Id.

[8] The determination of mitigating circumstances is within the discretion of the trial court. Rogers v. State, 878 N.E.2d 269, 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. The trial court is not obligated to accept the defendant's argument as to what constitutes a mitigating factor, and a trial court is not required to give the same weight to proffered mitigating factors as does a defendant. Id. An allegation that the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor requires the defendant to establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record. Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. If the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, it is not obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist. Id.

[9] With respect to Gray's challenge to his sentence under Cause No. 265 following the revocation of his probation, Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(h) provides:

If the court finds that the person has violated a condition at any time before termination of the period, and the petition to revoke is filed within the probationary period, the court may impose one (1) or more of the following sanctions:

(1) Continue the person on probation, with or without modifying or enlarging the conditions.

(2) Extend the person's probationary period for not more than one (1) year beyond the original probationary period.

(3) Order execution of all or part of the sentence that was suspended at the time of initial sentencing.

[10] The Indiana Supreme Court has held that a trial court's sentencing decisions for probation violations are reviewable using the abuse of discretion standard. Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007). The Court explained that, “[o]nce a trial court has exercised its grace by ordering probation rather than incarceration, the judge should have considerable leeway in deciding how to proceed” and that, “[i]f this discretion were not afforded to trial courts and sentences were scrutinized too severely on appeal, trial judges might be less inclined to order probation to future defendants.” Id. An abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances. Id. As long as the proper procedures have been followed in conducting a probation revocation hearing, the trial court may order execution of a suspended sentence upon a finding of a violation by a preponderance of the evidence. Goonen v. State, 705 N.E.2d 209, 212 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

[11] During the sentencing hearing, Gray did not advance for mitigation consideration that his medical conditions would cause undue hardship. Although Gray's counsel vaguely referenced that Gray “does receive and is still receiving medical disability and has received it for quite some time,” Transcript Volume II at 18, he did not mention any medical conditions or make any argument as to how those conditions would cause undue hardship or should affect Gray's sentence. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor that was both significant and clearly supported by the record. Moreover, in light of Gray's criminal history and history of prior probation violations, Gray has demonstrated no abuse of discretion.

[12] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the sentence imposed by the trial court.

[13] Affirmed.

Brown, Judge.

Altice, J., and DeBoer, J., concur.