WRIGHT v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Wardell Wright appeals his murder conviction, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In June 2023, 14-year-old B.M., who lived with her aunt in a neighborhood on the west side of Indianapolis, was dating 19-year-old Wright. On the evening of June 17, B.M. wanted marijuana but didn't have any money. Wright and B.M. concocted a plan to set up a purchase of marijuana from B.M.’s classmate at Ben Davis High School, 15-year-old J.L. The next morning, B.M. contacted J.L., and they agreed to meet. B.M. asked J.L. to meet her in her neighborhood down the street from her house. Wright drove B.M. and his friend, 19-year-old Brenden Dixson, to the agreed-upon location, a cul-de-sac on Lohr Drive.

[3] According to B.M., the plan was for Wright and Dixson to be there for “backup” to “force J.L. to give [her] the weed for free.” Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 126-27. Wright had an AR-style rifle, and Dixson had a handgun, which Wright had given him. Wright and Dixson hid in bushes in the middle of the cul-de-sac, and B.M. stood on the sidewalk between two houses waiting for J.L. As J.L. approached in his car, Wright and Dixson emerged from the bushes and started shooting at the driver's side door. J.L. was killed and crashed his car. Wright, B.M., and Dixson ran to Wright's car and left. A security camera on one of the houses B.M. was standing by captured most of the incident, and the footage showed Wright shooting at J.L. with an AR-style rifle. See Ex. 5 (clip 2).

[4] The State charged Wright with murder and a firearm enhancement. The State also charged Dixson with murder and alleged that B.M. was a delinquent child for committing what would be murder if committed by an adult. Both Dixson and B.M. made deals with the State. In exchange for his testimony against Wright, Dixson agreed to plead guilty to Level 2 felony attempted robbery and be sentenced to 30 years (with at least 20 years executed, to be determined at sentencing).¹ Similarly, in exchange for her testimony against Wright, B.M. admitted that she was a delinquent for committing what would be Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit robbery if committed by an adult with placement in a residential facility.

[5] A jury trial was held in April 2025. Both B.M. and Dixson testified against Wright. Near the end of B.M.’s testimony, the State sought to publish Exhibit 5, which consisted of three video clips. After the second clip (which depicted the shooting) was played for the jury, there was an outburst from the gallery:

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Bi*ch a** (indiscernible) m'f*cka killed a kid.

THE COURT: Hey, all right, that's enough.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You killed a kid (indiscernible).

THE DEPUTY SHERIFF: Come on out.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Lucky they got you (indiscernible).

(Disruption in gallery)

THE COURT: Everyone be quiet and stay seated. Silence. Everyone else be seated and be quiet, please.

Ladies and gentlemen, obviously these are extremely emotional circumstances, and I recognize that that man should not have -- so just understand that that's emotional. Your decision is to make the decision based on the evidence not (indiscernible) emotional outburst, okay? I apologize for that.

Ladies and gentlemen, if you cannot sit in here quietly and you cannot be quiet, you need to leave the room. I also understand that this is emotional and that people are here, but you cannot behave that way or we will start it all over again. So if you want to start it all over again, we can do that. Thank you.

Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 136-37.

[6] The State then played the final clip of Exhibit 5, after which defense counsel moved for a mistrial. Defense counsel acknowledged that the trial court had already admonished the jury but claimed that “a little bit more” was “require[d].” Id. at 139. The State suggested that the court individually poll the jurors. The court then called the 12 jurors and 2 alternate jurors into the courtroom one by one and asked if they could be fair and impartial and decide the case on the evidence presented. See id. at 140-48. They all said they could. Defense counsel did not object to the court's procedure or questions. When the court finished polling the jurors, it asked defense counsel if he was satisfied that the jurors could be fair and impartial. He responded “[n]ot really” and that he was still moving for a mistrial. Id. at 148. Noting that it “didn't seem to be that [the jurors] were even hesitating when they answered the question,” the court denied the motion. Id. at 148-49.

[7] The trial resumed without incident. The jury found Wright guilty of murder, and he admitted to the firearm enhancement. The trial court sentenced him to 68 years.

[8] Wright now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] Wright contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial. “Because the trial court evaluates first-hand the relevant facts and circumstances at issue and their impact on the jury, it is in the best position to evaluate whether a mistrial is warranted.” Weisheit v. State, 26 N.E.3d 3, 15 (Ind. 2015), reh'g denied. “We accordingly review the trial court's denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion.” Id.

[10] Defendants seeking a mistrial for suspected jury taint are entitled to a presumption of prejudice after making two showings, by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) extra-judicial contact or communications between jurors and unauthorized persons occurred and (2) the contact or communications pertained to the matter before the jury. Ramirez v. State, 7 N.E.3d 933, 939 (Ind. 2014). The burden then shifts to the State to rebut the presumption of prejudice by showing that any contact or communications were harmless. Id. If the State does not rebut the presumption, the trial court must grant a new trial. Id.

[11] Trial courts apply this presumption-of-prejudice analysis in the context of the procedures our Supreme Court established in Lindsey v. State, 295 N.E.2d 819 (Ind. 1973). Id. That is, trial courts “must immediately investigate suspected jury taint by thoroughly interviewing jurors collectively and individually, if necessary.” Id. at 940. The Lindsey procedure is as follows:

If any of the jurors have been exposed, he must be individually interrogated by the court outside the presence of the other jurors, to determine the degree of exposure and the likely effect thereof. After each juror is so interrogated, he should be individually admonished. After all exposed jurors have been interrogated and admonished, the jury should be assembled and collectively admonished, as in the case of a finding of “no exposure.” If the imperiled party deems such action insufficient to remove the peril, he should move for a mistrial.

295 N.E.2d at 824.²

[12] The State acknowledges that the presumption of prejudice applies here, as “[t]he record shows that a spectator made an outburst in open court in front of the jury” and the outburst “pertained to a matter before the jury.” Appellee's Br. p. 15. However, the State claims that it rebutted the presumption of prejudice by showing that the outburst was harmless. We agree with the State. First, immediately after the outburst, the trial court admonished the jury to disregard it and indicated that it was inappropriate. See Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 136-37. Second, the court individually polled the jurors, and they each quickly stated that they could disregard the outburst and decide the case based on the evidence presented at trial. See id. at 140-48. Third, the substance of the outburst was “[y]ou killed a kid.” Id. at 136. At the time of the outburst, the jury had already heard evidence that J.L. was a “kid” (15 years old), and it had just seen video of Wright shooting at J.L. with an AR-style rifle. The outburst, while inappropriate, did not attempt to communicate facts to the jury that had not already been admitted or had been excluded from trial. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.

[13] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   After Wright's trial, Dixson was sentenced to 30 years, with 23 years executed, 7 years suspended, and 3 years of probation.

2.   Wright makes a separate argument that the trial court did not follow the Lindsey procedure because it asked leading questions and did not collectively admonish the jurors after it individually polled them (even though it collectively admonished them before). As the State points out, Wright didn't object on either of these grounds at trial and therefore must establish fundamental error on appeal. See Appellee's Br. pp. 12-13. But Wright doesn't argue fundamental error on appeal and has arguably doubly waived this issue. See Bowman v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1174, 1179 (Ind. 2016) (holding that where appellant “failed to raise the issue of fundamental error in his initial appellate brief[,]” such a claim was “entirely waived”). Regardless, for the reasons explained below, Wright cannot establish fundamental error.

Vaidik, Judge.

Bailey, J., and Scheele, J., concur.