P.H., Appellant-Defendant v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] In these juvenile delinquency proceedings, P.H. appeals the juvenile court's judgment that he committed resisting law enforcement and unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle. His sole argument on appeal is that “[t]he State failed to prove [his] identity as one of the individuals who committed the alleged” delinquent acts. Appellant's Brief at 8. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The day after a 2018 Hyundai Tucson was reported stolen, Lawrence Police Officer Mackenzie Cobb saw the vehicle, began to follow it, and asked fellow officers to provide backup before attempting to pull it over. The vehicle led her on a brief chase, but the driver of the stolen vehicle soon lost control and crashed into a fence. Two young males then fled on foot but were found nearby and arrested. One of those individuals was identified as fourteen-year-old P.H.

[3] The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that P.H. had committed acts that, if committed by an adult, constituted Level 6 felony auto theft,¹ Class A misdemeanor resisting law enforcement,² and Class A Misdemeanor unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle.³ The juvenile court held a bench trial at which the State called three witnesses.

[4] First, the State called the owner of the stolen Hyundai, who testified that she had not given anyone permission to use her vehicle. She also said that security camera footage had captured four individuals standing near the vehicle shortly before it went missing, but that she did not “recognize anyone in the courtroom today[.]” Transcript at 7. When the car was eventually returned to her, she testified that it had damage to its body and interior, including that “the steering column was torn up.” Id. at 6. During the owner's cross-examination, P.H. offered the security footage into evidence. The video showed two individuals standing near the front of the Hyundai and the legs of at least two others standing at the rear. He also offered a still frame that had been taken from that footage, which depicted the partially covered faces of two individuals and the lower body of a third. The car's owner did not identify P.H. as one of the individuals depicted in the video or the still frame.

[5] Next, the State called Officer Cobb. She testified that before pulling the Hyundai over, she ran the license plate to confirm it had been reported as stolen. After she activated her cruiser's lights and siren, the car led her on a brief chase and eventually crashed. After it crashed, both front doors and one of the back doors opened. Two individuals jumped out of the vehicle and fled on foot, while a third stayed by the car and complied with Officer Cobb's instructions. One of the individuals who fled was wearing all black and the other had dark pants, a lighter top, and carried a book bag. Cobb provided these descriptions to nearby officers, and two suspects were later arrested after an officer found one in a residential area and a K9 unit found the other hiding in a nearby backyard. After Cobb described these facts, she had the following exchange with the State's attorney:

[THE STATE:] Did both of those suspects ․ match your descriptions?

[Cobb:] Yes.

Q How accurately would you say?

A I would say [ ] very accurate, yes.

* * *

Q ․ And do you recognize anyone in court today?

A I do.

Q And could you please describe them by what they are wearing?

A Today, the suspect is wearing a black shirt, black male juvenile and has an Afro.

Tr. at 15-16. At the State's request, the trial court noted for the record that Officer Cobb had identified P.H.

[6] Finally, the State called a K9 officer who testified that he received the descriptions of the suspects from Officer Cobb and began tracking them with his K9. While doing so, he saw “two black males running [ ] through [a] neighborhood” who matched Cobb's descriptions. Id. at 23. He pursued and ultimately arrested one of those males, while the other was found and arrested by another officer. He made clear that the suspect he arrested was “not the person” on trial, referring to P.H., and testified that he did not “recognize anyone in court today[.]” Id. at 23-24.

[7] In its closing argument, the State argued that Officer Cobb “testified that she recognized that [P.H.] was inside the vehicle” shortly before his arrest. Id. at 25. P.H.’s attorney countered that “Cobb testified that she recognized [P.H.], but she did not testify as to how or where she recognized him from.” Id. at 26. Defense counsel further opined that he didn't “think that [P.H.] ha[d] been identified as being involved in this at all.” Id. at 27.

[8] Ultimately, the juvenile court entered true findings on the allegations of resisting law enforcement and unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle and a not true finding for auto theft. In its dispositional decree, the court placed P.H. on probation and ordered him to participate in home-based casework and drug testing. P.H. now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[9] On appeal, P.H. contends there was insufficient evidence presented at trial to prove that he committed resisting law enforcement or unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle. When reviewing a claim that a juvenile court's true finding is not supported by sufficient evidence, “we apply a ‘deferential standard of review,’ and we will ‘neither reweigh the evidence nor judge witness credibility.’ ” A.V. v. State, 228 N.E.3d 504, 509 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting Carmack v. State, 200 N.E.3d 452, 459 (Ind. 2023)), reh'g denied, trans. denied. We consider “all the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the verdict,” and we will affirm the juvenile court's judgment “if probative evidence supports each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quoting Carmack, 200 N.E.3d at 459).

[10] To establish that P.H. committed resisting law enforcement as alleged here, the State was required to prove that he “knowingly or intentionally ․ fle[d] from a law enforcement officer after the officer ha[d], by visible or audible means, ․ identified himself or herself and ordered [him] to stop[.]” Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3). To establish that P.H. committed unlawful entry of a motor vehicle as alleged, the State was required to prove that he “enter[ed] a motor vehicle knowing that [he did] not have the permission of an owner, a lessee, or an authorized operator[;] ․ d[id] not have a contractual interest in the motor vehicle; ․ [and] the motor vehicle ha[d] visible steering column damage or ignition switch alteration as a result[.]” I.C. § 35-43-4-2.7(d), (e)(1). P.H. argues the evidence was insufficient to prove any of these elements because “no witness with direct knowledge of the incident tied [him] to the scene.” Appellant's Br. at 11. We disagree.

[11] To be sure, because the victim, the security camera footage, and the K9 officer's testimony did not connect P.H. to the crimes, the only evidence identifying him as a perpetrator was Officer Cobb's testimony describing him as one of “the suspect[s]” that had been arrested. Tr. at 16. However, Indiana has long recognized that testimony by a single eyewitness unequivocally identifying a defendant as the perpetrator is sufficient to support a conviction. Scott v. State, 871 N.E.2d 341, 344 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Richardson v. State, 388 N.E.2d 488, 491 (Ind. 1979), reh'g denied), trans. denied.

[12] P.H. acknowledges the rule set forth by Richardson and Scott but contends that Officer Cobb's identification was “equivocal” and therefore insufficient to adjudicate him as a delinquent given the absence of other evidence tying him to the crimes. Appellant's Br. at 11. Indeed, this Court recognized in Scott that “equivocal testimony of an eye-witness, standing alone, does not support a conviction.” 871 N.E.2d at 345. But Officer Cobb did not equivocate when she identified P.H. at trial. She testified that the two individuals who had been arrested matched the descriptions of those she witnessed flee from the Hyundai, she said that she recognized P.H., and she described him as “the suspect [ ] wearing a black shirt[.]” Tr. at 16 (emphasis added).

[13] Though we agree with P.H. that the manner in which the State asked Officer Cobb if she “recognize[d] anyone in court” was arguably ambiguous when taken out of context, the juvenile court could have reasonably inferred from the whole of Cobb's testimony—including her identification of P.H. as “the suspect”—that P.H. was one of the individuals arrested after fleeing the Hyundai. Id. To conclude otherwise would require us to substitute our judgment for the juvenile court's, which we will not do. See Scott, 871 N.E.2d at 345 (“[W]e will impinge upon the trier of fact's responsibility to weigh the evidence only ‘where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony which is equivocal or the result of coercion and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence of the appellant's guilt.’ ” (quoting Tillman v. State, 642 N.E.2d 221, 223 (Ind. 1994))).

[14] In short, because Officer Cobb did not equivocate in her identification of P.H. as one of the individuals arrested after fleeing the stolen Hyundai, P.H. has failed to show that the evidence was insufficient for the juvenile court to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he resisted arrest and committed unauthorized entry of a motor vehicle.

Conclusion

[15] For these reasons, we affirm the juvenile court's judgment.

[16] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Ind. Code § 35-43-4-2 (a)(1)(B)(i).

2.   I.C. § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3).

3.   I.C. § 35-43-4-2.7(d), (e)(1).

DeBoer, Judge.

Brown, J., and Altice, J., concur.