BOOK v. BOOK (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Halie Book (“Mother”) and Kevin Book (“Father”) are embroiled in contentious post-dissolution proceedings concerning their six children. Most recently, the trial court ordered Mother to pay Father's attorneys’ fees and to not restrict his communication with their children; the trial court also abated Father's child support obligation until he has a relationship with the children. Mother now appeals that order, but because her significant noncompliance with Indiana Appellate Rule 46 substantially impedes our review of her claims, we hold that she has waived appellate review thereof.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] In August 2019, after 14 years of marriage and 6 children, Mother and Father divorced. Since the divorce was finalized, Mother has “st[ood] in the way of” Father reunifying with the children “by not allowing [Father] any visits or communication with the children and blocking [Father] from being able to reach out to them in any[ ]way.” Appealed Order at 1; Appellant's App. Vol. II at 50. Mother “continues to do everything in her power to cut [Father] off from having a normal relationship with his children,” including blocking Father's phone number, “which has caused him to not be able to have the simplest forms of communication, to receive tax information or even wish his children Happy Birthday or Merry Christmas.” Appealed Order at 1; Appellant's App. Vol. II at 50. Due to Mother's actions, in October 2024, Father filed a motion for rule to show cause. After a hearing thereon, the trial court declined to find Mother in contempt but ordered (1) Mother to pay Father's attorneys’ fees in the amount of $7,500; (2) no restrictions be placed on Father's ability to communicate with the children; and (3) Father's child support obligation be “abated by 50% ․ until such time he has a relationship with his children,” Appealed Order at 2; Appellant's App. Vol. II at 51. Mother now appeals the trial court's order.¹

Discussion and Decision

Mother Has Waived Appellate Review of Her Claims

[4] Mother seems to challenge the trial court's orders regarding Father's ability to communicate with the children, Father's child support, and the attorneys’ fees award. However, we cannot address those claims due to Mother's significant noncompliance with Appellate Rule 46. Although we have a well-established preference for deciding cases on their merits rather than on procedural grounds like waiver, Pierce v. State, 29 N.E.3d 1258, 1267 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Roberts v. Cmty. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 897 N.E.2d 458, 469 (Ind. 2008)), if a party's failure to comply with the Appellate Rules is “sufficiently substantial to impede our consideration of the issue raised,” we will not address the merits of that issue, id. (quoting Guardiola v. State, 375 N.E.2d 1105, 1107 (Ind. 1978)).

[5] The purpose of our appellate rules—especially Appellate Rule 46 governing the content of briefs—“is to aid and expedite review and to relieve the appellate court of the burden of searching the record and briefing the case.” Miller v. Patel, 212 N.E.3d 639, 657 (Ind. 2023) (emphasis added) (quoting Dridi v. Cole Kline LLC, 172 N.E.3d 361, 364 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021)). We will not search the record to find a basis for the party's argument. Carter ex rel. CNO Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Hilliard, 970 N.E.2d 735, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing Nealy v. Am. Family Mut. Ins., 910 N.E.2d 842, 845 n.2 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), trans. denied). Similarly, “[w]e will not step in the shoes of the advocate and fashion arguments on his behalf, ‘nor will we address arguments’ that are ‘too poorly developed or improperly expressed to be understood.’ ” Miller, 212 N.E.3d at 657 (quoting Dridi, 172 N.E.3d at 364).

[6] Mother's second amended brief has numerous procedural deficiencies. To start, Mother's Statement of Issues does not “concisely and particularly describe each issue presented for review,” Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(5), but instead primarily describes or quotes the appealed order, see Appellant's 2d Am. Br. at 4–5. For instance, Mother's first issue statement is as follows:

The Court's Order stated that Appellant continued to stand in the way of reunification (See Appendix, page 50, paragraph 4) by not having the children in any counseling, when Appelle[e] concedes he did have the children in counseling. That the Appellant was ordered to pay the Appellee attorney[s’] fees of Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7[,]500.00) (See Appendix, page 50, paragraph 6) with interest for bad conduct of the Appellant, when the Appellee failed to establish by testimony anything factual or specific that the Appellant could have done or should have done that amounted obdurate kind of conduct that allows courts to award adverse attorney fees where no issue of contempt was made.

Id. at 4.

[7] Mother weaves argument into her Statement of Case and Statement of Facts, see id. at 5–8, which is not permissible, Dridi, 172 N.E.3d at 365 (citing Ramsey v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., 789 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)) (“[T]he statement of facts must also be devoid of argument.”). Mother also fails to support with record citations numerous statements of fact in both her Statement of Case and Statement of Facts, see Appellant's 2d Am. Br. at 5–8, as required by Appellate Rules 46(A)(5) and 46(A)(6)(a), respectively.

[8] Moreover, Mother includes the incorrect standard of review, see App. R. 46(A)(8)(b)—she provides the abuse of discretion standard, Appellant's 2d Am. Br. at 5 (citing Rogers v. Rogers, 876 N.E.2d 1121, 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied), but the applicable standard is clear error because the trial court sua sponte entered findings and conclusions in this case, Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 123 (Ind. 2016) (citing In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. 2014)); the general judgment standard may also be applicable to the extent the trial court's findings and conclusions do not cover a particular issue, id. at 124 (citing S.D., 2 N.E.3d at 1287).

[9] Mother also fails to present cogent reasoning in her Argument. See App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). Mother's Argument is essentially a recitation of facts and lacks citation to authority. For example, Mother asserts without citation to authority that the “modification was an abuse of discretion in the child support order, which sets a vague prospective, and should be struck as an illegal order.” Appellant's 2d Am. Br. at 9 (citing Appellant's App. Vol. II at 53–55). Mother's citation to the Appellant's Appendix is a three-page order containing multiple modifications, and Mother does not identify to which modification she is referring. Furthermore, Mother identifies three issues in her Statement of Issues, but there are no headings relating to those issues in Mother's Argument or other indicia that Mother's Argument actually addresses the enumerated issues. Compare Appellant's 2d Am. Br. at 4–5, with id. at 8–10; see App. R. 46(A)(8)(c) (requiring headings for each argument).

[10] It appears that Mother's first attempt at presenting argument occurs in her Conclusion, see Appellant's 2d Am. Br. at 10–11, but the Conclusion must “include a precise statement of the relief sought,” App. R. 46(A)(9), not argument. Even if we were to consider Mother's Conclusion as her Argument, she still fails to support her claims with cogent reasoning. After summarizing some authority concerning the American Rule of attorneys’ fees, Mother states, “It was an abuse of discretion for the court to grant unlimited contact visitation with the children, to modify child support as it did, and mak[e] a very large award of attorney[s’] fees ․” Appellant's 2d Am. Br. at 11. Mother does not provide any support for these conclusions. And, as Father correctly notes in his briefing, Indiana Code section 31-17-7-1 governs the award of attorneys’ fees in this case, not the American Rule. See Ind. Code § 31-17-7-1(a) (allowing courts to award attorneys’ fees in child custody and parenting time proceedings).

[11] Mother's noncompliance with Appellate Rule 46 substantially impedes our consideration of the issues she raises, so we conclude that she has waived appellate review thereof. See Pierce, 29 N.E.3d at 1267. We therefore affirm the trial court on all issues raised.

[12] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   After this case was fully briefed, Father filed a motion to dismiss and for appellate attorneys’ fees. Simultaneously with this decision, we have issued an order (1) denying Father's dismissal request; (2) granting his appellate attorneys’ fees request, see Ind. Appellate Rule 66(E); Gallo v. Sunshine Car Care, LLC, 185 N.E.3d 392, 404–05 (Ind. Ct. App.) (awarding appellate attorneys’ fees), trans. denied, 194 N.E.3d 599 (Ind. 2022); and (3) remanding for a determination of Father's reasonable appellate attorneys’ fees.

Felix, Judge.

Brown, J., and Scheele, J., concur.