MARTINEZ v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Statement of the Case

[1] Saul Martinez appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He claimed that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with his guilty plea in a 2003 theft case. Concluding that the post-conviction court did not err in rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In March 2003, the State of Indiana charged nineteen-year-old Martinez with six counts of Class D felony theft in connection with his misuse of a credit card that belonged to his girlfriend's mother. Martinez, by counsel, entered into a plea agreement with the State. He agreed to plead guilty to one count of Class D felony theft in exchange for a suspended sentence and the possibility that his conviction would be reduced to a misdemeanor if he successfully completed probation.

[3] The trial court accepted the parties’ agreement and entered a judgment of conviction. Martinez completed his term of probation, and the court converted his Class D felony conviction to a Class A misdemeanor conviction.

[4] In the years that followed, Martinez started a company that installs decorative concrete. He also started a family. Martinez has not been arrested since the 2003 case.

[5] In 2020, Martinez petitioned to have his conviction expunged. The trial court granted his petition.

[6] In January 2024, over twenty years after pleading guilty, Martinez filed a petition for post-conviction relief challenging his theft conviction. He alleged that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel. Martinez specifically alleged that his counsel should have asked him about his immigration status and advised him that pleading guilty might interfere with him seeking citizenship.

[7] The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing. During the hearing, Martinez, a lawful permanent resident of the United States, stated that he is seeking citizenship, but his expunged misdemeanor conviction is hindering that process. The State did not present any evidence.

[8] The trial court issued an order denying Martinez's petition. In the order, the court concluded that Martinez's petition was barred by the doctrine of laches and that he had failed to carry his burden of proof on the merits of his ineffective assistance claim. This appeal followed.

Issue

[9] Martinez argues that the post-conviction court erred by rejecting his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.¹

Discussion and Decision

[10] Post-conviction proceedings are civil actions. Bobadilla v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1272, 1279 (Ind. 2019). “The petitioner has the burden of establishing his grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence.” Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(5).

[11] Because Martinez seeks review of the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, he is appealing from a negative judgment. Baumholser v. State, 186 N.E.3d 684, 688 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022), trans. denied. “A party appealing a negative post-conviction judgment must establish that the evidence is without conflict and, as a whole, unmistakably and unerringly points to a conclusion contrary to that reached by the post-conviction court.” Back v. State, 162 N.E.3d 593, 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021), trans. denied. Stated differently, the petitioner “must convince this Court that there is no way within the law that the court below could have reached the decision it did.” Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 745 (Ind. 2002). We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge credibility of witnesses. Back, 162 N.E.3d at 600.

[12] When reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, we apply the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Nix v. State, 212 N.E.3d 194, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. “To prevail on such a claim, the petitioner must demonstrate both that counsel's performance was deficient and the deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner.” Id. “A counsel's performance is deficient if it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness based on prevailing professional norms.” State v. Pearson, 191 N.E.3d 892, 898 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). There is a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance and used reasonable professional judgment. Id. Further, the law requires courts to consider the legal precedent available to counsel at the time of representation, and counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to anticipate or initiate changes in the law. Lee v. State, 91 N.E.3d 978, 987 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quotation omitted), trans. denied.

[13] “To meet the appropriate test for prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Pearson, 191 N.E.3d at 898. “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. A petitioner's failure to establish both elements of the Strickland standard will cause the ineffective assistance of counsel claim to fail. Marin v. State, 210 N.E.3d 857, 867 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied.

[14] Martinez argues that his counsel performed deficiently by failing to advise him of the effect that pleading guilty might have on a future citizenship application. He cites Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010), in which the United States Supreme Court determined “that counsel must inform her client whether his plea carries a risk of deportation. Our longstanding Sixth Amendment precedents, the seriousness of deportation as a consequence of a criminal plea, and the concomitant impact of deportation on families living lawfully in this country demand no less.” But that case was decided well after Martinez pleaded guilty, and the Supreme Court has determined that the holding in Padilla does not apply retroactively. See Chaidez v. U.S., 568 U.S. 342, 354 (2013) (holding that Padilla announced a new rule).

[15] Martinez also cites two Indiana cases: Bobadilla, 117 N.E.3d 1272, and Barajas v. State, 987 N.E.2d 176 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), to support his claim that counsel performed deficiently by failing to ask about his immigration status and potential citizenship issues.² In Bobadilla, the Indiana Supreme Court held that the petitioner's counsel rendered deficient performance by independently marking “N/A” on a form asking about citizenship “without first inquiring into his client's citizenship status.” 117 N.E.3d at 1284. The Bobadilla court, echoing the holding in Padilla, emphasized that “counsel's failure to inform a client of deportation consequences” was at issue. Id. at 1282-83. In Barajas, the petitioner argued that his attorney should have “explain[ed] the deportation consequences of his guilty plea.” 987 N.E.2d at 180. The Court of Appeals ultimately decided the petitioner was not prejudiced by any deficient performance.

[16] This case differs substantially from Bobadilla and Barajas because Martinez expressed no concerns about being deported as a result of his theft conviction. To the contrary, Martinez denied that anyone was “trying to deport” him. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 14. He instead testified only that his criminal conviction was preventing him from completing the citizenship process. But Bobadilla and Barajas focused on deportation, and they do not compel us to conclude that counsel renders deficient performance by failing to ask about a client's immigration status where a conviction might subsequently affect a citizenship application. In the future, the holdings in Bobadilla and Barajas may be extended to situations like Martinez's, but as we have noted, counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to anticipate or advocate for changes in the law. See Woodson v. State, 961 N.E.2d 1035, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (affirming rejection of ineffective assistance claim in connection with counsel's alleged failure to challenge precedent), trans. denied.

[17] Martinez's claim of ineffective assistance falls short on the element of deficient performance. As a result, we do not need to address the element of prejudice. Martinez has failed to show that the post-conviction court erred as a matter of law when it rejected his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Conclusion

[18] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

[19] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   Martinez also argues that the post-conviction court erred in concluding that his petition is barred by laches. “Laches is an equitable doctrine that, when applicable, bars a party from seeking relief.” Silvers v. State, 250 N.E.3d 511, 518 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025), aff'd on reh'g, 255 N.E.3d 564, trans. denied. In the post-conviction context, “the State has the burden of proving laches as an affirmative defense[.]” Id. at 519. The “State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) the petitioner unreasonably delayed in seeking relief and (2) the State is prejudiced by the delay.” Id.Here, the State did not present any evidence during the post-conviction hearing, and nothing in Martinez's evidence demonstrates any prejudice to the State. Having not presented any evidence, the State has not carried its burden to show that laches applies. See Barber v. State, 141 N.E.3d 35, 41 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (petitioner's claim not barred by laches; State failed to present any evidence to prove prejudice), trans. denied. But we will not reverse the post-conviction court's judgment because we affirm the post-conviction court's rejection of Martinez's claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

2.   Both of these cases, like Padilla, were issued well after Martinez pleaded guilty, but prior Indiana cases addressed counsel's failure to inform their clients of the prospect of deportation. See Segura v. State, 749 N.E.2d 496, 500 (Ind. 2001) (“[T]he failure to advise of the consequence of deportation can, under some circumstances, constitute deficient performance.”), overruled in part on other grounds by Bobadilla, 117 N.E.3d at 1287; Williams v. State, 641 N.E.2d 44, 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (“It is our firm belief that the consequence of deportation, whether labelled collateral or not, is of sufficient seriousness that it constitutes ineffective assistance for an attorney to fail to advise a noncitizen defendant of the deportation consequences of a guilty plea.”), trans. denied. Bobadilla and Barajas are based on the principles discussed in Segura and Williams, and we discuss Bobadilla and Barajas in the context of those decisions.

Najam, Senior Judge.

Bradford, J., and Felix, J., concur.