JONES v. STATE (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Case Summary

[1] Eddy T. Jones appeals his conviction for strangulation, as a Class A misdemeanor, as well as the corresponding written sentencing order following a bench trial. We affirm and remand with instructions.

Issues

[2] Jones raises three issues for our review:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction.

2. Whether the court erred when it imposed a written sentencing order that conflicted with its oral sentencing order.

3. Whether the court entered an incomplete sentencing order.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Jones and T.B. began dating in June 2014, and they lived together for their “whole relationship,” which lasted until April 2023. Tr. Vol. 2 at 51. On December 29, 2022, Jones and T.B. went with T.B.’s mother, some other family members, and friends to the zoo. After Jones and T.B. returned home, a conflict ensued between them, and Jones placed his hands around T.B.’s throat.

[4] The next day, T.B. went to the hospital and reported that Jones had strangled her the previous day. T.B. also told medical personnel that she had a headache and that her throat hurt. Drenda Bell, a forensic nurse, examined T.B. and noted that “there was strangulation that was present[.]” Id. at 92. Bell also noted that T.B.’s neck was “tender,” that there were “petechia in the back [of] the throat,” and that there was “redness on both sides of [T.B.’s] neck.” Id. at 100, 103. After the exam, T.B. spoke to an officer but declined to “file charges[.]” Id. at 68.

[5] On January 11, 2024, T.B. ultimately reported to police that Jones had strangled her, taken her keys and her phone, and prevented her from leaving their home on the night of December 29, 2022. Based on T.B.’s report, the State charged Jones with strangulation, as a Level 6 felony (Count 1); domestic battery, as a Class A misdemeanor (Count 2); kidnapping, as a Level 6 felony (Count 3); criminal confinement, as a Level 6 felony (Count 4); and interfering with the reporting of a crime, as a Class A misdemeanor (Count 5).

[6] The court held a bench trial on April 22, 2025. During the trial, T.B. testified that on December 29, 2022, her mother had planned a trip to the zoo, which included another male. She then testified that this “irritated” Jones and that they “argued” on the way to the zoo. Id. at 54. She further testified that, during the drive, Jones was “intense” and “really short” and was driving “really reckless[ly].” Id. at 55. T.B. also testified that, once they arrived at the zoo, Jones was “very rude,” and the two of them ended up parting ways from the rest of the group and ultimately left. Id. at 56. T.B. also stated that Jones was “aggressive” on the drive home and was “yelling” at her, calling her things like “a whore and the B word.” Id. at 59. And she testified that, after they returned home, Jones got upset over a phone call she had received and demanded that she unlock her phone. She then testified that Jones followed her into the bathroom, “grabbed [her] by [her] neck[,]” and lifted her such that her feet were off the floor. Id. at 61. She also testified that she “couldn't breathe” and that she lost consciousness. Id. at 62. And she testified that, when she woke up, Jones had taken her phone and keys and prevented her from leaving the house that night. The State also presented the testimony of Bell regarding her examination of T.B. and had admitted as evidence T.B.’s medical records.

[7] After the State had rested, Jones moved for a directed verdict on all charges. The court denied it as to Counts 1, 2, and 4 but granted it as to Counts 3 and 5. Then, in his defense, Jones testified that he had spent December 29, 2022, with a friend getting a tattoo and that he had never seen T.B. that day.

[8] After both parties had rested and presented their closing arguments, the court stated that it “question[ed] credibility somewhat across the board” but that the “thing that h[e]ld[ ] the greatest potency of credibility [were] the medical records.” Id. at 169. The court further stated that it “believe[d] that the truth is in the middle here,” “that they likely went on a date,” and that there “was conflict.” Id. The court then found Jones guilty of Count 1, finding that “he put his hands around her neck at some point out of frustration and anger.” Id. And the court found him guilty of Count 2 but merged it with Count 1. The court then found that the strangulation was “the only physical contact that occurred” and that Jones did not confine T.B. Id. at 169. As such, the court found Jones not guilty of Count 4.

[9] At the conclusion of a sentencing hearing, the court granted Jones alternative misdemeanor sentencing and entered judgment of conviction on Count 1 as a Class A misdemeanor. The court then sentenced him to 365 days, with any time not already served to be suspended to probation. As conditions of his probation, the court ordered him to “work diligently to try and get [his] GED” and to “work with probation to get a valid driver's license.” Id. at 191. The court also ordered Jones to participate in a 26-week batterer's intervention program as well as Moral Reconation Therapy (“MRT”). And, as an “incentive,” the court indicated that it would “allow [his] probation to terminate if [he] successfully complete[d] those four substantive terms of probation.” Id. at 192.

[10] Thereafter, the court issued its written sentencing order. In that order, the court noted that Jones had been found guilty of Count 1 as a Class A misdemeanor but did not mention any of the other four counts or their dispositions. See Appellant's App. Vol. 2 at 167. In addition, the sentencing order and the order of probation required Jones to “[o]btain a High School Diploma or GED” and “[o]btain a Valid Driver's License” along with completing the 26-week batterer's intervention program and MRT. Id. at 168, 169. And the order provided for “[p]robation to terminate upon completion of terms.” Id. This appeal ensued.

Discussion and Decision

Issue One: Sufficiency of the Evidence

[11] Jones first asserts that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction. Our standard of review on a claim of insufficient evidence is well settled:

For a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we look only at the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the [judgment]. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We do not assess the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017).

[12] To prove that Jones committed strangulation, the State was required to prove that he knowingly or intentionally applied pressure to the throat or neck of T.B. in a manner that impeded her normal breathing or blood circulation and that he did so in a rude, angry, or insolent manner. See Ind. Code § 35-42-2-9(c)(1). On appeal, Jones does not dispute that he placed his hands on T.B.’s neck. However, he contends that the State failed to prove that he did so in a rude, angry, or insolent manner. In particular, Jones asserts that the court found credibility problems with both T.B.’s and his testimony, that it found that the strangulation had occurred only through the medical records, and that the medical records did not provide any indication of the “manner of strangulation.” Appellant's Br. at 13.

[13] Jones is correct that the court questioned “credibility somewhat across the board.” Tr. Vol. 2 at 169. However, the court explicitly stated that it believed that Jones and T.B. “likely went on a date” and that “there was conflict.” Id. And the court believed that “he put his hands around her neck[.]” Id. Thus, it is clear that, while the court did not believe all of T.B.’s testimony, it believed the portion of her testimony regarding a fight between her and Jones and that Jones put his hands around her neck. Further, the medical records demonstrate that T.B. went to the hospital on December 30, 2022, and reported that she had been strangled the day before. And the court clearly found those records to be credible.

[14] It was entirely reasonable for the court, as the fact-finder, to conclude that Jones’ act of putting his hands around T.B.’s neck when there had been conflict between the two of them was done in a rude, angry, or insolent manner. As such, the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for strangulation.

Issue Two: Conflict in Sentencing Orders

[15] Jones next contends that the court erred when it entered a written sentencing order that conflicted with its oral sentencing order. “When oral and written sentencing statements conflict, we examine them together to discern the intent of the sentencing court.” Walker v. State, 932 N.E.2d 733, 738 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). And we may remand the case for correction of clerical errors if the trial court's intent is unambiguous. See Willey v. State, 712 N.E.2d 434, 445 n.8 (Ind. 1999) (“Based on the unambiguous nature of the trial court's oral sentencing pronouncement, we conclude that the Abstract of Judgment and Sentencing Order contain clerical errors and remand this case for correction of those errors.”).

[16] Here, the trial court's oral sentencing statement provided as follows:

I read in the pre-sentence investigation that Mr. Jones left high school in ninth grade and wants to partake and receive his GED. I'd like probation to help him do that. As one of the conditions of probation, I'm going to order that you work diligently to try and get your GED.

The second, I note that almost every other misdemeanor conviction here relates to not having a valid driver's license, and you don't currently have a valid driver's license. I'm going to order that you work with probation to get a valid driver's license. I think it's really important to be able to help your mom. I think it's important for you and your employment opportunities.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 191.

[17] That oral statement is clear that the court intended for Jones to work toward obtaining his GED and driver's license because they would be helpful to him, not that Jones was mandated to complete either task. And we agree with Jones that it would be impractical, and likely difficult, to require Jones to both obtain his GED and get a driver's license in less than a year while simultaneously completing a batterer's intervention program and MRT and while being employed full-time, which was another condition of his probation.

[18] Given the unambiguous nature of the trial court's oral sentencing order, we conclude that the written sentencing order—which requires that he “[o]btain,” not just work toward, a GED and driver's license—contains clerical errors. We therefore remand with instructions for the court to correct the sentencing order to reflect that Jones is required to work toward obtaining his GED and driver's license.¹

Issue Three: Sentencing Order

[19] Finally, Jones contends that the court erred when it entered a sentencing order that provides only a disposition as to Count 1 but does not reference Counts 2 through 5 or their dispositions. As the State points out, the “only requirements” for a sentencing order “are that the order includes the crimes for which [a defendant] was found guilty and clearly expresses the sentence imposed on those convictions” and that an order that meets those requirements “need not be amended[.]” Baker v. State, 255 N.E.3d 1199, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025). However, we also agree that the “better practice” is for “sentencing orders to be complete and accurate with respect to the charges that were tried and the disposition of each, not just the charges that were reduced to a conviction.” Crane v. State, 147 N.E.3d 424, 425 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020). As we are already remanding for correction of the sentencing order, we also direct the court to amend that order to reflect that the guilty finding on Count 2 merged with Count 1 and that Jones was found not guilty of Counts 3, 4, and 5.²

Conclusion

[20] The State presented sufficient evidence to support Jones’ conviction for strangulation, and we affirm that conviction. But we remand with instructions for the court to fix the clerical errors in the sentencing order related to his conditions of probation and to reflect the charges for which Jones was tried but not found guilty.

[21] Affirmed and remanded with instructions.

FOOTNOTES

1.   The State contends that we need not remand for clarification because Jones has not shown an inability to fulfill the conditions. The State further alleges that, if he is unable to obtain his GED or driver's license and if the probation department files a probation violation petition against him, he could “have the opportunity to show the court that he faithfully attempted” to complete the conditions. Appellee's Br. at 21. The State further contends that, if the court finds a violation, Jones would be able to appeal that determination. However, we find it unnecessarily burdensome to require either the State or Jones to go through the litigation process to determine whether he violated the conditions of his probation when a logical and economical solution exists to remand for clarification so all parties know, without ambiguity, that Jones is required only to work diligently toward his GED and driver's license, not obtain them.

2.   We note that, while the court found Jones guilty of Count 2, it properly did not enter judgment of conviction on that count.

Bailey, Judge.

Tavitas, C.J., and Kenworthy, J., concur.