IN RE: the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationships of: Q.D. (2026)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

[1] A.H. (“Mother”) and Q.D. (“Father”) (collectively, “Parents”) appeal the involuntary termination of their parental rights to Q.D., Jr. Mother also appeals the involuntary termination of her parental rights to J.H. Mother presents three issues for our review, which we restate as:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted Exhibit 10 and Exhibit 14 containing the results of Mother's drug screens (the “Drug Screen Records”);

2. Whether the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the conditions under which Q.D., Jr. and J.H. (collectively, “Children”) were removed from her care would not be remedied; and

3. Whether the trial court's findings support its conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights to Children was in Children's best interests.

Father presents two additional issues for our review, which we restate as:

1. Whether the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) provided Father with reasonable services to support his reunification with Q.D., Jr.; and

2. Whether the evidence supported the trial court's findings that Father had mental health issues and that he had not made meaningful progress toward reunification with Q.D., Jr.

We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother is the mother of J.H.,¹ born in October 2021, and Q.D., Jr., born in June 2023. Father is the father of Q.D., Jr. Children lived with Parents prior to this case. In April 2023, DCS received a report that there was drug use by a third party living in the family home. DCS Family Case Manager Molly Parkhurst (“FCM Parkhurst”) visited the family home and observed it was “very cluttered[,]” with “dirty dishes” and “cockroaches all over the home.” (Tr. Vol. II at 23-24.) A few days later, FCM Parkhurst returned to the home and spoke with Mother. Based on her knowledge of another person in the home using illegal substances, FCM Parkhurst asked Mother to submit to a drug screen, which returned a positive result for methamphetamine. FCM Parkhurst later returned to talk to Mother about an informal adjustment, and Mother admitted to using methamphetamine. Mother agreed to participate in an informal adjustment with the goals of “improv[ing] the home conditions as well as obtain[ing] substance use services to address the ongoing positive drug screens, [and engaging in] parenting education.” (Id. at 28.)

[3] During the informal adjustment, DCS tried to help Parents clean the home, but Parents missed cleaning appointments with service providers. DCS contracted with an exterminator to assist with the pest problem, but the home was never clean enough for the exterminator to come. DCS also gave Parents referrals for mental health and substance abuse services, but Parents did not participate in them.

[4] Mother gave birth to Q.D., Jr. on June 28, 2023. Q.D., Jr.’s umbilical cord blood tested positive for “THC, non-prescribed amphetamines, and methamphetamine.” (Id. at 28.) In addition, the doctor's office reported to DCS that Mother was impaired during one of Q.D., Jr.’s visits in July 2023. Mother admitted to using marijuana prior to that appointment. FCM Parkhurst visited the family's home on July 11, 2023, and observed Parents were both impaired. FCM Parkhurst also noticed the house was not clean, and there were cockroaches climbing on top of clean baby bottles. Based on the condition of the home and Mother's substance abuse, DCS removed Children from Parents’ care. Q.D., Jr. was placed in relative care, and J.H. was placed in a foster home, where they have been since removal from Parents’ care.

[5] On July 12, 2023, DCS filed its petition alleging Children were Children in Need of Services (“CHINS”). In September 2023, Father admitted Q.D., Jr. was a CHINS because he “lack[ed] the parenting skills to appropriately care for and/or supervise [Q.D., Jr.]” (Ex. Vol. II at 43.) Mother denied Children were CHINS and the trial court held a fact-finding hearing on the matter. In October 2023, the trial court adjudicated Children as CHINS based on Mother's substance abuse, Mother's financial instability, and the unsanitary conditions of the family home. In December 2023, the trial court entered its dispositional decree ordering Parents to, among other things, obtain and maintain suitable housing; participate in services designed to address parenting skills, substance abuse, and mental health issues; participate in random drug screens; obey the law; and visit with their respective children.

[6] During the pendency of the CHINS case, Mother showed some progress with reunification services such as engaging in services to address the condition of the family home. Mother completed an intensive outpatient treatment program to address her substance abuse, but she was unable to maintain sobriety during that program. Mother refused to enter an inpatient substance abuse treatment program. Throughout the case, Mother regularly tested positive for illegal substances including methamphetamine. Mother did not engage in mental health services to address her diagnoses of anxiety and depression, nor did she complete individual therapy based on recommendations stemming from her psychological and domestic violence assessments. She also did not participate in services aimed at improving her parenting and home management skills.

[7] During the same time Father voluntarily completed an intensive outpatient program to address his alcohol abuse problem. Father requested mental health services to address mental health issues after he “stuck a gun to his head on two separate occasions on the same day.” (Tr. Vol. II at 15.) However, he only attended two out of four therapy sessions. Father also did not make progress in other services aimed at improving parenting skills, housing conditions, or employment. On April 3, 2024, Mother was charged with Level 6 felony possession of methamphetamine ² following an arrest on March 30, 2024.³

[8] Mother and Father also did not consistently attend supervised visitation with Children. From March 2024 to November 2024, Mother visited with Children five times despite being offered weekly visits. At one point, Mother told service provider Vicki Carr that she “wanted to keep custody of [A.H.], but not [Q.D., Jr.]” (Id. at 148.) When Father visited with Q.D., Jr., he did not interact with his child “in a productive way” and his involvement with Q.D., Jr. during visits was “minimum at best.” (Id. at 124.) Eventually, the trial court suspended Parents’ visitation with their respective children due to their failure to consistently attend supervised visitation.

[9] In November 2024, DCS filed its petition to terminate Mother's parental rights to Children and to terminate Father's parental rights to Q.D., Jr. The trial court held fact-finding hearings in January 2025 and May 2025. The trial court heard evidence regarding Parents’ inability to participate in and complete services as well as testimony regarding Mother's substance abuse issues and Parents’ lack of visitation with Children.

[10] Carr testified that Father had obtained employment twice during the pendency of the case, but he was not employed at the time of the May 2025 fact-finding hearing. Father testified during the May 2025 fact-finding hearing that he was starting a new job on the Wednesday following the hearing. Carr also testified that Mother completed training at the “Greensburg Honda plant” but that she “didn't know what happened with that.” (Id. at 145.) Additionally, Carr told the trial court that Mother briefly worked for a “kind of a temp service” but was not employed at the time of the May 2025 fact-finding hearing. (Id.) Carr indicated she provided Mother with a list of employers willing to hire those with felony criminal histories, but Mother did not obtain employment with those businesses.

[11] During the May 2025 fact-finding hearing, Family Case Manager Anastasia Terry (“FCM Terry”) testified regarding the condition of the family home. She reported Mother had not allowed her to see the home since February 28, 2025. When FCM Terry visited the family home at that time she observed “trash and debris on the floor that a child would easily be able to put into their mouth ․ [and] missing flooring and, like, some weak spots in the floor.” (Id. at 197.) FCM Terry also testified that one of the rooms in the house was “covered in dog feces” when she visited the house in January 2025 and that Mother would not allow her access to that room during the February 2025 visit. (Id. at 198.) On June 9, 2025, the trial court issued its order terminating Mother's parental rights to Children and Father's parental rights to Q.D., Jr. based on Parents’ failure to participate in services and visitation, Mother's continued substance abuse issues, Parents’ inability to obtain and maintain employment, and the unsuitable condition of the family home.

Discussion and Decision

[12] Parents challenge the termination of their parental rights to their respective children. “The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” In re A.L., 223 N.E.3d 1126, 1137 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied. However, a juvenile court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a termination. Id. “If ‘parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities,’ termination of parental rights is appropriate.” Id. (quoting Bester v. Lake Cnty. Ofc. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)). The termination of the parent-child relationship is “an ‘extreme measure’ and should only be utilized as a ‘last resort when all other reasonable efforts to protect the integrity of the natural relationship between parent and child have failed.’ ” K.E. v. Ind. Dep't of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Rowlett v. Vanderburgh Cnty. Ofc. of Fam. & Child., 841 N.E.2d 615, 623 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied).

[13] To terminate a parent-child relationship in Indiana, DCS must allege and prove “one (1) or more” of the circumstances listed in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d). Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c). As relevant here, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(d) provides DCS can prove:

(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

(4) That there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being, safety, physical health, or life of the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(d) (2024). In addition, DCS must prove that termination is in the children's best interests, Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(3) (2024), and that there exists a satisfactory plan for the children's care following termination. Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(c)(2) (2024). DCS must provide clear and convincing proof of these allegations at the termination hearing. In re T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019), trans. denied. “[I]f the State fails to prove any one of these statutory elements, then it is not entitled to a judgment terminating parental rights.” In re K.E., 162 N.E.3d 565, 569 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1261 (Ind. 2019)), trans. denied. Because parents have a constitutionally protected right to establish a home and raise their children, the State “must strictly comply” with the statutory requirements for terminating parental rights. In re Q.M., 974 N.E.2d 1021, 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Platz v. Elkhart Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 631 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994)).

[14] When reviewing a trial court's termination of parental rights,

we do not reweigh the evidence or judge witness credibility. We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most favorable to the judgment and give due regard to the trial court's unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. We will set aside the trial court's judgment only if it is clearly erroneous.

In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1143 (Ind. 2016) (internal quotations and citations omitted). When, as here, a judgment contains specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. In re Adoption of T.L., 4 N.E.3d 658, 662 (Ind. 2014). First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the trial court's judgment. Id. A finding is clearly erroneous when the record lacks evidence or reasonable inferences from the evidence to support it. Steele-Giri v. Steele, 51 N.E.3d 119, 125 (Ind. 2016). “We accept unchallenged findings as true.” Henderson v. Henderson, 139 N.E.3d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019).

Mother's Arguments

1.1 Admission of Drug Screen Records

[15] Mother argues the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the Drug Screen Records that contained the results of her drug screens throughout the case. “The admission of evidence is entrusted to the sound discretion of the juvenile court.” Matter of A.F., 69 N.E.3d 932, 941-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. The trial court abuses that discretion when its “decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Id. at 942. If a trial court “abuses its discretion by admitting the challenged evidence, we will reverse for that error only if the error is inconsistent with substantial justice or if a substantial right of the party is affected.” Id.

[16] Mother first argues the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the Drug Screen Records because DCS did not give her notice, pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 902(11), that they would be introduced as evidence. That rule states, in relevant part,

The following items of evidence are self-authenticating; they require no extrinsic evidence of authenticity in order to be admitted:

* * * * *

(11) Certified Domestic Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. Unless the source of information or the circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness, the original or a copy of a domestic record that meets the requirements of Rule 803(6)(A)-(C),[4] as shown by a certification under oath of the custodian or another qualified person. Before the trial or hearing, the proponent must give an adverse party reasonable written notice of the intent to offer the record – and must make the record and certification available for inspection – so that the party has a fair opportunity to challenge them.

Evid. R. 902(11) (footnote added) (emphases in original).

[17] At the fact-finding hearings, Mother objected to Exhibit 10 based on hearsay because she did not have “the ability to cross-examine anybody that tested [the drug screens]” and that “we're asking one witnesses [sic] to try to get in things that several people did.” (Tr. Vol. II at 37.) Mother renewed the same objection for Exhibit 14. Mother did not mention Indiana Evidence Rule 902(11) in her objections to the Drug Screen Results. Because Mother's objections were based on hearsay and not Indiana Evidence Rule 902(11), her argument regarding Indiana Evidence Rule 902(11) is waived for failure to present it to the trial court. See, e.g., First Chicago Ins. Co. v. Collins, 141 N.E.3d 54, 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (“an argument or issue raised for the first time on appeal is waived for appellate review”).

[18] Mother also argues the trial court also abused its discretion when it admitted the Drug Screen Results because they were hearsay that did not fall under an exception. Hearsay is “a statement that: (1) is not made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing; and (2) is offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Evid. R. 801(c). “Hearsay is not admissible unless these rules or other law provides otherwise.” Evid. R. 802. As is relevant here, Indiana Evidence Rule 803(6) states “a record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis” is admissible as a “[r]ecord[ ] of [r]egularly [c]onducted [a]ctivity” as long as:

(A) the record was made at or near the time by – or from information transmitted by – someone with knowledge;

(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit;

(C) making the record was a regular practice of that activity;

(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting certification; and

(E) neither the source of information nor the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.

Mother asserts the Drug Screen Records were inadmissible because they did not qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule under Indiana Evidence Rule 803(6).

[19] In Matter of K.R., 154 N.E.3d at 818, 822 (Ind. 2020), our Indiana Supreme Court held that drug test results may be admitted under this exception when they demonstrate sufficient reliability indicators. Mother acknowledges that “[t]he contents of the [Drug Screen Reports] likely satisfy K.R.’s trustworthiness standards, containing references to CLIA[⁵ ] compliance and quality control measures.” (Mother's Br. at 13) (emphases in original) (footnote added). However, she contends that, despite their trustworthiness under K.R., the Drug Screen Reports lack “procedural compliance and chain of custody integrity” because some of the individuals who collected the samples did not testify at the fact-finding hearing. (Id.)

[20] Regarding chain of custody issues involving DCS:

DCS bears a higher burden to establish the chain of custody of “fungible” evidence, such as blood and hair samples, whose appearance is indistinguishable to the naked eye. To establish a proper chain of custody, DCS must give reasonable assurances that the evidence remained in an undisturbed condition. However, DCS need not establish a perfect chain of custody, and once DCS strongly suggests the exact whereabouts of the evidence, any gaps go to the weight of the evidence and not to admissibility. To mount a successful challenge to the chain of custody, one must present evidence that does more than raise a mere possibility that the evidence may have been tampered with.

Matter of De.B., 144 N.E.3d 763, 770-71 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (internal citations omitted)

[21] During the fact-finding hearing in January 2025, FCM Parkhurst testified all FCMs were required to complete drug screening training. She described DCS's method for administering drug screens, including the donor's completion of paperwork, the collection and sealing of the sample, and the storage and submission of the sample to the laboratory. She told the trial court that she, along with four other FCMs, collected drug screens from Mother from May 2023 until December 2024. FCM Terry later testified that she collected drug screens from Mother in December 2024 and March 2025.

[22] The Drug Screen Records included certifications from the laboratory's certifying scientist setting forth the laboratory's verification processes, including specimen donor verification, inspection for collection errors, and tampering prevention. The affidavit signed by the certifying scientist stated, in part, “I can state that both the Chain of Custody and the test results are scientifically reliable.” (Ex. Vol. II at 97.) Each drug screen result provided a chain of custody document certifying that Mother provided the drug screen specimen and sealed the collection tube. Mother and the FCM signed this document. Finally, Mother signed a document after each specimen collection indicating that she would follow the collection processes as required by DCS and the laboratory. Therefore, DCS presented sufficient evidence of the chain of custody to give a reasonable assurance that the specimens remained undisturbed after collection and the test results were accurate. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the Drug Screen Records.

[23] Moreover, even if the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the drug screen records, any error was harmless. “The improper admission of evidence is harmless error when the judgment is supported by substantial independent evidence to satisfy the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned evidence contributed to the judgment.” Matter of De.B., 144 N.E.3d at 769. Mother's positive drug screens were only one component of the trial court's findings and conclusions supporting termination. The trial court also heard evidence regarding Mother's failure to maintain suitable housing for Children, her inability to obtain stable employment and income, and her unwillingness to participate and complete some of the services designed to address the issues that led to Children's removal from her home.

[24] Additionally, even regarding the specific issue of Mother's substance abuse, the trial court received evidence that although Mother completed an intensive outpatient program, “during her time in the program, she was unable to obtain and maintain her sobriety.” (Tr. Vol. II at 34.) After outpatient treatment was unsuccessful, Mother refused inpatient treatment. FCM Terry testified Mother told her that she had used methamphetamine in December 2024 because she was unable to obtain pain medication for an injury to her hand. Based thereon, we conclude any error in the admission of the Drug Screen Records was harmless. See, e.g., In re K.L., 137 N.E.3d 301, 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (any error in admission of testimony was harmless because there existed “overwhelming evidence” to support the termination of the mother's parental rights).

1.2 Reasons for Removal Would Not be Remedied

[25] Mother contends the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the conditions under which Children were removed from her care would not be remedied because she had made “meaningful progress toward remedying the specific removal conditions” and the trial court did not “properly consider improvements in the home environment and [Mother's] documented parenting capacity[.]” (Mother's Br. at 15.) When considering whether the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the conditions under which a child is removed from a parent's care would not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-3 (Ind. 2014). First, we identify the reasons for the child's removal and then we determine whether there is a reasonable probability those conditions will not be remedied. Id. at 643. When hearing the evidence at a termination of rights hearing, the trial court must judge the parent's ability to parent the children at the time of the termination hearing and consider any evidence of changed conditions, including the “parent's substance abuse and lack of adequate housing and employment” as well as a parent's “failure to respond to services.” In re A.L., 223 N.E.3d at 1138-9. The trial court may also evaluate “habitual patterns of conduct ․ to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” Id. at 1139. “The trial court need not wait until the children are irreversibly influenced by their deficient lifestyle such that their physical, mental and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” Stone v. Daviess Cnty. Div. of Child. & Fam. Servs., 656 N.E.2d 824, 828 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied.

[26] The trial court made several findings regarding Mother's progress in rectifying the reasons for Children's removal, which included unsanitary and unsafe housing conditions, substance abuse, and mental health issues. In its termination order, the trial court found,⁶ in relevant part:

[C.]2. [Mother] has failed to make any meaningful adjustments in her circumstances and conduct during the pendency of the CHINS case.

a. [Mother] has failed to obtain suitable housing for [Children]. There has been little to no improvement in the condition of her home, there remains [sic] structural and sanitary deficiencies – observed as recently as February 28, 2025 – that would pose a threat to the wellbeing of [Children] if [they] were to be returned to [Mother's] care. Additionally, [Mother] has not obtained alternate housing.

b. [Mother] was unable to obtain meaningful or lasting sobriety throughout the pendency of the CHINS case, never going a full two months without producing a screen positive for methamphetamine. [Mother] was charged with possession of methamphetamine on April 3, 2024. [Mother's] three most recent drug screens (12/31/2024, 3/31/2025, and 4/8/2025) were all positive for methamphetamine; all three screens occurred while DCS's TPR petition was pending.

c. [Mother] was unable to obtain stable employment and/or income throughout the pendency of the CHINS case and is currently without proof of any income.

(App. Vol. II at 27-28.) The trial court then outlined DCS's efforts to obtain reunification between Mother and Children, such as “family preservation services[,]” intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment, “recovery coaching[,]” inpatient substance abuse treatment, case management services; and services to address mental health, domestic violence, and parenting issues. (Id. at 28.) The trial court found, regarding Mother's progress in these services:

[C.]4. [Mother] has NOT shown a commitment to utilizing these offered services so that she could make lasting adjustments in her circumstances and conduct through the pendency of the CHINS case.

a. [Mother] completed an intensive outpatient program through Meridian Health Services (IOT) between October 2023 and January 2024. However, she did not maintain sobriety during that time and did not follow through with the recommended services upon discharge.

b. [Mother] has not meaningfully participated in any intensive outpatient substance abuse treatment since January 2024 despite active referrals and ongoing support from providers.

c. [Mother] has refused to enter an inpatient program despite being recommended by many of her providers and despite efforts by DCS and service providers to minimize barriers.

d. [Mother] completed a Parent and Family Functioning Assessment with Robin Cruz with PEACE in January 2024. Ms. Cruz recommended, among other things, that [Mother] completed [sic] a psychological evaluation, [sic] domestic violence assessment, and participate in individual therapy.

e. [Mother] completed a psychological evaluation and a domestic violence evaluation but did not follow recommendations made – including individual therapy.

f. [Mother] began individual therapy in April 2024 but quickly became non-compliant and was discharged by May 2024. She never re-engaged in this service.

g. While [Mother] was partially compliant with meeting with her life skills provider and peer recovery coach throughout much of the CHINS case, [Mother] showed little progress in those services and by the time of the second hearing on DCS's termination petition, was discharged from both due to non-compliance.

a. [Mother's] life skills provider and peer recovery coach attempted to assist [Mother] on [sic] obtaining and maintaining sobriety, housing, and employment, none of which she was able to obtain.

b. At least one provider attributed [Mother's] lack of progress to her inconsistency in meeting with the provider and a lack of engagement/focus when she did meet.

h. At the time of the final day of this termination hearing, Mother had either been unsuccessfully discharged or had yet to initiate all referred services and was not engaged with any services despite none of the conditions that resulted in [Children] being placed out of her care being remedied.

5. There are no apparent services DCS could offer [Mother] that would likely bring about lasting parental adjustment enabling the return of [Children] to her care within a reasonable timeframe given [Children's ages].

(Id. at 28-30) (emphasis in original). Based thereon, the trial court concluded the conditions under which Children were removed from Mother's care would not be remedied.

[27] The trial court's findings supported its conclusion that the conditions under which Children were removed from Mother's care would not be remedied. Mother did not participate in most services offered and when she did, she did not complete them. The condition of the family home did not improve over the two-year span of time of the CHINS and termination cases. Mother did not maintain her sobriety and tested positive for methamphetamine as recently as a month before the May 2025 fact-finding hearing. Therefore, we conclude the trial court's findings support its conclusion that the conditions under which Children were removed from Mother's care would not be remedied.⁷ See, e.g., In re C.S., 190 N.E.3d 434, 439 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (mother's continued drug use, pending criminal charges, and inability to demonstrate she could care for her child supported the trial court's conclusion that the conditions under which child was removed from her care would not be remedied), trans. denied.

1.3 Children's Best Interests

[28] Mother contends the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that termination of her parental rights is in Children's best interests because the “evidence demonstrated improvement rather than a situation where all reasonable efforts had failed.” (Mother's Br. at 17.)

[I]n determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a child, the court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. In doing so, the court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the children involved. The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship. Moreover, the testimony of service providers may support a finding that termination is in the child's best interests.

Z.B. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Servs., 108 N.E.3d 895, 903 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (internal citations omitted), trans. denied.

[29] As noted above, DCS provided Mother with a plethora of services to address the condition of the family home, her mental health issues, her substance abuse, and her parenting skills. Mother either participated minimally or not at all and did not make progress toward reunification with Children. In addition, regarding Children's foster placements, the trial court found J.H. had been “placed with caregivers who have shown a willingness and ability to meet his elevated needs. There is an observed bond between [J.H.] and his current placement. Said placement has expressed intent on [sic] adopting [J.H.] once the parent-child relationships have terminated.” (App. Vol. II at 31.) Similarly, the trial court found “[Q.D., Jr.] is placed with relative caregivers who have shown a willingness and ability to meet his elevated needs. There is an observed bond between [Q.D., Jr.] and his current placement. Said placement has expressed intent on adopting [Q.D., Jr.] once the parent-child relationships have terminated.” (Id. at 62.) Finally, regarding Mother's participation in visitation with Children, the trial court found:

[C.]6. [Mother] ․ [has] not maintained a meaningful relationship or bond with [Children].

a. [Mother] was largely inconsistent with visitation with [Children] throughout the pendency of the CHINS case, having been discharged by multiple visitation providers for non-compliance.

b. [Mother] had five total visits with [Children] between March and November of 2024 despite being offered them weekly. Her last two visits with [Children] were on September 28, 2024 and November 21, 2024. The CHINS court, at the request of DCS, suspended visitation due, at least in part, to her non-compliance in January 2025.

(App. Vol. II at 30.) Based thereon, we conclude the trial court's findings support its conclusion that termination of Mother's parental rights was in Children's best interests. See, e.g., R.W., Sr. v. Marion Cnty. Dept. of Child Servs., 892 N.E.2d 239, 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (trial court's findings supported its conclusion that termination of the father's parental rights was in the child's best interests based on the father's failure to complete services and child's bond with foster family).

2. Father's Arguments

2.1 Services Provided to Achieve Reunification

[30] Father argues he did not make progress in his efforts to reunify with Q.D., Jr. because DCS did not offer appropriate services tailored to his situation. In particular he argues he was “a new parent trying to learn to parent at infrequent visits taking place in a library, alongside [Mother] with whom he had a very complicated relationship.” (Father's Br. at 23.) He contends these difficulties were compounded by “a suspected learning disability[.]” (Id.) Pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-34-21-5.5(b)(2), DCS “shall make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families ․ [and, i]f a child has been removed from the child's home, to make it possible for the child to return safely to the child's home as soon as possible.”

[31] “[A] failure to provide services does not serve as a basis on which to directly attack a termination order as contrary to law.” J.W., 259 N.E.3d 1039, 1048 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting In re J.W., Jr., 27 N.E.3d 1185, 1190 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied), trans. denied. Additionally, “a parent may not sit idly by without asserting a need or desire for services and then successfully argue that he was denied services to assist him with his parenting.” Id. (quoting In re B.D.J., 728 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)). While Father requested other services beyond what DCS recommended and offered, such as an intensive outpatient therapy program and mental health treatment, there is no evidence in the record to suggest Father requested additional services to assist with his parenting that were tailored to his specific situation and needs, nor did he argue to the trial court that the services he received were insufficient. Thus, Father's argument that DCS did not provide him appropriate services for reunification fails. See, e.g., Matter of G.M., 71 N.E.3d 898, 906 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (mother's argument that that she did not complete services because she was given limited time to do so, had a demanding work schedule, and lacked transportation failed because “the adequacy of services provided as part of her CHINS case ․ is unavailable for our review during an appeal following termination of parental rights”).

2.2 Challenged Findings

[32] Father challenges two of the trial court's findings and argues they are not supported by the evidence. First, Father challenges Finding C.1., which states:

[Child] has remained in out-of-home care since July 11, 2023 due to [Mother's] substance abuse, the unsanitary and unsafe condition of [Parents’] living environment, the apparent instability of [Mother] and [Father's] mental health conditions, and [Father's] lack of basic parenting skills/knowledge.

(App. Vol. II at 57.) Father contends there was “no evidence presented that Father had a mental health condition which prevented him from caring for [Q.D., Jr.].” (Father's Br. at 17.) He acknowledges testimony about a day when he “stuck a gun to his head” (id.) (quoting Tr. Vol. II at 15), but he asserts “having such a day in the context of all that was going on in Father's life is understandable considering the jeopardy to his parent/child relationship and the unhealthy relationship with Mother, who could not maintain sobriety.” (Id. at 18.)

[33] However, during the May 2025 fact-finding hearing, FCM Douglas Rader (“FCM Rader”) testified that he recommended Father attend therapy to address mental health issues after Mother told him that Father “had stuck a gun to his head on two separate occasions on the same day[.]” (Tr. Vol. II at 15.) FCM Rader told the trial court that when he spoke with Father about the incident, Father “confirmed that that happened and he was having some mental health issues and would like a therapy referral put in place.” (Id. at 15-16.) However, Father did not complete the therapy. FCM Terry testified she was concerned about allowing Children to return to Parents’ care because of “[Parents’] inability to provide stability ․ [based on] [Mother's] and [Father's] mental health concerns[.]” (Id. at 192.) Father's argument that he did not have a mental health condition is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do. See In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1143 (appellate court cannot reweigh evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses). Therefore, we conclude the evidence supports the trial court's finding that Father's mental health condition, among other factors, prevented him from reunification with Q.D., Jr.

[34] Next, Father challenges Finding C.2., which states, “[Mother] and [Father] have failed to make any meaningful adjustments in their circumstances and conduct during the pendency of the CHINS case.” (App. Vol. II at 57.) Father asserts he made a meaningful adjustment in his life by obtaining and maintaining a legal source of income. He also challenges Finding C.2.c., which states:

c. [Mother] and [Father] were unable to obtain stable employment and/or income throughout the pendency of the CHINS case and are both currently without proof of any income.

a. [Father] obtained full-time employment on at least two occasions during the pendency of the CHINS case. However, his employment was terminated at both places for calling in too many times.

(Id. at 58.) Father argues this finding is not supported by the evidence because he was employed at Walmart and Sugar Creek during the CHINS proceedings and at the time of the May 2025 fact-finding hearing “had obtained another job with a restaurant/bait shop near Brookville Lake.” (Father's Br. at 18.)

[35] While Father was employed at those businesses, his employment was not stable. FCM Parkhurst testified Father worked at Walmart from “about October of 2023 until maybe sometime in February of 2024[.]” (Tr. Vol. II at 44.) FCM Parkhurst told the trial court that Father was “let go” from Walmart because “he had called in too many times.” (Id. at 158.) She also stated Father worked at Sugar Creek starting in November 2024, but “was there maybe a week or two.” (Id. at 159.) FCM Parkhurst did not indicate why Father left that position. Father testified that he was to begin work the Wednesday after the May 2025 fact-finding hearing at a “restaurant and ․ a tackle shop” near Brookville Lake. (Id. at 225.) However, based on his employment history, it is hard to imagine this new job would be stable. Father's argument is an invitation for us to reweigh the evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses, which we cannot do.⁸ See In re V.A., 51 N.E.3d at 1143 (appellate court cannot reweigh evidence and judge the credibility of witnesses).

Conclusion

[36] The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the Drug Screen Records. Additionally, the trial court's findings supported its conclusions that the conditions under which Children were removed from Mother's care would not be remedied and that termination of Mother's parental rights to Children was in Children's best interests. Further, Father's argument regarding the sufficiency of services offered to him by DCS fails because he cannot attack a termination order based on the adequacy of the services. Finally, the evidence supports the findings Father challenges. Based thereon, we affirm the trial court's termination of Mother's parental rights to Children and the termination of Father's parental rights to Q.D., Jr.

[37] Affirmed.

FOOTNOTES

1.   J.H.’s father is B.I., and his parental rights to J.H. were also terminated. B.I. does not participate in this appeal.

2.   Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1.

3.   During the May 2025 fact-finding hearing, Mother reported she entered a diversion program regarding this case.

4.   As we will discuss in the next section, drug screen results are “records of a regularly conducted activity” pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 803(6). See Matter of K.R., 154 N.E.3d 818, 821 (Ind. 2020).

5.   “CLIA” stands for “Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments” that drug testing facilities are required to follow. Matter of De.B., 144 N.E.3d 763, 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).

6.   The order quoted here is the order terminating Mother's parental rights to J.H. This order contains nearly identical findings to the order terminating Mother's parental rights to Q.D., Jr., except that the order concerning Q.D., Jr. contains findings to also support the termination of Father's parental rights to Q.D., Jr. Unless otherwise noted, we will use the findings in the order pertaining to J.H., as they focus on the reasons the trial court terminated Mother's parental rights. As the findings are nearly identical, we will use “Children” instead of J.H.

7.   Mother also argues that the trial court's findings do not support its conclusion that the continuation of the Mother-Children relationship posed a threat to Children's well-being. However, as DCS is required to prove only one of the factors alleged in Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(c), we need not address Mother's argument. See, e.g., In re J.S., 183 N.E.3d 362, 369 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (statute regarding factors required to terminate parental rights is written in the disjunctive and, thus, DCS need prove only one of the enumerated elements therein), trans. denied.

8.   Father also contends he made a “meaningful adjustment in his circumstances” when he acknowledged he had “an issue with alcohol” and voluntarily completed a substance abuse treatment program. (Father's Br. at 19.) Father is correct – early in the CHINS case he told FCM Terry that he had a problem with alcohol, asked for a referral to a treatment program, and completed that program. The record does not suggest he relapsed. However, the trial court may not have found Father's completion of that program significant because his alleged alcohol problem was not a reason Children were removed and because of the other problems that continued to exist. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion.

May, Judge.

Altice, J., and Foley, J., concur.